Coalition for a Sustainable Delta et al v. Carlson et al, No. 1:2008cv00397 - Document 85 (E.D. Cal. 2009)

Court Description: ORDER denying without prejudice Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Adjudication 57 , signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 07/16/09. (Coffman, Lisa)

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Coalition for a Sustainable Delta et al v. Carlson et al Doc. 85 1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRI CT CO URT 4 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF C ALIFORNIA 5 6 7 8 9 10 COALITIO N FOR A SUST AINABLE DELTA, BELRIDGE WATER STORA GE DISTRICT, BERRENDA MESA WATER STORAGE DISTRICT , LOST HILLS WATER DISTRICT , WHEELER RI DGE MARICOPA WATER ST ORAGE DISTRI CT, and DEE DILLON 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Plaintiffs, 1:08-CV-00397 OWW GSA MEMORAND UM DECISION DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION F OR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 57 ) v. DONALD K OCH, in his official capacity as Director of the Californ ia Departmen t of Fish and Game, Defendant, CENTRAL DELTA WATER AGENCY, et al., Defendant-Intervenors, CALIFORN IA SPORTFISHING P ROTECTION ALLIANCE , et a l., Defendant-Intervenors. 23 24 25 I. INTRODUCTION This cas e challenges the California Department of 26 Fish and Game’s (“CD FG”) enforcement of state spo rt- 27 fishing regulations that protect striped bass pop ulations 28 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 within t he Sacrament o-San Joa quin Delta. 2 coalitio n of water u sers led by the Coalition for a 3 Sustaina ble Delta (“ Coalition”), complain t hat CD FG’s 4 enforcem ent of these regulations violates the End angered 5 Species Act (“ESA”), because striped bass prey up on at 6 least fo ur species l isted under the ESA, includin g the 7 Sacramen to River win ter-run C hinook salmon, Central 8 Valley s pring- run Chinook salmon, Central Valley 9 steelhea d, and delta smelt (the “Listed Species”) . 10 Plainti ffs, a Plaintif fs move for summary judgment on the follo wing 11 discrete issues, the resolution of which they ass ert 12 “will na rrow the iss ues in the case and provide t he 13 parties with guidanc e as to how to proceed”: 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (1) [T]h at those por tions of the Central Valley Improvem ent Act (“CV PIA”), Pub. L. 102-575, 106 Stat. 46 00, Title 34 , 106 Stat 4706-31 (1992), pertaini ng to anadro mous fish, do not exempt CDFG’s e nforcement o f striped bass sport-fi shing regulati ons from the take prohibitions under Section 9 of the ESA , 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(1)(B ); (2) [T]h at it is a v iolation of the ESA to “take” a single enda ngered Sacramento-River winter-r un [C]hinook salmon, threatened Central Valley s pring- run [C]hinook salmon, threatened Central Valley steel head, or threatened delta smelt wi thout prior take authorization from the appropri ate federal Wildlife Agency; (3) [T]h at it is a v iolation of the ESA for a governme nt or govern ment agency or entity t o “take” a federally l isted species through the exercise of its regu latory authority without first re ceiving take authorization from the appropri ate federal Wildlife Agency; and (4) [T]h at Mr. Dillo n has standing under Article III of t he United St ates Constitution to pu rsue this lit igation. Doc. 57- 2 at 1-2. 2 1 Defendan t Donald Koc h, Director of CDFG, (“State 2 Defendan t”) opposes summary adjudication on the s econd, 3 third, a nd fourth is sues, but takes no position o n the 4 CVPIA af firmative de fense, which is asserte d only by 5 Defendan t-Inte rvenor s Cen tral Delta Water A gency, et al. 6 (“Centra l Delta”). 7 Defendan t also filed a supplemental opposition, 8 addressi ng recent di scovery addressing Mr. Dillon ’s 9 standing . Doc. 69. Doc. 65. By stipulation, Sta te Central Delta joins the Stat e 10 Defendan t’s oppositi on, but separately opposes su mmary 11 adjudica tion on its CVPIA affirmative defense. 12 Defendan t-Inte rvenor s Cal ifornia Sportfishi ng Protecti on 13 Alliance , et a l., (“CSPA”), filed a separat e brie f 14 opposing summary adj udication on the first and se cond 15 issues, but take no position on the CVPIA affirma tive 16 defense or Dee Dillo n’s standing. D oc. 66. Doc. 67. 1 17 II. 18 19 BACKGROUND The stri ped bass (Morone saxatilis) i s a non-native 20 species introduced f rom the New Jersey coast to the 21 Californ ia waters ne ar Martinez in 1879. 22 Doc. 65- 5, Exh. A (S triped Bass Resto ration and 23 1 24 25 26 27 28 Fuchs D ecl., CSP A fi le d th e de cl ar ati on o f Bi ll Jen ni ng s in s up po rt o f i ts opp os it io n to s um ma ry ad ju di ca ti on on th e si ng le t ak e (s eco nd ) an d tak e by r eg ul at or y au tho ri ty ( th ir d ) i ss ue s. Do c. 6 7- 2. P la in ti ff s obj ec t to J en ni ng s’ d ecl ar at io n on num er ou s gr ou nd s. Do c. 75 . Bec au se , as d is cu ss ed be lo w, t he s e con d an d th ir d is su es ar e no t cog ni za bl e on s um ma ry ju dg me nt , it is no t ne ce ss ar y to r eso lv e Pla in ti ff s’ o bj ec ti on s a t th is t im e . If C SP A, o r an y ot her p ar ty , rel ie s up on t he J en ni ngs d ec la ra ti o n i n fu tu re p ro ce ed in gs, Pla in ti ff s ma y re ne w the ir o bj ec ti o ns. No o th er e vi de nt iar y obj ec ti on s we re m ad e in co nn ec ti on wit h th is m ot io n fo r par ti al sum ma ry a dj ud ic at io n. 3 1 Manageme nt Plan) at 1. 2 multipli ed rapidly, with abundance reaching appro ximately 3 3 millio n adults by the early 1960s. 4 (Conserv ation Plan f or the CDFG Striped Bass Mana gement 5 Program (“Conservati on Plan”)) at 21. 6 the stri ped bass pop ulation has experienced a dec line, 7 with the adult popul ation eroding to 775,000 by 1 996. 8 Id., Exh. C (E ndangered Species Act, Section 7 9 Consulta tion Biologi cal and Conference Opinion) a t 1. Upon introduction, the sp ecies Id., Exh. B Since the 1960s, 10 More rec ent surveys indicate that the adult strip ed bass 11 populati on now numbe rs approximately one million fish. 12 Nobriga Decl., Doc. 65-4, at ¶22. 13 Pursuant to Article 4, section 20 of the Ca lifornia 14 Constitu tion, the Ca lifornia Legislature delegate d to the 15 Californ ia Fish and Game Commission (the “Commiss ion”) 16 “the pow er to regula te the taking or possession o f birds, 17 mammals, fish, amphi bians, and reptiles,” Cal. Fi sh & 18 Game Cod e § 200, and the regulatory authority to 19 establis h seasons, b ag limits, and the “manner an d the 20 means” o f take for s port fish, including the stri ped 21 bass, Ca l. Fish & Ga me Code § 205. 22 authorit ies, the Com mission established sport-fis hing 23 regulati ons for the striped bass that prohibit an glers 24 from tak ing the spec ies in certain areas and in c ertain 25 situatio ns. 26 striped bass sport-fishing regulation s impo se catch 27 limitati ons, size li mitations, and gear restricti ons on 28 striped bass anglers . Pursuant to t hese 14 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 5.75, 27.85. Id. Current For example, anglers may not 4 1 take str iped bass fr om within the Delta that are less 2 than 18 inches in le ngth and may only catch and k eep two 3 striped bass in exce ss of 18 inches in length. 4 is respo nsible for e nforcing the sport-fishing 5 regulati ons. 6 Material Facts (“PSU F”) 2. 7 responsi bilities, De fendant Koch has enforced and 8 continue s to enforce the striped bass sport-fishi ng 9 regulati ons. Id. CDFG Plaint iffs’ Statement of Undisputed Consistent with his PSUF 3 . 10 The 1999 Conservatio n Plan proposed a striped bas s 11 stocking program tha t would have stocked 1.275 mi llion 12 yearling or hatchery-reared bass for a five -year perio d, 13 with red uced stockin g in the following five years . 14 Conserva tion Plan at 40. 15 U.S. Fis h and Wildli fe Service (“FWS”) and the Na tional 16 Marine F isheries Ser vice (“NMFS”) separate incide ntal 17 take per mits under t he ESA for the Striped Bass 18 Manageme nt Program. 19 prepared a Bio logica l and Conference Opinio n pursuant to 20 Section 7 of the ESA , which expressed concern abo ut and 21 required mitigation for striped bass predation of Listed 22 Species due to the C DFG stocking program. 