James v. Sheklanian, et al., No. 1:2008cv01943 - Document 97 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial, Signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 9/3/2010. For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED: 1) Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict is DENIED; 2) Plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment is DENIED; 3) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to vacate the judgment; Plaintiff's motion for a new trial is GRANTED; and 5) A new trial date shall be set in accordance with the new parties' early availability. (Arellano, S.)
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James v. Sheklanian, et al. Doc. 97 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 8 1:08-cv-01943-OWW-GSA JOHN JUSTIN JAMES, 9 AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (Doc. 85) Plaintiff, 10 v. 11 12 SHANT SHEKLANIAN, 13 Defendants. 14 I. 15 INTRODUCTION. 16 On April 28, 2010, the jury returned its verdict in this 17 action. The jury found that Madera Police Officer Shant Sheklanian 18 (“Defendant”) unlawfully used excessive force in the arrest of John 19 James (“Plaintiff”) in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 20 rights under the U.S. Constitution. 21 also found that Defendant’s Fourth Amendment violation was not the 22 cause 23 instructions on the verdict form, the jury made no finding as to 24 damages. of harm or damage to (Doc. 79). Plaintiff. However, the jury (Id.). Following 25 On May 28, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking: (1) to set 26 aside the judgment; (2) to grant judgment as a matter of law; (3) 27 to amend the judgment; or (4) a new trial. 28 filed opposition to Plaintiff’s motion on June 17, 2010. (Doc. 89). (Doc. 85). Defendant 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 The court issued a Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff’s motion on August 26, 2010. 3 4 (Doc. 94). Defendant filed a request for clarification of the Memorandum Decision on September 1, 2010 (Doc. 96). II. 5 FACTUAL BACKGROUND.1 6 On January 26, 2007, at or about 11:20 p.m., an altercation 7 arose inside the Back Street Bar & Grill in Madera (“the Bar”), 8 California. 9 several individuals began fighting in the street. Plaintiff exited 10 the Bar and attempted to intervene in a confrontation between one 11 of his friends and another person. 12 Madera Police Officers arrived at the scene. Approximately 20 to 30 patrons exited the bar, and A few moments later, several 13 Although the circumstances surrounding Defendant’s use of 14 force on Plaintiff are subject to dispute, it is undisputed that 15 Defendant tackled Plaintiff, punched Plaintiff after tackling him, 16 and later utilized his taser on Plaintiff. 17 arrested, placed in the back of a patrol car, and taken to a local 18 hospital where he was treated for his injuries. 19 approximately $466 dollars for medical care related to the injuries 20 he sustained on January 26, 2007. Plaintiff was then Plaintiff paid 21 Plaintiff testified that the taser strike was “very painful” 22 and that he had “a lot of pain” in his left shoulder for about 23 three weeks after the attack. 24 Plaintiff’s chest area and where not removed until Plaintiff 25 arrived at the hospital, where his wounds were treated. Plaintiff Two taser barbs where lodged in 26 1 27 28 The facts material to the instant motion are those relevant to the issue of whether it is possible to reconcile the jury’s finding of excessive force with the jury’s finding that Defendant did not cause Plaintiff harm. This factual history is limited accordingly. 2 1 also sustained 2 Plaintiff stated that he experienced limitations with respect to 3 his ability to lift items over two pounds, to lay down with his 4 arms 5 activities. 6 shoulder persisted. in a certain laceration positions, and a knot to above engage his in left eye. recreational At the time of trial, tension and pain in Plaintiff’s III. LEGAL STANDARD. 7 8 9 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 provides, in pertinent part: 10 If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue 11 12 13 14 15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. A renewed motion for judgment as a matter of 16 law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) is properly 17 granted "if the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to 18 the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, and 19 that conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict.” E.g. Harper v. 20 City of L.A., 533 F.3d 1010, 1021 (9th Cir. 2008)(citation 21 omitted). "A jury's verdict must be upheld if it is supported by 22 substantial evidence, which is evidence adequate to support the 23 jury's conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary 24 conclusion." Id. 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 states in part, "A new 26 trial may be granted . . . in an action in which there has been a 27 trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have 28 3 1 heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the 2 United States." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1). 3 grounds include, but are not limited to, claims "that the verdict 4 is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are 5 excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to 6 the party moving." Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 7 251 (1940). 8 jury’s assessment of the evidence, the trial court may grant a new 9 trial only if the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of Historically recognized Where a Rule 59 motion is based on a challenge to the 10 the evidence. See, e.g. Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 11 556 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). 12 A district court may set aside a jury’s verdict and order a 13 new trial where the jury’s findings are so inconsistent that they 14 cannot be reconciled with each other. 