Kuhlmann v. Christianson et al, No. 1:2014cv01042 - Document 39 (E.D. Cal. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING 35 Defendant Christianson's Motion for Summary Judgment signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 8/11/2015. Within seven (7) days from the date of this order, Plaintiff shall show cause in writing why Does 1 to 50 should not be dismissed from this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). (Jessen, A)
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1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9 DAVID KUHLMANN, Plaintiff, 10 vs. 11 12 13 14 Case No. 1:14-cv-01042-BAM ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 35) SHERIFF ADAM CHRISTIANSON, et al., Defendants. _________________________________/ 15 16 Plaintiff David Kuhlmann (“Plaintiff”) filed a civil rights action against Sheriff Adam 17 Christianson, Parole Agent Grady Welch and Does 1 to 50 arising from an alleged beating Plaintiff 18 sustained from fellow inmates while he was detained in the Stanislaus County Jail on a charge of 19 sexual battery. Defendant Grady Welch has been dismissed from this action.1 20 Presently before the Court is Defendant Christianson’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 21 35.) On August 6, 2015, the Court deemed the matter suitable for decision without oral argument and 22 vacated the hearing scheduled for August 14, 2015. (Doc. 38). Having considered the moving, 23 opposition, reply papers, and the entire file, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is 24 GRANTED. 25 /// 26 /// 27 1 28 The appearing parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 23, 27.) For that reason, the matter has been assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73; see also L.R. 301, 305. (Doc. 28). 1 1 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 2 On April 13, 2013, Parole Agent Grady Welch arrested Plaintiff for a parole violation charge 3 of sexual battery. Plaintiff was taken to the Stanislaus County Jail, and placed under the care, custody 4 and control of Defendant Christianson. (Doc. 14, p. 1.) Plaintiff initially was housed in a safety cell. 5 On April 19, 2013, Defendant Christianson and Does 1 to 50 moved Plaintiff from the safety cell to a 6 general cell populated by known gang members. (Doc. 14, ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff was forced to show his 7 paperwork to the other inmates and was then severely beaten by inmates when the nature of his parole 8 violation was discovered. (Doc. 14, ¶ 2, and p. 4.) Plaintiff was moved to another general population 9 cell and beaten again. (Doc. 14, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff complained to Defendants of severe pain and 10 disorientation, but Defendants allegedly refused Plaintiff competent medical treatment. (Doc. 14, ¶ 2, 11 and p. 4.) Plaintiff was later taken to Doctors Medical Center in Modesto, California, where he was 12 diagnosed with a severe brain injury. (Doc. 14, ¶ 3.) 13 In his amended complaint, filed on June 7, 2014, Plaintiff alleged three claims for relief: (1) 14 negligence; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) failure to protect from harm under 15 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 14). Defendant Christianson moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 16 claims against him. (Doc. 35). 17 UNDISPUTED FACTS 18 The following facts are not reasonably in dispute.2 Plaintiff was arrested on a parole violation 19 on April 13, 2013, and taken to the Stanislaus County Jail. Plaintiff claims that while he was 20 incarcerated in the Stanislaus County Jail, he was placed in general population and severely beaten by 21 other inmates. (Doc. 14, ¶¶ 1-2.) Defendant Christianson is the Sheriff of Stanislaus County and has 22 been since 2006. (Doc. 35-3, Declaration of Adam Christianson (“Christianson Dec.”) ¶ 1.) 23 Defendant Christianson did not have any personal knowledge that Plaintiff was arrested on April 13, 24 2013; that he was incarcerated in the Stanislaus County Jail on April 13, 2013; that he was initially 25 housed in a safety cell; that on April 19, 2013, he was moved from a safety cell to the general 26 27 28 2 The facts detailed here are taken from Defendant Christianson’s moving papers. (Doc. 35.) Plaintiff’s opposition papers neither identify disputed facts, nor include a reproduction of the itemized facts in Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts or an admission or denial those facts in compliance with Local Rule 260(b). (Doc. 36.) Given Plaintiff’s failure to dispute Defendant’s undisputed facts and evidence, the Court considers this evidence as undisputed. 2 1 population; or that he was “beaten by the inmates.” (Christianson Dec. ¶ 3.) Defendant Christianson 2 had no personal involvement in arresting Plaintiff, nor did he have any personal involvement in 3 making any classification or housing decision for Plaintiff, nor was he involved in any medical care 4 decisions made concerning Plaintiff while he was incarcerated. (Id.) LEGAL STANDARD 5 6 Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, disclosure materials, discovery, and any 7 affidavits provided establish that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 8 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that may affect 9 the outcome of the case under the applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 10 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable [trier of fact] could return a 11 verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 12 The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the 13 district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, 14 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes 15 demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 16 323 (1986). The exact nature of this responsibility, however, varies depending on whether the issue 17 on which summary judgment is sought is one in which the movant or the nonmoving party carries the 18 ultimate burden of proof. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). If 19 the movant will have the burden of proof at trial, it must “affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable 20 trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). In 21 contrast, if the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, “the movant can prevail merely 22 by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. 