Ernst v. Cate, et al., No. 1:2008cv01940 - Document 47 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Recommending That The District Court Grant in Part and Deny in Part Defendants Jett and Chavez's 37 Motion to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim signed by Magistrate Judge Gary S. Austin on 11/13/2009. Matter referred to Judge Oliver W. Wanger; Objections to F&R due by 12/16/2009. (Esteves, C)
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Ernst v. Cate, et al. Doc. 47 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 TED KEENER ERNST, 10 Plaintiff, 11 12 CASE NO. 1:08-cv-01940-OWW-GSA FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING THAT THE DISTRICT COURT GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANTS JETT AND CHAVEZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM v. MATTHEW CATE, et al., 13 Defendants. / (Doc. 24) 14 15 16 Findings and Recommendations on Defendants Jett and Chavez’s Motion to Dismiss I. 17 Procedural and Factual Background Plaintiff Ted Keener Ernst, a state prisoner, by his attorney, proceeds in this civil action 18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12132). 19 Plaintiff also alleges negligence claims and various constitutional and statutory claims under 20 California law. Defendant Cate removed plaintiff’s complaint from the Superior Court of 21 California to this court on December 17, 2008 (doc. 1). On April 7, 2009, plaintiff filed an 22 amended complaint (doc. 16). Defendants Jett and Chavez filed a motion to dismiss the 23 complaint under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on July 8, 2009 (doc. 37). Plaintiff filed his opposition on 24 September 4, 2009 (doc. 41), and Jett and Chavez replied on September 17, 2009 (doc. 42). Jett 25 and Chavez amended their reply on September 17, 2009 (doc. 43). 26 Facts Alleged in Complaint. Plaintiff is an inmate of Salinas Valley State Prison 27 (“SVSP”). Due to paraplegia dating from childhood, plaintiff is a permanent wheelchair user. 28 /// 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Although plaintiff is a Montana inmate, he is housed by the California Department of Corrections 2 and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) pursuant to an agreement between CDCR and Montana. 3 On December 3, 2007, defendant Broncato, a CDCR corrections officer, transported 4 plaintiff by CDCR van #314 from Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”), where plaintiff then 5 resided, to Corcoran Hospital for routine care. Plaintiff’s hands were cuffed to his hips in a waist 6 restraint. His wheelchair was not secured to the van nor was plaintiff restrained by a seatbelt. 7 While traveling at 70 miles per hour, Broncato tapped the brakes to slow for an S-curve. The 8 van’s wheels locked, and plaintiff was thrown head-first from his wheelchair to the van’s floor, 9 where his head hit a raised steel bracket, and his body struck a milk crate. Plaintiff incurred 10 head and chest lacerations, compression of his spine resulting in lower spine trauma, and various 11 scrapes and bruises. As a result, plaintiff’s head and bruises swelled, and he experienced pain, 12 including sharp, stabbing pain in his lower back. 13 Plaintiff contends that the defendants were aware that the van was in poor condition. 14 With over 239,000 miles on its odometer, the van had brake problems and holes in its floor big 15 enough for passengers to view the road passing beneath them. Broncato had filed a grievance 16 regarding the van’s unsafe condition on July 2, 2007. Plaintiff alleges that “Plata ordered that 17 Van #314 be replaced two weeks prior to the December 3, 2007 incident.” 18 In another inmate’s appeal (Pardo, KVSP-07-022980, February 26, 2008), KVSP 19 admitted that the van was in need of repairs. In plaintiff’s administrative appeal, KVSP admitted 20 that the van was being repaired and replaced by a new van. 21 Plaintiff sues defendants Katherine Jett, deputy director of CDCR, and Officer Chavez in 22 their official and personal capacities. Other defendants include CDCR Secretary Cate, 23 Corrections Officer Broncato, and 100 John Does. 24 II. 25 Standard of Review – Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint.” Schneider v. California 26 Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998). A court may not look outside of the 27 pleadings to resolve the motion. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a 28 court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, construe the pleading in the 2 1 light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's 2 favor. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Jenkins v. 3 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). 4 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 5 exceptions,” none of which applies to § 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 6 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short 7 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. 8 P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 9 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 10 __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 11 555 (2007). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 12 that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 13 14 at 1949. The statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and 15 the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. The court is not required to 16 accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 17 unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), 18 amended by 275 F.3d 1187 (2001). 