(HC) Heredia-Oliva v. Sugrue, No. 1:2009cv01646 - Document 22 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER DIRECTING the Clerk to Substitute Neil Adler, Warden, as Respondent Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); ORDER DENYING 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; and ORDER DIRECTING the Clerk to Enter Judgment in Favor of Respondent, signed by Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto on 6/20/2010. CASE CLOSED. (Jessen, A)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
(HC) Heredia-Oliva v. Sugrue Doc. 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 10 ABRAHAM HEREDIA-OLIVA, 11 Petitioner, 12 v. 13 NEIL ADLER, Warden, 14 Respondent. 15 16 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 1:09-cv—1646-SKO-HC ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO SUBSTITUTE NEIL ADLER, WARDEN, AS RESPONDENT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d) ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. 1) ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT 17 Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in 18 forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant 19 to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to the parties’ consent,1 the 20 matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for all 21 proceedings, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to 22 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b), and Local Rule 301. 23 Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on 24 July 21, 2009, in the District of Arizona, and transferred to 25 this Court on September 18, 2009. Respondent filed an answer 26 27 28 1 Petitioner filed a signed, written consent form on September 28, 2009; Respondent John Sugrue filed a written consent form signed by an authorized representative on December 15, 2009 and March 4, 2010. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 entitled as a response, on March 9, 2010. 2 traverse, entitled “BRIEF ON REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S RESPONSE,” on 3 March 29, 2010. Petitioner filed a 4 I. Background 5 When the petition was initially filed, Petitioner was 6 incarcerated at the Correctional Institution in California City, 7 California (CICC). 8 transferred to the Correctional Institution in Taft, California 9 (TCI), where he is presently incarcerated. 10 (Pet. 1.) In 2010, Petitioner was (Not., doc. 15.) Petitioner is serving a sentence of fifty-one (51) months 11 for having illegally reentered the United States after 12 deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). 13 2.) 14 supervised release after serving his term. 15 was pronounced on May 30, 2008. 16 (Resp. Att. 1, Petitioner was sentenced to thirty-six (36) months of (Id.) The judgment (Id. at 4.) Petitioner’s sole contention is that the Bureau of Prisons 17 (BOP) erroneously calculated his good conduct time (GCT) pursuant 18 to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). 19 requires the BOP to award fifty-four (54) days of GCT for each 20 year of imprisonment to which Petitioner was sentenced instead of 21 for each year actually served by Petitioner. 22 that if the statute were applied as he urges, then Petitioner’s 23 release date would change from November 15, 2010, to October 15, 24 2010. Petitioner argues that the statute Petitioner contends (Pet. 6.) 25 II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 26 Respondent correctly concedes that this action, which 27 concerns alleged violations of federal law making conditions, 28 place, or duration of confinement illegal, was properly brought 2 1 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 2 writ of habeas corpus extends to a prisoner in custody under the 3 authority of the United States who shows that the custody 4 violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 5 States. 6 challenges the validity or constitutionality of his conviction 7 must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 8 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner challenging the manner, 9 location, or conditions of the execution of a sentence must bring (Resp. 3.) 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Relief by way of a Although a federal prisoner who 10 a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 11 Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2000). 12 district court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 2241 13 over a claim concerning the BOP’s failure to consider whether a 14 prisoner was entitled to time credit because such a challenge is 15 to the manner in which the sentence is being executed. 16 Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1991). 