(HC) Veni Wayne Fonoti v. K Clark, No. 1:2008cv00853 - Document 43 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING 1 Petition for Writ of habeas Corpus signed by District Judge Claudia Wilken on 10/15/2009. CASE CLOSED (Figueroa, O)
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(HC) Veni Wayne Fonoti v. K Clark Doc. 43 1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9 VENI WAYNE FONOTI, Petitioner, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 No. CV 08-0853 CW ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. KEN CLARK, Warden, Respondent. 13 / 14 15 16 Petitioner Veni Wayne Fonoti filed a petition for a writ of 17 habeas corpus pursuant to title 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging as a 18 violation of his constitutional rights the denial of parole by the 19 California Board of Parole Hearings1 (Board) on August 5, 2004.2 20 Respondent Ken Clark opposes the petition and Petitioner has filed 21 a traverse. 22 23 Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court denies the petition. 24 1 25 26 The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1, 2005, and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal Code § 5075(a). 2 27 28 The papers do not directly specify how many parole denials Petitioner received before the August 5, 2004 hearing. However, it appears that the August 5, 2004 hearing was Petitioner's third hearing before the Board. Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 3 I. The Commitment Offense The following summary of the facts of Petitioner's commitment 4 offense is derived from the appellate court's opinion on direct 5 appeal, People v. Fonoti, No. B029624 (Cal. Ct. App. July 20, 6 1988). 7 8 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California BACKGROUND 11 12 13 14 15 Defendant drove for about 5 minutes in a residential area (15 mile zone) making right and left turns in an attempt to lose Officer Zabel who was a considerable distance behind; driving 40 and 50 miles per hour through traffic controlled intersections, he traveled approximately 4 miles; at no time were Defendant's lights on. Driving directly at a police car coming from the opposite direction to assist in the pursuit, Defendant caused Officer Ryan to "jam on" his brakes and turn abruptly to avoid a collision. Meanwhile, Officer Zabel gained on Defendant and when he was "very, very close" to the Blazer, Defendant, for no apparent reason, suddenly "slammed on" his brakes making a "complete" stop causing Officer Zabel to "plow" into the rear of the Blazer whereupon Defendant turned and sped away; both vehicles were damaged but still operable. Officer Zabel followed but dropped behind Officers Ryan and Arthur who had activated lights and sirens on their police car. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendant drove through a city intersection at 50 miles per hour, then turned onto Long Beach Boulevard where the speed limit varies from 30 to 35 miles per hour and there were numerous traffic light controlled major city intersections; he drove through 5 intersections against red lights at speeds of 55, 70, and 75 to 80 miles per hour; Officer Zabel's police car reached a speed of over 100 miles per hour pursuing Defendant on Long Beach Boulevard. Before coming to Willow Street, a car had to slam on its brakes to avoid being hit as Defendant went through a red light; when Defendant crossed the intersection at Willow his speed exceeded 95 miles per hour; at Anaheim a pedestrian had to jump up over the curb to avoid being run over by Defendant; several vehicles had to slam on their brakes to keep from being hit. The officers began to lose ground because the lights were red against them; at Spring Street, a California Highway Patrol car joined the pursuit. Defendant came to the freeway entrance but, because of his speed, was unable to turn to enter; as he approached the overpass, a Plymouth Fury containing [twenty-three 2 1 year old Jeffrey] Cady and [twenty-one year old David] Jacoby was making its turn onto Long Beach Boulevard from the freeway exit, when the Blazer, without lights and at high speed, crashed into the driver's side of the Fury killing Cady instantly and fatally injuring Jacoby; the impact was "very great" and of such force that both vehicles rose three feet off the ground and the Blazer came to rest on the center divider 125 feet north of the overpass; Defendant was in the Blazer unconscious bleeding profusely from the forehead; there was massive damage to both vehicles and debris covered the street. 2 3 4 5 6 7 Defendant was the sole defense witness. About 8 p.m. on March 7, he walked across the street to a bar in which he spent three or four hours; he drank a couple of beers and mixed drinks, played pool and talked to a lady he met there who was also drinking; she asked him to take her home; when he left he felt "kind of high" but not drunk; after they left the bar the lady asked him for $25; when she admitted she was a prostitute he told her to get out because he was married; she refused and he tried to push her out; he got out and slapped her and pulled her out of the car, and she began shouting; he got back into his car but that is all he recalled; the next thing he remembered was waking up at the hospital. 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 People v. Fonoti, No. B029624 at 3-5. 15 16 Petitioner was twenty-five years old at the time he committed the offense. Trans. at 18. 17 A jury found Petitioner guilty of two counts of second degree 18 murder, assault against a police officer, evading a police officer 19 and hit and run. 20 to run concurrently. 21 judgment. 