19 III. 20 Plaintiff’s Claims Although plaintiff’s complaint purports to allege six causes of action, it is poorly 21 organized, frequently including multiple legal claims within a single “cause of action.” 22 Plaintiff’s claims include the following: 23 A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims 24 1. Third Cause of Action (in part). In violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 25 prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, defendants failed to provided 26 “a meaningful hearing in a meaningful time, instead claiming that a third level 27 appeal had to be filed–with the idea that Plaintiff would lose his right to file a 28 /// 3 1 claim against defendants within 6 months.” The complaint specifies that this 2 claim is brought against defendants in their official capacities. 3 2. Fourth Cause of Action (in part). In violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 4 Amendment due process and equal protection, defendants failed to provided “a 5 meaningful hearing in a meaningful time, instead claiming that a third level appeal 6 had to be filed–with the idea that Plaintiff would lose his right to file a claim 7 against defendants within 6 months.” 8 3. Fifth Cause of Action. The accident constituted cruel and unusual 9 punishment in the form of battery. 10 4. Sixth Cause of Action. Restating his allegations of the first cause of action, 11 plaintiff asserts that defendants’ negligence violated the Fifth and Fourteenth 12 Amendments. 13 B. ADA Claim (Second Cause of Action (in part)) 14 C. State Claims 15 1. First Cause of Action. Defendants were negligent under state law. 16 2. Second Cause of Action (in part). Defendants violated California 17 Government Code, § 11135. 18 2. Third Cause of Action (in part). Defendants violated California 19 Constitution, art. 1, § 7. 20 3. Fourth Cause of Action (in part). Defendants are liable under California 21 Government Code, § 19572. 22 IV. 23 No Cognizable Claims Against Defendant Chavez Plaintiff alleges that defendants Chavez and Broncato called van #314 “the death van” 24 (doc. 16, ¶¶ 19, 59, and 68) and that all named defendants, including Chavez, “had a duty to 25 possess, maintain, and control the van they were transporting [plaintiff] in on the 3rd of 26 December, 2007" (doc. 16, ¶¶ 24 and 71), and breached that duty (doc. 16, ¶¶ 25 and 72). These 27 unsupported legal conclusions are the only mentions of defendant Chavez in the complaint, 28 /// 4 1 which does not even identify Chavez, allege that he was a CDCR employee, or link Chavez to 2 any of the alleged occurrences that gave rise to plaintiff’s injuries. 3 “Thread bare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 4 statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The complaint simply fails to set forth 5 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” See 6 Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. 7 For the first time in his opposition brief, plaintiff claims that “Chavez was responsible for 8 restraining the wheel chair.” Although the court must accept as true the allegations of the 9 complaint in question, construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 10 motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor, it may not look outside the pleadings to 11 resolve this motion. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); 12 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). A complaint must 13 “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it 14 rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to do so. Chavez is entitled to 15 dismissal of the complaint against him, in its entirety, for failure to state a claim upon which 16 relief may be granted. F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 17 V. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 18 A. 19 Except for count three, which specifies that it is brought against defendants in their Eleventh Amendment Immunity 20 official capacities, plaintiff alleges that he is seeking to impose liability on defendants in their 21 individual and official capacities (doc. 16, ¶2). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money 22 damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials in their “official 23 capacities.” Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 24 S.Ct. 441 (2007)(citations omitted). Because CDCR is a state agency entitled to Eleventh 25 Amendment immunity, plaintiff may not sue it in federal court. Ibid. See also Natural 26 Resources Defense Council v. California Dep’t of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); 27 Brooks v. Sulphur Spring Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 28 U.S. 938 (1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 5 1 The Eleventh Amendment also protects Jett, Chavez, and the other defendants from suits 2 in their official capacities. Aholelei, 488 F.3d at 1147; Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 3 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). This means that plaintiff’s third cause of action, which he 4 brings against the defendants in their official capacities (doc. 16), is not cognizable as a matter of 5 law. The Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits against the defendants, including Jett and 6 Chavez, for wrongdoing in their personal capacities, however. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 7 (1991); Ashker v. California Dep’t of Corr., 112 F.3d 392, 394-95 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 8 U.S. 863 (1997). 9 B. 10 Supervisory or Administrative Liability Jett contends that, as CDCR’s deputy director, she is not liable for CDCR employees’ 11 acts merely because she is an agency administrator. Because Jett had no personal participation in 12 the accident in which plaintiff was injured, she argues that she cannot be held liable for the 13 alleged violations of § 1983. 