(HC) Torres v. Yates et al, No. 1:2007cv00328 - Document 32 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS signed by District Judge Claudia Wilken on 4/1/2009. CASE CLOSED.(Matson, R)
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(HC) Torres v. Yates et al Doc. 32 1 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 5 No. 1:07-00328 CW (HC) 6 CESAR ALFREDO TORRES, 7 Petitioner, 8 9 v. JAMES A. YATES, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Respondent. / 11 12 ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS On April 20, 2007, Petitioner Cesar Alfredo Torres, a state 13 prisoner incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison, filed a 14 petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the 15 prosecution of his offenses violated the Constitution’s Ex Post 16 Facto Clause and that he was unconstitutionally sentenced to 17 consecutive terms. 18 answer. 19 papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES the petition. 20 21 On December 31, 2008, Respondent filed an Petitioner has not filed a traverse. Having read all the PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On February 11, 2004, an information was filed against 22 Petitioner and, on August 11, 2004, an amended information was 23 filed, charging him with the following offenses: 24 forcible rape in violation of California Penal Code § 261(a)(2)1 25 (counts 1, 4 and 7), oral copulation with a person under the age of three counts of 26 27 1 28 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code, unless otherwise noted. Dockets.Justia.com United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 fourteen in violation of § 288a(c)(1) (count 2), forcible oral 2 copulation in violation of § 288a(c)(2) (count 3), two counts of 3 committing a lewd act on a child under the age of fourteen in 4 violation of § 288(a) (counts 5 and 6), forcible sodomy in 5 violation of § 286(c)(2) (count 8), and sodomy with a person under 6 the age of fourteen and more than ten years younger than Petitioner 7 in violation of § 286(c)(1) (count 9). 8 trial began. 9 dismissed. On August 11, 2004, a jury On Petitioner’s motion, counts 6, 7, and 9 were On August 13, 2004, the jury returned a verdict of 10 guilty as to counts 1 and 4 for forcible rape, count 3 for forcible 11 oral copulation, count 5 for committing a lewd act on a child under 12 the age of fourteen, and count 8 for forcible sodomy. 13 was found not guilty as to count 2. 14 Petitioner On October 14, 2004, Petitioner was sentenced to a twenty-six 15 year prison term consisting of: consecutive six-year terms for 16 counts 1, 4, 5, and 8, and a consecutive two-year term (one-third 17 the midterm) for count 3. 18 consecutive term on count 3 because that would have required the 19 court to find that multiple victims were involved in the offense. 20 The court concluded this would violate the rule of Apprendi v. New 21 Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488-90 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 22 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004), that other than a prior conviction, any 23 fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 24 statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 25 reasonable doubt. 26 The trial court did not impose a full, Petitioner timely appealed the imposition of the consecutive 27 sentences and the denial of his Ex Post Facto Clause and statute of 28 limitations claims. The appellate court held that “there is no 2 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 requirement that the factual prerequisite for the imposition of 2 full-term consecutive sentences under § 667.6(d) be submitted to 3 the jury.” 4 at 12-13 (Cal. App. Mar. 17, 2006).2 5 third minimum sentence on count 3 and modified it to a separate, 6 full, six-year consecutive sentence. 7 rejected Petitioner’s claim that his prosecution for the charged 8 offenses violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and the claim that the 9 prosecution was time-barred.3 Resp’s Lodged Item # 5, People v. Torres, No. F046568 The court struck the one- Id. at 14. The court also Petitioner filed a petition for 10 review with the California Supreme Court, which summarily denied 11 it. 12 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 13 The following facts are taken from the appellate court’s 14 opinion. 15 grandparents in the mid-1980's while their parents were farm 16 workers. 17 at the time of the trial, testified that Petitioner molested her 18 from the time she was eight years old until she was twelve years 19 old. 20 2004 because she was afraid of Petitioner. 21 22 Maria, Monica and Myra are sisters who lived with their Petitioner lived with them. Maria, who was twenty-five Maria did not disclose the abuse until late 2003 or early Monica, who was twenty-three years old at the time of the trial, testified that Petitioner began molesting her when she was 23 2 24 25 26 27 28 Section 667.6 requires the court to impose full, consecutive sentences for certain offenses, including rape and forcible sodomy, if the crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on different occasions. Cal. Penal Code § 667.6. 3 A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it: (1) punishes as criminal an act which was innocent when committed; (2) makes a crime's punishment greater than when the crime was committed; or (3) deprives a person of a defense available at the time the crime was committed. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990). 3 1 seven or eight years old and continued to do so until she was ten. 2 She testified that Petitioner threatened that he would hurt her or 3 her grandmother if she ever told anyone. 4 5 testified that Petitioner molested her from when she was four or 6 five until she finished first grade. 7 Petitioner told her not to say anything. 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Myra, who was twenty years old at the time of the trial, She also testified that Petitioner’s defense was that he never inappropriately touched Maria, Monica or Myra. Cynthia, the victims’ cousin, testified, on 10 Petitioner’s behalf, that he never molested her or tried to touch 11 her inappropriately. 12 13 LEGAL STANDARD A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state 14 prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of 15 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 17 Penalty Act (AEDPA), a district court may not grant a petition 18 challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim 19 that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state 20 court’s adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that 21 was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 22 clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 23 of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based 24 on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 25 evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 26 § 2254(d). 