Takahashi v. Farmers Insurance Group, No. 1:2009cv01668 - Document 14 (E.D. Cal. 2010)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER re: Defendant's 4 Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 3/9/2010. Plaintiffs claims under Title VII and the ADEA, contained within her Constructive Wrongful Discharge claim, are time-barred and barred by res judicata. As to the Title VII and ADEA claims, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Supplemental jurisdiction is declined over the r emaining state law claims, and they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. In all other respects, Farmerss motion to dismiss or, in alternative, motion for a more definite statement is DENIED as moot. Defendant shall submit a form of order consistent with, and within five (5) days following electronic service of, this Memorandum Decision. (Bradley, A)

Download PDF

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 Mitsue Takahashi, 09-CV-01668-OWW-SMS Plaintiff, 5 v. 6 7 8 Farmers Insurance Group Merced Office, individuals and DOES 1 through XX, inclusive, Defendants. 9 10 I. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Before the court 23 24 25 26 27 is a motion to dismiss or, in the Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange ( Farmers ) erroneously sued as Farmers Insurance Group Merced Office. The motion is directed at all claims asserted in Plaintiff Mitsue Takahashi s pro se complaint. (Doc. 1.) The following background facts are taken from the complaint and the parties submissions in connection with the motion. II. 20 22 INTRODUCTION alternative, a motion for a more definite statement filed by 19 21 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT S MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT BACKGROUND In the early 1990's, Plaintiff filed and litigated a lawsuit against Farmers concerning her termination from employment, and several events leading up to her termination. In that case, she alleged various state law employment claims. That lawsuit resulted in a judgment of nonsuit in favor of Farmers. Years later, Plaintiff filed this federal lawsuit, this time asserting federal employment claims arising out of the same circumstances. A. The 1991 Lawsuit 28 1 1 Previously, Plaintiff filed a state court lawsuit against 2 Farmers in Merced County Superior Court which both parties refer to 3 in the briefing as the 1991 lawsuit. 4 Amended Complaint ( TAC ) filed September 23, 1993, the lawsuit 5 included claims (i) for race, sex, ancestry and age discrimination 6 in violation of California s Fair Employment and Housing Act 7 ( FEHA ), California Government Code § 12940; (ii) retaliation in 8 violation 9 distress ( IIED ); (iv) breach of contract; (v) breach of an 10 implied in fact contract of employment; (vi) wrongful termination 11 in violation of public policy; and (vii) and breach of the implied 12 covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1 13 of FEHA; (iii) intentional As alleged in the Third infliction of emotional In the TAC, Plaintiff claimed that her termination violated 14 FEHA and contravened California public policy. 15 alleged discrimination in certain actions The TAC also leading up to her 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 In connection with its motion, Farmers filed a request for judicial notice of various public documents from the 1991 lawsuit, including: (1) the TAC; (2) an Order After Hearing On Defendant s Motion For Summary Judgment; (3) a Notice of Entry of Judgment; (4) a Notice of Entry of Order; and (5) an Acknowledgment of Partial Satisfaction. (Doc. 6, Exs. A-E.) In ruling on a motion to dismiss, [a] court may . . . consider certain materials-documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice-without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). A court make take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record. Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Headwaters, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005). The documents at issue here are public court filings in a state court lawsuit. Judicial notice of these documents is taken. 28 2 1 termination, 2 such as denying her promotions into upgraded positions. 3 In an order dated December 8, 1993, the Superior Court granted 4 in part and denied in part Farmers s motion for summary judgment 5 or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. (Doc. 6, Ex. B.) The 6 Superior Court determined that the IIED claim was preempted by 7 California s 8 adjudication on this claim. Otherwise, the remainder of the motion 9 was denied. Workers Compensation Act and granted summary 10 Later, at trial, the Superior Court granted a judgment of 11 nonsuit in favor of Farmers, entered December 14, 1994. (Doc. 6, 12 Ex. C.; see also Doc. 6, Ex. D at 2.) 13 nonsuit indicates, among other things, that, at trial, Plaintiff 14 failed to carry her burden on her claim for discrimination under 15 FEHA, 16 termination in violation of public policy, failed to show a causal 17 connection between protected activity and her termination from 18 employment (precluding her FEHA retaliation claim), and that good 19 cause existed for Plaintiff s termination. 20 against 21 $29,225.53. 22 B. 23 failed to carry Plaintiff on her burden February on 22, The order granting the her 1995, claim for wrongful Costs were taxed in the amount of The Current Lawsuit Fourteen years later, in September 2009, Plaintiff filed this 24 federal lawsuit. 