15 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 a court asks not whether the verdict necessarily makes sense under 17 any reading, but whether it can be read in light of the evidence to 18 make sense. 19 court remand for a new trial. 20 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 21 108, 110 (1963)). 22 in light of the jury instructions. Borck v. City of L.A., 303 Fed. 23 Appx. 437, 439 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (citing Floyd, 929 24 F.3d at 1399); Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1038 25 (9th Cir. 2003). 26 27 28 Id. White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 In an inconsistent verdict case, Only in the case of fatal inconsistency may the Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1396 A court determines the meaning of the verdict IV. DISCUSSION. A. Inconsistency of the Verdict Plaintiff contends that in light of the jury instructions and 4 1 evidence presented at trial, the jury’s finding that Defendant used 2 excessive force on Plaintiff but that Plaintiff’s excessive force 3 was not the cause of harm to Plaintiff is fatally inconsistent. 4 The jury was provided with the following causation instruction: 5 6 7 8 In order to establish that the act of Officer Shant Sheklanian deprived the plaintiff of his particular rights under the laws of the United States Constitution as explained in other instructions, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was so closely related to the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights as to be the moving force that caused the ultimate injury. 9 10 (Doc. 77, Instruction 15). 11 The causation instruction accurately informed the jury of the 12 causation requirement. Causation is established where the evidence 13 demonstrates that a defendant’s action was a substantial factor in 14 bringing about the harm underlying a plaintiff’s claim. 15 Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 117 Cal. App. 4th 635, 701 (Cal. 16 Ct. App. 2004) (discussing substantial factor standard); Hardison 17 v. Bushnell, 18 Cal. App. 4th 22, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (“simple 18 test for determining whether the cause-in-fact component of legal 19 cause exists: Was the actor's conduct ‘substantial factor in 20 bringing about the harm[?]’”); accord Harpe v. City of L.A., 533 21 F.3d 1010, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008) (causation established where 22 defendants action was “moving force behind the injury of which the 23 plaintiff complains”). 24 plaintiff suffered a detrimental change to the body. 25 California, Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 4th 744, 755 (Cal. 26 Ct. App. 1995). 27 the injury resulting from such force that it is the legal cause of 28 the harm sustained. E.g., Harm is established by evidence that a Macy's Use of force on another is so closely connected to See Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of 5 1 Automobile Club of Southern California, 47 Cal. 4th 302, 308 (Cal. 2 2009) (discussing causation element of assault and battery). 3 The evidence presented at trial indicated that Defendant was 4 responding to a reported fight in a public street outside the Bar. 5 Defendant, upon arrival, saw no fighting among people gathered in 6 the street. Defendant saw Plaintiff talking to two or three 7 individuals. Defendant tackled Plaintiff to the ground, punched 8 him in the face, and utilized a taser on Plaintiff. 9 presented at trial also indicated that Plaintiff suffered pain as 10 a result of Defendant’s use of force, and that Plaintiff incurred 11 medical bills at a local hospital emergency room in connection with 12 the physical injuries he sustained during Defendant’s use of force, 13 including removal of taser darts from his chest. 14 presented, 15 Plaintiff’s physical injuries. 16 at trial, the jury’s finding that Defendant did not cause Plaintiff 17 harm cannot be reconciled with the jury’s finding that Defendant 18 violated 19 unreasonable seizure under color of law. nor did any Plaintiff’s exist, Fourth regarding The evidence No evidence was alternate causes of In light of the evidence presented Amendment right to be free from 20 Defendant’s opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial 21 contends that the jury could have reasonably found that Defendant 22 used excessive 23 damages. 24 found no causation. This was clear error. That defendant suffered 25 physical and mental pain and sustained physical injuries as a 26 result of Defendant’s use of force is undisputed. 27 evidence presented that would allow the jury to conclude that 28 Defendant was not the cause of such pain and injuries. force but that Plaintiff was not entitled to The jury did not reach the issue of damages because it 6 There was no The 1 fundamental inconsistency in the jury’s verdict is its finding that 2 Defendant used excessive force, but that such force did not cause 3 harm to Plaintiff. 4 Whether, in the jury’s mind, the act which rose to the level of 5 excessive force was Defendant’s tackling, punching, or tasing of 6 Plaintiff is immaterial. 7 force is inseparable from the pain, medical treatment, and injury 8 caused thereby, the jury’s finding that Defendant did not cause 9 Plaintiff harm renders the jury’s verdict fatally inconsistent and The jury’s verdict is legally irreconcilable. Because Defendant’s use of excessive 10 requires granting of Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. 11 Floyd, 929 F.2d at 1396. 12 B. See Compromise Verdict 13 A compromise verdict “is one reached when the jury, unable to 14 agree on liability, compromises that disagreement by entering a low 15 award of damages.” E.g. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Koch 16 Industries, Inc., 701 F.2d 108, 110 (10th Cir. 1983). 17 verdicts are a species of juror misconduct. 