(HC) Reyes Salazar-Torres v. Benov, No. 1:2014cv00410 - Document 14 (E.D. Cal. 2014)

Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to Grant Respondent's 13 Motion to Dismiss the Petition; FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to Dismiss the 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as Moot and Direct the Clerk to Close the Case, signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 09/30/14. Referred to Judge O'Neill. Thirty-Day Deadline. (Gonzalez, R)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 REYES SALAZAR-TORRES, Case No. 1:14-cv-00410-LJO-BAM-HC 12 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION (DOC. 13) 13 v. Petitioner, 14 MICHAEL L. BENOV, 15 Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS MOOT (DOC. 1) AND DIRECT THE CLERK TO CLOSE THE CASE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 through 304. Pending before the Court is the Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as moot, which was served and filed on July 2, 2014. Although the thirty-day period for filing opposition to the motion has passed, no opposition has been filed. I. Background Petitioner, an inmate of the Taft Correctional Institution (TCI), challenges the disallowance of twenty-seven days of good 1 1 conduct time credit that Petitioner suffered as a result of prison 2 disciplinary findings, initially made at TCI on or about February 6, 3 2014, that he engaged in the prohibited conduct of possession of 4 stolen property. (Pet., doc. 1 at 2-7; motn., doc. 13-1, 11-13.) 5 Petitioner seeks invalidation of the sanction. 6 the following claims in the petition: Petitioner raises 1) because the disciplinary 7 hearing officer (DHO) was not an employee of the Federal Bureau of 8 Prisons (BOP) and thus lacked the authority to conduct the 9 disciplinary hearing and make findings resulting in punishment, 10 including disallowance of good conduct time credit, Petitioner 11 suffered a violation of his right to due process of law; and 2) 12 because the DHO was not an employee of the BOP but rather was an 13 employee of a private entity with a financial interest in the 14 disallowance of good time credits, Petitioner’s due process right to 15 an independent and impartial decision maker at the disciplinary 16 hearing was violated. 17 (Doc. 1 at 2-7.) Respondent moves for dismissal of the petition as moot because 18 the disciplinary charges were reheard via teleconference on May 28, 19 2014, by a certified disciplinary hearing officer of the BOP. 20 the rehearing, Petitioner admitted the violation. At The BOP DHO found 21 that Petitioner had committed the prohibited misconduct of 22 possession of unauthorized property, and he assessed a fifteen-day 23 term in disciplinary segregation, which was suspended pending 180 24 days of clear conduct; no loss of good time credit was imposed. 25 (Doc. 13-1 at 1-3, 15-17.) 26 II. Mootness 27 Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide cases that are moot 28 because the courts= constitutional authority extends to only actual 2 1 cases or controversies. 2 U.S. 67, 70-71 (1983). Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, 464 Article III requires a case or controversy 3 in which a litigant has a personal stake in the outcome of the suit 4 throughout all stages of federal judicial proceedings and has 5 suffered some actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable 6 judicial decision. Id. A petition for writ of habeas corpus 7 becomes moot when it no longer presents a case or controversy under 8 Article III, ' 2 of the Constitution. 9 477, 479 (9th Cir. 2003). Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d A petition for writ of habeas corpus is 10 moot where a petitioner=s claim for relief cannot be redressed by a 11 favorable decision of the court issuing a writ of habeas corpus. 12 Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 13 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). 14 jurisdictional. Mootness is See, Cole v. Oroville Union High School District, 15 228 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, a moot petition must 16 be dismissed because nothing remains before the Court to be 17 remedied. 18 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. at 18. Here, documentation submitted by Respondent in support of the 19 motion to dismiss demonstrates that the claims initially alleged by 20 Petitioner are no longer in controversy. The charges were reheard 21 by an officer who had the precise qualifications that Petitioner had 22 alleged were required by principles of due process of law and the 23 pertinent regulations. It is undisputed that the findings and 24 sanctions that constituted the object of Petitioner’s challenges in 25 the petition have now been superseded by the findings and sanctions 26 of the certified BOP DHO. 27 When, because of intervening events, a court cannot give any 28 effectual relief in favor of the petitioner, the proceeding should 3 1 be dismissed as moot. Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996). 2 In the present case, it appears that the only relief that Petitioner 3 sought was invalidation of the findings and associated sanctions. 4 It has been demonstrated that the rehearing of the incident report 5 by an indisputably qualified DHO has effectuated the relief sought 6 by Petitioner. Thus, it is no longer possible for this Court to 7 issue a decision redressing the injury. In summary, the claims in the petition before the Court are no 8 9 longer subject to redress by the Court. The factual accuracy of the 10 findings on rehearing are undisputed, the record establishes that 11 Petitioner received procedural due process of law, and there is no 12 indication that Petitioner suffered any legally cognizable 13 prejudice. Further, any claims that remain concern only conditions of 14 15 confinement. A federal court may not entertain an action over which 16 it has no jurisdiction. 17 (9th Cir. 2000). Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 Relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus extends 18 to a person in custody under the authority of the United States if 19 the petitioner can show that he is “in custody in violation of the 20 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 21 § 2241(c)(1) & (3). 