(PC) Hawkins v. State of California et al, No. 1:2009cv01705 - Document 78 (E.D. Cal. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER ADOPTING 71 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS; Grant in Part Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice; Find Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment to be Untimely; Deny Defendant's 58 Motion for Summary Judgment signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 07/08/2015. (Flores, E)
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(PC) Hawkins v. State of California et al Doc. 78 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LEROY HAWKINS, JR. , 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants. 16 18 1) GRANT IN PART PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 2) FIND PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO BE UNTIMELY (ECF No. 71) 19 21 ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO: 3) DENY DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 17 20 CASE No. 1:09-cv-01705-LJO-MJS (PC) Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The action proceeds against 22 Defendant Bacher, whom Plaintiff alleges violated his First Amendment right of access to 23 24 25 the courts. (ECF No. 25.) On May 22, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued findings and recommendations to 26 deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, to find Plaintiff’s cross-motion for 27 summary judgment to be untimely, and to grant in part Plaintiff’s request for judicial 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 notice. (ECF No. 71.) Plaintiff filed objections to the Court’s finding that his cross-motion 2 for summary judgment was untimely (ECF No. 75); Defendant filed objections to the 3 Court’s denial of summary judgment (ECF No. 76); and Plaintiff replied to Defendant’s 4 objections (ECF No. 77). 5 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court has 6 7 conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the 8 Court finds the Findings and Recommendations to be supported by the record and by 9 proper analysis. The Court addresses Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s objections in turn. 10 11 I. Plaintiff’s Objections Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge should have considered his cross-motion 12 13 14 for summary judgment because Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. The Court concludes that summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff is not appropriate. Although the 15 Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, were sufficient to 16 support the conclusion that he had suffered actual injury under Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 17 343, 353 (1996), the Court did not find that Plaintiff had established actual injury as a 18 19 matter of law. (ECF No. 71, at 14.) Defendant disputes that Plaintiff suffered actual injury as a result of his inability to file a petition for habeas corpus. (Id., at 7.) In addition, 20 21 as discussed below, there is a dispute of fact regarding the type of assistance Plaintiff 22 requested of Defendant, and therefore whether her failure to provide it amounted to an 23 unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. Defendant has thus raised triable issues 24 of fact regarding Plaintiff’s access to court claim, so the Court rejects Plaintiff’s 25 contention that he is entitled to summary judgment. 26 27 28 II. Defendant’s Objections Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to deny summary 1 judgment and qualified immunity. Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge 2 mischaracterized the type of assistance Plaintiff sought from Defendant, and that 3 Plaintiff’s complaint and deposition indicate he only wanted her to perform legal research 4 and craft legal arguments, tasks she was neither authorized nor qualified to perform. 5 6 She also argues that as an individual with no legal training, she is not an appropriate 7 defendant for an access-to-courts claim, and that she reasonably believed her offer to 8 scribe a letter for Plaintiff was not unconstitutional. The Court rejects these contentions. 9 Plaintiff’s complaint does not indicate that he only asked Defendant for legal advice 10 and research. Rather, it indicates that he sought help from Defendant in “preparing his 11 petition” and that she told him the only assistance she could provide was in scribing a 12 13 14 letter to the court. (ECF No. 24, at 4.) Although Defendant acknowledges in her objections that she could have helped “scribe” a habeas petition, she does not indicate 15 that she ever told Plaintiff this, or that Plaintiff turned down such assistance. (ECF No. 16 76, at 5.) To the contrary, Defendant indicates that the only type of assistance she told 17 Plaintiff she could provide was the scribing of a letter, the inefficacy of which she all but 18 19 conceded she was aware. (ECF No. 63, at 6.) Therefore the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge did not misconstrue the scope of Plaintiff’s claim, and agrees that there 20 21 22 23 is a triable issue of fact regarding the type of assistance Plaintiff requested and the type of assistance Defendant did or did not provide. Similarly, while there may perhaps have been other appropriate defendants for 24 Hawkins’ access-to-courts claim, this does not mean that Peggy Bacher is not a proper 25 defendant: state officials, including library staff, may be liable for impeding inmates’ 26 access to the courts. See Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 2009)(prison 27 librarian sued on access-to-courts claim). In any case, there is no requirement that 28 1 defendants in access-to-courts cases have formal legal training. See Allen v. Sakai, 40 2 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994)(noting that “it does not require sophisticated ‘legal 3 scholarship’ to know a plaintiff’s access to the courts could be hindered seriously” by 4 denying particular services); see also, e.g., Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 5 6 2010)(plaintiff had viable access-to-courts claim against correctional officer and warden). 7 It is disingenuous for Defendant to contend that her lack of formal legal training should 8 alone absolve her of responsibility for Plaintiff’s inability to access the court when it is 9 undisputed that her duties explicitly required her to help developmentally disabled 10 11 inmates like Plaintiff gain court access (ECF Nos. 58-2, at 2, & 71, at 5), and she concedes that it would have been “well within [these] duties” to have helped Plaintiff 12 13 14 15 scribe a habeas petition, assistance it does not appear she offered to him. (ECF No. 76, at 5.) For these same reasons, the Magistrate Judge did not err in finding that 16 Defendant was not entitled, at the summary judgment stage, to qualified immunity. 17 Given the Clark Remedial Plan’s authorization of staff assistance in “completing any 18 19 forms or documents necessary to secure any rights or benefits available to nondisabled inmates” (CRP, at 8, 47) and Defendant’s agreement that scribing a petition would have 20 21 been “well within” her responsibilities (ECF No. 76, at 5), there appears to be at least a 22 material question of fact whether it was reasonable for Defendant to believe that the only 23 assistance she could provide to Plaintiff was scribing a letter she indicated she knew 24 was unlikely to advance his efforts to file a habeas petition. 25 26 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 1) The Court adopts the Findings and Recommendations filed May 22, 2015 27 (ECF No. 71) in full; 28 1 2) Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 60) is considered 2 3 untimely; 3) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 58) is DENIED; 4 4) The case is to remain open. 5 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 8, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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