(PC) Grandison v. M. Stainer et al, No. 1:2011cv01506 - Document 23 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending that this action be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to stare a claim re 21 Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint filed by Jeffery Sebastian Grandison ; referred to Judge O'Neill; Objections to F&R due by 9/4/2012, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 07/30/2012. (Martin-Gill, S)
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(PC) Grandison v. M. Stainer et al Doc. 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 JEFFERY SEBASTIAN GRANDISON, 11 CASE NO. Plaintiff, 12 1:11-cv-01506-LJO-MJS (PC) ORDER RECOMMENDING WITH PREJUDICE DISMISSAL v. (ECF No. 21) 13 M. STAINER, et al., 14 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE IN THIRTY (30) DAYS Defendants. 15 / 16 17 SCREENING ORDER 18 19 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 20 On August 31, 2011, Plaintiff Jeffery Sebastian Grandison, a state prisoner 21 proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 22 23 § 1983. (ECF No. 4.) On May 25, 2012, Plaintiff’s Complaint was screened and dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a cognizable claim. (ECF No. 17.) 24 25 26 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21) is now before the Court for screening. /// 27 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 II. 2 3 SCREENING REQUIREMENT The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 4 5 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 6 raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 7 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 8 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 9 10 thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 11 12 granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, 13 14 or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder v. 15 Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 16 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating 17 federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 18 19 20 III. SUMMARY OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT The First Amended Complaint names the following individuals as Defendants: (1) 21 M. Stainer, Warden, Tehachapi Correctional Institution (Tehachapi); (2) CCII E. Stelter, 22 Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) Organizer; and (3) CCI Pierce, 4B Counselor. 23 24 Plaintiff alleges the following: On September 19, 1994, Plaintiff was charged with sexual misconduct involving a 25 26 female correctional officer. (Compl. at 9, 11.) No criminal charges were filed. At a 27 2 1 2 3 Security Housing Unit hearing on March 30, 2011, Defendant Pierce recommended that an “R” suffix be applied to Plaintiff’s custody level because of the single past incident of misconduct.1 (Id. at 4.) Warden Stainer was present at the hearing and congratulated 4 5 6 Defendant Pierce on his decision, stating “‘I did not think you had it in you.’” Plaintiff interrupted, stating that the relationship between himself and the female officer was 7 consensual. Defendant Stainer then indicated that the female officer at issue was his wife. 8 Reading from the incident report, Stainer stated that his wife refused Plaintiff three times. 9 (Id.) 10 Plaintiff’s classification was reviewed at a hearing on April 28, 2011. Defendant 11 12 13 Stelter approved the “R” suffix classification without providing Plaintiff an explanation of the justifications. (Id.) According to California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section 14 3377.1(b), the “R” suffix designation is reserved for inmates convicted of violating any one 15 of the sex related offenses enumerated in California Penal Code Section 290. Plaintiff has 16 no criminal convictions for a sex offense. (Id.) Stelter considered people as “subjects” and 17 “was ‘not indifferent’ toward [Plaintiff]” during the hearing. (Id. at 3, 4.) 18 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation has a system-wide 19 20 security problem associated with the “R” suffix classification. Inmates with the designation 21 are frequently the targets of “hate crimes” perpetrated by inmates and prison staff. The “R” 22 classification is applied to all sex crimes and does not distinguish the worst offenders such 23 as molesters or rapists. (Id. at 3.) “A ‘R’ suffix has the discomfort of an unnecessary 24 25 26 27 1 Plaintiff characterizes the basis for the “R” suffix designation as the single incident of sexual misconduct. However, ICC documents attached to the Complaint identify multiple sex related offenses as part of Plaintiff’s case factors: “Sexual Harassment/ Over Familiarity (7-22-08), Sexual Battery on a Peace Officer: Masturbation (9-14-94 & 4-08-99), & Indecent Exposure (10-04-10) . . . .” (Id. at 11.) 3 1 2 lingering threat and hardship of non-conviction restraints on [Plaintiff’s] liberty.” (Id.) The designation also precludes Plaintiff from being considered for lower security facilities. (Id.) 3 Plaintiff does not specifically identify the federal right allegedly violated by the 4 5 6 Defendants. The initial complaint primarily alleged a violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Because the factual allegations in the First Amended 7 Complaint are substantively identical to those put forth in the original complaint, the Court 8 will analyze the present allegations as part of a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. 