(HC) Barton v. Mendoza-Powers, No. 1:2007cv00258 - Document 12 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and DIRECTING Clerk to Enter Judgment and Close the File signed by District Judge Claudia Wilken on 7/23/2009. CASE CLOSED. (Jessen, A)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
(HC) Barton v. Mendoza-Powers Doc. 12 1 2 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 EDDIE BARTON, No.07-CV-00258 CW 7 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 8 v. 9 KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS, Warden, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Respondent. 11 / 12 13 On February 16, 2007, Petitioner Eddie Barton, proceeding pro 14 se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to title 15 28 U.S.C § 2254, challenging as a violation of his constitutional 16 rights the August 22, 2005 decision of the California Board of 17 Parole Hearings (Board)1 denying him parole for three years. 18 On March 11, 2008, Respondent filed an answer. On April 3, 19 2008, Petitioner filed a traverse. Having considered all of the 20 papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES the petition. 21 BACKGROUND 22 I. Commitment Offense 23 The California court of appeal, in affirming Petitioner's 24 convictions, described the commitment offense as follows: 25 26 Around 11 p.m. on December 13, 1991, Kenneth Keziah was walking in the Hillcrest area of San Diego when he noticed two men leaning against the side of a building. 27 28 1 Formerly known as the Board of Prison Terms. Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 The area was well lit and Keziah had no problem seeing them. Both men wore jeans and boots and both had very short hair. One of the men wore a red and black flannel shirt and the other wore a blue flannel shirt. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 The two men approached Keziah and asked him if he wanted to go home with them. When Keziah declined the invitation, the man in the red and black shirt, later identified as Barton, grabbed Keziah and said, "What? We're not good enough for you?" He then hit Keziah in the face, breaking his nose. . . . A short time after the attack on Keziah, Bryan Baird, John Wear and Jacob Isaacsen were walking in the same area of Hillcrest when they saw two men approach. As the two groups passed, Baird said, "Hey, how's it going?" One of the men, later identified as Barton, immediately hit Baird in the mouth. [The other attacker, DiPaolo] grabbed Wear, struggled with him and began punching him while he was on the ground. Barton joined in the attack on Wear, punching and kicking him and yelling, "Don't cry faggot." He then pulled out a knife and fatally stabbed Wear in the stomach. . . . Barton then threatened Baird with the knife. As Baird crouched down to protect himself, Barton struck and kicked him in the back and cut him on his head. According to a man who witnessed the crimes from his nearby balcony, the attackers took their time, stopped only after they were finished and casually strolled away. 17 18 19 20 21 The next day, Barton visited Timothy Carosella. Di Paolo was also there. Barton told Carosella he had robbed a porno shop in Hillcrest the night before. Barton and Di Paolo bragged that they also had beaten up a homosexual in Hillcrest. A few days later, after Carosella learned a young man had died in Hillcrest, Barton admitted he had killed Wear and needed to get out of town. 22 . . . 23 27 At trial, Barton's defense was misidentification. He claimed the description of the perpetrator was that of a skinhead, specifically Anthony Giacalone. He also asserted an alibi defense, claiming he and two friends were at his sister's house the night before watching a boxing match on cable television. However, Barton's sister told police Barton was not at her house that night and she did not have cable television. 28 2 24 25 26 1 People v. Barton, No. D-026470, slip op. at 4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 1998). United States District Court For the Northern District of California 3 On June 14, 1993, a jury convicted Petitioner of one count of 4 second degree murder, one count of assault with a deadly weapon, and 5 one count of battery with serious injury, and he was sentenced to 6 twenty-one years to life in state prison. 7 of appeals, the judgment was modified to reflect a total aggregate 8 sentence of twenty years to life in prison. 9 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) Id. at 2. After a series Id. at 30. The 10 calculated Petitioner's minimum eligible parole date as January 6, 11 2006. 12 (Pet'r Ex. 2, 2005 Parole Bd. Hr'g, at 1.) During his incarceration at Avenal State Prison, Petitioner 13 received three 115 Rule Violation Reports2 for inmate misconduct—one 14 in 1995 for possession of inmate manufactured alcohol, one in 1997 15 for participation in a work stoppage, and the most recent in 2001 16 for attempt to smuggle escape paraphernalia (a map). 17 Psychological Eval. at 5.) 18 counseling chronos, all between 1994 and 1995. (Pet'r Ex. 5, Petitioner also received four 128A (Id.) 19 Petitioner has completed various vocational courses, therapy, 20 and self-help activities in prison, including Alcoholics Anonymous 21 and Narcotics Anonymous. 22 appreciation for his work with the Youth-Adult Awareness Program 23 (YAAP), and other community service programs, obtained his General (Id.) He received certificates of 24 25 2 27 115 and 128A refer to different forms used by prison officials to report rules violations. Prison staff use a CDC-128-A form to document repeated minor misconduct and a CDC-115 form for misconduct that is not minor or is believed to violate the law. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3312(a). 28 3 26 1 Education Development (GED) credential, and received excellent work 2 performance reports. (Id. at 6.) 3 II. Parole Hearing United States District Court For the Northern District of California 4 On August 22, 2005, Petitioner attended his first parole 5 suitability hearing before the Board. 6 decision, the Board considered the nature of Petitioner's underlying 7 offense, including the facts that multiple victims were involved, 8 that the crime was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated 9 manner and in a manner which demonstrated an exceptionally callous (Pet'r Ex. 2) In making its 10 disregard for human suffering, and that the motive for the crime was 11 "very trivial" in relation to the offense. 