22 while confined in a penal institution and sentenced to a 23 consecutive two-year term. 24 Evaluation Report at 2. 25 II. 26 27 28 He is serving two terms of fifteen-years to life, Lodgment 1, July 1, 1987 state court In 1992, Petitioner was convicted of possessing a weapon Pet's Ex. C, March, 2004 Life Prisoner August 5, 2004 Board Hearing The Board found that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released 3 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 from prison. 2 carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner and with a 3 demonstrated disregard for human life because, as a result of a 4 traffic collision caused by Petitioner, multiple victims died. 5 Board also cited a March 1, 2002 psychological report authored by 6 Dr. Eric Rueschenberg, a forensic psychologist, who concluded that 7 Petitioner presented a low to moderate risk of violence in the 8 community with a potential relapse into alcohol use as the primary 9 risk factor and a tendency to exercise poor judgment as the The Board cited the commitment offense which was The 10 secondary risk factor. 11 that, in the past, Petitioner's poor judgment had led him to become 12 involved in conflictual relationships in the community as well as 13 in prison, and that before the commitment offense, he was actively 14 abusing alcohol, getting into bar fights and showing a tendency 15 toward violence against women. 16 Petitioner continued to relapse into alcohol use and occasional 17 violence. 18 Petitioner had become more serious about recovery, improved himself 19 and stayed out of trouble, preparing himself for parole 20 consideration. 21 Pet's Ex. A at 6. Id. Dr. Rueschenberg noted After he was incarcerated, However, during the latter part of his incarceration, Id. The Board also noted that Petitioner lacked realistic parole 22 plans. 23 hold for Samoa, so that he probably would be deported upon release. 24 Petitioner wanted to live in the house he had previously built 25 there. 26 obtain support letters indicating he could live in Samoa. 27 Board also noted that Petitioner had failed to submit a letter from 28 4 The Board pointed out that Petitioner had an immigration Nonetheless, the Board noted that Petitioner had failed to The United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 a friend or relative in California ensuring that Petitioner had a 2 place to live in California if he were not deported. 3 The Board commended Petitioner for his completion, in 2002, of 4 a twenty-four week course in Alcoholics Anonymous and the self-help 5 course, Way to Happiness, and, in 2004, a TV video course, the 6 Importance of Fatherhood. 7 disciplinary reports were in October, 1997 and in 2001. The Board noted that Petitioner's last 8 The Board concluded that the positive aspects of Petitioner's 9 behavior did not outweigh the factors indicating unsuitability for 10 parole. 11 free, work toward reducing his custody level so that more program 12 opportunities would become available to him, participate in any 13 self-help and substance abuse programs that were available and 14 cooperate with the clinicians in the completion of a new clinical 15 evaluation before the next parole suitability hearing. 16 also found that, until Petitioner demonstrated that he could cope 17 with stress in a non-destructive manner, his behavior was 18 unpredictable and a threat to others. The Board recommended that Petitioner remain disciplinary- The Board 19 In a separate decision, based on the same factors discussed 20 above, the Board found that it was not reasonable to expect that 21 Petitioner would be granted parole during the following two years. 22 III. Superior Court Habeas Decision 23 On January 20, 2005, the California superior court issued a 24 written decision denying Petitioner habeas relief. 25 In re Fonoti, BH003024 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 20, 2005). 26 noted that the Board had based its decision on the following 27 factors: 28 See Lodgment 8, The court (1) the commitment offense was especially cruel in that 5 1 multiple victims were killed in the same incident; (2) the 2 psychological report was not totally supportive of release because 3 it concluded that Petitioner posed a low to moderate degree of risk 4 of violence if released based upon a potential for violent behavior 5 and relapse into alcohol use, which Petitioner had exhibited prior 6 to and since his incarceration; and (3) Petitioner lacked realistic 7 parole plans in that he failed to provide letters indicating he 8 would have a residence if released. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 The court accepted the first two factors as some evidence 10 supporting the Board's decision, but rejected the Board's third 11 reason, noting that Petitioner had an immigration hold pending 12 which suggested that he would be deported upon release to Samoa, 13 his native country, and that the record showed that Petitioner had 14 financial resources and a house in Samoa. 15 Petitioner's argument that the Board failed to apply properly the 16 considerations set forth in Penal Code § 3041 because the Board had 17 considered Petitioner's positive institutional gains but found that 18 they did not outweigh the factors demonstrating that he was 19 unsuitable for parole. 20 merit Petitioner's arguments that the Board has a no-parole policy 21 and that the Board abused its discretion in allowing Petitioner to 22 remain handcuffed during the hearing. 23 Board's decision based on the fact that there was some evidence in 24 the record to show that Petitioner was a danger to public safety if 25 released into the community. 