(HC) Corley v. Dickinson, No. 1:2009cv01607 - Document 23 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER Directing the Substitution of Respondent Matthew Cate in Place of Former Respondent C. Dickinson pursuant to F.R.C.P. 25(d); ORDER Directing Respondent to Lodge Additional Records and to File a Supplemental Brief Regarding the Motion to Dismiss 15 no later than thirty days after the date of service of this order; ORDER Permitting Petitioner to File a Supplemental Response no later thatn thirty days after Respondent's Service of the Supplemental Brief on Petitioner; ORDER DENYING 8 6 2 Motion for Reconsideration of his Motion for the Appointment of Counsel, signed by Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto on 05/11/2010. (Supplemental Brief due: 06/14/2010) (Martin, S)
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(HC) Corley v. Dickinson Doc. 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 ANTHONY LEE CORLEY, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) ) v. ) ) MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of the) California Department of ) Corrections and ) Rehabilitation, ) ) Respondent. ) ) ) 18 1:09-cv—01607-SKO-HC ORDER DIRECTING THE SUBSTITUTION OF RESPONDENT MATTHEW CATE IN PLACE OF FORMER RESPONDENT C. DICKINSON PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d) ORDER DIRECTING RESPONDENT TO LODGE ADDITIONAL RECORDS AND TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF REGARDING THE MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 15) NO LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF SERVICE OF THIS ORDER ORDER PERMITTING PETITIONER TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE NO LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER RESPONDENT’S SERVICE OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON PETITIONER 19 20 21 ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF HIS MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (DOCS. 8, 6, 2) 22 23 24 25 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 26 pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 27 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case, 2 including the entry of final judgment, by manifesting their 3 consent in writings signed by the parties or their 4 representatives and filed by Petitioner on September 21, 2009, 5 and on behalf of Respondent on February 10, 2010. 6 I. Substitution of Respondent Matthew Cate 7 In connection with a motion to dismiss the action for 8 untimeliness filed on March 9, 2010 (doc. 15 at 1, n. 1), 9 Respondent requested that the Court substitute Matthew Cate, 10 Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and 11 Rehabilitation (CDCR), as Respondent in this action. 12 is unopposed. The request 13 Respondent represented that Petitioner is currently 14 incarcerated out of state and that thus, the Secretary of the 15 CDCR would be the appropriate respondent in this action. 16 Respondent requested that the substitution occur pursuant to Fed. 17 R. Civ. P. 25(d), which provides that a court may at any time 18 order substitution of a public officer who is a party in an 19 official capacity whose predecessor dies, resigns, or otherwise 20 ceases to hold office. 21 (Id.) Title 28 U.S.C. § 2242 provides that a petition for writ of 22 habeas corpus shall allege the name of the person who has custody 23 over the applicant. 24 2254 Cases in the District Courts (Habeas Rules) provides that if 25 the petitioner is currently in custody under a state-court 26 judgment, the petition must name as respondent the state officer 27 who has custody. 28 destroys personal jurisdiction. Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section A failure to name the proper respondent Stanley v. California Supreme 2 1 2 Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). Although petitions brought by federal prisoners must be 3 filed in the district of confinement, petitions brought by 4 prisoners in custody under a judgment and sentence of a state 5 court of a state which, as California, contains two or more 6 federal judicial districts, are subject to the terms of 28 U.S.C. 7 § 2241(d), which expressly 1) permits a state prisoner to file a 8 petition in either the district where the person is in custody or 9 in the district in which the state court was held which convicted 10 and sentenced the prisoner, and 2) vests concurrent jurisdiction 11 in both courts. 12 Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (state prisoner may bring petition 13 in the federal district where he is confined or in the federal 14 district where the sentencing court is located); see, Ortiz- 15 Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1996). 16 Here, the petition, in which Petitioner challenges 17 convictions suffered in Stanislaus County, was transferred to 18 this district, in which the state court was located that 19 convicted and sentenced Petitioner. 20 personal jurisdiction over the Respondent. 21 Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Thus, the Court obtained The proper respondent to a habeas petition is the person who 22 has custody over the petitioner. 23 statutes contemplate a proceeding against a person who has the 24 immediate custody of the prisoner and the power to produce the 25 body of the prisoner. 26 (2004). The Habeas Rules do not expressly specify the warden of 27 the petitioner’s custodial institution as the proper respondent; 28 however, the Advisory Committee Note to Habeas Rule 2 indicates 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2243. The Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 3 1 that the warden and the chief officer in charge of the state 2 penal institutions are appropriately considered as the state 3 officer having custody. 