(HC) Law v. Mendoza-Powers, No. 1:2007cv00978 - Document 18 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, signed by Senior Judge D Lowell Jensen on 04/15/2009. CASE CLOSED(Martin, S)
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(HC) Law v. Mendoza-Powers Doc. 18 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 FRESNO DIVISION 4 PERRY JESSIE LAW, 5 NO. C-07-0978-DLJ 6 Petitioner, 7 ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v 8 JAMES D. HARTLEY, Warden, 9 10 Respondent. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Petitioner Perry Jessie Law (“Petitioner”), a California state prisoner incarcerated at Avenal State Prison in Avenal, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the February 8, 2006 decision of the California Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”) to deny him parole. has filed an answer, to which Petitioner has replied. 24 Having considered the papers submitted and the applicable law, the Court hereby DENIES the petition. I. 22 23 Respondent1 James D. Hartley BACKGROUND In 1980, Petitioner was convicted, in Fresno County Superior Court, of murder in the second degree, assault with a deadly 25 1 26 27 28 Petitioner named Kathy Mendoza-Powers, the former warden of Avenal State Prison, as Respondent. James D. Hartley has replaced Mendoza-Powers as warden. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) allows the successor of a public office to automatically be substituted as a party. Accordingly, the clerk is directed to change the name of Respondent to James D. Hartley. U.S. District Court E. D. California 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 weapon, and false imprisonment. 2 indeterminate term of fifteen years to life in state prison. 3 He was sentenced to an Petitioner has been found not suitable for parole on six 4 previous occasions. 5 not suitable for parole and denied him a subsequent hearing for two 6 years. 7 in the state courts. 8 his final state habeas petition, the instant petition for a writ of 9 habeas corpus followed. On February 8, 2006, the BPH again found him Petitioner challenged the BPH’s February 8, 2006 decision 10 After the Supreme Court of California denied II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 12 (“AEDPA”), codified under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive 13 vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in custody 14 pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the [p]etitioner is 15 not challenging his underlying state court conviction.” 16 Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). 17 court may entertain a petition for habeas relief on behalf of a 18 California state inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody 19 in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 20 States.” 21 Under AEDPA, this 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s 22 adjudication of any claim on the merits: “(1) resulted in a 23 decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 24 application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 25 the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 26 decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 27 facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 28 proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). U.S. District Court E. D. California White v. 2 Under this deferential 1 standard, federal habeas relief will not be granted “simply because 2 [this] court concludes in its independent judgment that the 3 relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 4 law erroneously or incorrectly. 5 be unreasonable.” 6 Rather, that application must also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in 7 determining whether the state court made a decision contrary to, or 8 made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, the 9 only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 10 U.S.C. section 2254(d), rests in the holdings (as opposed to the 11 dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court 12 decision. 13 Cir. 2003). Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 Petitioner claims that the BPH’s February 8, 2006 decision 16 does not comport with due process. 17 the BPH improperly based its decision on the historical facts of 18 his commitment offenses and of other offenses in his past criminal 19 history, and that this evidence cannot be considered to be reliable 20 evidence that he poses a current danger to society. 21 asserts as well that the length of his incarceration is 22 disproportionate to the crime for which he was convicted, which 23 results in a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. 24 Petitioner also claims that his parole denial was based on his 25 status as an alcoholic in violation of the Sixth and Eighth 26 Amendments to the Constitution. 27 28 Petitioner California’s parole scheme “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole which cannot be denied without U.S. District Court E. D. California Petitioner first argues that 3 1 adequate procedural due process protections.” 2 Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006); 3 McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). 4 liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole date, 5 but upon the incarceration of the inmate.” 6 F.3d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2003). 7 “The Biggs v. Terhune, 334 There are two relevant aspects to Petitioner’s liberty 8 interest in parole. 9 opportunity to be heard by the BPH, and he must have been informed First, Petitioner must have been afforded an 10 of the reasons why he failed to qualify for parole. 11 Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). The 12 record shows that the BPH afforded Petitioner and his counsel an 13 opportunity to speak and to present their case at the hearing, gave 14 them time to review Petitioner’s central file, allowed them to 15 present relevant documents and provided them with a reasoned 16 decision in denying parole. 17 with the requirements of Greenholtz. 18 Greenholtz v. The Court finds that the facts comport Second, there must be “some evidence” in support of the BPH’s 19 decision. 20 deferential, but it is meant to ensure that “the record is not so 21 devoid of evidence that the findings of [the BPH] were without 22 support or otherwise arbitrary.” 23 445, 457 (1985). 24 “does not require examination of the entire record, independent 25 assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the 26 evidence.” 27 determined according to state law. 28 851 (9th Cir. 2007). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125. The “some evidence” standard is Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. Determining whether this requirement is satisfied Id. at 455-56. What constitutes “some evidence” is U.S. District Court E. D. California Sass v. California 4 Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 1 In finding Petitioner unsuitable for parole, the BPH explained 2 that it found that the crime of conviction was carried out “in an 3 especially cruel and callous manner, [with] multiple victims, one 4 being murdered, and others being terrorized, held against their 5 will.” 6 record of violence and within his own family a confrontation” in 7 which a police officer was shot, combined to support their 8 determination that he was currently ineligible for parole. 9 Tr. Decision at pgs 2-3. 10 This combined with the fact that Petitioner had a “previous (Resp’t Ex. 1). This evidence is sufficient to meet the required legal standard of “some evidence.” 11 The state superior court and court of appeal upheld BPH’s 12 decision, and the California Supreme Court summarily affirmed. 13 has not demonstrated that these decisions were contrary to, or an 14 unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 15 has Law demonstrated that these decisions were based on an 16 unreasonable determination of the facts. 17 demonstrated that an independent review of the record reveals the 18 state court decisions to be objectively unreasonable. 19 this claim lacks merit. 20 Law Nor Law has also not Accordingly, Petitioner also claims that his denial of parole due to his 21 status as an alcoholic violates his rights under the Sixth and 22 Eighth amendments to the Constitution. 23 Rehabilitation Act protects any “otherwise qualified individual” 24 from “be[ing] excluded from the participation in, be[ing] denied 25 the benefits of, or be[ing] subjected to discrimination” under 26 specified programs “solely by reason of her or his disability.” 27 U.S.C. § 794(a). 28 on the circumstances of the crime committed, he is not “otherwise Section 504 of the 29 As noted above, as Petitioner’s denial was based U.S. District Court E. D. California Hr’g 5 1 2 qualified” for release. Upon review of the record, the Court concurs that Petitioner’s 3 record during prison is exemplary. 4 to make a determination of the appropriateness of parole, perhaps 5 it would reach a different conclusion than the Parole Board has 6 thus far; however, this Court’s constitutional role is merely to 7 determine whether the Parole Board’s decision is supported by some 8 evidence, and it is, ending this Court’s analysis. Were this Court in a position 9 10 11 12 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 13 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 DATED: April 15, 2009 18 _______________________ D. Lowell Jensen United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 U.S. District Court E. D. California 6
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