14 The Supreme Court recently emphasized that the term “supervisory liability,” loosely and 15 commonly used by courts and litigants alike, is a misnomer. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. 16 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees 17 under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948; Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. In a 18 § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the 19 alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 20 Because each government official, regardless of title, is liable only for his or her own 21 misconduct, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant, through his or her individual 22 actions, violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 23 For defendants in supervisory positions, a plaintiff must specifically allege a causal link 24 between each defendant and the claimed constitutional violation. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 25 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 26 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under § 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must 27 allege facts indicating that each supervisory defendant (1) either personally participated in the 28 alleged deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, (2) knew of the violations and failed to 6 1 act to prevent them, or (3) promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 2 ‘itself is a deprivation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional 3 violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); 4 Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege facts implicating defendant Jett in 5 any of these three categories. 6 The complaint only names Jett in the allegations that all named defendants, including Jett, 7 “had a duty to possess, maintain, and control the van they were transporting [plaintiff] in on the 8 3rd of December, 2007" (doc. 16, paras. 24 and 71), and breached that duty (doc. 16, paras. 25 9 and 72). The § 1983 claims against Jett are based solely on respondeat superior liability for 10 CDCR employees’ actions, for which Jett cannot be liable under § 1983. Jett is entitled to 11 dismissal of plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against her as a matter of law. 12 V. 13 Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act Plaintiff’s second cause of action is the only claim in which plaintiff contends that the 14 defendants, including Jett, acted intentionally. First, plaintiff alleges, “The defendants decided to 15 punish [plaintiff] for the crime he was convicted of by placing him in his wheelchair, 16 unrestrained, in a van traveling 70 miles per hour, and then applying the brakes” (doc. 16, ¶ 33). 17 Later, plaintiff claims, “Defendants discriminated against plaintiff because of his 18 disability–willfully and indifferently ignored his need to be restrained within the van transporting 19 him to a facility he needed to visit for medical reasons” (doc. 16, ¶ 36). Because plaintiff 20 provides no factual support for these legal conclusions, he fails to satisfy the pleading standards 21 set forth in Iqbal and Twombly. 22 With regard to Jett, although a court evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is 23 instructed to assume the truth of all factual allegations of the plaintiff and the reasonable 24 inferences to be drawn from them, it need not accept as true unreasonable inferences or 25 conclusory allegations masquerading as facts. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 26 614 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). When a party’s factual allegations are 27 blatantly inaccurate, a court is not required to accept them as true. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 28 378-80 (2007). That the CDCR Secretary and Assistant Director acted in concert with two 7 1 corrections officers “to punish [plaintiff] for the crime he was convicted of by placing him in his 2 wheelchair, unrestrained, in a van traveling 70 miles per hour, and then applying the brakes” 3 strains credulity. Similarly, the underlying facts offer nothing to suggest that Jett “discriminated 4 against plaintiff because of his disability–willfully and indifferently ignored his need to be 5 restrained within the van transporting him to a facility he needed to visit for medical reasons.” 6 Title II of the ADA “prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of disability.” Lovell v. 7 Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003). The statute 8 provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 9 excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of 10 a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II of the 11 ADA applies to inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 12 U.S. 206, 213 (1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. 13 denied, 524 U.S. 937(1998); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 453-56 (9th Cir. 1996). “To 14 establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a qualified 15 individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise 16 discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) 17 such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. 18 “To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA . . . , a plaintiff must prove intentional 19 discrimination on the part of the defendant,” and the standard for intentional discrimination is 20 deliberate indifference. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). 