J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Kooner, No. 1:2012cv01842 - Document 20 (E.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING 13 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 11/15/2013. (Jessen, A)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 J & J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC., 11 12 1:12-cv-01842-AWI-JLT Plaintiff, ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT v. (Doc. ) -- 13 13 MANDEEP SINGH KOONER, individually, and d/b/a PEOPLE S PIZZA, 14 15 Defendants. __________________________________/ 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Defendant Mandeep Singh Kooner has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in response 19 to the complaint of J & J Sports Productions, Inc., (“J & J”) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 20 Procedure 12(c). For reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED. 21 22 II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 23 The Court refers the parties to previous orders for a complete chronology of the proceedings. On 24 November 9, 2012, plaintiff J & J Sports Productions, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”) 25 26 1 1 2 filed its complaint against defendant Mandeep Singh Kooner, (“Defendant”) for violations of the 3 Communications Act of 1943, 47 U.S.C. § 605, et seq, the Cable and Television Consumer 4 Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. § 553, et seq, California's Unfair 5 Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq, and common law. 6 In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges as follows: 7 “… on November 12, 2011 (the night of the Program at issue herein…), Defendant Mandeep Singh Kooner had the right and ability to supervise the activities of People's Pizza, which included the unlawful interception of Plaintiff s Program.”i 8 9 Plaintiff further alleges: 10 11 12 “… on November 12, 2011… Defendant Mandeep Singh Kooner, as the sole individual specifically identified on the liquor license for People's Pizza, had the obligation to supervise the activities of People's Pizza, which included the unlawful interception of Plaintiff s Program.” 13 Plaintiff further alleges: 14 15 16 “… on November 12, 2011… Defendant Mandeep Singh Kooner personally, or by specifically directed the employees of People's Pizza to unlawfully intercepted and broadcast Plaintiff s Program at People's Pizza. The actions of the employees of People's Pizza are directly imputable to Defendant Mandeep Singh Kooner and by virtue of his ownership of People's Pizza.” 17 Plaintiff further alleges: 18 19 “… the unlawful broadcast of Plaintiff s Program, as supervised and/or authorized by Defendant Mandeep Singh Kooner, resulted in increased profits for People s Pizza.” 20 21 On August 12, 2013, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). On August 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed its opposition to 23 Defendant s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendant filed his reply to Plaintiff s 24 opposition on August 29, 2013. 25 26 2 1 2 3 III. LEGAL STANDARD 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) states: “After the pleadings are closed, but early enough 5 not to delay trial, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c). 6 Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party establishes that on the face of the 7 pleadings there is no material issue of fact that remains to be resolved, and the moving party is 8 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Beckway v. DeShong, 717 F.Supp.2d 908, 913 (N.D. 9 Cal. 2010); Waldron v. Boeing Co., 388 F.3d 591, 593 (8th Cir. 2004). The court must accept as 10 true all material allegations in the complaint, and must construe those allegations in a light most 11 favorable to the Plaintiff. Ambrose v. Coffee, 696 F.Supp.2d 1119, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2010); 12 Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., 917 F.Supp.2d 1019, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2013). The pleadings must 13 show “beyond doubt” that the Plaintiff can prove no facts in support of the claim that would 14 entitle relief. Nickoloff v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 511 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 15 2007). 16 “Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the district court goes beyond the 17 pleadings to resolve an issue; such a proceeding must properly be treated as a motion for 18 summary judgment.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 19 1550 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c). However, where subject matter 20 jurisdiction is challenged, the court may consider extrinsic materials, such as affidavits. See 21 United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 80 (2nd Cir. 1998); Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Federal 22 Republic of Nigeria, 948 F.2d 90, 96 (2nd Cir. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 1215, 23 112 (1992); Kamen v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2nd Cir. 24 1986). Although subject matter jurisdiction is normally challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), it may 25 26 3 1 2 also be raised on a motion pursuant to Rule 12(c). See Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United 3 States, 777 F.2d 822 (2nd Cir. 1985) (affirming dismissal of action for lack of subject matter 4 jurisdiction on a Rule 12(c) motion). 5 Federal courts may hear only cases and controversies arising under the context given 6 within Article III of the Constitution. U.S. Const., art. III § 2; See also SEC v. Medical 7 Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972). This is known as a case or controversy 8 having justiciable character. The cases and controversies requirement is a dual limitation that 9 ensures federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to other branches of government or 10 the states. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968). A court must determine if a dispute is of 11 justiciable character before it may decide the merits of a particular issue. 12 Standing is a federal doctrine built upon the idea there must be a separation of powers 13 within the federal government. Standing is a further limitation on the powers of the judiciary, 14 and without this limit, the authority of the judicial branch would be unchecked. See Lujan v. 15 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A dispute is not justiciable, and thus may not 16 be before a federal court, if plaintiff lacks standing to sue. Schswarzer, et al., Federal Civil 17 Procedure Before Trial 2E-2 (2013). 18 Article III provides the constitutional requirements for standing: 1) A concrete and 19 particularized injury in fact, 2) Causation, and 3) Redressability. “To satisfy the Article III case 20 or controversy requirement, a litigant must have suffered some actual injury that can be 21 redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 22 70 (1983); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); 23 NAACP., Western Region v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1352 (9th Cir. 1984). The injury 24 must be “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The 25 26 4 1 2 party filing the action or removing it to federal court bears the burden of establishing the 3 constitutional elements of standing. Lujan, at 561; Central Delta Water Agency v. United 4 States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Simon, at 41-42). 5 Additionally, there are prudential requirements for standing. The prudential requirements 6 are judge-made principles that preclude jurisdiction over some types of cases in which Article III 7 standing exists. Schswarzer, et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial 2E-3 (2013). These 8 include prohibitions on third-party standing, See Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 9 542 U.S. 1, 14 (2004), and “generalized” injuries, See Valley Forge Christian College v. 10 Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-475 (1982), and a 11 requirement that the Plaintiff s claim falls within a “zone of interest” sought to be protected by 12 the statute in question, See Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2366-67 (2011). 13 14 IV. DISCUSSION 15 Defandant s motion for judgment on the pleadings is built upon the argument that Plaintiff has 16 no standing to sue in Federal Court resulting in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant 17 does not allege that Plaintiff fails to meet the constitutional requirements of standing, or the 18 additional limitations judicial opinions have placed upon standing. Rather, Defendant contends 19 there are further requisite elements of standing based upon statutory and contractual law that 20 Plaintiff fails to meet in the instant case. Defendant concludes, therefore, that Plaintiff lacks 21 standing to sue. 22 A. Plaintiff’s claims for violation of Title 47 U.S.C. § 605 and § 553 - Plaintiff alleges causes 23 of action for violation of Title 47 U.S.C. § 605 and § 553. Plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to 24 contract with the Program licensor, J & J was granted exclusive nationwide commercial 25 26 5 1 2 distribution rights to the Program that allowed them to grant subsequent sublicensing rights to 3 broadcast the Program to commercial entities throughout North America. J & J alleges that 4 without authorization, Defendant “did unlawfully intercept, receive, publish, divulge, display 5 and/or exhibit the Program at the time of its transmission at his commercial establishment,” in 6 violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 and § 553. 7 In its complaint, J & J seeks relief under 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553. Both 8 statutes prohibit the unauthorized interception and exhibition of communications. The common 9 elements of both statutes require: 1) The plaintiff must show that the defendants intercepted a 10 broadcast, 2) The plaintiff must show defendants were not authorized to intercept the broadcast, 11 and 3) Defendants showed this broadcast to others. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a); 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1). 12 The primary distinction between the sections regards the manner in which a defendant intercepts 13 a signal. Section 605 is violated upon interception of a signal transmitted via satellite, section 14 553 is violated upon interception of a signal transmitted via cable system. A plaintiff can prevail 15 upon a cause of action for either section 605 or 553. “Piracy of television programs, such as 16 that which occurred here, either falls within the purview of § 553 or § 605, but not both. See TKR 17 Cable Co. v. Cable City Corp., 267 F.3d 196, 207 (3rd Cir. 2001).” J & J Sports Productions, 18 Inc., v. Gencarelli, 2011 WL 1253886, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2011). 