26 27 28 The court rejected The court summarily rejected as without Thus, the court affirmed the Petitioner filed subsequent habeas petitions in the California court of appeal and the California Supreme Court. 6 Both petitions 1 were summarily denied. 2 Petitioner brought this federal habeas corpus petition challenging 3 the state court decisions upholding the Board's determination. 4 5 Subsequently, LEGAL STANDARD Because this case involves a federal habeas corpus challenge 6 to a state parole eligibility decision, the applicable standard is 7 contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 8 1996 (AEDPA). 9 2002). 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California (Lodgments 10, 12). McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief 11 unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted 12 in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 13 application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 14 the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 15 decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 16 facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 17 proceeding." 18 362, 412 (2000). 19 the state court's factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. A federal court must presume the correctness of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 20 Where, as here, the highest state court to reach the merits 21 issued a summary opinion which does not explain the rationale of 22 its decision, federal court review under § 2254(d) is of the last 23 state court opinion to reach the merits. 24 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). 25 court opinion to address the merits of Petitioner's claim is that 26 of the California superior court. 27 28 7 Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d In this case, the last state 1 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 2 DISCUSSION Petitioner argues that (1) he was denied due process because 3 the Board's decision was not supported by some evidence that he is 4 presently dangerous; (2) the commitment offense was not 5 particularly egregious in comparison to other second degree 6 murders; (3) the Board did not allow Petitioner fully to represent 7 himself because he was restrained in handcuffs during the hearing; 8 (4) the Board improperly based its finding of unsuitability on 9 opposition by the district attorney; (5) there was no evidence to 10 support the Board's finding that Petitioner needed more self-help 11 to assist him in dealing with the causative factors of the 12 commitment offense and understanding his involvement in the crime 13 and the underlying substance abuse issue; (6) the Board failed to 14 consider the amount of time Petitioner had served and the 15 determinate term that would be set by the matrix; (7) the Board 16 made its decision based on its "no parole" policy; (8) the Board 17 failed to give a separate statement of reasons for imposing the 18 two-year denial; and (9) the Board improperly concluded that the 19 psychiatric report constituted a basis for parole denial. 20 The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that a 21 parole board's decision deprives a prisoner of due process with 22 respect to his constitutionally protected liberty interest in a 23 parole release date if the board's decision is not supported by 24 “some evidence in the record,” or is “otherwise arbitrary.” 25 v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 26 2006) (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985)). 27 Respondent argues that California inmates do not have a 28 8 Sass United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 federally protected liberty interest in parole release and that the 2 Ninth Circuit’s holding to the contrary in Sass is not clearly 3 established federal law for the purposes of AEDPA. 4 Court is bound by Ninth Circuit authority. 5 Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (all California prisoners 6 whose sentences provide for the possibility of parole are vested 7 with a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the receipt 8 of a parole release date, a liberty interest that is protected by 9 the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause); McQuillion, However, this See, e.g., Irons v. 10 306 F.3d at 898 ("under clearly established Supreme Court 11 precedent, the parole scheme in California . . .[gives] rise to a 12 constitutionally protected liberty interest). 13 claim fails. 14 Therefore, this When assessing whether a state parole board's unsuitability 15 determination was supported by “some evidence,” the court's 16 analysis is framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole 17 suitability determinations in the relevant state. 18 at 1128. 19 California law to determine the findings that are necessary to deem 20 a prisoner unsuitable for parole, and then must review the record 21 to determine whether the state court decision constituted an 22 unreasonable application of the “some evidence” principle. 23 Sass, 461 F.3d Accordingly, in California, the court must look to Id. California law provides that a parole date is to be granted 24 unless it is determined “that the gravity of the current convicted 25 offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past 26 convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the 27 public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration 28 9 1 . . .” 2 The California Code of Regulations sets out the factors 3 showing suitability or unsuitability for parole that the Board is 4 required to consider. 