18 584 F.3d 52, 61 (2nd Cir. 2009) (characterizing compromise verdict 19 as juror misconduct); see also Eastland Partners Ltd. Partners v. 20 Village Green Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 620, 633 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); 21 United States v. Straach, 987 F.2d 232, 241-42 (5th Cir. 1993) 22 (distinguishing 23 misconduct involving external influences). 24 compromise verdict, it “subvert[s] the law and contort[s] findings 25 of fact in favor of a desired result.” 26 S.A., 540 F.3d 992, 1009 n.17 (9th Cir. 2008). 27 verdict demonstrates that they jury failed to give due regard to 28 the evidence. compromise verdict from Compromise See Aczel v. Labonia, other types of jury When a jury renders a See Cal. v. Altus Fin. A compromise National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Great Lakes 7 1 Warehouse Corp., 261 F.2d 35, 38 (7th Cir. 1958). 2 3 To determine whether a verdict is a compromise verdict, a 4 court looks for a close question of liability, a damages award that 5 is grossly inadequate, and any other indicia of compromise apparent 6 from the record. 7 at 110; accord D'Hedouville, 552 F.2d at 897; Hatfield v. Seaboard 8 A.L.R. Co., 396 F.2d 721, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1968). 9 insufficient damages verdict, standing alone, does not necessarily E.g. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 701 F.2d Although an 10 indicate a compromise verdict, 11 F.2d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1983), a clearly insufficient damages 12 award raises suspicion of a compromise verdict, Pagan v. Shoney's, 13 Inc., 931 F.2d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 1991). 14 set aside a verdict on the basis of an improper compromise where 15 the jury might have reasonably reached an allegedly improper award 16 based on the evidence in the record. 17 Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Lab., 711 A district court may not E.g. Pagan, 931 F.2d at 339. Where it appears the jury rendered a compromise verdict, a 18 district court may order a new trial. 19 F.2d 512, 521 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing National Railroad Passenger 20 Corp., 701 F.2d at 110); D'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 21 F.2d 886, 897 (9th Cir. 1977). 22 verdict taints the entire proceeding and the proper remedy is a new 23 trial on all issues. 24 Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 25 448, 456 (3rd Cir. 2001) (“the probability that the verdict was 26 tainted by compromise also leads us to favor a new trial on all 27 issues”); D'Hedouville, 552 F.2d at 897 (new trial on all issues 28 warranted where E.g. Romberg v. Nichols, 970 A jury’s impermissible compromise Carter v. Moore, 165 F.3d 1071, 1083 (7th circumstances indicate 8 improper compromise 1 verdict); Lucas v. American Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 291, 292-94 (5th 2 Cir. 1980) (ordering new trial on all issues where compromise 3 verdict was apparent); Hatfield v. Seaboard Airline R.R. Co., 396 4 F.2d 721, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1968) (same); Schuerholz v. Roach, 58 5 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1932) (same). 6 is appropriate only in those cases where it is plain that the error 7 which has crept into one element of the verdict did not in any way 8 affect the determination of any other issue." 9 455 (citations omitted). “Grant of a partial new trial Pryer, 251 F.3d at 10 The jury’s contradictory findings regarding liability and 11 causation strongly suggest that the jury failed to give due regard 12 to the evidence, subverted the law, and contorted the facts in 13 order to achieve a desired result. 14 Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of Defendant tackling, 15 punching, and tasing Plaintiff, the jury found that Defendant’s use 16 of excessive force did not cause Plaintiff harm. 17 finding of no harm is not only contrary to the undisputed facts 18 established at trial, it is illogical on its face. 19 juror could find that Plaintiff did not suffer some amount of harm 20 as the result of Defendant’s actions. 21 uncontested and obvious damages” establishes an intolerably high 22 probability that the jury rendered a compromise verdict. 23 Pagan, 931 F.2d at 339. 24 award is sufficient to raise serious suspicion of a compromise, a 25 fortiori, where the jury does not even reach the issue of damages 26 because it renders an illogical, unsupportable finding on an 27 undisputed question of harm, the probability that the jury rendered 28 an impermissible compromise verdict is too high to permit any Although it is undisputed that The jury’s No rational The jury’s “disregard for See Because a clearly insufficient damages 9 1 portion of the verdict to stand. 2 456. 3 verdict on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim did not affect the 4 jury’s determination of Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim. 5 455. 6 jury’s compromise, See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), the jury’s misconduct 7 has tainted the entire proceeding and the appropriate remedy is a 8 retrial on all issues, including Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim, 9 Carter, 10 See, e.g., Pryer, 251 F.3d at It is not plain that the error which affected the jury’s Id. at Because it is impossible to ascertain the full scope of the 165 F.3d 1071 at 1083; Pryer, 251 F.3d at 456; D'Hedouville, 552 F.2d at 897. ORDER 11 12 For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED: 13 1) Plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict is DENIED; 14 2) Plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment is DENIED; 15 3) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to vacate the judgment; 16 4) Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is GRANTED; and 17 5) A new trial date shall be set in accordance with the 18 parties’ early availability. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: September 3, 2010 emm0d6 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10
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