17 A Tucker v. III. Jurisdiction over Respondent and Substitution of Neil Adler, Warden, as Respondent 18 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides that writs of habeas 19 corpus may be granted by the district courts “within their 20 respective jurisdictions.” A writ of habeas corpus operates not 21 upon the prisoner, but upon the prisoner’s custodian. Braden v. 22 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-495 23 (1973). A petitioner filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus 24 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial 25 district of the petitioner's custodian. Brown v. United States, 26 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). The warden of the 27 penitentiary where a prisoner is confined constitutes the 28 3 1 custodian who must be named in the petition, and the petition 2 must be filed in the district of confinement. 3 Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 446-47 (2004). 4 custodian is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at 5 the time the petition is filed; transfer of the petitioner 6 thereafter does not defeat personal jurisdiction that has once 7 been properly established. 8 (1948), overruled on other grounds in Braden v. 30th Judicial 9 Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. at 193, citing Ex parte Id.; Rumsfeld v. It is sufficient if the Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 193 10 Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 305 (1944); Francis v. Rison, 894 11 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990). 12 custodian deprives the Court of personal jurisdiction. 13 v. Reilly, 349 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2003). 14 A failure to name and serve the Johnson Here, Petitioner was incarcerated within the district at the 15 time the petition was filed, and he is presently incarcerated in 16 the district. 17 The petition names John Sugrue, Warden of CICC, as 18 Respondent. 19 TCI, Petitioner’s immediate custodian has been Neil Adler. 20 (Resp. 2.) 21 (Resp. 2), which the Court finds is reasonably interpreted as a 22 waiver of any objection to jurisdiction over the person. 23 Respondent notes that since Petitioner’s transfer to Respondent then waives any objection “on this basis,” Although 28 U.S.C. § 2242 requires that the petition name 24 the person who has custody over the petitioner and the authority 25 or claim by virtue of which custody is maintained, it is 26 established that this requirement is akin to personal 27 jurisdiction and is subject to the general rule that objections 28 to personal jurisdiction may be waived. 4 Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 1 F.3d 991, 993-94, 994 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Rumsfeld v. 2 Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 433-34, 434 n. 7, 452-53 (2004) and Smith 3 v. Idaho, 392 F.3d 350, 354-56 (9th Cir. 2004)) (petition brought 4 pursuant to § 2241)). 5 The Court concludes that Petitioner’s immediate custodian, 6 Warden Neil Adler, is an appropriate respondent in this action, 7 and that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), he should be 8 substituted in place of John Sugrue, Warden. 9 10 Respondent further waives any defect if personal service on the custodian of the Petitioner has not been effected. 11 The Court notes Respondent’s waivers and concludes that the 12 Court has jurisdiction over the person of Petitioner’s custodian 13 and is acting within its jurisdiction within the meaning of 28 14 U.S.C. § 2241(a). 15 IV. 16 As a “prudential matter,” federal prisoners are generally Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 17 required to exhaust available administrative remedies before 18 bringing a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 19 v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Castro- 20 Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001)); Martinez v. 21 Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). 22 that Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies. 23 (Resp. 3.) 24 Huang Respondent concedes V. Calculation of Good Credit Time pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) 25 Title 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) provides in pertinent part: 26 27 (b) Credit toward service of sentence for satisfactory behavior.-- 28 (1) Subject to paragraph (2), a prisoner who is serving 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the prisoner's life, may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner's sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner's term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term, subject to determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. Subject to paragraph (2), if the Bureau determines that, during that year, the prisoner has not satisfactorily complied with such institutional regulations, the prisoner shall receive no such credit toward service of the prisoner's sentence or shall receive such lesser credit as the Bureau determines to be appropriate. In awarding credit under this section, the Bureau shall consider whether the prisoner, during the relevant period, has earned, or is making satisfactory progress toward earning, a high school diploma or an equivalent degree. Credit that has not been earned may not later be granted. Subject to paragraph (2), credit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the sentence. (2) Notwithstanding any other law, credit awarded under this subsection after the date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act shall vest on the date the prisoner is released from custody. 