27 law if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if 28 it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts 28 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 28 U.S.C. A decision is contrary to clearly established federal 4 1 materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but 2 nonetheless reaches a different result. 3 1062, 1067 (9th. Cir. 2003). 4 The only definitive source of clearly established federal law 5 under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is the holdings of the Supreme Court as 6 of the time of the relevant state court decision. 7 Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d Williams v. To determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 10 law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state 11 court that addressed the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a 12 reasoned decision. 13 Cir. 2000). 14 state court to address the merits of Petitioner's claims. In the present case, the appellate court is the only 15 16 17 LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th DISCUSSION I. Statute of Limitations and Violation of Ex Post Facto Clause Petitioner argues his conviction must be reversed because the 18 prosecution of the offenses charged against him were time-barred 19 and violated the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause, relying on 20 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003). 21 The California appellate court explained that the information 22 against Petitioner was filed pursuant to § 803(g)(1) which, at the 23 time,4 provided: 24 25 26 Notwithstanding any other limitation of time described in this chapter, a criminal complaint may be filed within one year of the date of a report to a California law enforcement agency by a person of any age alleging that he or she, while under the age of 18 years, was the victim of a crime described in Section 261, 286, 288, 27 28 4 Section 803(g) was subsequently amended. 5 1 2 People v. Torres at 6. 3 limitations could have expired on Petitioner’s charged offenses was 4 January 1, 1994 and that the legislature enacted § 803(g) effective 5 January 1, 1994. 6 against Petitioner was first filed on February 11, 2004, within one 7 year from the date the crimes were reported and that it met the 8 other requirements of § 803(g). 9 concluded that the charges were timely filed. 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 288a, 288.5, 289, or 289.5. It noted that the earliest the statute of Id. at 5-6. The court also noted that the action Id. at 6. Therefore, the court The court then explained that in Stogner, the Supreme Court 11 held that § 803(g) was unconstitutional only when applied to 12 offenses in which the statute of limitations had expired before the 13 effective date of § 803(g). 14 limitations for Petitioner’s offenses had not expired when § 803(g) 15 became effective, the court held they were not barred. Id. at 6-7. Because the statute of 16 The appellate court’s interpretation of Stogner is correct. 17 In Stogner, the Supreme Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause 18 prohibited criminal prosecutions that the passage of time had 19 previously barred because it inflicted punishment where the party 20 was not, by law, liable to any punishment. 21 However, the Court explicitly excepted those cases in which the 22 statute of limitations for the offense in question had not expired 23 because the party could still be punished for the alleged crime. 24 Id. at 613, 618. 25 offenses charged against Petitioner had not expired on the 26 effective date of § 803(g), the Ex Post Facto Clause does not 27 apply. 28 539 U.S. at 610. Because the statute of limitations on the In his petition for review to the California Supreme Court, 6 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 Petitioner pointed out that a condition precedent to the operation 2 of § 803(g), included in the statute itself, is that the 3 limitations period specified for the charged offenses must have 4 expired. 5 to the Ex Post Facto Clause as explicated in Stogner. 6 is incorrect. 7 offenses would have to be a condition precedent to the operation of 8 § 803(g); if the limitations period had not expired, there would be 9 no need for § 803(g). Petitioner concluded that this condition made it subject Petitioner The expiration of the statute of limitations on the Because the statute of limitations had not 10 expired on the charged offenses when § 803(g) became effective, 11 application of § 803(g) did not subject Petitioner to an 12 unconstitutional extension of punishment for those offenses. 13 fact that, in 2004, when the information was filed, the statute of 14 limitations on the offenses had expired does not change this. 15 The Therefore, the state court’s denial of this claim was not 16 contrary to or an unreasonable application of established Supreme 17 Court authority. 18 II. Imposition of Consecutive Sentences 19 Petitioner argues that he was improperly sentenced to 20 consecutive sentences under § 667.6 in violation of his Fifth, 21 Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 22 because the court, rather than a jury, found that the offenses 23 involved separate victims or the same victim on separate occasions, 24 his right to a jury trial on all facts increasing his sentence, as 25 explicated in Apprendi and Blakely, was violated. Petitioner’s theory is that 26 However, Petitioner’s argument is foreclosed by a recent 27 Supreme Court case, Oregon v. Ice, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 711 28 (2009). At issue in Ice was an Oregon statute which required a 7 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 finding of certain facts about the charged offenses before the 2 judge could impose consecutive sentences. 3 petitioner argued that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury 4 trial, as stated in Apprendi and Blakely, required that the jury, 5 rather than the judge, determine any fact that increased the 6 maximum punishment authorized for a particular crime, which 7 included the imposition of consecutive sentences. 8 Declining to extend Apprendi and Blakely, the Court held that the 9 Sixth Amendment does not prohibit states from assigning to judges, Id. at 715. The Id. at 716. 10 rather than to juries, the finding of facts necessary to impose 11 consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences for certain 12 offenses. Id. at 718. 13 Thus, pursuant to Ice, Petitioner’s claim that the imposition 14 of consecutive sentences violated his constitutional rights fails. 15 The state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to or an 16 unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. 17 18 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s petition for a writ of 19 habeas corpus is DENIED. 20 judgment and close the case. The Clerk of the Court shall enter 21 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 24 Dated: 4/1/09 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 25 26 27 28 8
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