25 Amended Complaint in state court, challenges the legality of her 26 termination 27 termination, 28 complaint from Her federal complaint, like her earlier Third employment, including includes and denying claims actions her for 3 leading promotions. (i) Wrongful up The to her federal Discharge 1 Constructive ; (ii) Conspiracy to Defraud; (iii) IIED; and (iv) 2 Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. 3 In her claim for Wrongful Discharge Constructive (referred 4 to in this order as the Constructive Wrongful Discharge claim), 5 Plaintiff 6 Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ( ADEA ) and Title VII s 7 prohibition 8 discrimination. 9 2009, Plaintiff filed a claim with the EEOC concerning her wrongful asserts on that her national termination origin, violated race, color, the and Age sex The complaint alleges that on or about June 12, 10 discharge, and the EEOC rejected the claim. The EEOC s Dismissal 11 and Notice of Rights, dated June 24, 2009, is attached to the 12 complaint as Exhibit A. 13 that it was closing Plaintiff s case because: Your charge was not 14 timely filed with the EEOC, in other words, you waited too long 15 after the date(s) of the alleged discrimination to file your 16 charge. On this EEOC document, the EEOC stated Apart from the Constructive Wrongful Discharge claim, the 17 18 remaining claims are state law claims. 19 allege 20 jurisdiction 21 supplemental jurisdiction exists over the state law claims. 22 C. diversity exists jurisdiction. over the Title The complaint does not However, VII and federal ADEA question claims, and Motion To Dismiss 23 In its motion to dismiss, Farmers argues that Plaintiff's 24 current claims are barred by the statute of limitations and by the 25 doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion). 26 Plaintiff distinguishes her current employment lawsuit from her 27 1991 lawsuit by arguing that the 1991 lawsuit contained no federal 28 claims whatsoever. In opposition, This does not address whether Plaintiff had 4 1 the unfettered opportunity to assert, in the 1991 lawsuit, any and 2 all federal claims she had arising out of her employment with 3 Farmers. 4 III. 5 6 7 A. STANDARDS OF DECISION Motion To Dismiss Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the 8 complaint lacks sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 9 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 10 Cir. 1990). To sufficiently state a claim for relief and survive 11 a 12(b)(6) motion, the pleading does not need detailed factual 12 allegations but the [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise 13 a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. 14 Twombly, 15 insufficiency, a complaint is also subject to dismissal under Rule 16 12(b)(6) where it lacks a cognizable legal theory, Balistreri, 901 17 F.2d at 699, or where the allegations show that relief is barred 18 for some legal reason, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Apart from factual 19 Res judicata can be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 20 dismiss, see Intri Plex Technologies, Inc. v. Crest Group, Inc., 21 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007), as long as evaluating the 22 motion does not require an examination of materials not permitted 23 in a motion to dismiss. 24 dismiss, 25 pleadings, it must normally convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 26 56 motion for summary judgment, and it must give the nonmoving 27 party an opportunity to respond. United States v. Ritchie, 342 28 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). A court may, however, consider if a district When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to court considers 5 evidence outside the 1 certain materials-documents attached to the complaint, documents 2 incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial 3 notice-without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 4 summary judgment. Id. at 908. 5 dismiss on res judicata grounds, disputed issues of fact are 6 raised, the defense cannot be resolved. See Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 7 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). 8 B. If, in evaluating a motion to Motion For A More Definite Statement 9 If a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner 10 that provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a more 11 definite 12 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). 13 12(e), [a] party may move for a more definite statement of a 14 pleading when it is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot 15 reasonably prepare a response. statement under Rule 12(e) before responding. Under Rule 16 IV. 17 A 18 review of DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS Plaintiff s attached to federal the complaint, complaint, and the the EEOC 19 documentation judicially 20 noticeable public records from the 1991 lawsuit, reveal that 21 Plaintiff s current Title VII and ADEA claims, which are contained 22 within the Constructive Wrongful Discharge claim, are time-barred 23 and barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. 24 claims are subject to dismissal and supplemental jurisdiction will 25 be declined over the remaining state law claims. 