19 Defendant argues there are two reasons that J & J has no standing to sue in the instant 20 case. First, Defendant contends J & J lacks standing to sue because it is not the “exclusive 21 licensee.” Defendant relies on a myriad of common law cases to support this argument, 22 interpreting them to form the following synthesized rule applicable to television signal piracy 23 law, and states in his motion: “… plaintiff (licensee) must have the sole discretion to sue, the 24 original licensor cannot have retained rights to determine if a lawsuit can be brought or to license 25 26 6 1 2 other parties, the original licensor cannot retain a financial interest in the litigation or the ability 3 to direct the litigation decisions, the licensee must have an exclusive license not just in name but 4 in substance, and all rights must be transferred to the licensee in order for the licensee to have the 5 power to sue.” 6 Second, Defendant contends Plaintiff lacks standing to sue because J & J stands in breach 7 of its contractual obligations with the licensor. Defendant asserts that, under common law, 8 where contracts grant proprietary rights and contain provisions that limit the right to sue, 9 standing does not lie where breach of contract has occurred. Defendant contends that Plaintiff 10 had the affirmative duty under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) to disclose evidence proving 11 contractual compliance with its licensor in order to sufficiently establish its standing to sue in the 12 instant case. 13 14 i. Plaintiff’s constitutional standing to sue is sufficiently established - Plaintiff s complaint 15 has sufficiently alleged a “concrete and particularized injury in fact,” asserting a precise date, 16 time, and location of a specific unlawful signal interception by Defendant. Further, the 17 complaint sufficiently demonstrates that Plaintiff s injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged 18 action of the defendant” by alleging the Program was broadcast at Defendant s commercial 19 establishment without Defendant contractually obtaining the rights to do so. The possibility of 20 “redress by a favorable judicial decision” is likewise established here because an award of 21 monetary damages by the court would serve to compensate Plaintiff for alleged injuries. 22 Plaintiff s complaint meets the three requisite elements of constitutional standing. 23 ii. Plaintiff’s statutory standing to sue is sufficiently established - 47 U.S.C. § 605 provides 24 clear language regarding a plaintiff s standing to sue: “Any person aggrieved by any violation of 25 26 7 1 2 subsection (a) of this section… may bring a civil action in a United States district court or in any 3 other court of competent jurisdiction.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(A). Section 553 is equally clear: 4 “Any person aggrieved by any violation of subsection (a)(1) of this section may bring a civil 5 action in a United States district court or in any other court of competent jurisdiction.” 47 U.S.C. 6 § 553(c)(1). The term “person aggrieved” was not defined when § 605(e)(3)(A) was originally 7 enacted. However, section 605 of the Communications Act was further amended by the Satellite 8 Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-667, § 205, 102 Stat. 3959-60. That Act amended § 9 605 by adding the following definition of a “person aggrieved” to § 605(d): “the term „any 10 person aggrieved shall include any person with proprietary rights in the intercepted 11 communication by wire or radio, including wholesale or retail distributors of satellite cable 12 programming....” 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(6). 13 In National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., the Court of Appeals agreed with the 14 District Court below that the use of the word “include” in the statutory phrase “any person 15 aggrieved shall include any person ...” does not mean that only persons who meet that definition 16 have standing to sue. National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 912 (6th Cir. 17 2001); DIRECTTV, Inc. v. Budden, 420 F.3d 521, 528 (5th Cir. 2001); DIRECTV, Inc. v. 18 Boonstra, 302 F.Supp.2d 822, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The legislative history of section 605(d) 19 supports the courts interpretations. In the House Report accompanying the 1988 amendment to 20 § 605 that added the definition of “person aggrieved” under § 605(d)(6), the purpose of the 21 amendment was explained as follows: 22 23 24 Section 5 of [the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988] amends [§ 605] of the Communications Act pertaining to the piracy of satellite cable programming. The Committee's amendment is intended to deter piracy practices by (1) stiffening applicable civil and criminal penalties, (2) expanding standing to sue, and (3) 25 26 8 1 2 4 making the manufacture, sale, modification ... of devices or equipment with knowledge that its primary purpose is to assist in unauthorized decryption of satellite cable programming expressly actionable as a criminal act. H.R.Rep. No. 100-877(II), at 28, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5638, 5657 (emphasis added). 5 Limiting the availability of civil actions to those persons who “have the sole discretion to 3 6 sue or license other parties, retain all financial interest in any potential litigation, enjoy 7 unconditional ability to direct all future litigation, have an exclusive license not just in name but 8 also in substance, and possess all rights as transferred from the original licensor,” as Defendant 9 would like the court to find, is inconsistent with the intent of Congress as expressed in the Cable 10 Communications Policy Act of 1984 and the Satellite Home Viewer Act in 1988. Both acts were 11 intended to expand the scope of protection provided by the Communications Act, not limit it. 12 National Satellite Sports, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, at 912. 13 It is unnecessary to interpret or construe the standing language within sections 605 or 14 553. The language is plain and the intent of Congress is clear. Defendant s claim that standing 15 to sue under television signal piracy laws should be further limited beyond constitutional and 16 prudential requirements is at odds with the legislative intent behind the amendment to section 17 605. To narrow the reach of the Communications Act is to contravene long-standing statutory 18 language, and the Court is unwilling to do so. If the legislature wants to further limit the 19 language “any person aggrieved” to included Defendant s proposed elements derived from a 20 myriad of common law cases, it may do so. 21 Furthermore, “[h]istory associates the word „aggrieved with a congressional intent to 22 cast the standing net broadly-beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights 23 upon which „prudential standing traditionally rested.” Federal Election Commmission v. Akins, 24 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998); J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. 