23 If the movant satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the allegations in 24 its pleadings to “show a genuine issue of material fact by presenting affirmative evidence from which a 25 jury could find in [its] favor.” FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in 26 original). “[B]ald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence” will not suffice in this regard. Id. at 929; 27 see also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“When 28 the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56[], its opponent must do more than simply show 3 1 that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (citation omitted). “Where the record 2 taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 3 ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities 4 Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). 5 In resolving a summary judgment motion, “the court does not make credibility determinations 6 or weigh conflicting evidence.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Instead, “[t]he evidence of the 7 [nonmoving party] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” 8 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of the air; the nonmoving party 9 must produce a factual predicate from which the inference may reasonably be drawn. See Richards v. 10 Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 11 1987). DISCUSSION 12 Plaintiff’s Claim for Failure to Protect from Harm against Defendant Christianson 13 I. 14 Plaintiff asserts a Section 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety and failure to 15 protect him from harm in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant Christianson. 16 Defendant Christianson contends that this claim fails because he had no involvement in any of the acts 17 or omissions Plaintiff alleges caused harm. 18 Christianson’s lack of personal involvement. Rather, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Christianson, 19 as Sheriff, was the public official in charge of the Stanislaus County Jail and was responsible for 20 setting jail policy and for supervising the deputy sheriffs that denied Plaintiff a protected cell and 21 adequate medical care. Plaintiff also contends that he “has had no opportunity to complete discovery 22 which would include production of documents and interrogatories to Defendant.” (Doc. 36, p. 1.) In opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant 23 A constitutional claim brought by a pretrial detainee challenging his conditions of confinement is 24 analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 25 535 n. 16 (1979); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). However, federal courts apply 26 the same standards to a pretrial detainee’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment as to a prisoner’s 27 rights under the Eighth Amendment. Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128; Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 28 F.3d 1232, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard applied to 4 1 pretrial detainees); Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010); Oregon 2 Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (guarantees of the Eighth Amendment 3 provide a minimum standard of care for determining the rights of pretrial detainees). 4 Jail officials must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of pretrial detainees. Farmer 5 v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (quoting 6 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 499 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989)); Johnson v. Lewis, 7 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). To establish liability, a pretrial detainee must show that jail 8 officials acted with deliberate indifference – or knowing disregard – to a substantial risk of harm to his 9 health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 10 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; Frost, 152 11 F.3d at 1128. 12 The undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendant Christianson was not aware of any risk of harm 13 to Plaintiff’s health or safety, and thus could not have acted with deliberate indifference to such harm. 14 In his declaration, Defendant Christianson disavows any knowledge of Plaintiff’s arrest, Plaintiff’s 15 subsequent incarceration in the Stanislaus County Jail, Plaintiff’s housing assignments while in the 16 Stanislaus County Jail, any alleged beating of Plaintiff by other inmates or Plaintiff’s medical care. 17 (Christianson Dec. ¶ 3.) 18 involvement with Plaintiff’s incarceration in the Stanislaus County Jail. In other words, Defendant Christianson represents that he had no 19 Plaintiff does not present any evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant 20 Christianson knew Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of harm while he was housed in the Stanislaus 21 County Jail following his arrest on April 13, 2013, or acted with deliberate indifference to such a risk 22 of harm. Indeed, Plaintiff not only fails to proffer contradictory evidence, but also fails to address 23 Defendant Christianson’s argument that he lacked any knowledge of or involvement in Plaintiff’s 24 incarceration in the Stanislaus County Jail. (Doc. 36.) 25 Christianson’s liability is based on his role as Sheriff and his attendant responsibilities setting jail 26 policy and supervising the deputy sheriffs who allegedly denied Plaintiff a protected cell, supervision 27 and adequate medical care. (Doc. 36, p. 1.) Plaintiff’s argument is not persuasive and fails to raise a 28 genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment in favor of Defendant Christianson. 5 Instead, Plaintiff argues that Defendant 1 Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under section 1983 for the actions of subordinate 2 employees based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 3 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074–75 4 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915–16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A 5 supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, 6 or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 7 constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 8 726 F.3d at 1074–75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915–16. “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists 9 even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a 10 policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force 11 of a constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 12 (9th Cir. 1989)). 