26 A. These federal Title VII and ADEA Claims 27 1. Time-barred 28 A person seeking relief under Title VII must first file a 6 1 charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful 2 employment practice, or, if . . . the person initially instituted 3 proceedings with the state or local administrative agency, within 4 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Surrell v. 5 Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). 7 person to file a charge with the EEOC before initiating a civil 8 action for age discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Ordinarily, the 9 person must file that charge within 180 days of the alleged 10 discriminatory act. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). However, when the state 11 where the act occurred has its own age discrimination law and its 12 own 13 extends the time to 300 days. Sanchez v. Pac. Powder Co., 147 F.3d 14 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998). 15 Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006); Bouman 16 v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1991). enforcement agency-a Similarly, [t]he ADEA requires a so-called deferral state -the ADEA California is a deferral state. 17 Here, as alleged in her state court complaint, Plaintiff was 18 ultimately terminated from employment at Farmers on or about 19 February 15, 1993.2 20 and events leading up to her termination, in the state court 21 lawsuit. 22 of Farmers in December 1994. Years later, Plaintiff, as alleged in 23 her federal complaint, submitted a charge of discrimination to the 24 EEOC on or about June 12, 2009, regarding her purported wrongful 25 termination from Farmers. 26 300-day time limitation applies, Plaintiff filed her charge of 27 28 She litigated the legality of her termination, That lawsuit resulted in a judgment of nonsuit in favor Regardless of whether the 180-day or 2 Plaintiff does not dispute the validity allegation regarding the date of termination. 7 of her own 1 discrimination with the EEOC over fifteen years beyond any possible 2 deadline for her claims. 3 claims are time-barred. Accordingly, her Title VII and ADEA 4 2. Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) 5 Even assuming the Title VII and ADEA claims are not time- 6 barred, they are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. To 7 determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, federal 8 courts look to state law. Intri-Plex Techs., 499 F.3d at 1052. 9 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts must give full faith and 10 credit to judgments of state courts. Section 1738 does not allow 11 federal courts to employ their own preclusion rules in determining 12 the preclusive effect of state judgments. Rather, it ... commands 13 a federal court to accept the rules chosen by the State from which 14 the judgment is taken. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 15 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 California law on claim preclusion is well established: [t]he 17 application of claim preclusion in California focuses on three 18 questions: (1) was the previous adjudication on the merits, (2) was 19 it final, and (3) does the current dispute involve the same claim 20 or cause of action ? Kay v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 504 F.3d 21 803, 808 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 California law also contains a fourth requirement for res judicata 23 to attach: [t]he party against whom the bar is asserted must have 24 been a party, or in privity with a party, to the first proceeding. 25 Ferraro v. Camarlinghi, 161 Cal. App. 4th 509, 531 (2008) (emphasis 26 and internal quotation marks omitted). 27 claim preclusion are met here. 28 First, the nonsuit granted 8 in All the requirements for favor of Farmers was an 1 adjudication on the merits. The state court order specifies that 2 the nonsuit was granted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 3 section 581c(a). 4 judgment of nonsuit, specifically provides that [i]f the motion is 5 granted, unless the court in its order for judgment otherwise 6 specifies, the judgment of nonsuit operates as an adjudication upon 7 the merits. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 581c(c) (emphasis added). 8 Here, the Superior Court did not specify that the judgment of 9 nonsuit would not operate as an adjudication on the merits. That section, which deals with motions for To the 10 contrary, the order specifically states that it shall operate as 11 an adjudication on the merits. 12 judgment of nonsuit was an adjudication on the merits, and the 13 first element of claim preclusion is satisfied. 14 Accordingly, the state court Second, the judgment of nonsuit is also final. Unlike the 15 federal rule and that of several states, in California the rule is 16 that the finality required to invoke the preclusive bar of res 17 judicata is not achieved until an appeal from the trial court 18 judgment has been exhausted or the time to appeal has expired. 19 Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising, 85 20 Cal. App. 4th 1168, 1174 (2000) (citation omitted). Here, the time 21 to appeal the December 1994 judgment of nonsuit has long since 22 expired. 