(HC) Inglett v. Adams et al, No. 1:2006cv01050 - Document 12 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, signed by District Judge Claudia Wilken on 9/30/09: The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the file. (CASE CLOSED)(Hellings, J)
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(HC) Inglett v. Adams et al Doc. 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 No. C 06-01050 CW JEFFREY RICHARD INGLETT, 12 13 14 v. WARDEN D. ADAMS, et al., 15 Respondent. / 16 17 ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Petitioner, On November 02, 2007, Petitioner Jeffrey Richard Inglett, a 18 state prisoner incarcerated at the Corcoran State Prison (Corcoran) 19 in Kings County, California, filed a petition for a writ of habeas 20 corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that his 21 constitutional rights were violated when the Board of Parole 22 Hearings1 (the Board) denied him parole for the second time on May 23 25, 2003. 24 that “some evidence” did not support the Board's denial of parole, 25 the Board improperly relied on his commitment offense to deny As grounds for federal habeas relief, Petitioner claims 26 27 28 1 The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1, 2005, and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal Code § 5075(a). Dockets.Justia.com 1 parole, and he reasonably relied on his plea agreement to believe 2 that he would be released in seventeen to twenty years. 3 17, 2008, Respondent Warden D. Adams filed an answer. 4 timely filed a traverse. 5 petition for writ of mandamus to expedite review of his habeas 6 petition which was denied by the Court on December 18, 2007. 7 (Docket # 4). 8 parties, the Court DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus. United States District Court For the Northern District of California Petitioner On November 11, 2007, Petitioner filed a Having considered all of the papers filed by the 9 10 On March BACKGROUND I. Personal History 11 Petitioner started "drinking and doing drugs" around age 12 twelve. 13 sixteen, Petitioner completed the ninth grade and discontinued his 14 high school education. 15 going to school "because at that time I was more active on getting 16 high and drinking than previously. 17 go to school." 18 II. 19 (Pet.'s Ex. B, 2003 Parole Bd. Hr'g at 20.) (Id. at 22.) At the age of He explained that he stopped I really wasn't sober enough to (Id.) Prior Criminal Record In January, 1980, when Petitioner was fourteen years old, he 20 was arrested and convicted of attempted burglary and placed on 21 probation. 22 January, 1981, at the age of sixteen years, Petitioner was arrested 23 and convicted of selling marijuana, sent to camp and then released 24 on probation. 25 June, 1981, Petitioner was charged and convicted of malicious 26 mischief for fighting and vandalizing cars and sentenced to one 27 year at "fire camp"; within the same month he was convicted of 28 vandalism, for which he was sentenced to one year at the Youth (Id. at 14; Resp's Ex. B, Probations Report at 11.) (Pet.'s Ex. B at 14-15; Probation Report at 11.) 2 In In 1 Correctional Center and two years probation.2 2 17; Probation Report at 12.) 3 III. Commitment Offense United States District Court For the Northern District of California 4 (Pet's Ex. B at 16, In 1983, when Petitioner was seventeen years of age, he and a 5 crime partner entered a home in San Diego, California, with the 6 intent to rob. 7 methamphetamines. 8 home, was an eighty-six year old woman. 9 who was asleep when Petitioner and his crime partner entered the (Id. at 9.) Petitioner was under the influence of (Id. at 10.) Mrs. Anna Wurtz, the owner of the (Id. at 62.) Mrs. Wurtz, 10 home, awoke during the course of the burglary. 11 Petitioner grabbed Mrs. Wurtz, put a knife to her throat, and told 12 her not to scream. 13 her throat, struck her, and stabbed her about ninety times. 14 at 9-10, 62.) 15 her home. 16 IV. 17 (Id.) (Id. at 9.) Mrs. Wurtz screamed and Petitioner slit (Id. Petitioner then set fire to Mrs. Wurtz' hair and to (Id. at 11.) Parole Hearings In January, 1999, Petitioner had his first hearing before the 18 Board, which found that he was unsuitable for parole. 19 Ex. A, 1999 Parole Bd. Decision at 1.) 20 the Board cited the dispassionate and especially cruel and callous 21 manner in which the commitment offense was carried out, 22 Petitioner's escalating pattern of criminal conduct as a youth, his 23 "persistent pattern of tumultuous relationships," his drug and 24 alcohol abuse, his failure to profit from society's efforts to 25 rehabilitate him prior to his commitment offense and his failure to 26 upgrade educationally and vocationally while in prison. (Traverse, In support of its finding, (Id. at 1- 27 2 28 Petitioner's full criminal record was not discussed at the 2003 hearing. 3 1 2.) 2 free for eleven years and his recent excellent work reports. 3 at 2-3.) 4 disciplinary-free, reduce his custody level, and continue getting 5 good reports. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 6 The Board commended Petitioner for having remained discipline(Id. The Board recommended that Petitioner remain (Id. at 4.) In May, 2003, Petitioner attended his second parole hearing. 7 (Pet.'s Ex. B, 2003 Parole Bd. Hr'g at 1.) 8 issue in this petition. 