Robert Scanlan v. Officer Tran et al, No. 1:2015cv00282 - Document 16 (E.D. Cal. 2015)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending Dismissing the First Amended Complaint Without Leave to Amend, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 10/2/2015. Referred to Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill. Objections to F&R due within 14 days. (Hall, S)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT SCANLAN, Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 14 OFFICER TRAN, et al., Defendants. 15 16 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No.: 1:15-cv-00282 - LJO - JLT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS DISMISSING THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND In this action, Plaintiff alleges Defendants are liable for violations of his civil rights, including 17 18 showing deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and the deprivation of property. (See Doc. 19 12) However, as explained below, Plaintiff fails to allege facts in sufficient to support his claims in the 20 First Amended Complaint. Because further leave to amend would be futile, the Court recommends 21 that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint be DISMISSED without leave to amend. 22 I. Screening Requirement 23 When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court is required to review the complaint, and 24 shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or the 25 action or appeal is “frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . 26 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). 27 The Court must screen the First Amended Complaint because an amended complaint supersedes the 28 previously filed complaint. See Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. 1 1 Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). A claim is frivolous “when the facts alleged arise to the 2 level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts 3 available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); see also Neitzke v. 4 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328 (1989) (finding claims may be dismissed as “frivolous” where the 5 allegations are “fanciful” or “describe[e] fantastic or delusional scenarios”). 6 II. 7 Pleading Standards General rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A 8 pleading stating a claim for relief must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short 9 and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the 10 relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 8(a). The Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, and pro se pleadings are held to “less 12 stringent standards” than pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521-21 (1972). 13 A complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and 14 succinct manner. Jones v. Cmty Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, a 15 plaintiff must identify the grounds upon which the complaint stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 16 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted, 17 18 19 Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. 20 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 21 Conclusory and vague allegations do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 22 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further, 23 24 25 26 [A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation]. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation]. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation]. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ 27 28 Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). When factual allegations are well-pled, a court should 2 1 assume their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; legal 2 conclusions in the pleading are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Id. The Court has a duty to dismiss a case at any time it determines an action fails to state a claim, 3 4 “notwithstanding any filing fee that may have been paid.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915e(2). Accordingly, a court 5 “may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a 6 claim.” See Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 7 Practice and Procedure, § 1357 at 593 (1963)). 8 III. 9 Section 1983 Claims Plaintiff seeks to state claims for violations of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the 10 United States pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), which “is a method for vindicating 11 federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). An individual may 12 bring a civil rights action pursuant to Section 1983, which provides: 15 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress... 16 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To plead a Section 1983 violation, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it may be 17 inferred that (1) a constitutional right was deprived, and (2) a person who committed the alleged 18 violation acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Williams v. Gorton, 19 529 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1976). 