13 In this instance, it is undisputed that Defendant Christianson had no personal involvement in the 14 alleged constitutional deprivations. Further, Plaintiff’s operative complaint includes no allegations 15 demonstrating a causal connection between any wrongful conduct by Defendant Christianson and the 16 purported constitutional violations. 17 implemented a policy that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. Indeed, 18 in contravention of any such claim, Plaintiff expressly alleges that defendants ignored established jail 19 policy when housing Plaintiff in the general population. (Doc. 14, p. 6.) Thus, Plaintiff may not 20 impose liability against Defendant Christianson based on supervisory liability. There also is no allegation that Defendant Christianson 21 Plaintiff also does not assert a claim against Defendant Christianson in his official capacity. 22 “Official-capacity suits [under § 1983] ... ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action 23 against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–166 24 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)); 25 Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 26 2008) (“An official capacity suit against a municipal officer is equivalent to a suit against the entity.”). 27 If Defendant Christianson were sued in his official capacity, Stanislaus County would be the 28 appropriate defendant in his place. 6 1 However, even if Plaintiff sued Defendant Christianson in his official capacity, Stanislaus County 2 cannot be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability. 3 Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2003); Gibson v. Cnty. of 4 Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). Stanislaus County could only be held liable where an 5 “action pursuant to official [ ] policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Monell, 436 U.S at 6 691; Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008) (Monell liability established 7 where officer or entity promulgates a generally applicable statement of policy and the subsequent act 8 complained of is an implementation of that policy). Here, Plaintiff alleges that the constitutional 9 deprivations complained of were caused when defendants “rehoused Plaintiff in general population 10 ignoring established jail policy.” (Doc. 14, p. 6) (emphasis added). This allegation undercuts any 11 potential claim that the purported constitutional violations were caused by a Stanislaus County Jail 12 policy. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Harper, 533 F.3d at 1025. 13 II. State Law Claims 14 Plaintiff also asserts state law claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress 15 arising out of the same factual allegations. Defendant Christianson contends that he may not be held 16 liable for the torts of jail staff and may only be held liable under state law based upon his own acts or 17 omissions. As he lacked knowledge of or involvement in Plaintiff’s incarceration in the Stanislaus 18 County Jail, Defendant Christianson argues that he should be granted summary judgment with respect 19 to Plaintiff’s state law claims. 20 California Government Code section 820.8 provides: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a 21 public employee is not liable for an injury caused by the act or omission of another person. Nothing in 22 this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his own 23 negligent or wrongful act or omission.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.8. 24 As discussed, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Defendant Christianson lacked 25 involvement in Plaintiff’s incarceration and the housing and medical decisions following Plaintiff’s 26 arrest on April 13, 2013. Plaintiff has not raised a genuine dispute regarding Defendant Christianson’s 27 involvement or his immunity for the acts of others. Defendant Christianson is therefore entitled to 28 summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims. 7 1 III. Discovery 2 Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should be denied because he has had no opportunity to 3 complete discovery. Plaintiff’s argument is, at best, disingenuous. Fact discovery in this matter 4 opened on November 17, 2014, and closed on April 30, 2015. (Doc. 34.) There is nothing in the 5 record or in Plaintiff’s opposition papers demonstrating that Plaintiff was somehow prevented from 6 conducting relevant fact discovery during this five-month period. 7 Plaintiff also has not established entitlement to relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 56(d). Rule 56(d) provides that “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified 9 reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering 10 the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) 11 issue any other appropriate order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). In seeking relief under Rule 56(d), Plaintiff 12 bears the burden of specifically identifying relevant information, where there is some basis for 13 believing that the information actually exists, and demonstrating that the evidence sought actually 14 exists and that it would prevent summary judgment. Blough v. Holland Realty, Inc., 574 F.3d 1084, 15 1091 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2011); 16 Tatum v. City and County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has 17 made no such showing and his apparent desire to conduct additional discovery after expiration of the 18 discovery deadline does not entitle him to relief under Rule 56(d). CONCLUSION AND ORDER 19 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 20 21 1. GRANTED; and 22 23 24 Defendant Christianson’s motion for summary judgment, filed on July 14, 2015, is 2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter summary judgment in favor of Defendant Christianson. 25 Additionally, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 26 1. Within seven (7) days from the date of this order, Plaintiff shall show cause in writing why 27 Does 1 to 50 should not be dismissed from this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 28 Procedure 4(m); and 8 1 2. The failure to respond to this order or the failure to show cause will result in dismissal of Does 1 to 50 from this action and the matter will be closed. 2 3 4 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: /s/ Barbara August 11, 2015 A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9
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