Dixon v. Wesbrook, et al., No. 1:2011cv01290 - Document 44 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER Granting Motion to Dismiss 18 , 32 ; ORDER Dismissing Action, signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 12/11/12. CASE CLOSED.(Gonzalez, R)
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Dixon v. Wesbrook, et al. Doc. 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 DENISA DIXON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) OFFICERS WESBROOK, SARGENT ) GRUNDEIS, AND SIX BAIL BOND ) AGENTS WITH CAUSALITY SURETY ) INSURANCE BOND AGENTS(S) IN ) THEIR OWN INDIVIDUAL ) CAPACITY, AND DOES 1 TO 50, ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________) 1:11-CV-01290 AWI JLT ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS ORDER DISMISSING ACTION (Documents #18 & #32) 18 19 20 BACKGROUND On July 24, 2011, Plaintiff Denisa Dixon filed a first amended complaint (“complaint”) in 21 the Kern County Superior Court. 22 Grundeis,1 and Six Unknown Bail Bond Agents working for Financial Casualty & Security, Inc. 23 as Defendants. On August 4, 2011, Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis removed the action to 24 this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) because the complaint contains claims brought under 25 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 26 The complaint names as Officer Wesbrook, Sergeant On December 20, 2011, the court granted all Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court 27 1 28 The complaint uses the spelling “Grundis”. However, in their motion, Defendants clarify that the correct spelling is “Grundeis”. The court will use this spelling. Dockets.Justia.com 1 dismissed the complaint with leave to amend the complaint. Plaintiff was given thirty days in 2 which to file a second amended complaint. 3 When Plaintiff did not file a second amended complaint within thirty days, on January 26, 4 2012, Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis’s filed a motion to dismiss this action for Plaintiff’s 5 failure to prosecute. 6 On March 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In this 7 document, Plaintiff appears to request additional time in which to file a second amended 8 complaint. Plaintiff argues that Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis have made it difficult to 9 file a second amended complaint because they have ignored Plaintiff’s requests for the names of 10 the Six Unknown Bail Bond Agents. 11 On March 13, 2012, Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis filed a response to Plaintiff’s 12 reply. Defendants again contend that Plaintiff failed to timely amend her complaint. On 13 March 13, 2012, Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis also filed a notice that they had never 14 received written discovery requests for the names of the Six Unknown Bail Bond Agents. 15 On April 24, 2012, the court received a second amended complaint from Plaintiff. 16 Because no leave to file a late second amended complaint had been granted, the Clerk of the 17 Court lodged the second amended complaint (“lodged second amended complaint”). 18 On May 9, 2012, Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis filed an objection / motion to strike 19 the lodged second amended complaint because no leave of court had been granted to file a 20 second amended complaint at this late date. Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis also contend 21 that the lodged second amended complaint fails to contain any causes of action and it is merely a 22 mixture of Plaintiff’s factual allegations from the prior complaint and other documents. 23 On May 17, 2012, Defendant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. filed an objection / 24 motion to strike the lodged second amended complaint. Defendant Financial Casualty & Surety, 25 Inc. contend that this action should be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute. 26 27 28 2 1 ALLEGED FACTS2 2 The lodged second amended complaint alleges that Six Unknown Bail Bond Agents 3 working for Defendant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. were attempting to apprehend Keon 4 Brackenridge. Keon Brackenridge (Plaintiff’s son) had used Plaintiff’s address as his mailing 5 address; However, Robin Willis, and not Plaintiff, had arranged for him to be released on bail. 6 The lodged second amended states that when the Six Unknown Bail Bond Agents came to 7 Plaintiff’s house to find Keon Brackenridge, they forcefully searched Plaintiff’s house, causing 8 property damage, and they physically assaulted Plaintiff. 9 complaint alleges that the Six Unknown Bail Bond Agents violated California law governing bail 10 The lodged second amended agents, including California Penal Code § 1299. 11 When the Six Unknown Bail Bond Agents were in her house, Plaintiff alleges that she 12 called the Bakersfield Police Department Watch Commander and asked that Police Officers be 13 sent to her home to arrest the bounty hunters because they had fabricated and misrepresented 14 themselves as legitimate Federal Agents with a warrant. 15 from the Bakersfield Police Department arrived at Plaintiff’s house. Defendants Wesbrook and 16 Grundeis spoke with Plaintiff as she took pictures. Plaintiff requested Defendants Wesbrook 17 and Grundeis to arrest the Six Unknown Bail Bond Agents or obtain their names so she would be 18 able to identify them in a lawsuit for violating her Constitutional rights. Defendants Wesbrook 19 and Grundeis did not arrest the Six Unknown Bail Bond Agents. It is unclear if they obtained 20 their names; But, Plaintiff has never been given their names. The lodged second amended 21 complaint states that these acts are evidence of “deliberate indifference” upon Plaintiff. 22 // 23 // Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis, 24 25 26 27 28 2 The facts are taken from Plaintiff’s lodged second amended complaint. 3 1 2 3 DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE A. LEGAL STANDARD Defendants request that the court dismiss this action for Plaintiff’s failure to file an 4 amended complaint and failure to prosecute this action. A court may dismiss an action, with 5 prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action or failure to obey a court order. 