13 14 20 A plaintiff must allege a specific injury was suffered, and show causal relationship between the 21 defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976). Thus, 22 Section 1983 “requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants 23 and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff.” Chavira v. Ruth, 2012 WL 1328636 24 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2012). An individual deprives another of a constitutional right “if he does an 25 affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally 26 required to do so that it causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 27 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Thus, “[s]ome culpable action or in action must be attributable to defendants.” 28 See Puckett v. Corcoran Prison - CDCR, 2012 WL 1292573, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2012). 3 1 2 IV. Factual Allegations Plaintiff asserts he was convicted of a crime, but “was out on bail awaiting [s]entencing” in July 3 2014. (Doc. 14 at 5) He alleges that “a [w]arrant was issued for his arrest for failing to appear in 4 Court,” and he was arrested on July 9, 2014 by California City Police Officer Tran. (Id.) According to 5 Plaintiff, “During the ride to the Police Department, Plaintiff stated to Officer Tran that he was on his 6 way to the hospital because of a [s]erious beating he suffered the day before due to an altercation he 7 had with [f]our [m]en.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends the “altercation . . . left him with lacerations on his 8 lips, black eyes and broken teeth.” (Id. at 5-6) He asserts Officer Tran did not take him to the hospital, 9 but instead “proceeded to drive him to the jail station.” (Id. at 5) 10 Plaintiff alleges that once at the police department, he told Officer Schulthiess that “he was 11 upset because Officer Tran ‘ignored’ his injuries in… and failed to take precaution to deliver him to a 12 Medical Facility immediately.” (Doc. 14 at 6) He alleges, “Officer Schulthiess [then] took notice of 13 Plaintiffs’ [sic] condition due to the injuries he sustained,” and took Plaintiff “to the Tehachapi 14 hospital.” (Id.) He asserts that once at the hospital, Plaintiff told the nurse “he was experiencing 15 migraine headache’s [sic] and severely high blood pressure,” and a nurse “verified Plaintiff need to be 16 seen by a [d]octor.” (Id.) 17 According to Plaintiff, a doctor “completed a quick examination and [o]rdered a CAT SCAN.” 18 (Doc. 14 at 6-7) However, Plaintiff reports the doctor returned “[a] few minutes later,” and told Officer 19 Schulthiess that the computer system was down, and “it would be approximately 6 to 8 hours before the 20 CAT SCAN could be completed.” (Id. at 7) Plaintiff alleges Officer Schulthiess told the doctor they 21 “simply can’t wait that long.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends Officer Schulthiess told him that if he signed out 22 of the hospital, “he would take Plaintiff to the Bakersfield hospital.” (Id.) He alleges he agreed to do 23 so, after which Officer Schulthiess told the doctor to sign Plaintiff out, and handed Plaintiff’s SDI 24 insurance card to the doctor “to [p]ay for the [v]isit without Plaintiffs’ [sic] permission.” (Id.) Plaintiff 25 asserts he received a prescription for Ultram and Officer Schulthiess received some “unknown 26 [p]apers,” and they left the hospital. (Id.) 27 28 Plaintiff alleges that Officer Schulthiess did not take him to another hospital after they left, but rather “delivered Plaintiff… to the Bakersfield Pre-trial jail.” (Doc. 14 at 7) He asserts Officer 4 1 Schulthiess turned him over to Officer “John Doe” for booking, took the unknown papers, and told 2 Officer Doe “that Plaintiff had already received [m]edical attention and he’s fine.” (Id. at 8) Plaintiff 3 asserts he told “Officer Doe” that he needed medical treatment, which the officer denied. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he was transferred to Wasco State Prison on July 25, 2014. (Doc. 1 at 8) He 4 5 reports that approximately one month later, “he received a Diagnostics Dental X-Ray,” which showed 6 he had “two broken teeth that had to be extracted.” (Id.) 7 V. Discussion and Analysis 8 Based upon the foregoing facts, Plaintiff contends Officers Tran, Schulthiess and “Doe” 9 exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the standards of the Eighth 10 Amendment and California Govt. Code § 845.6 (Doc. 14 at 10- 12) 11 A. 12 As an initial matter, Plaintiff asserts the Defendants are liable for a violation of his “Due 13 Process rights related to his Medical Care under the Eighth Amendments [sic] prohibition against Cruel 14 and Unusual Punishment.” (Doc. 14 at 4) Previously, this Court informed Plaintiff that the proper 15 analysis of his complaints related to his medical care was under “‘the more protective substantive due 16 process standard’ of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment,” because Plaintiff 17 did not allege that he had been convicted of a crime. (Doc. 12 at 5, quoting Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 18 918, 931-33 (9th Cir. 2004)). Plaintiff clarifies in the First Amended Complaint that he was, in fact, 19 convicted of a crime and was awaiting sentencing at the time of the events alleged. (Doc. 14 at 5) 20 Thus, his claim for deliberate indifference of a serious medical need must be analyzed under the Eighth 21 Amendment. See Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hospital., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (explaining that the 22 protections of the Eighth Amendment are invoked after “a formal adjudication of guilt”). To state a 23 cognizable claim for failure to provide adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff 24 “must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious 25 medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-104 (1976). 