4326 Kurz, Ltd., 2009 WL 1886124, at 25 26 9 1 2 *8. As a result, courts have found that distributors of satellite programming have proprietary 3 rights to communications they distribute and therefore have standing to sue when others injure 4 those rights by violating § 605. See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Rennard Street Enterprises, 5 Inc., 975 F.Supp. 746, 753 (E.D. Penn. 1997) (finding plaintiff constituted “aggrieved person for 6 purposes of [§ ] 605, because it has a propriet[ar]y right to the distribution of ... broadcast” from 7 original broadcaster); see also Garden City Boxing Club, Inc. v. Hernandez, 2008 WL 4974583, 8 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2008) (finding that distributor of televised boxing match to commercial 9 entities had proprietary interest in communication to qualify as person aggrieved and therefore 10 had standing to sue). 11 iii. Lack of standing to sue based on failure to prove contractual fulfillment –Plaintiff s 12 standing to sue under sections 605 and 553 has been sufficiently established, as stated above. 13 Defendant s second argument based upon breach of contract with the licensor in unsupported. 14 The court finds Defendant has not sufficiently explained or provided support as to why 15 Plaintiff s potential breach of contract with the Licensor makes Plaintiff not an aggrieved party 16 lacking standing. 17 Plaintiff has met the burden of establishing the constitutional and prudential elements of 18 standing, and therefore, Defendant s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED without 19 leave to amend. 20 21 22 B. Plaintiff’s claim for conversion- Plaintiff further alleges a state law cause of action for common law conversion, contending that Defendant “tortuously obtained possession of the Program and wrongfully converted same for their own use and benefit.” Defendant makes no 23 specific argument in his motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the conversion claim. 24 A conversion requires “ownership or right to possession of property, wrongful disposition of the 25 26 10 1 2 property right and damages.” J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Concepcion, 2011 WL 2220101, 3 at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2011) (quoting G.S. Rassmussen & Associates, Inc. v. Kalitta Flying 4 Service, Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992). Accepting as true all material allegations in the 5 complaint, and construing those allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the complaint 6 supports all three elements required of a claim for conversion: 1) Plaintiff purchased rights to 7 sublicense the program at issue, 2) Defendant did not enter into an agreement to pay a fee to 8 Plaintiff in exchange for the right to exhibit the Program in its commercial establishment, and 3) 9 Plaintiff has incurred damages equal to the amount Defendant should have paid for the 10 contractual right to show the Program. As such, Plaintiff does not lack standing to bring its 11 claim for conversion, and Defendant s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED without 12 leave to amend. 13 C. Plaintiff’s claim for violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 14 Plaintiff further alleges a cause of action for violation of California Business and Professions 15 Code § 17200, contending that Defendant s unauthorized interception and exhibition of the 16 Program constituted “unlawful…fraudulent…unfair, and deceptive trade practices…” 17 Defendant makes no specific argument in his motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the 18 section 17200 claim. 19 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 states: 20 As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 21 22 23 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 provides the elements necessary for standing to sue for 24 violation of section 17200: 25 26 11 1 2 3 Actions for relief pursuant to this chapter shall be prosecuted exclusively in a court of competent jurisdiction by... a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. 4 5 As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that as a result of Defendant s 6 unlicensed exhibition and display of the Program, a particularized and concrete injury was 7 suffered. Further, the proximate result of the conduct “permanently deprived [Plaintiff] of the 8 patronage of current, previous and potential customers of the sports and entertainment 9 programming it licenses commercially to the hospitality industry, all to its severe financial injury 10 and loss…” This is undisputed by Defendant in his motion. Because Plaintiff has sufficiently 11 established standing under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code by adequately alleging an “injury in fact” and 12 a “loss of money or property as a result of the unfair competition,” Defendant s motion for 13 judgment on the pleadings is DENIED without leave to amend. 14 15 16 V. DISPOSITION For reasons discussed above, the motion for judgment on the pleadings shall be DENIED 17 without leave to amend. 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: November 15, 2013 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 12 1 2 i 3 “Program” refers to the closed-circuit nationwide television broadcast of Manny Pacquiao v. Juan Manuel Marquez III WBO Welterweight Championship Fight Program, including all “under-card bouts” and fight commentary comprised within the telecast. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 13
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