6 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992). In determining whether to dismiss 7 an action for failure to comply with court orders, “the Court must weigh the following factors: 8 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 9 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic 10 alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.” Pagtalunan 11 v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 12 (9th Cir. 1992)); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). 13 series of conditions precedent before the judge can do anything,’ but a ‘way for a district judge to 14 think about what to do.’” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 15 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006); (quoting Valley Eng'rs Inc. v. Elec. Eng'g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 16 1057 (9th Cir. 1998). 17 B. DISCUSSION 18 “These factors are ‘not a The court finds that dismissal of this action for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute is 19 appropriate. The public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the court’s 20 interest in managing the docket weigh in favor of dismissal. “The public’s interest in 21 expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642; 22 Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). This action has been 23 pending since August, 2011. Even though Plaintiff was given thirty days in which to file a 24 second amended complaint, Plaintiff did not attempt to file a second amended complaint until 25 three months after it was due. The public’s interest in the expeditious resolution of litigation 26 weighs heavily in favor of dismissal so that the court’s limited resources may be spent on cases 27 28 4 1 in which the litigant is diligently proceeding. Thus, both the first and second factors weigh in 2 favor of dismissal. 3 Turning to the risk of prejudice, “pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in 4 and of itself to warrant dismissal.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642; Yourish 191 F.3d at 991. 5 However, delay inherently increases the risk that witnesses’ memories will fade and evidence 6 will become stale. Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. Defendants have requested dismissal for 7 Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute. Based on Defendants’ positions in their briefs, the court finds 8 that this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 9 As for the availability of lesser sanctions, at this stage in the proceedings there is little 10 available to the court which would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the 11 court from further unnecessary expenditure of its scare resources. As to this factor, Plaintiff has 12 already been warned about the possibility of dismissal. In addition, as discussed below, the 13 court has reviewed Plaintiff’s lodged second amended complaint, and it still fails to state a claim 14 against Defendants. There is no lessor sanction the court can give Plaintiff after she has been 15 told about the complaint’s pleading deficiencies and has still failed to submit a complaint that 16 states a claim. 17 Finally, because public policy favors disposition on the merits, this factor normally 18 weighs against dismissal. Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. “At the same time, a case that is stalled 19 or unreasonably delayed by a party's failure to comply with deadlines and discovery obligations 20 cannot move forward toward resolution on the merits. Thus, [the Ninth Circuit has] also 21 recognized that this factor ‘lends little support’ to a party whose responsibility it is to move a 22 case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction.” 23 In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1228. The court finds this factor has little influence given the factors 24 supporting dismissal. Thus, the complaint is subject to dismissal for Plaintiff’s failure to timely 25 comply with the court’s order to file a second amended complaint. 26 27 28 5 1 2 DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Normally, the court would simply dismiss this action for Plaintiff’s failure to file a second 3 amended complaint and failure to prosecute. 4 her leave to file a second amended complaint, and on April 24, 2012, Plaintiff lodged a proposed 5 second amended complaint. In the interests of justice, the court will evaluate whether Plaintiff’s 6 lodged second amended complaint states a claim, and if this action could proceed on the April 7 24, 2012 lodged second amended complaint. 8 A. Legal Standard – Rule 12(b)(6) 9 However, Plaintiff has asked that the court give Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed because 10 of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory 12 or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Johnson v. 13 Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 14 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all of the complaint’s 15 material allegations of fact are taken as true and the facts are construed in the light most 16 favorable to the non-moving party. Marceau v. Balckfeet Hous. Auth., 540 F.3d 916, 919 (9th 17 Cir. 2008); Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the court is not 18 required to accept as true facts and allegations that are conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 19 fact, or unreasonable inferences. 20 2008). Although they may provide the framework of a complaint, legal conclusions are not 21 accepted as true and “[t]hreadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 22 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). As 23 the Supreme Court explained: 24 25 26 In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1056-57 (9th Cir. While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). 27 28 6 1 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, “a complaint must contain 2 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 3 Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 4 content that allows the court draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 5 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. 6 B. DISCUSSION 7 1. Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis 8 Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis contend that the court should not proceed on the 9 lodged second amended complaint because it does not contain sufficient allegations of a 10 Constitutional violation. 