26 27 28 Claim One: Deliberate Indifference to a serious Medical Need 1. Serious medical need A serious medical need exists “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 5 1 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 2 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious medical need 3 include “[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and 4 worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 5 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Id. at 1059-60 (citing 6 Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990). 7 In this case, Plaintiff does not clearly identify his serious medical need(s), though he reports that 8 at the time of his arrest he had black eyes, a cut lip, and broken teeth. (Doc. 14 at 6) Further, Plaintiff 9 alleges that he reported having a migraine headache to the nurse at the hospital, who said he needed to 10 see a doctor after Plaintiff said “he was experiencing migraine headache’s [sic] and severely high blood 11 pressure,” and a nurse “verified Plaintiff need to be seen by a [d]octor.” (Id.) Because Officer 12 Schulthiess deemed it appropriate to take Plaintiff to the hospital and a nurse told Plaintiff he needed to 13 see a doctor, it appears Plaintiff had a serious medical need. 14 15 2. Deliberate indifference Once a plaintiff alleges facts to show the existence of a serious medical need, he must also 16 allege facts sufficient to support a finding that Defendants responded to that need with deliberate 17 indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). In clarifying the culpability required for 18 deliberate indifference,” the Supreme Court held, 19 20 21 [A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exits, and he must also draw that inference. 22 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Therefore, a defendant must be “subjectively aware that serious harm is 23 likely to result from a failure to provide medical care.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1193 (emphasis omitted). 24 When a defendant should have been aware of the risk of substantial harm but, indeed, was not, “then 25 the person has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Id. at 1188. 26 Where deliberate indifference relates to medical care, “[t]he requirement of deliberate 27 indifference is less stringent . . . than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to 28 provide inmates with medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns.” 6 1 Holliday v. Naku, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55757, at *12 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2009) (citing McGuckin, 2 974 F.2d at 1060). Generally, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs may be manifested in 3 two ways: “when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or . . . 4 by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 5 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1988). 6 7 a. Officer Tran Plaintiff asserts he told Officer Tran that he was going to the hospital when Tran placed him 8 under arrest and, seemingly, contends that Tran is liable for a failure to provide medical care because 9 Tran took Plaintiff to the police station rather than the hospital. (Doc. 14 at 5, 10) Plaintiff contends 10 that when he was arrested, he had “lacerations on his lips, black eyes and broken teeth.” (Id. at 6) 11 However, Plaintiff also reports he told Officer Tran that the injuries were “sustained the day before,” 12 and that he did not confirm he had broken teeth until he had an x-ray more than a month later. (See id. 13 at 5, 8) Because Plaintiff admitted to Officer Tran that he had suffered the injuries the day before but 14 did not seek medical treatment, it is not clear that Officer Tran knew Plaintiff suffered from a medical 15 condition that needed immediate treatment. Indeed, the nurse at the hospital did not state Plaintiff 16 needed to see a doctor for the physical injuries that were visible when Officer Tran placed Plaintiff 17 under arrest, but rather for Plaintiff’s reported migraine and high blood pressure. (See id. at 6; see also 18 Doc. 1 at 6 [plaintiff alleged the nurse told him that he “needed to see a doctor because of migraine 19 headache’s [sic] and severly [sic] high blood pressure”]) 20 Further, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support a conclusion that Officer Tran knew Plaintiff 21 faced a risk of further harm or injury due to a lack of medical care prior to Tran taking him to the police 22 department. See Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010) (deliberate indifference 23 “requires both (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need 24 and (b) harm caused by the indifference”) (emphasis added). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a 25 cognizable claim of inadequate medical care against Officer Tran. 26 b. Officer Schulthiess 27 Plaintiff asserts that Officer Schulthiess took him to the Tehachapi hospital, where a doctor “did 28 a quick examination” and ordered a CAT scan. (Doc. 14 at 6-7) However, the physician then informed 7 1 Plaintiff and Officer Schulthiess that the computer system was down, and “it would be approximately 6 2 to 8 hours before the CAT [scan] could be completed. (Id. at 7) Officer Schulthiess declined to wait for 3 the computer system to work, and did not take Plaintiff to another hospital to receive the CAT scan. 4 (Id.) Instead, Officer Schulthiess “transported [Plaintiff] to the Bakersfield Pre Trial Jail.” (Id. at 7) 5 Based upon the facts alleged, it appears Officer Schulthiess was aware Plaintiff had a serious 6 medical need because the doctor ordered a CAT scan. On the other hand, the fact that the physician 7 indicated Plaintiff could wait 6-8 hours for the test suggests a lack of urgency for the treatment. The 8 facts alleged fail to support an inference that Schulthiess was “aware that serious harm [was] likely to 9 result from a failure to provide medical care.