5 These include “[a]ll relevant, reliable information available,” 6 such as, 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 2402(b). the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in finding of unsuitability. 8 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). Id. 17 Circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole include 18 the nature of the commitment offense and whether “[t]he prisoner 19 committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel 20 manner.” 21 victims, whether "[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate 22 and calculated manner,” whether the victim was “abused, defiled or 23 mutilated during or after the offense,” whether “[t]he offense was 24 carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous 25 disregard for human suffering,” and whether “[t]he motive for the 26 crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” 27 Id. 28 Id. at (c). This includes consideration of the number of Other circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole 10 1 are a previous record of violence, an unstable social history, 2 previous sadistic sexual offenses, a history of severe mental 3 health problems related to the offense, and serious misconduct in 4 prison or jail. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 5 Id. Circumstances tending to support a finding of suitability for 6 parole include no juvenile record, a stable social history, signs 7 of remorse, that the crime was committed as a result of significant 8 stress in the prisoner's life, a lack of criminal history, a 9 reduced possibility of recidivism due to the prisoner's present 10 age, that the prisoner has made realistic plans for release or has 11 developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon release, 12 and that the prisoner's institutional activities indicate an 13 enhanced ability to function within the law upon release. 14 (d). 15 that due process is denied when "an inquiry focuse[s] only upon the 16 existence of unsuitability factors." 17 1181, 1208 (2008). 18 Id. at In a recent decision, the California Supreme Court stated In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th Respondent contends that, even if California prisoners do have 19 a liberty interest in parole, the due process protections to which 20 they are entitled by clearly established Supreme Court authority 21 are limited to an opportunity to be heard and a statement of 22 reasons for denial. 23 rejected by the Ninth Circuit, which held in Irons, 505 F.3d at 851 24 that a prisoner’s due process rights are violated if the Board’s 25 decision is not supported by "some evidence in the record," or is 26 "otherwise arbitrary." 27 thus clearly established federal law in the parole context for 28 This position, however, has likewise been The “some evidence” standard identified is 11 1 2 Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-1129. As noted above, because the superior court ruled that the 3 Board's justification for Petitioner's unsuitability for parole 4 based on his lack of parole plans was unfounded, it upheld the 5 denial of Petitioner's parole based on two findings of the Board: 6 (1) the commitment offense was especially egregious primarily 7 because it involved multiple victims and (2) Petitioner's 8 psychological evaluation concluded that he presented a low to 9 moderate risk of violence due to his tendency to abuse alcohol and 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California purposes of § 2254(d). 11 to use poor judgment. The fact that the commitment offense involved multiple victims 12 is one of the factors indicating egregiousness listed in title 15, 13 California Code of Regulations section 2402 (c). 14 dispute that Petitioner's offense involved multiple victims. 15 There is no The court was not unreasonable in finding that Petitioner's 16 psychological evaluation provided some evidence of dangerousness. 17 As stated above, Dr. Rueschenberg concluded that Petitioner 18 presented a low to moderate risk of violence in the community due 19 to the risk that he would relapse into alcohol use and his tendency 20 to exercise poor judgment. 21 drinking as a teenager and that he continued using alcohol even 22 after he was incarcerated. 23 Petitioner admitted that he began Petitioner argues that the court improperly characterized his 24 psychiatric report as unfavorable because it focused on the 25 negative aspects of the report rather than the positive. 26 the report concluded that Petitioner had recently become serious 27 about recovering from alcoholism, improving himself and staying out 28 12 Although 1 of trouble, the fact remains that the report provides some evidence 2 of a risk to public safety. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 3 Petitioner argues that there was no evidence to support the 4 court's finding that the Board properly applied the considerations 5 set forth in Penal Code § 3041. 6 unreasonable in its conclusion that the Board considered 7 Petitioner's positive gains in prison, but found that they did not 8 outweigh the factors suggesting unsuitability. 9 argues that the Board improperly found that he needed more self- However, the court was not Petitioner also 10 help classes to assist him with understanding the causative factors 11 of the commitment offense and the underlying substance abuse. 12 However, as noted above, Petitioner admitted that using alcohol had 13 been a problem for him since he was a teenager and that he 14 continued abusing it even after he was incarcerated. 15 the psychiatrist recommended that Petitioner continue with self- 16 help and therapy prior to release. 17 state court's denial of this claim was not unreasonable. 