23 Exh. C. at 4-5 , 31-39. 24 stocking program in 2002 and the program has not been 25 reinitia ted. 26 Californ ia Departmen t of Fish and Game’s Striped Bass 27 Manageme nt Program) at 1, 5. 28 In 2000, CDFG obtained from the Fuchs Decl., Exhs. D and E. NMFS Fuchs Decl., CDFG halted i ts str iped b ass Fuchs Decl., Exh. F (2003 Annual Re port for Plaintif fs maintain that the striped bass sport5 1 fishing regulations have contributed to the maint enance 2 of an ar tificially h igh population of striped bas s in the 3 Delta. 4 to analy ses indicati ng that enforcement of the pr esent 5 striped bass regulat ions, alone, will not stabilize th e 6 striped bass populat ion over the long-run. 7 the Cons ervation Pla n concluded that CDFG managem ent 8 efforts that did not include an artificial stripe d bass 9 stocking program wou ld result in a long-ter m decl ine i n PSUF 9. CDF G disputes this assertion, po inting For example, 10 the adul t striped ba ss population to 515,000 adults. 11 Conserva tion Plan at 37. 12 maintain ing the stri ped bass population at stable levels 13 would re quire much m ore restrictive sport-fishing 14 regulati ons than are presently enforced. 15 The plan further conclu ded that Id. at 117. It is un disputed tha t populations of the Listed 16 Species have decline d in recent years. 17 delta sm elt populati on as measured by abundance i ndices 18 relied u pon by FWS h as declined by two to three o rders of 19 magnitud e from histo rical highs. 20 Natural Resources De fense Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. 21 Supp. 2d 322, 334-35 (E.D . Cal. 2007). 22 currentl y at a histo ric low and considered to be in 23 “critica l condition. ” 24 winter-r un Chi nook salmon, Central Valley spring- run 25 Chinook salmon, and Central Valley steelhead popu lations 26 have als o suffered s harp declines in abundance. 27 Coast Fe d’n of Fishe rmen’s Assns. v. Gutierrez, 6 06 F. 28 Supp. 2d 1195, 1218- 1224 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 6 PSUF 14. For examp le, the PSUF 13; see also Del ta sme lt ar e The Sacramento R iver Pac. 1 It is un disput ed tha t striped bass prey on Listed 2 Species. PSUF 10. Plaintiffs maintain that by p romoting 3 and main taining an a rtificially high population o f 4 striped bass in the Delta, the striped bass sport -fishing 5 regulati ons have als o artificially increased striped b ass 6 predatio n of the Lis ted Species. 7 while CD FG concedes that evidence shows that the Listed 8 Species are among th e species that constitute the striped 9 bass’ fo od source, t he Listed Species “are not co mmon in PSUF 11. Howev er, 10 the stri ped bass diet and striped bass predation is not 11 responsi ble for thei r current status.” 12 G (Biolo gical Assess ment for the California Depar tment of 13 Fish and Game Stripe d Bass Management Program, Ju ne 1995- 14 June 199 6 (“BA”)) at 54-56. 15 observed , “[s]almon and striped bass populations 16 coexiste d in much gr eater abundance than the popu lations 17 existing today and a vailable historical informati on on 18 populati on trends do es not suggest that high peri ods in 19 striped bass abundan ce coincided with lower popul ations 20 of salmo n as would b e expected if striped bass we re a 21 major fa ctor limitin g salmon abundance.” 22 Plan at 26. 23 abundanc e data refer enced in the Conservation Pla n 24 disclose d a positive, rather than a negative, correlat ion 25 between striped bass abundance and salmon abundan ce. 26 authors of the analy sis concluded that “[w]hile i t is 27 difficul t to interpr et the causes for and therefo re the 28 meaning of such corr elations, this positive corre latio n 7 Fuchs Dec ., Exh. As the Conservation Plan Conserv ation In fact , statistical analysis of spe cies The 1 certainl y indicates that striped bass predation i s not a 2 dominant factor cont rolling the salmon population .” 3 at 27; s ee also BA at 41- 45. 4 Id. CDFG sub mits the dec laration of CDFG biologist 5 Matthew Nobriga to s upport its opposition to Plai ntiff’s 6 motion f or partial s ummary judgment. 7 “[i]t is logical tha t if predation by one species is 8 strong e nough to cau se declines in another that t he 9 abundanc e of the pre y species would go down when the Nobriga opi nes that 10 abundanc e of the pre dator goes up.” 11 ¶11. 12 regressi on, Nobriga reviewed the relationship bet ween 13 striped bass abundan ce and the abundance of winte r-run 14 salmon, spring-run salmon, and Delta smelt. 15 Conserva tion Plan, t hese regression analyses disc losed 16 the pres ence of a po sitive, not a negative, relat ionship, 17 between striped bass abundance and winter-run sal mon 18 abundanc e. 19 relation ship between striped bass abundance and s pring- 20 run salm on abundance or striped bass abundance and Delta 21 smelt ab undance. 22 Nobrig a Decl . at Us ing a statis tical method known as linear As in the The anal yses did not find any statist ical Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. Nobriga also summari zes the results of a 2003 stu dy 23 of the r elationship between striped bass abundanc e and 24 winter-r un salmon ab undance, conducted by biologi sts 25 Lindley and Mohr. 26 complete elimination of the striped bass populati on from 27 the Bay- Delta system would only incre ase winter-run 28 recovery probabiliti es by slightly more than thre e 8 T his study conclud ed that even the 1 percent and that the winter run would still have about a 2 one in f ive chance o f extinction in the next 50 y ears. 3 Id. at ¶ 22. 4 The only negative re lationship disclosed by the 5 Nobriga regression a nalyses was between Delta sme lt 6 abundanc e and the ab undance of Mississippi silver sides, a 7 small fi sh that preys on Delta smelt eggs a nd lar vae. 8 Nobriga opines this negative relationship “is evi dence 9 that sil verside abun dance may have reduced the pe r capita 10 number o f smelt surv iving to the summer.” Id. at ¶15. 11 Nobriga notes that, while striped bass do eat del ta 12 smelt, t hey also eat their predators and competit ors, 13 like the Mississippi silverslide. 14 this, su ggests that it is possible that the elimi nation 15 of strip ed bass from the Bay-Delta system c ould increa se 16 silversi de abundance , which would inc rease silverside 17 predatio n of the Del ta smelt. 18 silversi de predation of the Delta smelt could pot entially 19 offset a ny reduced s triped bass predation of the smelt. Id. at ¶10. Id. at ¶ 10. From Increased 20 21 22 23 III. STANDARD OF DECISION A motion for summary judgment and a motion for partial summary judg ment (sometimes called summar y 24 adjudica tion) are go verned by the same standards. 25 Californ ia v. Campbe ll, 1 38 F .3d 772, 780-81 (9th Cir. 26 1998); C osta v. Nat' l Action Fin. Servs., 2 007 WL 27 4526510, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2007). 28 9 Summar y 1 judgment is appropri ate when “the pleadings, the 2 discover y and disclo sure materials on file, and a ny 3 4 5 6 7 affidavi ts show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and th at the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat ter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) . A p arty moving f or summary j udgment “always bears the ini tial 8 responsi bility of in forming the district court of the 9 basis fo r its motion , and identifying those porti ons of 10 the plea dings, depos itions, answers to interrogat ories, 11 and admi ssions on file, together with the affidavits, if 12 13 14 15 16 17 any, whi ch it believ es demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of mat erial fact.” Cel otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 31 7, 323 (1986) (internal quota tion marks om itted). Where th e movant has the burden of proof on an issue 18 at trial , it must “a ffirmatively demonstrate that no 19 reasonab le trier of fact could find other than fo r the 20 21 22 23 24 moving p arty.