12 being asked to speak about the impact his crime had on the Hillcrest 13 community, Petitioner stated that he knew the crime had caused fear 14 and confusion. 15 an adequate understanding of the gravity of the offense, especially 16 in terms of the impact it had on the gay community. 17 (Id. at 54.) (Id. at 59.) After The Board concluded that this was not (Id. at 55-56.) The Board also reviewed Petitioner's personal background as 18 well as his previous criminal record, noting that he had no prior 19 criminal record as an adult but had a substantial juvenile record 20 including offenses related to marijuana, alcohol, and theft, which 21 indicated an escalating pattern of criminal conduct culminating in 22 the current commitment offense. 23 (Id. at 62.) The Board considered Petitioner's psychological evaluation, 24 dated March 8, 2005, which concluded that he presented a moderately 25 low to moderate risk of future violence if released into the 26 community. 27 enforcement was also noted. 28 (Id. at 70.) Opposition to Petitioner's parole from law (Id. at 66.) 4 1 2 noted Petitioner's seven negative prison citations as well as his 3 exemplary participation in vocational training, self-help, and 4 programming. 5 Petitioner's plans for parole, which it stated seemed realistic, in 6 that he had letters offering employment, a place to stay if paroled, 7 and many letters of support from family and friends. 8 63-64.) 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Referring to Petitioner's institutional behavior, the Board (Id. at 67-68.) The Board also considered (Id. at After deliberation, the Board concluded that Petitioner was not 10 suitable for parole and that the positive aspects of his behavior 11 did not outweigh the factors of unsuitability and issued a three- 12 year denial of parole. 13 Petitioner continue therapy and vocational programs, avoid 14 behavioral citations, and obtain positive marketable skills, but 15 emphasized that the particular nature of the crime and the 16 psychological evaluation were not supportive of release. 17 67-69.) 18 into the gravity of the offense he had committed and the impact it 19 had on the Wear family and the Hillcrest community supported a 20 denial of parole. 21 (Id. at 68.) The Board recommended that (Id. at The Board also stated that Petitioner's lack of insight (Id.) Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with 22 the San Diego County superior court challenging the Board's 23 decision. 24 decision, denied the petition. 25 court of appeal, in a brief decision, denied his petition. 26 court of appeal found that Petitioner's crimes were "callous, cruel 27 and inexplicable," refuting Petitioner's claims that the Board mis- 28 5 On March 12, 2006, the superior court, in a written On June 30, 2006, the California The 1 characterized the offense. 2 2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 3 on factors other than the commitment offense for its denial of 4 parole: "The Board also noted Barton minimized both the impact of 5 the crime and his juvenile record. 6 begin to work on his alcohol abuse problem until 2001 and he had 7 disciplinary findings for possession of inmate-manufactured alcohol 8 in 1995 and possession of escape paraphernalia in 2001. 9 decision is supported by the evidence." United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 In re Barton, No. D-048475, slip op. at The court also found that the Board relied The Board's Id. On September 13, 2006, the California Supreme Court summarily 11 denied his petition for review. 12 relief in this Court. 13 14 The record shows Barton did not Petitioner now seeks federal habeas LEGAL STANDARD This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 15 "on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 16 State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of 17 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 19 28 Because this case involves a federal habeas corpus challenge to 20 a state parole eligibility decision, the applicable standard is 21 contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 22 1996 (AEDPA). 23 2002). 24 unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in 25 a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 26 application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 27 the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 28 McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief 6 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 2 facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 3 proceeding." 4 412 (2000). 5 state court's factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, A federal court must presume the correctness of the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 6 A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court authority 7 and falls under the first clause of § 22554(d)(1) only if "the state 8 court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 9 Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a 10 case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially 11 indistinguishable facts." 12 court decision is an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court 13 authority, under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly 14 identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's 15 decisions but "unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of 16 the prisoner's case." 17 Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state Id. at 413. There is "no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted 18 person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid 19 sentence." 20 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). 21 uses mandatory language, it may create a presumption that parole 22 release will be granted when or unless certain designated filings 23 are made, and thereby give rise to a constitutionally protected 24 liberty interest. 25 held that the Nebraska parole statute providing that the board 26 "shall" release prisoners, subject to certain restrictions, creates 27 a due process liberty interest in release on parole. 