23 24 25 26 27 28 The second element of claim preclusion is satisfied. To determine whether the same claim or cause of action is involved, as explained by the Ninth Circuit in Kay: California has consistently applied the primary rights' theory, under which the invasion of one primary right gives rise to a single cause of action. . . . California's primary rights' theory does not mean that different causes of action are involved just because relief may be obtained under ... either of two legal theories. Res judicata [claim preclusion] prevents 9 litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding. 1 2 3 504 F.3d at 809 (alteration in original) (citations and internal 4 quotation marks omitted); see also Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass n v. 5 City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1993) ( California, 6 as most states, recognizes that the doctrine of res judicata will 7 bar not only claims actually litigated in a prior proceeding, but 8 also claims that could have been litigated. ) (citing Busick v. 9 Workmen s Compensation Appeals Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 967, 975 (1972)). 10 The primary right at issue here is Plaintiff s right to be 11 free 12 including denying her promotions and terminating her employment for 13 unlawful 14 litigated these adverse employment actions in the 1991 lawsuit, 15 which resulted in a judgment of nonsuit against her. 16 asserted only state law claims in the 1991 lawsuit, her current 17 federal Title VII and ADEA claims represent only new theories of 18 liability arising out of the same adverse actions, not different 19 causes of action. See Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666, 681-82 20 (1994) ( Even where there are multiple legal theories upon which 21 recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise to only one 22 claim for relief. ) (internal quotation marks omitted); Takahashi 23 v. Bd. of Educ., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1464, 1476 (1988) ( [P]laintiff 24 specifically 25 dismissal 26 discharge, discharge in violation of state civil rights) or was a 27 consequence of the termination (emotional distress, damages), part from unlawfully reasons. alleges (wrongful motivated Through that her each discharge, 28 10 adverse state act employment law claims, complained conspiracy, of actions, Plaintiff Although she caused the unconstitutional 1 and parcel of the violation of the single primary right, the single 2 harm suffered. ). 3 could have litigated, her Title VII and ADEA claims in the state 4 court lawsuit. 5 preclusion is satisfied. Plaintiff had full opportunity to raise, and For these reasons, the third element of claim 6 The fourth and final requirement is that [t]he party against 7 whom the bar is asserted must have been a party, or in privity with 8 a party, to the first proceeding." Ferraro, 161 Cal. App. 4th at 9 531. Here, the party against whom claim preclusion is asserted, 10 Plaintiff, is an identical party (the plaintiff) from the 1991 11 lawsuit. 12 With all the requirements for claim preclusion established, 13 Plaintiff s Title VII and ADEA claims are barred on res judicata 14 grounds. 15 B. 16 Supplemental Jurisdiction The remaining claims in Plaintiff s federal complaint are 17 state law claims. 18 may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law 19 claims if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which 20 it has original jurisdiction." 21 before trial ... pendant state claims also should be dismissed." 22 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367-68 (9th Cir. 23 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brown v. Lucky 24 Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the 25 propriety of dismissing supplemental state law claims without 26 prejudice when the district court has dismissed the federal claims 27 over which it had original jurisdiction). 28 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court "When federal claims are dismissed Discretion is exercised to decline supplemental jurisdiction. 11 1 This lawsuit is at an early stage and no judicial resources have 2 been spent on analyzing the merits of Plaintiff s state law claims. 3 The state law claims present no issues of federal interest. 4 state court is in a better position to address state law claims. 5 Supplemental jurisdiction is declined over the state law claims, 6 and they are dismissed without prejudice. The V. CONCLUSION 7 8 For the reasons stated: 9 1. Plaintiff s claims under Title VII and the ADEA, 10 contained within her Constructive Wrongful Discharge claim, are 11 time-barred and barred by res judicata. 12 ADEA claims, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and these claims are 13 DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 2. 14 15 As to the Title VII and Supplemental jurisdiction is declined over the remaining state law claims, and they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 3. 16 In all other respects, Farmers s motion to dismiss or, in 17 alternative, motion for a more definite statement is DENIED as 18 moot. Defendant shall submit a form of order consistent with, and 19 20 within five (5) 21 Memorandum Decision. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: 9i274f March 9, 2010 days following electronic service /s/ Oliver W. Wanger UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 12 of, this

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.