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978 , 984 (9th C ir. 2007); see also S. Cal. G as Co . v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3 d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that a party moving for summary judgment on claim 25 on which it has the burden at trial “must establi sh 26 beyond c ontroversy e very essential element” of th e claim) 27 (interna l quotation marks omitted). 28 10 With respect to an 1 issue as to which th e non-mov ing party has the burden of 2 proof, t he movant “c an prevail merely by pointing out 3 4 5 6 7 that the re is an abs ence of evidence to support t he nonmovin g party’s ca se.” Sor emekun, 509 F.3d at 984. When a m otion for su mmary judgment is prope rly ma de and supp orted, the n on-movant cannot defeat the m otion by 8 resting upon the all egations or denials of its ow n 9 pleading , rather the “non-mov ing party must set forth, by 10 affidavi t or as othe rwise provided in Rule 56, ‘s pecific 11 facts sh owing that there is a genuine issue for t rial. ’” 12 13 14 15 16 Id. (quo ting A nderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). “C onclusory, speculative testim ony in affidavi ts and movin g papers is insufficient to r aise genuine issues of fa ct and defeat summary judgmen t.” Id. 17 To defea t a motion f or summary judgment, the non- 18 moving p arty must sh ow there exists a genuine dis pute (or 19 issue) o f material f act. 20 21 22 23 24 A fact is “material” if it “might a ffect the ou tcome of the suit under the g overning law.” A nderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “[ S]ummary jud gment will not lie if [a] dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine ,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a 25 reasonab le jury coul d return a verdict for the no nmoving 26 party.” 27 judgment , the district court does not make credibility Id. a t 248. In ruling on a motion for s ummary 28 11 1 determin ations; rath er, the “evidence of the non- movant 2 is to be believed, a nd all justifiable inferences are to 3 be drawn in his favo r.” Id. at 255. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 IV. ANALYSIS A. Two of t he Four Requ ested Determinations are Not Amenable to Summary Judgment. Federal Rule of Civi l Procedure 56(a) provides th at a plaintif f may move “ for summary judgment on all o r par t of [a] c laim.” Plaintiff cites a number of cases for the unremark able proposi tion that a party may move fo r partial summar y judg ment on a single issue of law or f act relevant to a partic ular claim or defense. Criti cally, 15 however, in each cit ed case, legal rules were app lied to 16 specific facts to fi nd a claim or issue undispute d as a 17 matter o f law. 18 1197-99 (9th C ir. 1988) (denying motion for summa ry 19 20 21 22 See Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194 , adjudica tion as to w hether specific phone call ma de by Plaintif f was protec ted speech because material f acts were dis puted); Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Products , 23 990 F.2d 342, 344-46 (7th Cir . 1993) (denying mot ion for 24 summary judgment on issue of causation, finding t hat 25 material issues of f act existed); Min ority Police 26 Officers Ass’n of So uth Bend v. City of South Ben d, 721 27 F.2d 197 , 201- 202 (7th Cir. 1983) (summarily adjudicat ing 28 12 1 issue of stand ing, rejecting plaintiffs’ theory that 2 minority police offi cers share interests with min orities 3 4 5 6 7 applying to become o fficer); First Nat’l In s. Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 9 77 F. Supp. 1051, 1055-59 (S.D. Ca l. 1997) (gr anting partial summary judgme nt on several issues, as o pposed to causes of action, t o narrow 8 issues a t trial, app lying various legal doctrines to the 9 specific facts of th at case); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. 10 Californ ia (Caltrans ), 790 F. Supp. 9 83, 98 4 (C.D. Cal . 11 1991) (d etermining, on summary judgme nt, th at the 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 petroleu m exclusion in the Comprehensive Environm ental Response and Liabili ty Act (“CERCLA”) applies to unrefine d and refine d gasoline, used petroleum pr oducts, and petr oleum- laden soil, substances at issue in that case). Plaintiffs als o cite Disandro v. Morr ison-Knudsen Co., Inc ., 588 F. Su pp. 889, 892 (D. Haw. 1984), and United S tates v. Phi lip Morris USA, Inc., 3 27 F. Supp. 2d 13, 18 ( D.D.C. 2004) , for the proposition that it is appropri ate to summa rily adjudicate a “pure” legal issue to narro w the issues in a case and advance the pr ogress 25 of the l itigation. In Disandro, the distri ct cou rt 26 entertai ned plaintif f’s request, styled as a moti on for 27 partial summary judg ment, on the issues of whethe r a 28 13 1 particul ar statute r equired proof of defend ant’s scien ter 2 and/or p laintiff’s r eliance. 3 4 5 6 7 Defendant argued th at ruling o n these disc rete issues of law would amou nt to an advisory opinion in violation of Article III’s ca se or controve rsy requirem ent. Id. at 893. This argum ent was rejected based on Lies v. Farrell Lines, In c., 641 F.2d 8 765, 768 -69 & n.3 (9 th Cir. 1981), recognizing th at “[i]t 9 is appro priate to de cide a few limited issues by summary 10 judgment , even if th ose issues are not entirely 11 disposit ive of any o ne claim ... [as] summa ry jud gment 12 13 14 15 16 can thus serve to se t the issues for trial.” How ever, the quot ed Lie s language interprets Rule 56(d)(1), which permits a court to d eem certain facts established if those fa cts appear t o be “without substantial 17 controve rsy.” 18 authorit y for the is suance of partial summary jud gment on 19 an abstract is sue of law (i.e ., one entirely divorced 20 21 22 23 24 See L ies 641 F.2d at 7 68. Lies is not from the facts of the case under consideration). Disandro ’s mis placed reliance on Lies rende rs its holding unpersua sive. Philip M orris USA, a RICO case, summarily a djudic ated 25 the “str ict legal is sue” of whether a defendant’s 26 liabilit y for conspi racy under the RICO statute r equired 27 that the defendant p articipate in the management of the 28 14 1 enterpri se. 2 United S tates, 698 F. Supp. 877, 879 (S.D. Fla. 1988), 3 4 5 6 7 327 F. Supp. 2d at 18. Citing Warne r v. this iss ue was deeme d amenable to summary adjudic ation because its resoluti on could “narrow the issues i n a case, ad vance the pr ogress of the litigation, and provide the part ies with some guidance as to how th ey pro ceed 8 with the case.” 327 F. Supp. 2d at 17. But Warner, like 9 Lies, co ncerne d the application of rule 56(d), which 10 permits the court to determine specific facts, no t 11 abstract issues of l aw. 12 13 14 15 16 Philip Morris is n o more persuasi ve than Disandro. Here, Pl aintiffs req uest determinations of the followin g, abstract questions of law: (1) whethe r the “take” o f a single e ndangered listed fish without prior 17 take aut horization f rom the appropriate federal w ildlife 18 agency v iolates the ESA; and 19 (2) whet her a govern ment agency or entity violate s the 20 21 22 23 24 ESA by “ taking” a fe derally listed species throug h the exercise of its regu latory authority without firs t obtainin g take autho rization from the appropriate federal Wildlife Agency. 25 As to th e first issu e, although the F irst Amended 26 Complain t (“FAC”), D oc. 46, and the Plaintiffs’ S tatement 27 of Undis puted Facts, Doc. 57-2, focus on al leged 28 15 1 populati on-lev el effects of the striped bass spor t- 2 fishing regulations on the Listed Species, the FA C also 3 alleges: 4 113. Th e ESA prohib its all take of all ESA-list ed species, even of a single individu al of the sp ecies. Loggerhea d Turtle v . County Cou ncil of Volusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1180 (M.D. Fla. 199 5); 16 U.S.C . § 1538. *** 115. By enforcing r egulations to protect and increase the non-native striped bass populat ion, defendant is taking t he Listed Sp ecies in violation of secti on 9 of the ESA. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 FAC at ¶ ¶ 113, 115. 12 of the “ single take” issue to vindicate their pos ition 13 that “in order to su cceed on the merits, Plaintif fs need 14 15 16 17 Plaintiffs seek early adjudi cation only pro ve that stri ped bass predation of Listed Species is great er, by one f ish, than if the sport-fishing regulati ons were not enforced.” Doc. 79-2 at 3-4. 