28 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 However, if a state's statutory parole scheme Id. at 11-12. In Greenholtz, the Supreme Court 7 Id. In such a 1 case, a prisoner gains a legitimate expectation of parole that 2 cannot be denied without adequate procedural due process 3 protections. 4 (1987); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-16. See Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373-81 5 California's parole scheme uses mandatory language: 6 The panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting. 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). Accordingly, under the clearly 11 established framework of Greenholtz and Allen, "California's parole 12 scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on 13 parole. The scheme creates a presumption that parole release will 14 be granted unless the statutorily defined determinations are made." 15 McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902. 16 Respondent concedes that Petitioner has exhausted his state 17 remedies by filing a petition for review in the California Supreme 18 Court. Where, as here, the highest state court to reach the merits 19 issued a summary opinion which does not explain the rationale of the 20 decision, federal court review under § 2254(d) is of the last state 21 court opinion to reach the merits. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 22 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the last state court 23 opinion to address the merits of Petitioner's claim is the opinion 24 of the California court of appeal. 25 DISCUSSION 26 Petitioner claims that the failure of the Board to meet the 27 28 8 1 "some evidence" standard has resulted in a violation of his due 2 process rights. 3 placed undue weight on the unchanging factor of the gravity of his 4 commitment offense, without supporting the decision with any post- 5 conviction evidence. 6 fair hearing by misconstruing some facts, violating the "spirit and 7 intent" of the Indeterminate Sentencing Act, and violating its own 8 administrative decision-making process. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 Specifically, Petitioner contends that the Board He also contends that the Board denied him a Petitioner's claims fail. The Supreme Court has established that a parole board's 10 decision deprives a prisoner of due process if the board's decision 11 is not supported by "some evidence in the record," or is "otherwise 12 arbitrary." 13 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985)). 14 disciplinary hearings as identified in Hill is clearly established 15 federal law in the parole context for AEDPA purposes. 16 306 F.3d at 904. 17 decision must have "some indicia of reliability." 18 Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). 19 the Board's discretion to decide how to resolve conflicts in the 20 evidence and to decide how much weight to give each factor. In re 21 Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 656, 677 (2002). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (citing Superintendent v. Hill, The "some evidence" standard used for McQuillion, In addition, the evidence underlying the Board's Jancsek v. Oregon It is within 22 When assessing whether a state parole board's suitability 23 determination was supported by "some evidence," the district court's 24 analysis is framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole 25 suitability determinations in the relevant state. 26 1128. 27 California law to determine what findings are necessary to deem a 28 Sass, 461 F.3d at Accordingly, in California, the district court must look to 9 1 prisoner unsuitable for parole, and then must review the state court 2 record in order to determine whether the holding that the Board's 3 findings were supported by "some evidence" constituted an 4 unreasonable application of the principle articulated in Hill, 472 5 U.S. at 454. 6 The California Supreme Court summarized the standards which the 7 Board must use in determining whether a prisoner is suitable for 8 parole. 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662-64 (9th Cir. 2007). 11 12 13 [C]ircumstances tending to establish unsuitability for parole are that the prisoner: (1) committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner; (2) possesses a previous record of violence; (3) has an unstable social history; (4) previously has sexually assaulted another individual in a sadistic manner; (5) has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense; and (6) has engaged in serious misconduct while in prison. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c). 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 The regulation further provides that circumstances tending to establish suitability for parole are that the prisoner: (1) does not possess a record of violent crime committed while a juvenile; (2) has a stable social history; (3) has shown signs of remorse; (4) committed the crime as the result of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has built over a long period of time; (5) committed the criminal offense as a result of battered woman syndrome; (6) lacks any significant history of violent crime; (7) is of an age that reduces the probability of recidivism; (8) has made realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon release; and (9) has engaged in institutional activities that indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(d). 23 In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 653-54. 24 25 26 27 28 The California Supreme Court further explained, Factors that support a finding that the prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner include the following: (A) multiple victims were attacked, injured, or killed in the same or separate incidents; (B) the offense was 10 1 2 3 4 carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder; (C) the victim was abused, defiled, or mutilated during or after the offense; (D) the offense was carried out in a manner that demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering; and (E) the motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 5 Id. at 654 n.11. 6 Petitioner argues that the facts of his crime are less heinous 7 than the facts in other cases in which the nature of the commitment 8 offense was found to be "exceptionally callous" and yet were 9 inadequate to provide the sole basis for "some evidence" of present 10 dangerousness. 