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1193 (emphasis). Indeed, Plaintiff 10 does not allege he suffered any harm or any risk of harm from not receiving the CAT scan. Without 11 suffering harm, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Officer Schulthiess. See Conn, 591 12 F.3d at 1095. c. 13 Officer “Doe” 14 Plaintiff asserts Schulthiess told Officer “Doe” at the jail that “Plaintiff “had already received 15 [m]edical attention and he’s fine.” (Doc. 14 at 8) Plaintiff asserts that though Officer Doe denied his 16 request to see a doctor, he was allowed to be seen by “the jail [n]urse.” (Id.) Thus, it appears that 17 Officer “Doe” did not deny Plaintiff’s request to receive further medical treatment. Moreover, 18 seemingly, the nurse did not believe further medical intervention was needed at that time. 19 Because there are no facts that support a conclusion that Officer “Doe” showed deliberate 20 indifference toward a serious medical need, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against the officer. Claim Two: Violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6 21 B. 22 Plaintiff alleges also that the defendants are liable for a failure to summon medical care in 23 violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6. (Doc. 14 at 10-12) Specifically, Section 845.6 provides that 24 although a public employee is not liable for an injury proximately caused by failure to obtain medical 25 care for an inmate, a public employee is liable if he “knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is 26 in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical 27 care.” Accordingly, to state cognizable claim under Section 845.6, a plaintiff “must establish three 28 elements: (1) the public employee knew or had reason to know of the need, (2) for immediate medical 8 1 care, and (3) failed to reasonably summon such care.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2 2006). Importantly, Liability under this provision is limited to situations where “there is actual or 3 constructive knowledge that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care.” Watson v. California, 4 26 Cal. App. 4th 836, 841 (Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis in original). Here, Plaintiff alleges Officers Tran, Schulthiess, and Doe violated Section 845.6 “by failing to 5 6 ensure that Plaintiff timely saw a [p]rofessiona [d]octor to complete a CAT SCAN from a ‘head 7 injurie’ [sic] he suffered in an altercation, and also a completed [e]xamination of his injuries to his 8 ‘busted’ lip, black eyes and broken teeth.” (Doc. 14 at 11) However, as discussed above, Plaintiff 9 told Officer Tran that the injuries were suffered the day before, undermining his assertion that he 10 needed urgent medical treatment. Furthermore, the nurse at the hospital did not refer Plaintiff to a 11 doctor for his visible injuries, and the doctor at the hospital did not opine Plaintiff needed an 12 immediate CAT scan, but suggested he could wait for the computer systems to be restored. 13 Consequently, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support the conclusion that the officers were 14 aware of a need for “immediate” medical care. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1099; Watson 26 Cal. App. 4th at 15 841. 16 VI. 17 Conclusion and Order Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support a determination that the defendants are liable 18 for failure to provide adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment and failure to summon 19 medical treatment under Cal. Gov’t Code Section 845.6. Previously, the Court gave Plaintiff an 20 opportunity to amend his complaint to allege facts sufficient to support his claims. Because Plaintiff 21 failed to cure the deficiencies of his allegations, the Court finds further leave to amend would be futile. 22 See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 23 Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED: 24 1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint be DISMISSED without leave to amend; 25 2. All remaining motions be terminated as moot; and 26 3. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to close this action. 27 These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 28 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 9 1 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within fourteen 2 days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written 3 objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 4 Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 5 specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 6 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 834 (9th Cir. 2014). 7 8 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: October 2, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10
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