4 California Director of Corrections in place of the warden of the 5 institution where a petitioner is housed does not deprive the 6 court of personal jurisdiction over the respondent where the 7 petitioner is a state prisoner bringing a challenge to a 8 conviction sustained within the jurisdiction of the California 9 CDC. It has been held that naming the Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894-95 (9th Cir. 10 1996). 11 has the power to produce a prisoner depends in part upon the 12 state law governing the penal system of the state in question. 13 Id. at 895. 14 significant the fact that both the warden of a California prison 15 and California’s Director of Corrections had the power to produce 16 the prisoner, both might receive service of process, and the laws 17 of the state put the custody of the prisoner in the director. 18 The court concluded that under those circumstances, in cases 19 where a prisoner has been transferred or where his immediate 20 custodian has otherwise been put in doubt, the Director of 21 Corrections serves as an effective respondent and eliminates 22 procedural roadblocks to resolution on the merits. 23 Whether a state official has custody of a prisoner and In Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, the court found Id. at 896. As of July 1, 2005, Cal. Pen. Code § 5050 abolished the 24 office of the Director of Corrections and provided that any 25 reference to the Director of Corrections in any code refers to 26 the Secretary of the CDCR. 27 28 The Court therefore concludes that Matthew Cate, Secretary of the CDCR, is an appropriate respondent in this action, and 4 1 that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), he should be substituted 2 in place of C. Dickinson. 3 II. Supplemental Input regarding the Pending Motion to Dismiss 4 On May 9, 2010, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss this 5 action for untimeliness. The Court has reviewed the papers 6 submitted in support of the motion and notes that lodged document 7 number 8, an order of the Stanislaus County Superior Court dated 8 January 3, 2007, refers to the Stanislaus court’s having denied a 9 previous writ on November 15, 2006, and expressly refers to the 10 previous decision of that date. The Court has reviewed the 11 remaining papers lodged in support of the motion and cannot 12 locate the previous petition for writ or any decision of the 13 Stanislaus County Superior Court with respect to that petition. 14 It appears that in order for the Court fully to consider the 15 issues pertinent to the motion to dismiss, the earlier petition 16 and the ruling on the petition must be lodged with this Court. 17 Further, both Respondent and Petitioner will be given an 18 opportunity to file additional briefing concerning the 19 significance of the missing proceedings and the precise effect, 20 if any, on the computation of the running of the statute of 21 limitations. 22 23 III. Petitioner’s Motion to Reconsider His Motion to Appoint Counsel 24 On July 9, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion for the 25 appointment of counsel (doc. 2) on the grounds that he was unable 26 to afford to employ counsel, he was unschooled in the law and 27 unable to comply with unspecified processes and rules of the 28 Court, and he wanted to avoid dismissal of his petition for 5 1 technical defects. 2 Petitioner’s motion on the grounds that the interests of justice 3 did not merit appointment based on Petitioner’s lack of legal 4 training (doc. 6). 5 On September 15, 2009, the Court denied On September 28, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion for 6 reconsideration of his motion for counsel (doc. 8). 7 that he should be given counsel because he had raised multiple 8 issues in the petition concerning the alleged ineffectiveness of 9 his trial counsel in connection with not only the proceedings 10 leading up to Petitioner’s guilty pleas but also the sentence 11 imposed. 12 13 He argued (Doc. 8 at 1, 4, 7.) A. Standards for Appointment of Counsel There currently exists no absolute right to appointment of 14 counsel in habeas proceedings. 15 F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 889 (1958); 16 Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 17 U.S. 823 (1984). 18 See e.g., Anderson v. Heinze, 258 A Magistrate Judge may appoint counsel at any stage of a 19 habeas corpus proceeding if the interests of justice require it. 20 18 U.S.C. § 3006A; Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 21 Cases. A district court evaluates the likelihood of a 22 petitioner’s success on the merits and the ability of a 23 petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 24 complexity of the legal issues involved. 25 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). 26 27 28 Weygandt v. Look, 718 B. Relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) Motions for reconsideration may be considered pursuant to the standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b). 6 United States 1 v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2 2001). 3 Petitioner does not appear to state grounds sufficient to 4 warrant relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), which is 5 appropriate when there are highly unusual circumstances, the 6 district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, the 7 district court committed clear error, or a change in controlling 8 law intervenes. 