9 IV. 10 ANALYSIS A. Section 1983 11 12 To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 13 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 14 (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 15 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 16 17 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 18 19 20 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 21 mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 22 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set 23 forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its 24 face.’” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant 25 26 committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal 27 4 1 2 3 conclusions are not. Id. at 1949-50. B. Due Process The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due 4 5 process of law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). In order to invoke the 6 protection of the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a 7 liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Id. Liberty interests may arise from the 8 Due Process Clause itself, or from an expectation or interest created by prison regulations. 9 10 Id. The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.” Id. 11 12 13 Plaintiff can not claim any constitutional right to a particular prison classification arising directly from the Fourteenth Amendment, as inmates have no liberty interest in 14 custody classification decisions. Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 15 1987); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976). 16 17 The existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). 18 19 20 Such liberty interests are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 21 life.” Id. at 484; Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007). Under certain 22 circumstances, labeling a prisoner with a particular classification may implicate a liberty 23 interest subject to the protections of due process. Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827 24 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the ‘sex offender’ 25 label coupled with the subjection of the targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment program 26 27 whose successful completion is a precondition for parole eligibility create the kind of 5 1 deprivations of liberty that require procedural protections.”). 2 3 In this instance, Plaintiff has alleged no facts upon which the Court could conclude that a liberty interest with respect to the assignment of the “R” suffix designation could be 4 5 6 established. The First Amended Complaint provides no significant new factual details; Plaintiff essentially reasserts the claims put forth in the original pleading. Plaintiff suggests 7 the allegations that Defendant Stelter considered people as “subjects” and “was ‘not 8 indifferent’ toward [Plaintiff]” during the hearing (compl. at 3, 4) are significant to his claims. 9 Neither allegation supports a finding that the legal standard described above has been 10 met. 11 12 13 Plaintiff also alleges that inmates designated with the “R” suffix are subjected to an increased risk of violence. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges “[a] ‘R’ suffix has the 14 discomfort of an unnecessary lingering threat and hardship of non-conviction restraints on 15 [Plaintiff’s] liberty.” (Compl. at 3.) Such allegations do not state a claim. Even if the 16 allegations were clear, an increased risk of harm alone is insufficient. See Cooper v. 17 Garcia, 55 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (finding “the liberty interest at stake 18 must be more than a mere ‘sex offender’ . . . classification. Rather, that classification must 19 20 also be ‘coupled with’ some mandatory coercive treatment which affects a liberty interest, 21 such as parole release in Neal.”). Neither the assignment of an “R” suffix or the resulting 22 increase in custody status “impose[ ] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 23 relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Neal at 830; 24 Cooper, 55 F.Supp.2d at 1101; Johnson v. Gomez, 1996 WL 107275, at *2-5 (N.D. Cal. 25 1996); Brooks v. McGrath, 1995 WL 733675, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 26 27 The fact that the Defendants may have contravened a Title 15 regulation by 6 1 imposing the “R” suffix classification in the absence of a sex offense conviction does not 2 create a liberty interest. See Cooper, 55 F.Supp.2d at 1100. 3 4 Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that the Defendants violated his due process rights. The Court’s previous screening order instructed Plaintiff on the applicable 5 6 7 law and gave him an opportunity to amend to meet the pleading requirements. The fact that he has not successfully amended is reason to conclude he can not successfully 8 amend. No useful purpose would be served in once again advising him of the applicable 9 standard and giving him further leave to amend. 10 V. 11 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not state a cognizable claim against the 12 13 14 named Defendants. Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 15 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States 16 District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 17 636(b)(l). 18 Within thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court. The document 19 should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 20 21 22 Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 23 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 26 27 Dated: ci4d6 July 30, 2012 /s/ Michael J. Seng UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7
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