11 Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis for “the names and addresses of the Six Unknown bail bond 12 bounty hunters and have [sic.] been treated unfair which is discriminating and could be racially 13 motivated . . .” Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis: 14 15 The lodged second amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff asked had a conversation as plaintiff took pictures as evidence that clear show BPD acts was affirmative act of their deliberate indifference upon Petitioner’s calling the BPS for this State created agency violating Ms. Dixon rights not to be assaulted and illegally searched nor seized. 16 Plaintiff alleges that she asked Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis to arrest the Six Unknown 17 Bail Bond Agents for assaulting her and forcing their way into Plaintiff’s home. The lodged 18 second amended complaint alleges that Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis also failed to get the 19 names of the Six Unknown Bail Bond Agents and provide them to Plaintiff. 20 Plaintiff brings this action, in part, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 21 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, deprives 22 another of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United 23 States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The first inquiry in any action brought pursuant to Section 1983 is 24 whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws. Baker v. 25 McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979); Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1995). 26 Here, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated her due process rights. 27 28 7 1 The Due Process Clause is a limitation on the state’s power to act, and it is not a 2 guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. DeShaney v. Winnebago County 3 Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). As such, the Due Process Clauses does not 4 generally “confer an affirmative right to governmental aid to protect an individual’s rights, even 5 where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the 6 government itself may not deprive the individual.” Id. at 196; Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 7 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). “If the Due Process Clause does not require the State to provide 8 its citizens with particular protective services, it follows that the State cannot be held liable under 9 the Clause for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide them.” DeShaney, 10 489 U.S. at 196-97. The Due Process Clause is not implicated by an official’s negligent act that 11 results in unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 12 327, 328 (1986); Alfrey v. U.S., 276 F.3d 557, 568 (2002). 13 Federal courts recognize only two exceptions to the bright-line rule that state actors do 14 not violate the Fourteenth Amendment by their inaction. First, the Ninth Circuit has recognized a 15 “danger creation” exception that occurs when “state action affirmatively places the plaintiff in a 16 position of danger, that is, where state action creates or exposes an individual to a danger which 17 he or she would not have otherwise faced.” Kennedy v. Ridgefield City, 439 F.3d 1055, 1061 18 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989). Second, the “special 19 relationship” exception applies where a state actor abuses a special state-created relationship with 20 an individual, such as, when a person has been taken into state custody or is involuntarily 21 hospitalized. Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2007). 22 The lodged second amended complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible 23 violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. 24 investigate allegations or arrest persons simply because a citizen asks them to do so. The 25 complaint does not allege or describe a special relationship that existed between Plaintiff and 26 Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis or that Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis somehow 27 28 8 Police officers do not owe a duty to 1 created the danger causing or enhancing Plaintiff’s injuries. At best, Plaintiff has alleged 2 inaction by Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis. Inaction cannot be used to invoke a violation of 3 the Constitution. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Defendants Wesbrook and 4 Grundeis fails to state a claim. 5 2. Defendant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. 6 Plaintiff contends that the Six Unknown Bond Agents were acting under of color of state 7 law because California Penal Code § 1299 provides specific rules governing bail bond agents. 8 Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. is liable for the Six 9 Unknown Bond Agents’ actions. 10 As stated above, the remedy for alleged violations of the Constitution is generally 42 11 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must plead (1) that the defendant 12 acted under color of state law and (2) that the defendant deprived her of rights secured by the 13 Constitution or federal statutes. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Anderson v. Warner, 14 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 15 acts “under color of” state law if the conduct qualifies as state action under the Fourteenth 16 Amendment. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Normally, private parties are 17 not acting under color of state law, and as such, a cause of action under Section 1983 is not 18 available. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). The only way to proceed 19 with an action against a corporation or private person for violations of the Constitution is to show 20 that the corporation’s action were fairly attributable to the federal or state government. 21 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001); Lugar, 457 22 U.S. at 936; Mathis v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 75 F.3d 498, 502 (9th Cir. 1996).3 Thus, the The Supreme Court has held that a private party defendant 23 24 3 27 An action by a private corporation is only attributable to the federal or state government if: (1) there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the State itself; (2) the state “has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State;” and (3) the entity exercised powers that are traditionally those of State. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004- 12 (1982). 28 9 25 26 1 question is whether the defendant's “conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right 2 [is] fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 3 Action done by a private individual or private company is generally not done “under color 4 of state law.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The Ninth Circuit has found that 5 bounty hunters and bail bond agents are not state actors acting under color of state law for 6 purposes of Section 1983. Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 558 ( 9th Cir. 1974) 7 (en banc) see also United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1124(10th Cir. 2009); Landry v. A-Able 8 Bonding, Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 204-206 & n. 3-5 (5th Cir.1996)4. “[T]he bail bondsman is in the 9 business in order to make money and is not acting out of a high-minded sense of devotion to the 10 administration of justice.” Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 554-55. 11 The court does recognize that some courts outside the Ninth Circuit have held bail bond 12 agents act under color of state law when they act in concert with police officers or in some other 13 way attain the state’s authority. See, e.g., Landry, 75 F.3d at 204 (“[t]he majority of federal courts 14 that have addressed the state action issue in the context of bail bondsmen have based their 15 decisions on whether the bondsmen enlisted the assistance of law enforcement officials in 16 arresting their principals”); Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429-30 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding 17 state action where bondsman obtained aid from a police officer and relationship between 18 bondsmen and State was interdependent). Not only does the lodged second amended complaint 19 not allege any special relationship between Defendants, this court is also bound to Ninth Circuit 20 precedent. 21 The Ninth Circuit has held that bounty hunters and bail bond agents who did not comply 22 with the state statutes governing their actions are not acting under color of state law. Collins v. 23 Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 1989); Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 553-54; see also Hassett 24 25 26 4 But see Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429 (4th Cir.1987) (holding that bondsman was a state actor, where police officer assisted bondsman by gaining entrance to principal's residence, restraining an occupant of the residence, and serving warrants on an occupant of the residence). 27 28 10 1 v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 851 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.1988) (finding private misuse of state 2 statutes by private actor not sufficient under Section 1983); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Trela, 3 735 F.2d 257, 262 (7th Cir.1984) (stating that a plaintiff’s allegations that a private defendant 4 abused a statute or state procedure does not describe conduct that is actionable under Section 5 1983). Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. and the Six 6 Unknown Bail Bond Agents insist that they did not follow California law concerning bounty 7 hunters and bail bond agents. Because Plaintiff contends Defendants intentionally violated state 8 law by failing to adhere to California Penal Code § 1299, Plaintiff’s allegations are antithetical 9 to a claim that Defendants’ actions are attributable to a state policy. See Roudybush v. Zabel, 10 813 F.2d 173, 177 (8th Cir. 1987). Thus, even assuming in some circumstances that bounty 11 hunters and bail bond agents can be considered state actors, the complaint’s allegations negate 12 that Defendant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. and the Six Unknown Bail Bond Agents were 13 state actors because they allegedly violated California law. Thus, the complaint fails to state a 14 Section 1983 claim against Defendant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. 15 C. 16 Further Amendment When dismissing a complaint, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “leave to amend should be 17 granted unless the district court determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 18 allegation of other facts.” Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir.2001) (internal 19 quotation marks omitted); Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. (9th Cir. 1996). 20 However, once the court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint, the court’s 21 discretion in determining whether to allow additional opportunities to amend is particularly 22 broad. Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 794 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Miller 23 v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F .3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)); Chodos v. West Publishing Co., 24 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002). 25 26 The court finds that further amendment is not appropriate in this case. When dismissing the prior complaint, the court advised Plaintiff that any second amended complaint must be based 27 28 11 1 upon a well-founded belief that a cognizable or arguable legal theory exists that would support 2 her claims. Not only was the lodged second amended complaint submitted three months late, it 3 still fails to allege plausible claims against these Defendants. Thus, the court declines to give 4 any further leave to amend. 5 ORDER 6 Accordingly, the court ORDERS that: 7 1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED; 8 2. This action is DISMISSED for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim and failure to 9 comply with the court’s orders; 10 3. All pending motions are denied as moot; and 11 4. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close this action. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 Dated: 0m8i78 December 11, 2012 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12
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