2 This is an abstract question, as the motion is 18 19 supporte d by no undi sputed facts that could possi bly 20 support such a findi ng. 21 motion w ould require that the court hypotheticall y 22 assume, for purposes of this motion, that that the 23 In other words, Plaintif fs striped bass sport-fishing regulations caus ed an 24 25 26 27 28 2 At or al a rg um en t, P la int if fs ’ co un s el su gg es te d th at t he in te nt of th is a rg um en t wa s, in f ac t, t o e sta bl is h th at m in ut e pop ul at io nlev el e ff ec ts , e. g. , 0.0 1 pe rc en t, wou ld b e su ff ic ie nt t o e st ab li sh a v io la ti on o f th e ES A. B ut , Pl ai n tif fs c it e on ly s in gl e t ak e ca se s in su pp or t of t he ir m oti on f or p ar t ial s um ma ry j ud gm en t. W he th er a cer ta in p er ce nt ag e ef fec t wo ul d sa t isf y th e po pu la ti on -l eve l ef fe ct s sta nd ar d tu rn s on t he ap pl ic at io n o f p op ul at io n- le ve l im pac t jur is pr ud en ce . 16 1 individu al angler to release (or not catch) one 2 particul ar str iped b ass, which then, in tur n, consumed 3 4 5 6 7 one part icular, indi vidual Listed Species, and de termine the lega l effect of such a hypothetical case. Pl aintiffs have not presented s uch evidence, precluding summ ary adjudica tion of whet her “take” of a single listed fish 8 violates ESA section 9. 9 court ma y not assume facts that do not exist or c annot be 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 On summary judgment, a d istrict proved t o decide abs tract questions of law. The fact s supp orting Plaintiffs’ alternative theo ry of take -- tha t the sport -fis hing regulations have populati on-lev el effects on the Listed Species -- are highly d isputed. Al though striped bass may eat d elta smelt, t hey also eat delta smelt predators and 17 competit ors. 18 states: “[M]ajor foo d web perturbations can cause changes 19 that wer e not predic table in advance.” 20 21 22 23 24 25 Nobrig a Decl. at ¶10. As Mr. Nobri ga Id. Mr. Nobri ga conclude s that “it i s impossible to forecast the populati on responses of the Bay-Delta food web to the removal of striped b ass - one of its keystone spe cies.” Id. at ¶ 24 Federal courts are c ourts of limited jurisdiction , 26 and “mus t refrain fr om deciding abstract or hypot hetical 27 controve rsies and fr om rendering impermissible ad visory 28 17 1 opinions with respect to such controversies .” 2 Island I nst. v. Ruth enbeck, 4 90 F.3d 687, 694 (9th Cir . 3 4 5 6 7 See Earth 2007), r ev’d on othe r grounds, Summers v. E arth I sland Inst., 1 29 S. Ct. 1142 (2009) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968)); see also In re M ichaelson, 511 F. 2d 882, 893 (9th Cir. 1 975)(“This Court does not int end to 8 and cann ot, issue an advisory opinion on a hypoth etical 9 fact sit uation.”); Matter of Fed Pak System s, Inc., 80 10 F.3d 207 , 211- 12 (7th Cir. 1996)(federal court “lacks the 11 constitu tional power to r ende r advisory opinions or to 12 13 14 15 16 decide a bstract, aca demic, or hypothetical questi ons”). The seco nd request p resents the same problem: whether it is unlawf ul for a government or govern ment agency o r entity to take a Listed Species through the 17 exercise of its regu latory authority without first 18 receivin g ESA take a uthorization. 19 cannot s ummarily adj udicate, in the abstract, whe ther 20 21 22 23 24 A district cou rt “the exe rcise of [an agency’s] regulatory authori ty” results in a take. This inquiry does not require applicat ion of undisputed facts established in this case to the l aw. Whether the specific exercise of reg ulatory 25 authorit y that has o ccurred in this case resulted in an 26 unlawful take of any of the Listed Species is not raised 27 by the p resent motio n. The facts that unde rlie that 28 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 question are dispute d. Plaintif fs’ motion f or summary adjudication is DE NIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the single take (second) and take by regul atory author ity (third) issues. B. CVPIA Af firmative De fense. Central Delta assert s the following a ffirma tive defense: The prov isions of th e Central Valley Project Improvem ent Act, Pub .L. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600, Title 34 , 106 Stat. 4706- 31 (1992) pertaining to anadromo us fish, whi ch are defined to include striped bass, [] are a bar to any action to enforce any inconsis tent provisions of the Endanger ed Species A ct. Doc. 20 at 13. Plai ntiffs request summary adjudi cation to forec lose this af firmative defense, the operat ive effect o f which woul d be to exempt CDFG’s enforce ment of striped bass sport-f ishin g regulations from the t ake 18 prohibit ions under S ection 9 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C . § 1538 19 (a)(1)(B ), and the r equirement that CDFG obtain a n 20 incident al take perm it. 21 22 23 24 25 The CVPI A contains n umerous provisions calling fo r protecti on and enhan cement of striped bass within the Sacramen to-San Joaquin Delta. CVPIA section 3403 (a) defines the term “an adromous fish” to include “st riped 26 bass,” m aking applic able section 3406(b)(1)’s mai ntenance 27 and rest oration prov isions. That section require s the 28 19 1 Secretar y of Interior to “develop within th ree years of 2 enactmen t and implem ent a program which makes all 3 4 5 6 7 reasonab le efforts t o ensure that, by the year 20 02, natural production o f anadromous fish in Central Valley rivers a nd streams w ill be sustainable, on a long -term basis, at leve ls not less than twice the average levels 8 attained during the period of 1967-1991.” To this end , 9 it is un disputed tha t FWS has established a doubl ing goal 10 for stri ped bass of 2,500,000 fish. 11 66-4, at ¶3 & Ex. B (Final Restoration Plan for 12 13 14 15 16 17 McDaniel Dec l., Doc. Anadromo us Fish Rest oration Program, January 9, 2 001) at 9-10. I t is a lso un disputed that this goal has n ot been achieved . Id. at Ex. C (Anadromous Fish Restoration Program Doubling Gra phs for striped bass). Section 3406(b)(1)(B ) provides that “ the Secretar y is 18 authoriz ed and direc ted to modify Central Valley Project 19 operatio ns to provid e flows of suitable quality, 20 21 22 23 24 quantity , and timing to protect all life stages o f anadromo us fish....” Section 3406(b)(1)(D)(2) re quires that the Secretary “upon enactment of this title dedicate and mana ge annually 800,000 acre-feet of Ce ntral Valle y 25 Project yield for th e primary purpose of implemen ting the 26 fish, wi ldlife, and habitat restoration purposes and 27 measures authorized by this title....” 28 20 This provision 1 has been interpreted to require that the Secretar y give 2 primacy to its anadr omous fish doubling program i n the 3 4 5 6 7 allocati on of the 80 0,000 acre-foot CVP yie ld ded icati on. See San Luis & Delta Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of the Inte rior, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2009 WL 1362652 (E. D. Cal. 200 9); Ba y Institute of San Francisco v. United 8 States, 87 Fed. Appx . 637 (9th Cir. J an. 23, 2004). 9 Because striped bass are included in the statutor y 10 definiti on of “andad romous fish,” they are intend ed and 11 designat ed beneficia ries of these efforts. 12 CVPIA § 3403(a). 