9 Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Oregon v. To avoid being 10 frivolous, such a motion must provide a valid ground for 11 reconsideration. 12 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986). 13 pursuant to Rule 59(e) must be filed no later than twenty-eight 14 (28) days after the entry of the judgment. 15 59(e). 16 See, MCIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d A motion to alter or amend a judgment Fed. R. Civ. P. Here, there has been no demonstration of unusual 17 circumstances, newly discovered evidence, or intervening change 18 in controlling law. 19 clearly erroneous; Petitioner’s alleged denial of a right to 20 counsel at a point in criminal proceedings when he had a 21 constitutional right to counsel does not bear upon the likelihood 22 of his success in this proceeding, in which it has not yet been 23 determined whether an evidentiary hearing will take place. 24 is no showing that the interests of justice require the 25 appointment of counsel. 26 The denial of Petitioner’s motion was not There B. Relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the 28 reconsideration of final orders of the district court. 7 The rule 1 permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or 2 judgment on grounds including but not limited to 1) mistake, 3 inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 2) newly discovered 4 evidence; 3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an 5 opposing party; or 4) any other reason justifying relief from the 6 operation of the judgment. 7 reconsideration must be made within a reasonable time, and in 8 some instances, within one year after entry of the order. 9 R. Civ. P. 60(c). 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The motion for Fed. Rule 60(b) generally applies to habeas corpus proceedings. 11 See, Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530-36 (2005). 12 the Court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order, 13 Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994), motions for 14 reconsideration are disfavored. 15 must show more than a disagreement with the Court's decision and 16 offer more than a restatement of the cases and arguments 17 considered by the Court before rendering the original decision. 18 United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 19 (E.D. Cal. 2001). 20 60(b)(1) are committed to the discretion of the trial court, 21 Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983), which can 22 reconsider interlocutory orders and redetermine applications 23 because of an intervening change in controlling law, the 24 availability of new evidence or an expanded factual record, or 25 the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. 26 Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 27 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other 28 grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). Although A party seeking reconsideration Motions to reconsider pursuant to Rule 8 1 Local Rule 230(j) provides that whenever any motion has been 2 granted or denied in whole or in part, and a subsequent motion 3 for reconsideration is made upon the same or any alleged 4 different set of facts, counsel shall present to the Judge or 5 Magistrate Judge to whom such subsequent motion is made an 6 affidavit or brief, as appropriate, setting forth the material 7 facts and circumstances surrounding each motion for which 8 reconsideration is sought, including information concerning the 9 previous judge and decision, what new or different facts or 10 circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were 11 not shown upon such prior motion, what other grounds exist for 12 the motion, and why the facts or circumstances were not shown at 13 the time of the prior motion. 14 15 16 17 Here, Petitioner has not shown any facts or law that reflect any abuse of discretion, clear error, or manifest injustice. The Court therefore will deny Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 18 IV. Disposition 19 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 20 1) The request of Respondent C. Dickinson to substitute 21 Matthew Cate, Secretary of the California Department of 22 Corrections and Rehabilitation, is GRANTED, and Matthew Cate, 23 Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and 24 Rehabilitation, is SUBSTITUTED as Respondent in this action; 25 2) Respondent is DIRECTED to lodge no later than thirty (30) 26 days after the date of service of this order the decision of the 27 Stanislaus County Superior Court dated November 15, 2006, on 28 Petitioner’s petition for writ previously filed in that court, 9 1 and the petition addressed by the decision of November 15, 2006; 2 3) Respondent is DIRECTED to file no later than thirty (30) 3 days after the date of service of this order a supplemental brief 4 concerning the legal effect of the proceedings relating to the 5 Stanislaus County Superior Court’s decision of November 15, 2006, 6 on the issues raised in the motion to dismiss, including but not 7 limited to the computation of the running of the statute of 8 limitations; 9 4) Petitioner may FILE a supplemental response no later than 10 thirty (30) days after the date of Respondent’s service of the 11 supplemental filings on Petitioner; and 12 13 5) Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of Petitioner’s motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED. 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 Dated: ie14hj May 11, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10
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