11 his crime is less predictive of dangerousness than the crimes he 12 cites is a factual determination, and this Court must presume the 13 correctness of the state court's factual findings. 14 § 2254(e)(1). 15 determining that the crime was especially heinous, concluding that 16 Petitioner's crime satisfied all five, and the state court reviewed 17 this finding. This argument fails. Petitioner's conclusion that 28 U.S.C. The Board considered the above factors in (Pet'r Ex. 2 at 59.) 18 In addition, Petitioner's comparisons to other crimes are not 19 indicative that there was not some evidence to support the Board's 20 decision, because the nature of the commitment offense did not 21 provide the sole basis for the Board's decision. 22 court found, the Board considered all of the applicable factors 23 regarding suitability for parole as provided by state law in 24 California Code of Regulations, title 15, Section 2402(c). 25 stated above, the Board considered the "especially heinous" nature 26 of the commitment offense which satisfied all five factors that 27 support a finding that the prisoner committed the offense in such a 28 11 As the state As United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 manner. 2 into the impact of the crime, his previous criminal record, parole 3 plans, conduct while in prison (both positive and negative), and 4 psychological factors. 5 applicable to the Board's decision, such as a stable social 6 history, plans for parole, and "no juvenile record," support a 7 finding that he is suitable for parole. 8 some factors support suitability for parole is not determinative. 9 Based on the above, the state court's finding that there is "some 10 evidence" in the record to support the Board's denial of parole is 11 not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the principle 12 articulated in Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. 13 The Board also considered Petitioner's lack of insight Petitioner claims that some of the factors However, the fact that Furthermore, the nature of the underlying commitment offense 14 may provide the basis for "some evidence" as long as the parole 15 board has given due consideration to all applicable factors 16 regarding suitability for parole, and the circumstances of the 17 commitment offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated 18 or more violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction 19 for the offense. 20 Because it is an unchanging factor, the district court may find 21 there has been a violation of due process if the Board has 22 continually relied on the prisoner's commitment offense over the 23 course of many parole hearings. 24 Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the initial denial of a parole 25 release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the 26 prisoner's conduct before incarceration, but cautioned that "[o]ver 27 time . . . , should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary 28 In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 677-78, 682-83. Biggs 334 F.3d at 916-17. 12 In United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date 2 simply because of the nature of Biggs' offense and prior conduct 3 would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in 4 parole." 5 in which it held that a parole board's decision to deem a prisoner 6 unsuitable for parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense 7 comports with due process, the decision was made before the 8 prisoner had served the minimum number of years required by his 9 sentence. Id. In Irons, the Ninth Circuit noted that in all cases Irons, 479 F.3d at 665. It should be noted that this 10 was Petitioner's first parole hearing and that he had only served 11 twelve years out of a sentence with a minimum term of twenty years. 12 If, over time, the Board repeatedly denies parole based solely on 13 the commitment offense, this may eventually constitute a due 14 process violation. 15 Petitioner also claims that the Board mis-characterized him as 16 a "skin head" and mis-characterized his offense when considering 17 the applicable factors. 18 determinations by the Board violated the Board's administrative 19 process as set forth in California Penal Code Section 3041 and the 20 "spirit and intent" of California's Indeterminate Sentencing Act, 21 and, therefore, Petitioner's due process rights. 22 court of appeal found that Petitioner "was not characterized as a 23 'skinhead' by the Board; any reference was the result of Barton's 24 admissions and the facts of the crime." 25 D-048475, slip op. at 2. 26 correctness of the state court's factual findings. 27 § 2254(e). 28 Petitioner contends that these factual The California In re Barton, No. Again, this Court must presume the 13 28 U.S.C. 1 2 claim that the Board's decision violated the "spirit and intent" of 3 the Indeterminate Sentencing Act, but this claim is not subject to 4 federal habeas review. 5 issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due 6 process. 7 This Court accepts a state court's interpretation of state law, and 8 alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable 9 in federal habeas corpus review unless they impact federal rights. 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California The court of appeal's decision did not address Petitioner's Petitioner may not transform a state-law Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). Id. 11 The state court applied the proper test under the Fifth and 12 Fourteenth Amendments in finding that the Board's decision was 13 supported by some evidence in the record. 14 457. 15 contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, controlling federal 16 law, nor based on an unreasonable determination of facts. 17 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 18 DENIED. The state court's denial of Petitioner's petition was not CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 21 corpus is DENIED. 22 close the file. 23 See 28 Accordingly, Petitioner's due process claims are 19 20 See Hill, 472 U.S. at The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: 7/23/09 ___________________________ CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 25 26 27 28 14
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