3 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Add it io na l, s pe ci fi c req ui re me nt s f or th e pr ot ec ti on a nd res to ra ti on o f an ad ro mou s fi sh , in c lud in g st ri pe d ba ss , are f ou nd i n sec ti on 3 40 6( b) (8 )( to im pl em en t “s h ort p ul se s of i nc re as ed wa te r flo ws t o in cr ea se t he su rv iv al o f m igr at in g an ad ro mo us f ish m ov in g int o an d th ro ug h th e Sac ra me nt o- Sa n Jo aq ui n De lt a an d Ce ntr al V al le y riv er s an d st re am s” ); se ct io n 34 06 ( b)( 9) (t ha t th e Se cr et ary “ de ve lo p and i mp le me nt a p ro gr am to e li mi na t e, to t he e xt en t po ss ibl e, l os se s of an ad ro mo us f is h du e t o fl ow f lu c tua ti on s ca us ed b y th e o pe ra ti on of an y Ce nt ra l Va ll ey Pr oj ec t st or a ge or r e- re gu la ti ng f aci li ty ”) ; sec ti on 3 40 6( b) (1 9) (t hat t he S ec re t ary “ re ev al ua te e xi st ing ope ra ti on al c ri te ri a in or de r to m a int ai n mi ni mu m ca rr yo ver s to ra ge at Sa cr am en to a nd T ri nit y ri ve r re s erv oi rs t o pr ot ec t an d r es to re the a na dr om ou s fi sh o f t he S ac ra me n to an d Tr in it y Ri ve rs in acc or da nc e wi th t he m and at es a nd r e qui re me nt s of t hi s sub se ct io n. .. ”) ; se ct ion 3 40 6( c) (1 ) (th at t he S ec re ta ry “ dev el op a com pr eh en si ve p la n, t o r ee st ab li sh whe re n ec es sa ry a nd t o s us ta in nat ur al ly r ep ro du ci ng an ad ro mo us f i she ri es f ro m Fr ia nt D am to [ th e San J oa qu in R iv er ’s ] con fl ue nc e wi t h t he S an F ra nc is co Bay /S ac ra me nt o- Sa n Jo aqu in D el ta E s tua ry ”) ; se ct io n 34 06 (e) (1 )( th at the S ec re ta ry i nv es ti gat e “m ea su re s to m ai nt ai n su it ab le tem pe ra tu re s fo r an ad rom ou s fi sh s u rvi va l in t he S ac ra me nto a nd S an Joa qu in r iv er s an d th eir t ri bu ta ri e s, an d th e Sa cr am en to -Sa n Jo aq ui n Del ta b y co nt ro ll in g or re lo ca ti ng the d is ch ar ge o f ir ri gat io n ret ur n fl ow s an d se wa ge ef fl ue nt .. . ”); s ec ti on 3 40 6( e) (5 )(f or inv es ti ga ti on o f “m ea sur es t o pr ov i de fo r mo di fi ed o pe ra tio ns a nd new o r im pr ov ed c on tr ol st ru ct ur es at th e De lt a Cr os s Ch ann el a nd Geo rg ia na S lo ug h to a ssi st i n th e s ucc es sf ul m ig ra ti on o f a na dr om ou s fis h” ); s ec ti on 3 40 6( f)( th at “ [t ]h e Se cr et ar y, i n co ns ul tat io n wi th the S ec re ta ry o f Co mm erc e, t he S ta t e o f Ca li fo rn ia , ap pr opr ia te Ind ia n tr ib es , an d ot her a pp ro pr ia t e p ub li c an d pr iv at e ent it ie s, sha ll i nv es ti ga te a nd re po rt o n al l ef fe ct s of t he C en tr al Va ll ey 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Section 3406(b)(14) is directed specifically to striped bass, requir ing the Secretary to “develop and implemen t a program which provides for modified operatio ns and new o r improved control structures at the Delta Cr oss Channel and Georgiana Slough during t imes when sig nificant num bers of striped bass eggs, la rvae, 8 and juve niles approa ch the Sacramento River intak e to the 9 Delta Cr oss Channel or Georgiana Slough.” 10 Certain CVPIA provis ions require the Secret ary to 11 coordina te with stat e agencies to protect anadrom ous fish 12 13 14 15 16 in gener al and strip ed bass in particular. For e xample, Section 3406(b)(21) requires that the Secretary “ assist the Stat e of Califor nia in efforts to develop and implemen t measures t o avoid losses of juven ile anadrom ous 17 fish res ulting from unscreened or inadequately sc reened 18 diversio ns on the Sa cramento and San Joaquin rive rs, 19 their tr ibutaries, t he Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, and 20 21 22 23 24 the Suis un Marsh.” Similarly, section 3406(b)(18 ) requires that the Se cretary “if requested by the State of Californ ia, assist i n developing and implementing manageme nt measures to restore the striped bass f ishery 25 26 27 28 Pro je ct o n an ad ro mo us fi sh p op ul at i ons .. .” ); a nd s ec ti on 34 06 (g )( fo r the m od el in g of “ me as ure s ne ed ed t o re st or e an ad ro mo us f ish er ie s to opt im um a nd s us ta in ab le le ve ls i n a cco rd an ce w it h th e re sto re d car ry in g ca pa ci ti es o f C en tr al V al l ey ri ve rs .. .” a nd “ me asu re s des ig ne d to r ea ch s us tai na bl e ha rv e st le ve ls o f re si de nt an d ana dr om ou s fi sh .. .. ”) . 22 1 of the B ay-Del ta estuary.” 2 “coordin ated with ef forts to protect and restore nativ e 3 4 5 6 7 fisherie s.” Such measures must be I d. Central Delta is cor rect that “[i]t cannot be reasonab ly disputed that Congress intended to pro tect and restore striped bass .” Doc. 66 at 5. However, C ongress 8 also exp ressed its i ntention in CVPIA § 3406(b), that the 9 Secretar y “ope rate the Central Valley Proje ct to meet all 10 obligati ons under st ate and federal law, includin g but 11 not limi ted to the f ederal Endangered Species Act ....” 12 13 14 15 16 In light of the fact that the CVPIA expressly req uires complian ce with the ESA, Plaintiffs argue that their E SA claims c annot be bar red as a matter of law by the CVPIA. Doc. 57- 2 at 5-7. Central Delta rejoins that the more 17 specific , and more-recently enacted, provis ions of the 18 CVPIA re quiring rest oration of the striped bass f ishery 19 should p revail over the ESA’s earlier-enact ed, general 20 21 22 23 24 requirem ents. Plaintif fs cite Morton v. C.R. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-551 (1974) , for the proposition that “courts are not at liber ty to pick a nd choose among congressional 25 enactmen ts, and when two statutes are capable of co- 26 existenc e, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly 27 expresse d congressio nal intention to the contrary , to 28 23 1 regard e ach as effec tive.” 2 concern the repeal b y implication of an earlier, specific 3 4 5 6 7 Mancari and its progeny provisio n, by a later-ena cted , general one. Here , the issue is whether a l ater, specific provision rend ers inapplic able an earl ier-enact ed general one. Courts h ave “a duty to construe statutes harmoniously” whenev er 8 possible . 9 and Stat utory Constr uction § 53:1 (7th ed. 2008). 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2B N. Sin ger & J. Singer, Sutherland S tatutes Central Delta is cor rect that the CVPIA is the mo re recent a nd more spec ific expression of Congressio nal intent. Central Del ta suggests that Rodgers v. United States, 185 U.S. 83, 89 (1902) sets f orth the applicab le canon of statutory c onstruction: Where th ere are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular, and certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general, which, if s tanding alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act or provi sion, the special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the gene ral act or p rovision, especially when such gen eral and spe cial acts or provisions are contempo raneous, as the legislature is not to be presumed to have int ended a conflict. Central Delta ignore s the law that a later, more specific statute only trumps an earlier general one where the two statutes are in conf lict. Can the numerous CVP IA provisions directing the Secretar y of the Interior , in consultation with o ther federal agencies, to protect and enhance the stri ped bass populati on, be harmo nized with application of sec tion 9’s 24 1 take pro hibition to CDFG’s enforcement of the str iped 2 bass spo rt-fis hing regulations and more general 3 applicat ion of the ESA? 4 summary adjudication on an affirmative defense fo r which 5 Central Delta has th e burden of proof at trial, 6 Plaintif fs must show “an absence of evidence to s upport 7 the nonm oving party’ s case.” 8 Plaintif fs maintain, and have presented evidence to 9 support their claim, that State Defendant’s enfor cement On Plaintiffs’ motion for Soremek un, 509 F.3d at 9 84. 10 of the s port-f ishing regulations necessarily take Listed 11 Species, and that la wful application of the ESA t o State 12 Defendan t’s enforcem ent activities will require 13 eliminat ion of (or s ubstantial modification to) t hose 14 sport-fi shing regula tions, which are causing jeopardy to 15 Listed S pecies. 16 sport-fi shing regula tions are critica l to the maintenance 17 of curre nt str iped b ass a bundance levels. 18 evidence suggests th at the continued enforcement of these 19 regulati ons, and/or the promulgation of more stri ngent 20 protecti ons, may be necessary to achieve the 2,50 0,000 21 striped bass populat ion goal promulgated by the Servic e. 22 The State rejoins that the curre nt The State’s This pre sents a mate rial factual dispute over the 23 effects of CDFG’s st riped bass regulations on the bass 24 and List ed Species p opulations. 