16 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). 17 Petitioner argues that the phrase “term of imprisonment” 18 consistently refers to the sentence imposed, rather than to the 19 time actually served. Further, he contends that the statute 20 requires the credit to be applied during the last part of the 21 year, and not after the year is over. (Pet. 4, 7.) Petitioner 22 thus argues that he is presently entitled to credit calculated by 23 multiplying fifty-four (54) days by the number of years of 24 imprisonment to which Petitioner was sentenced. Petitioner 25 argues that his interpretation is required by the plain meaning 26 of the words in the statute, linguistics, legislative history and 27 Congressional intent, the need to construe consistently a term 28 6 1 that appears repeatedly in a statute, and the rule of lenity 2 requiring construction of a penal statute in favor of the 3 defendant. 4 (Pet. 7-11.) The BOP argues that a prisoner is entitled to a maximum 5 annual credit of fifty-four (54) days of GCT for each full year 6 of imprisonment that the prisoner serves, and a proportionally 7 adjusted amount of credit for any additional time served that is 8 less than a full year. 9 each year of imprisonment except during the last year of the The BOP awards the credit at the end of 10 sentence in which, pursuant to the statute’s directions 11 concerning proration and credit, the calculation occurs during 12 the last six weeks of the sentence. 13 In Barber v. Thomas, - S.Ct., No. 09-5201, 2010 WL 2243706, 14 *2 (U.S. June 7, 2010), the Court held that the BOP’s method of 15 calculating GCT was consistent with the most natural reading of 16 the statute, and the Court rejected the very arguments that 17 Petitioner has raised in this proceeding. 18 express language in § 3624(b) concerning receipt of credit “at 19 the end of each year” and the inconsistency of a contrary 20 position with the express terms of the statute. 21 Court reviewed the legislative history and concluded that 22 Congress had intended to change the previous system, in which a 23 prisoner was entitled to a deduction for credit on the day on 24 which the sentence commenced to run, subject to forfeiture for 25 misbehavior. 26 statute provides for the earning of credit at the end of the year 27 based on the prisoner’s behavior. 28 that the BOP’s method tied an award of GCT directly to good The Court noted the Id. *5. The The Court noted that in contrast, the present 7 Id. *5. The Court reasoned 1 behavior and better furthered the statute’s basic purpose, which 2 was to achieve uniform, essentially determinate terms absent a 3 reduction for good conduct. 4 inapposite the rule of lenity that requires that criminal 5 statutes be construed in favor of the defendant. 6 Court concluded that even if § 3624(b) could be construed as 7 imposing a criminal penalty, the rule of lenity did not apply 8 because after considering the text, structure, history, and 9 purpose of the statute, the Court discerned no grievous ambiguity Id. *5-*6. The Court found Id. *9. 10 or uncertainty in the statute. 11 petitioners not to defer to the BOP’s interpretation and 12 implementation of § 3624(b), the Court stated: 13 14 15 16 17 Id. at *9. The When urged by the In our view, the BOP’s calculation system applies that statute as its language is most naturally read, and in accordance with what that language makes clear is its basic purpose. No one doubts that the BOP has the legal power to implement the statute in accordance with its language and purposes; hence we need not determine the extent to which Congress has granted the BOP authority to interpret the statute more broadly, or differently than it has one here. Cf. Chevron, supra, at 944-845. 18 Barber v. Thomas, 2010 WL 2243706, *9-*11. 19 The controversy in the present case is governed by Barber v. 20 Thomas. The BOP’s interpretation and application of the statute 21 are consistent with the most natural reading of the language of 22 the statute when viewed in the context of the basic, statutory 23 purpose. The BOP’s method of calculating Petitioner’s GCT 24 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) with reference to years actually 25 served by Petitioner, as distinct from years to which Petitioner 26 was sentenced, was not erroneous or unfair. Petitioner has not 27 shown that he has failed to receive GCT to which he is entitled. 28 8 1 VI. Disposition 2 In summary, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s petition 3 for writ of habeas corpus should be denied. 4 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 5 1) The Clerk of the Court SUBSTITUTE Neil Adler, Warden, as 6 Respondent in this action; 7 8 2) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED with prejudice; and 9 3) The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 Dated: ie14hj June 20, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