9 incarceration, Petitioner had improved his education and vocational This is the hearing at The Board noted that during his 10 skills and had participated in various self-help activities. 11 at 78-79.) 12 Development Test (GED) and completed various college-level courses: 13 in 1994, he completed a program in Biblical studies; in 1999, he 14 completed a small business management course; in 2002, he completed 15 a certified washroom technician course; and, in 2003, coinciding 16 with his second hearing before the Board, Petitioner was enrolled 17 in a course entitled "National Association of Institutional Linen 18 Management." 19 (Id. Petitioner also passed his General Education (Id. at 24-27.) At the time of his 2003 hearing, Petitioner was working full- 20 time in Corcoran's laundry maintenance department (PIA), where he 21 began working in 1996. 22 assigned as PIA's "lead man mechanic." 23 received all satisfactory to above-average marks for his work in 24 PIA and received letters of appreciation from PIA superintendents 25 in 1999, 2002, and 2003. 26 (Id. at 30.) In 2000, Petitioner had been (Id. at 26.) Petitioner (Id. at 30.) Petitioner received eight certificates in 2002 from Visions 27 Adult School, a journaling self-study course, which included: 28 Chemical Dependence Interactive Journaling, Anger Interactive 4 1 Journaling, Breaking Free Interactive Journaling, the Con Game, 2 Coping Skills, Feelings, Life Management, and My Change Plan. 3 at 33.) 4 in which he corresponded with a minister to work through "The Big 5 Book," and "the twelve steps." 6 that Corcoran did not offer NA or AA programs but that he was 7 working with others to bring the programs to the prison. 8 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 (Id. Petitioner was involved in a self-study AA and NA program, (Id. at 34.) Petitioner testified (Id.) Clinical psychologist Marion Chiurazzi noted factors weighing in favor of granting parole, including: "an available support 10 system, feasible parole plans, a good job skill and habits, and 11 demonstrated improvement in his willingness to comply with rules 12 and authority over an extended period of time." 13 Petitioner was commended by the clinical psychologist for remaining 14 disciplinary-free and maintaining a stable work record. 15 41.) 16 factors included "his history of substance dependence and anti- 17 social violent behaviors and incomplete responsibility taking and 18 insight" into his commitment offense. 19 recommended that Petitioner participate in a substance abuse 20 treatment program or support group, and a lifer or other psycho- 21 educational group. 22 (Id. at 40.) (Id. at Dr. Chiurazzi stated that Petitioner's continuing risk (Id.) Dr. Chiurazzi (Id.) Upon release, Petitioner's plans included living with his 23 mother or with his fiancée, a woman whom he met when he was nine 24 years old and who is in AA. 25 working as an electrician and plumber for his brother who was 26 employed as a superintendent for a large mechanical corporation and 27 was responsible, in part, for hiring. 28 also reviewed letters of support from Petitioner's grandmother and (Id. at 45.) 5 His plans also included (Id. at 46-47.) The Board United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 grandfather, mother and step-father, father and step-mother, two 2 siblings, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, fiancée, and aunt. 3 at 47-51.) 4 program "immediately on parole." 5 police department and members of the victim's family submitted 6 letters opposing parole. (Id. Petitioner testified that he intended to join an AA (Id. at 50.) The San Diego 7 Although the Board commended Petitioner for remaining 8 disciplinary-free, for participating in the Visions Adult School 9 and for developing his vocational and educational skills, it found 10 that Petitioner would remain a risk until he participated in 11 sufficient self-help programs to learn how to cope with stress in a 12 non-destructive manner. 13 Petitioner's gains were recent and found that he must demonstrate 14 his ability to maintain those gains over an extended period of 15 time. 16 pattern of criminal conduct and violence leading up to his 17 commitment offense, the especially cruel and callous manner in 18 which he perpetrated the commitment offense, his unpredictability, 19 failure to assume full responsibility for the offense, lack of 20 insight regarding the offense, and lack of a sufficient plan to 21 insure he does not relapse into drug or alcohol addiction upon 22 release. 23 disciplinary-free, continue to upgrade vocationally, and 24 participate in self-help programs.3 (Id. at 78.) (Id.) (Id. at 78-79.) The Board noted that the The Board cited Petitioner's escalating The Board recommended that Petitioner remain (Id. at 80.) 25 26 3 27 28 In October 10, 2007, Petitioner attended his third parole hearing. (Pet.'s Ex. A, 2007 Parole Bd. Decision at 1.) The Board denied parole for two years. (Id. at 7.) This decision is not before the Court in this petition. 6 1 V. Habeas Corpus Petitions United States District Court For the Northern District of California 2 On October 14, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of 3 habeas corpus in San Diego County superior court, alleging that 4 there was no evidence to support the Board's 2003 determination 5 that he was not suitable for parole and that the decision violated 6 his due process rights. 