25 the legi slative purp ose of the CVPIA do not evinc e an 26 intent t o abrogate a pplication of the ESA. 27 the fact s are develo ped will it be possible to de termine 28 if a con flict in ope ration exists between impleme ntation 25 The express lang uage and Only after 1 of the E SA to the sp ort-fishi ng regulations and achiev ing 2 the CVPI A objectives by application of those regu latio ns. 3 Plaintif fs’ motion f or summary adjudication of Ce ntral 4 Delta’s CVPIA affirm ative defense is DENIED WITHO UT 5 PREJUDIC E. 6 C. 7 To maint ain an actio n in federal court, Plaintiff s 8 9 Standing of Dee Dill on. must hav e Article II I standing. See Lujan v. Nat’l 10 Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 872 (1990). 4 11 Article III’s standi ng requirements, a plaintiff must 12 show (1) [he] has su ffered an ‘injury in fact’ th at is 13 14 15 16 17 “[T]o satisfy (a) conc rete and par ticularized and (b) actual or imminent , not conjec tural or hypothetical; (2) th e inj ury is fairl y traceable to the challenged action of t he defendan t; and (3) i t is likely, as opposed to me rely 18 speculat ive, that th e injury will be redressed by a 19 favorabl e decision.” 20 21 22 Lai dlaw , 528 U. S. at 180-81. The burd en of establ ishing these thre e elements f alls upon the party asser ting federal jurisdiction. Defender s of Wildlif e, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1 992). Lujan v. “[E] ach 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 In ad di ti on t o th e Ar tic le I II r eq u ire me nt s, p la in ti ff s bri ng in g su it u nd er t he Ad mi ni st ra t ive P ro ce du re A ct , 5 U.S .C . § 706 , mu st e st ab li sh t hat t he y fa ll wit hi n th e “z on e of i nte re st ” of the s ta tu te u nd er w hi ch th ey b ri ng the ir l aw su it . S ee C ity o f Sau sa li to v . O’ Ne il l, 38 6 F. 3d 1 18 6 , a t 11 99 ( 9t h Ci r. 2 004 ). How ev er , wh er e Pl ai nt iff s’ s ui t ar i ses u nd er t he E SA ’s c iti ze n su it pro vi si on , wh ic h al lo ws “a ny p er so n ” t o co mm en ce a c iv il su it , th e zon e of i nt er es t te st is n eg at ed , o r a t le as t ex pa nd ed t o i nc lu de “an y pe rs on .” B en ne t v. Sp ea r, 5 20 U.S . 15 4, 1 64 ( 19 97 ). 26 1 element of Article I II standing ‘must be supporte d in the 2 same way as any othe r matter on which the plainti ff bears 3 4 5 6 7 the burd en of proof, i.e., with the manner and de gree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigati on.’” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 1 54, 16 7 (19 97) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). On summary judgment , 8 plaintif f “must show there is no genu ine dispute as to 9 material facts regar ding their standing and that they 10 have sta nding as a m atter of law.” 11 Envt.-Ca l. v. Union Oil of Cal., 996 F. Sup p. 934 , 937 12 13 14 15 16 Citizen s for a Bet ter (N.D. Ca l. 1997); cf. Def enders of Wildlife v. Gu tierr ez, 532 F.3d 913, 924 (D .C. C ir. 2008) (“In rev iewing the standing question, t he court must be careful not to decide t he questions on the merits for or against 17 plaintif f, and must therefore assume that on the merits 18 the plai ntiffs would be successful in their claim s.”). 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 When a p laintiff is an object of the challenged regulato ry action, s tanding is usually not challe nging to prove. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. When a plaintiff’s asserted injury “ari ses from the government’s all egedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of so meone else, mu ch more is n eeded.” Id. In that circumstance , causation and redressa bility ordin arily hinge on the response of the r egulated (or regulable) third party to the gove rnment actio n or inaction -- and perhaps on the r esponse of o thers as well. The 27 1 existenc e of one or more of the essential elements of standing “depends on the unfettered choices made by inde pendent actors not before the cour ts and whose exercise of broad and legitima te discretio n the courts cannot presume either t o control or to predict”; and it be comes the burd en of the pl aintiff to adduce facts showing that those c hoices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit r edressabilit y of injury. Thus, when the plaintif f is not him self the object o f the governme nt action or inaction he challenges, standing is not prec luded, but it is ordinarily "substan tially more difficult" to establish. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Id. (int ernal citati ons omitted). 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1. Injury-In-Fact. To satis fy the “inju ry in fact” requirement, Plaintif fs mus t prov ide e vidence of either actual or threaten ed injury. See U nited States v. En sign, 491 F.3d 1109, 11 16-17 (9th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff claim ing environm ental injury demonstrates injury in fact if he uses the affected ar ea and is a person “‘for whom the aestheti c and recrea tional values of the area wil l be lessened ’ by the cha llenged activity.” Lai dlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 ( quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 7 35 (1972)). To satisfy this burden, Mr. Dillon does not need to show actual harm; “an increased risk of harm c an itself b e injury in fact sufficient for standing. ” Ecologic al Rights Fo und. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 11 51 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Ocean Advoca tes v. U.S. Arm y Corps of E ng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 860 (9th Cir. 2004) (i njury in fac t existed where a gency’s issuance of a permit authorizing an oil company to build an a ddition 28 28 1 to its o il refinery dock increased the risk of an oil 2 spill, a n event that would harm plaintiffs’ inter ests). 3 To “requ ire actual e vidence of environmental harm, rat her 4 than an increased ri sk based on a violation of [a ] 5 statute, misundersta nds the nature of environment al harm 6 and woul d unduly lim it the enforcement of statuto ry 7 environm ental protec tions.” 8 860. 9 Ocean Advocate s, 402 F.3d at Here, Mr . Dill on declares that he has visited the 10 Delta “t o appreciate the natural environment, to escape 11 from the urban envir onment, and to engage in nume rous 12 recreati onal activit ies, including recreational b oating, 13 swimming , snorkeling , kayaking, and wildlife view ing.” 14 Dillon D ecl., Doc. 5 7-5, at ¶ 3. 15 he has “ been able to gain significant exposure to the 16 Sacramen to River win ter-run c hinook salmon, Central 17 Valley s pring- run chinook salmon, Central Valley 18 steelhea d, and delta smelt (“Listed Species”). When [h e] 19 encounte rs the Liste d Species [he] is generally f illed 20 with a s ense of appr eciation and satisfaction.” 21 Dillon C ontinues: 22 23 24 25 26 27 Through these ac tivities Id. Mr. My encou nters with t he Listed Species have occurred through a v ariety of different circumst ances. For example, I have witnessed salmon m igrating thr ough the Delta from a kayak, and view ed delta sme lt while riding on a trawl vessel. I have also viewed Listed Species while photogra phing the De lta’s diverse wildlife, and while sw imming along the Delta’s banks. These are but a few exampl es of my various experien ces, and are in no way intended to be a comprehe nsive list. 28 29 1 Id. at ¶ 4. 2 Listed S pecies, whic h I have personally witnessed over 3 the last seven years , has negatively impacted my use and 4 enjoymen t of the Del ta. 5 decline of the Liste d Species, my ability to fish for and 6 view sal mon has been significantly impaired.” 7 Mr. Dill on is a pers on “for whom the aesthetic an d 8 recreati onal values of the area will be lessened by the 9 challeng ed activity. ” 10 11 He furth er states that “the decline o f the For example, as a result of the Id. at ¶6. Fr iend s of the Earth v. La idlaw Envtl. S ervs. (TOC), Inc., 52 8 U.S. 167, 183 (2000). The Supr eme Court re cently examined the “injury i n 12 fact” re quirement in Summers v. Earth Islan d Inst itute , 13 129 S. C t. 1142 (200 9). 