28 U.S.C. A habeas corpus action is the proper mechanism 22 for a prisoner to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. 23 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973); Tucker v. Carlson, 1 24 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding in a Bivens action that a 25 claim that time spent serving a state sentence should have been 26 credited against a federal sentence concerned the fact or duration 27 28 1 The reference is to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 4 1 of confinement and thus should have been construed as a petition for 2 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to ' 28 U.S.C. ' 2241, but that to the 3 extent that the complaint sought damages for civil rights 4 violations, it should be construed as a Bivens action); Crawford v. 5 Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891B892 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding dismissal of 6 a petition challenging conditions of confinement and noting that the 7 writ of habeas corpus has traditionally been limited to attacks upon 8 the legality or duration of confinement); see, Greenhill v. Lappin, 9 376 Fed. Appx. 757, 757-58 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (holding 10 that the appropriate remedy for a federal prisoner's claim that 11 relates to the conditions of his confinement is a civil rights 12 action under Bivens); but see Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 13 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that habeas corpus is available pursuant to 14 § 2241 for claims concerning denial of good time credits and 15 subjection to greater restrictions of liberty, such as disciplinary 16 segregation, without due process of law); Cardenas v. Adler, no. 17 1:09-cv-00831-AWI-JLT-HC, 2010 WL 2180378 (E.D.Cal., May 28, 2010) 18 (holding that a petitioner's challenge to the constitutionality of 19 the sanction of disciplinary segregation and his claim that the 20 disciplinary proceedings were the product of retaliation by prison 21 staff were cognizable in a habeas proceeding pursuant to ' 2241). 22 Claims concerning various prison conditions that have been 23 brought pursuant to ' 2241 have been dismissed in this district for 24 lack of subject matter jurisdiction with indications that an action 25 pursuant to Bivens is appropriate. See, e.g., Dyson v. Rios, no. 26 1:10–cv–00382–DLB(HC), 2010 WL 3516358, *3 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 2, 2010) 27 (a claim challenging placement in a special management housing unit 28 in connection with a disciplinary violation); Burnette v. Smith, no. 5 1 CIV S–08–2178 DAD P, 2009 WL 667199 at *1 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 13, 2009) 2 (a petition seeking a transfer and prevention of retaliation by 3 prison staff); Evans v. U.S. Penitentiary, no. 1:07-CV-01611 OWW GSA 4 HC, 2007 WL 4212339 at *1 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 27, 2007) (claims brought 5 pursuant to ' 2241 regarding a transfer and inadequate medical 6 care). 7 Here, to the extent that any claims remain before the Court, 8 the claims concern conditions of confinement that do not bear a 9 relationship to, or have any effect on, the legality or duration of 10 Petitioner’s confinement. It has long been established that habeas 11 corpus should be used as a vehicle to determine the lawfulness of 12 custody and not as a writ of error. 13 Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1946). See Eagles v. U.S. ex rel. Habeas corpus proceedings are 14 not an appropriate forum for claims regarding disciplinary 15 procedures if the effect of the procedures on the length of the 16 inmate’s sentence is only speculative or incidental. 17 Branch, 974 F.2d 116, 117-118 (9th Cir. 1992). Sisk v. The Court concludes 18 that if any claims remain before the Court, the claims are not 19 within the core of habeas corpus jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 20 § 2241. 21 In summary, Petitioner has not asserted any factual or legal 22 basis that would preclude a finding of mootness. The Court thus 23 concludes that the matter is moot because the Court may no longer 24 grant any effective relief. See, Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 25 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a habeas claim was moot where a former 26 inmate sought placement in a community treatment center but was 27 subsequently released on parole and no longer sought such a 28 transfer); Kittel v. Thomas, 620 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2010) 6 1 (dismissing as moot a petition seeking early release where the 2 petitioner was released and where there was no live, justiciable 3 question on which the parties disagreed). Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court grant the 4 5 motion to dismiss the petition as moot. 6 III. Recommendations 7 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that: 8 1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition be GRANTED; and 9 1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED as moot; 10 and 2) The Clerk be DIRECTED to close the action. 11 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United 12 States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the 13 provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 14 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 15 District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served 16 with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court 17 and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 18 captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and 19 Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections shall be served and 20 filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if served by 21 mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review 22 the Magistrate Judge=s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(C). 23 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 24 specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court=s 25 order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. 27 28 Dated: /s/ Barbara September 30, 2014 A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8

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