18 Trans. at 31. Furthermore, Therefore, the Petitioner argues that the Board did not allow him to 19 represent himself fully because he was handcuffed during the 20 proceeding. 21 argument; the Board members gave Petitioner many opportunities to 22 respond to their findings, to answer their questions and to make 23 his own statements. 24 was not unreasonable. 25 However, the transcript of the hearing belies this Therefore, the court's rejection of this claim Petitioner argues that the Board improperly based its 26 unsuitability finding on the district attorney's opposition to 27 parole. 28 The state court reasonably rejected this claim because the 13 1 Board noted such opposition, but did not cite it as a factor in its 2 finding that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole. 3 claim that the Board failed to give a separate statement of reasons 4 for imposing a two-year denial is also undermined by the record of 5 the hearing. 6 decision, the Board was denying parole for two years and providing 7 specific reasons for this finding). 8 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 Petitioner's See Trans. at 64 (stating that, in a separate Petitioner argues that the matrix of prison terms set forth in section 2403(c) of title 15 of the California Code of Regulations 10 establishes a uniform prison term for second degree murder and, 11 because he has been in prison longer than the time set by the 12 matrix, his statutory right to a determinate term has been 13 violated. 14 The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base terms for 15 several categories of crimes. 16 second degree murders, the matrix of base terms ranges from the low 17 of fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years to a high of nineteen, 18 twenty, or twenty-one years, depending on some of the facts of the 19 crime. 20 the matrix is used to calculate the sentence only after an inmate 21 has been found suitable for parole. 22 See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. However, the relevant statute and regulations provide that The statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole 23 above a prisoner's expectancy in early setting of a fixed date 24 designed to ensure term uniformity. 25 1061, 1070-71 (2005). 26 27 28 For In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th While subdivision (a) of section 3041 states that indeterminate life (i.e., life-maximum) sentences should "normally" receive "uniform" parole dates for similar crimes, 14 1 subdivision (b) provides that this policy applies "unless [the Board] determines" that a release date cannot presently be set because the particular offender's crime and/or criminal history raises "public safety" concerns requiring further indefinite incarceration. Nothing in the statute states or suggests that the Board must evaluate the case under standards of term uniformity before exercising its authority to deny a parole date on the grounds the particular offender's criminality presents a continuing public danger. 2 3 4 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 5 6 Id. at 1070 (emphasis, brackets, and parentheses in original). 7 regulation cited by Petitioner explicitly states, "The panel shall 8 set a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for 9 parole." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(a). The "[T]he Board, exercising 10 its traditional broad discretion, may protect public safety in each 11 discrete case by considering the dangerous implications of a life- 12 maximum prisoner's crime individually." 13 1071. 14 binding in this federal habeas action. 15 U.S. 624, 629 (1988); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516-17 16 (1979). 17 Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at The California Supreme Court's determination of state law is See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 Furthermore, the matrix does not set a statutory maximum term 18 of years for a person convicted of second degree murder. 19 California Penal Code § 190 sets the statutory maximum for such an 20 inmate at life imprisonment. 21 Because the Board found that Petitioner would be a danger to 22 public safety if released, it had no statutory duty to set a 23 maximum term for Petitioner. 24 claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme 25 Court authority. 26 27 28 The state court's denial of this Finally, Petitioner argues that the Board improperly found him unsuitable for parole based upon a "no parole" policy. 15 Petitioner 1 argues that the Board "failed to accord proper deference to its own 2 'preponderance' of 'material' and 'relevant' evidence standard, and 3 failed to consider Petitioner's actual period of confinement and 4 the appropriate determinate term of § 2403(c) in the suitability 5 inquiry, and failed to fix his primary term." 6 As discussed above, the state court's rejection of these 7 arguments was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 8 Supreme Court authority. 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Petition at 21. In sum, the state court's finding that the Board had some 10 evidence to conclude that Petitioner was a danger to public safety 11 if released on parole, and the state court's denial of Petitioner's 12 due process claims, were not contrary to or an unreasonable 13 application of Supreme Court authority. 14 CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 16 corpus is DENIED. 17 close the file. 18 19 The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 10/15/09 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16
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