14 environm ental organi zations had standing to chall enge a 15 U.S. For est Service (“Service”) regulation that e xempted 16 certain types of pro jects from the Service’s noti ce, 17 comment, and appeal process. 18 first re viewed an af fidavit in which one of the 19 plaintif fs asserted that he had suffered injury i n the 20 past fro m developmen t on Forest Service land. 21 rejected as a basis for standing, because, among other 22 things, “it relates to pa st injury rather t han imminent 23 and futu re injury th at is sought to be enjoined.” 24 1150. 25 “want[s] to” visit s pecific sites in the Alleghen y 26 National Forest was found insufficiently specific . 27 vague de sire to retu rn is insufficient to satisfy the 28 requirem ent of immin ent injury: ‘Such ‘some day’ 30 Summers addr essed whether Id. at 1147. The Court Th is was Id. at I n addition, another plaintiff’s claim tha t he “This 1 intentio ns—wit hout any description of concrete pl ans or 2 indeed a ny specifica tion of when the some day wil l be— do 3 not supp ort a findin g of the ‘actual or imm inent’ inju ry 4 that our cases requi re.’” 5 504 U.S. at 564). 6 Id. at 1150-51 (quoting Lujan, In suppo rt of their motion for partial summary 7 judgment on the issu e of standing, Plaintiffs ori ginally 8 submitte d only Mr. D illon’s declaration. 9 arguably did not sat isfy Summers beca use, a lthough Mr. His dec laration 10 Dillon “ plans to con tinue frequenting the Delta,” Dillon 11 Decl., D oc. 57-5, at ¶ 6, he does not set forth any 12 specific facts descr ibing “concrete plans” for do ing so. 13 However, on May 27, 2009, Mr. Dillon filed responses t o 14 State De fendant’s in terrogatories, in which he de scribes 15 specific plans to re turn to the Delta to fish for Listed 16 Species over the 200 9 Labor Day weekend. 17 Fuchs. D ecl., Doc. 6 9-2, at E x. A. 18 evidence of Mr. Dill on’s “concrete pl ans.” 19 Defendan ts no longer contest Mr. Dillon’s injury in fact. 20 Mr. Dill on satisfies the injury in fact requireme nt for 21 purposes of standing . See Second This is suffi cient State 22 2. 23 24 Causatio n. The seco nd standing requirement, causation, requi res 25 that the injur y be “fairly traceable” to the challenge d 26 action o f the defend ant, and not be “the result o f the 27 independ ent action o f some third party not before the 28 court.” Tyler v. Cu omo, 236 F. 3d 1124, 1132 (9t h Cir. 31 1 2000). 5 2 “injury caused by a third party is too tenuously 3 connecte d to the act s of the defendant.” 4 Better F orestry v. U .S. Dept. of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 5 975 (9th Cir. 2003). 6 standing , while the causal connection cannot “be too 7 speculat ive, or rely on conjecture about the beha vior of 8 other pa rties, [it] need not be so airtight ... a s to 9 demonstr ate that the plaintiffs would succeed on the 10 The ca usatio n element is lack ing where an merits.’ ” 11 Citizen s for For the purposes of determi ning Oce an Advocates, 4 02 F.3d at 860. National Audubon Soc iety v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835 (9th 12 Cir. 200 2), provides guidance. The plaintiffs in Davis, 13 bird ent husiasts, al leged that a California law b anning 14 the use of leghold t raps to capture or kill wildl ife 15 violated the Migrato ry Bird Treaty Act. 16 Prior to the p assage of t hat California law , federal 17 official s used legho ld traps against predators to protect 18 several bird species . 19 held tha t plaintiffs had standing to challenge th e 20 leghold trap ban, fi nding their injury was “fairl y Id. at 844. Id. at 842-84 3. The Ninth Cir cuit 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 Whe n a pl ai nt if f se ek s t o vi nd ic at e a pr oc ed ur al h ar m, r ath er tha n a su bs ta nt iv e ri ght , th e ca us a tio n an d re dr es si bi li ty req ui re me nt s ar e re la xed . L uj an , 5 04 U. S. a t 57 3 n. 7; S alm on Spa wn in g & Re co ve ry A lli an ce v . Gu t ier re z, 5 45 F .3 d 12 20 , 1 22 6 (9 th Cir . 20 08 ). Fo r ex am ple , a cl ai m t hat a f ed er al a ge nc y fai le d to eng ag e in r eq ui re d co nsu lt at io n un d er ES A se ct io n 7( a) (2 ) i s pro ce du ra l in n at ur e and w ou ld b e s ubj ec t to t hi s re la xe d s ta nd ar d. Def en de rs o f Wi ld li fe v. E PA , 42 0 F .3d 9 46 , 95 7- 58 ( 9t h Cir . 20 05 ), rev er se d on o th er g ro und s by H om e B uil de rs v . De fe nd er s of Wi ld li fe , 551 U .S . 64 4 (2 00 7) . He re , Pl ai nt i ffs c la im t ha t St at e Def en da nt ’s enf or ce me nt o f th e sp ort -f is hi ng r e gul at io ns r es ul te d in una ut ho ri ze d ta ke i n vio la ti on o f E SA se ct io n 9. No p ar ty ha s arg ue d th at t hi s is a n a ll eg at io n o f p ro ce du ra l, r at he r tha n sub st an ti ve , ha rm u nd er th e ES A. 32 1 traceabl e” to the pr oposition because: 2 [T]he fe deral govern ment removed traps in direct response to Proposit ion 4 (whether under direct “threat of prosecuti on” or not). Removal of the traps le ads to a lar ger population of predators, which in turn decreases t he number of birds and other pr otected wild life. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Id. at 8 49. “ This c hain of causation has more th an one link, bu t it is not hypothetical or tenuous; nor do appellan ts challenge its plausibility.” Id. 6 Here, it is Plaintif fs’ burden to establish that their th eory of caus ation is at least “plausible. ” Id . See also Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 867 (9 th Cir. 200 3) (“A plain tiff who shows that a causal relation is ‘prob able’ has st anding, even if the chain can not be definiti vely establi shed.”). Plaintiffs do not h ave to establis h causation by a preponderance of the evi dence required to prevail on the merits. Ocean A dvocat es, 402 F.3d at 860 (while t he causal connection cannot “ be too speculat ive, or rely on conjecture about the beha vior of other pa rties, [it] need not be so airtight ... a s to demonstr ate that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits.” ). 7 Because Plaintiffs are mo ving for summary 6 Dav is u nd er mi ne s St at e D ef en da nt s’ sug ge st io n th at p la in tif fs ’ cau sa ti on s ho wi ng i s wea ke ne d by t h e p re se nc e of a n on -h uma n in t he cau sa l ch ai n. So l on g a s th er e is evi de nc e th at t he t hi rd pa rt y, whe th er p os se ss in g a fou r- ch am be re d he ar t or n ot , wi ll b eha ve i n a pre di ct ab le m an ne r, t he ca us al c ha i n i s no t ne ce ss ar il y ren de re d “te nu ou s” f or p ur po se s o f th e st an d ing a na ly si s. 7 The p ar ti es ’ un he lp fu lly r el y on n u mer ou s ca se s de ci di ng cau sa ti on o n th e me ri ts, i nc lu di ng Col d Mo un ta in v . Ga rb er, 3 75 F .3 d 884 ( 9t h Ci r. 2 00 4) , Pyr am id L ak e P aiu te T ri be o f In di an s v . U. S. Dep ar tm en t of t he N av y, 89 8 F. 2d 1 4 10 (9 th C ir . 19 90 ), P ali la v . Haw ai i De pa rt me nt o f Lan d an d Na tu r al Re so ur ce s, 6 39 F .2 d 4 95 ( 9t h Cir . 19 81 ), a nd A me ri can B al d Ea gl e v. B ha tt i, 9 F .3 d 16 3 ( 1s t Ci r. 199 3) , as c om pl et e pr oof o f ca us at i on is n ot r eq ui re d to es ta bl is h 33 1 judgment , to prevail , there must be no material f acts 2 that cal l into quest ion the plausibility of their theo ry 3 of causa tion. 4 CDFG’s C onservation Plan states that by modifying the 5 striped bass minimum size limits from 18 to 26 in ches, 6 the stri ped bass pop ulation will increase by almo st 7 210,000 fish. 8 nature a nd extent of the sport-fishing regu lation s hav e a 9 cognizab le impact on the striped bass population. Conse rvation Plan at 117. If true , the CDFG 10 counters that the Co nservation Plan also conclude d that 11 CDFG man agement effo rts that do not include an ar tificial 12 striped bass stockin g program would result in the long - 13 term dec line of the adult striped bass population to 14 515,000 adults. 15 at 37). 16 that mai ntaining the striped bass population at s table 17 levels r equires much more restrictive sport-fishi ng 18 regulati ons than are presently in force. 19 Conserva tion Plan at 117). 