21 Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support the claim that he “was excluded from 22 participation in or otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, 23 programs, or activities . . . by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. Although 24 plaintiff alleges that he was not properly secured in the van transporting him for medical care, he 25 alleges no facts suggesting that inmates who are not disabled were better secured. Further, to the 26 extent that plaintiff alleges that his injuries resulted from the van’s condition or lack of repair, 27 maintenance, or replacement, he was not treated differently from any other inmate transported in 28 the van. The accident in which plaintiff was injured simply is not the type of discrimination that 8 1 2 the ADA was intended to address. Finally, “‘Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination in programs of a public entity or 3 discrimination by any such entity.’” Roundtree v. Adams, 2005 WL 3284405 at *8 (E.D.Cal. 4 Dec. 1, 2005) (No. 1:01-CV-06502-OWW-LJO), quoting Thomas v. Nakatani, 128 F.Supp.2d 5 684, 691 (D. Haw. 2000), aff’d, 309 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2002). “The ADA defines ‘public entity’ 6 in relevant part as ‘any State or local government’ or ‘any department, agency, special purpose 7 district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.’” Roundtree, 2005 WL 8 3284405 at *8, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B)). Public entity, “‘as it is defined within the 9 statute, does not include individuals.’” Id., quoting Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 10 1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1146, cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000). 11 Thus, individual liability is precluded under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 12 plaintiff may not pursue an ADA claim against defendant Jett. Jett is entitled to dismissal of the 13 ADA claim against her as a matter of law. 14 V. State Claims 15 Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law. See Weilburg 16 v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2007); Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 17 662 (9th Cir. 2007); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2001); Sweaney v. Ada County, 18 Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997); Lovell v. Poway Unified School Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 19 370 (9th Cir. 1996); Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 1986); Ybarra v. Bastian, 647 20 F.2d 891, 892 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), 21 however, in any civil action in which the district court has original jurisdiction, the district court 22 “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the action within such original 23 jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III,” except as 24 provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention of 25 supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.” Acri v. Varian 26 Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). “The district court my decline to exercise 27 supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed 28 all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3). The Supreme Court 9 1 has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be 2 dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Amer. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). If the District Court adopts these findings and recommendations as well as the findings 3 4 and recommendations of even date addressing the two motions to dismiss brought by defendants 5 Broncato and Cate, no federal claims will remain against any defendant in this suit. Accordingly, 6 the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s state claims be remanded to the California court, 7 which is better prepared to address them and has a greater stake in their resolution in accordance 8 with state law. 9 VII. Conclusion and Recommendation 10 For the reasons set forth herein, the court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 11 1. Defendants Jett and Chavez’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, filed 12 July 8, 2009, be GRANTED, in part, with regard to plaintiff’s claims against 13 defendant Chavez; 14 2. prejudice; 15 16 Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Chavez be dismissed in their entirety, with 3. Defendants Jett and Chavez’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, filed 17 July 8, 2009, be GRANTED, in part, with regard to plaintiff’s federal claims 18 against Jett; 19 4. to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; 20 21 Plaintiff’s federal claims against Jett shall be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure 5. Defendants Jett and Chavez’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, be DENIED, in part, with regard to plaintiff’s state claims against Jett; and 22 23 6. Plaintiff’s state claims be remanded to the California state court. 24 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 25 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 26 thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may 27 file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 28 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file 10 1 objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 2 Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 3 4 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 6i0kij November 13, 2009 /s/ Gary S. Austin UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11
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