8 20 21 Doc . 65 at 3 (citing Conservatio n Plan The Conserv ation Plan additionally concl udes Id. (ci ting Plaintif fs’ evidence of a link between higher str iped bass abu ndance and i ncreased Listed Species morta lity is 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 sta nd in g. 8 The d ec la ra ti on o f Bi ll Je nn in gs , f ile d by C SP A, c ha ll en ges whe th er r em ov al o f th e s po rt -f is hi n g r eg ul at io ns w il l n ece ss ar il y lea d to a d ec re as e in st ri pe d ba ss pop ul at io n. Sp ec if ic all y, Jen ni ng s op in es t ha t he is “ op ti mi s tic ” th at s po rt f is he rme n ma y sel f re gu la te a nd p ro tec t th e st ri p ed ba ss f is he ry e ve n in th e abs en ce o f th e re gu la tio ns . J en ni n gs De cl . at ¶ 7. Bu t, CS PA sub mi tt ed J en ni ng s’ d ecl ar at io n in con ne ct io n wi th i ts o ppo si ti on t o Pla in ti ff s’ r eq ue st f or su mm ar y ad j udi ca ti on o f th e si ng le ta ke a nd tak e by r eg ul at or y au tho ri ty i ss ue s . CS PA e xp li ci tl y de cli ne d to opp os e Pl ai nt if fs ’ st and in g. Ac co r din gl y, t he J en ni ng s dec la ra ti on wil l no t be c on si de re d i n th is c on t ext . 34 1 material ly disputed. 2 Plan con cluded that a striped bass population of 765,000 3 adults m aintained th rough an artificial stocking program 4 would co nsume 6 perc ent of the Sacramento River w inter- 5 run Chin ook salmon p opulation, 3.1 percent of the Central 6 Valley S pring- run Chinook salmon population, and 5.3 7 percent of the delta smelt population. 8 at 45, 5 6, 70. 9 Species will be slig htly lower in the absence of the 10 stocking program, bu t will still be present and will 11 range fr om 3.4-4.7 percent of the winter-run, 2.3 perc ent 12 of the s pring- run, and 3.6 percent of the delta smelt. 13 Id. 14 of the L ongfin Smelt , released January 2009. 15 Rubin De cl., Doc. 78, Ex. 13 at 28. 16 support Plaintiffs’ contention that increased str iped 17 bass pop ulations adv ersely affect the Listed Spec ies’ 18 abundanc e. 19 For example, CD FG’s Conserv ation Conservat ion Plan Stri ped bass predation upon the L isted DFG reaff irmed these estimates in its Status Review Sec ond These statis tics However, the statist ical analyses described in th e 20 Declarat ion of Matth ew L. Nobriga raise questions about 21 Plaintif fs’ assertio n that ending the enforcement of the 22 striped bass sport-fishing regulation s will cause a 23 measurab le increase in the abundance of the Liste d 24 Species. 25 reductio ns in stripe d bass populations will have 26 unintend ed, negative effects on Listed Species ab undance. 27 Specific ally, Nobrig a emphasizes that, while stri ped bass 28 prey on delta smelt, they also prey on one of the delta 35 Nobriga op ines that it is possible that 1 smelt’s primary pred ators and competitors, the 2 Mississi ppi silversl ide. 3 Nobriga opines that allowing depletion of the str iped 4 bass pop ulation may actually lead to decreased de lta 5 smelt ab undance, bec ause striped bass predation o f 6 Mississi ppi silversl ide would be reduced. Nob riga Decl. at ¶¶ 7, 10. Id. at ¶ 10. 7 Nobriga refere nces research performed by others 8 contradi cting the hy pothesis that striped bass pr edation 9 had a ma jor influenc e on salmon survival. Id. at ¶12. 10 Nobriga also perform ed his own regression analyse s of the 11 relation ship between striped bass populations and those 12 of the L isted Specie s, evidencing a positive rela tionship 13 between striped bass abundance and winter-run abu ndanc e, 14 and no r elationship between striped bass abundanc e and 15 either s pring run, o r delta smelt abundance. 16 16-17. 17 Id. at ¶ ¶ The Nobr iga Declarat ion r aise s serious questions 18 about th e plausibili ty of Plaintiffs’ causal theo ry by 19 challeng ing Plaintif fs’ fundamental assertion tha t there 20 is some, measurable link between increased stripe d bass 21 abundanc e and Listed Species mortality. 22 is requi red to succe ssfully oppose Plaintiffs’ mo tion for 23 summary adjudication on the issue of standing bas ed on 24 the exte nt of the di spute over causation. This is all that 25 26 27 28 3. Redressibility. To satis fy the final requirement of Article III standing , a plaintif f must show it is “like ly tha t a 36 1 favorabl e court deci sion will redress the injury to the 2 plaintif f.” 3 v. Citiz ens for a Be tter Env’t, 523 U .S. 83 at 107 4 (“Relief that does n ot remedy the injury suffered cannot 5 bootstra p a plaintiffs into federal court; that is the 6 very ess ence of the redressibility requirement”). 7 “Redress ibility requ ires an analysis of whether t he court 8 has the power to rig ht or to prevent the claimed injury.” 9 Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F. 2d 1263, 1267 ( 9th Cir. L ujan, 504 U .S. at 560; see also Steel Co . 10 1982). 11 relief i s “likely” t o redress his injury, “not th at a 12 favorabl e decision w ill inevitably redress his in jury.” 13 Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 1994) 14 (emphasi s added and emphasis deleted from original). 15 “There i s no redress ability, and thus no standing , where 16 ... any prospective benefits depend on an indepen dent 17 actor wh o retains br oad and legitimate discretion the 18 courts c annot presum e either to control or to pre dict.” 19 Glanton v. AdvancePCS, Inc., 465 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th 20 Cir. 200 6); se e also United States v. Larson, 302 F.3d 21 1016, 10 19 (9th Cir. 2002). 22 A plaintiff need only show that the reque sted Even a s mall improve ment to the Listed Species’ 23 survival would be su fficient. See Massachu setts v. EP A, 24 539 U.S. 497, 525 (2 007)(for the purp oses of stan ding, a 25 favorabl e decision n eed only slow the increase or 26 marginal ly reduce th e risk of injury to plaintiff ); se e 27 also Sie rra Cl ub v. Franklin County Power o f Ill. , LLC , 28 546 F.3d 918, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2008) (envir onment al 37 1 plaintif f’s in jury would be redressed by favorable 2 decision requiring m ore stringent emissions contr ols, 3 even tho ugh defendan t would likely be allowed to continue 4 pollutin g); Vi ll. of Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 5 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1 993) (“even a small probabili ty of 6 injury i s sufficient to create a case or controve rsy ... 7 provided of course t hat the relief sought would, if 8 granted, reduce the probability.”); Natural Res. Def. 9 Council v. Kempthorn e, No. 1:05-cv-1207, 2007 WL 44623 95, 10 at *14-1 5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007) ( holding that even 11 though t he Court cou ld not determine “whether the 12 operatio ns of the CV P and SWP export facilities a re the 13 principa l cause of t he decline in the delta smelt or 14 whether other factor s beyond the control of the P rojects 15 are the principal cause ..., the impact from Project 16 operatio ns is at lea st a concurrent cause which 17 jeopardi zes the exis tence of the Delta smelt and 18 endanger s its surviv al and its critical habitat, which 19 necessit ates remedia l action.”). 20 Here, wh ether a favo rable decision in this case, 21 e.g., en joining enfo rcement of the striped bass s port- 22 fishing regulations, would redress to any extent the 23 claimed injury to Mr . Dillon’s aesthetic enjoymen t of the 24 Listed S pecies is ma terially disputed. 25 Plaintif fs’ motion f or summary adjudi cation of Dee 26 Dillon’s standing is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. T his 27 ruling d oes not prev ent Dillon from maintaining t hese 28 cases, a s, for plead ing purposes, his standing 38 1 colligat ions are acc epted as true. 2 V. CONCLUSI ON 3 4 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs ’ moti on 5 for summ ary adjudica tion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUD ICE in 6 its enti rety. 7 8 SO ORDER ED 9 Dated: July 16, 200 9 10 11 12 /s/ Oliver W. Wan ger Oliver W. Wang er United States Distri ct Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 39

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