7 11, 2003, in a four-page opinion, the court denied the petition. 8 (Id.) 9 the Board's decision that Petitioner was not yet suitable for (Respondent's Answer, Ex. D.) On November The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support 10 parole, including the nature of the commitment offense, 11 Petitioner's record of violence and assaultive behavior which 12 continued after imprisonment, his previous drug and alcohol 13 dependance, the need for further participation in self-help 14 programs, and the inadequacy of Petitioner's parole plans. 15 (Respondent's Answer, Superior Court Decision, Ex. D. at 3.) 16 court also found that Dr. Chiurazzi's psychological evaluation of 17 Petitioner expressed reservations about his risk for recidivism in 18 light of his volatile and violent adolescence and his drug 19 dependence, his initial disciplinary record while in prison, the 20 need to continue in a twelve-step program and to establish his 21 ability to sustain the positive growth made during incarceration. 22 (Id.) 23 The On February 2, 2004, Petitioner raised the same claims in his 24 petition to the California court of appeal. 25 Ex. E.) 26 denied the petition. 27 Decision, Ex. E. at 1.) 28 crime, Petitioner's criminal record, and his unstable social (Respondent's Answer, On February 9, 2004, in a two-page opinion, the court (Respondent's Answer, Court of Appeal The court found that the facts of the 7 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 history supported the Board's decision that Petitioner posed an 2 unreasonable risk of danger to society and a threat to public 3 safety if he were released on parole. 4 filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, 5 which summarily denied it on February 2, 2005. 6 Answer, Ex. F.) 7 state court remedies. 8 2006, Petitioner timely filed this federal habeas petition. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner then (Respondent's Respondent concedes that Petitioner exhausted his (Resp't's Answer at 3.) On February 1, 9 LEGAL STANDARD 10 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 11 1996 (AEDPA), a district court may not grant habeas relief unless 12 the state court's adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a 13 decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 14 application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 15 the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 16 decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 17 facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 18 proceeding.” 19 362, 412 (2000). 20 and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams, 529 U.S. at 21 407-09, and the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 22 determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 23 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. The first prong applies both to questions of law A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court 24 authority, that is, falls under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), 25 only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that 26 reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state 27 court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a 28 set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 8 Williams, 529 U.S. at United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 412-13. 2 Supreme Court authority, under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), 3 if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the 4 Supreme Court's decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle 5 to the facts of the prisoner's case.” 6 court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that 7 court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant 8 state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 9 erroneously or incorrectly.” A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Id. at 413. Id. at 411. The federal Rather, the application 10 must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. 11 Id. at 409. 12 “Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct 13 absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” 14 537 U.S. at 340. 15 evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness under 16 § 2254(e)(1); conclusory assertions will not do. 17 only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, Ninth Circuit 18 precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining 19 whether a state court decision is objectively unreasonable. 20 v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 21 Miller-El, A petitioner must present clear and convincing Id. Although Clark When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court 22 to consider the petitioner's claims, the court looks to the last 23 reasoned opinion of the highest court to analyze whether the state 24 judgment was erroneous under the standard of § 2254(d). 25 Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 26 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 27 California court of appeal is the highest court that addressed 28 Petitioner's claims. 9 Ylst v. In the present case, the 1 2 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 3 DISCUSSION I. "Some Evidence" Test Petitioner argues that the Board's decision finding him 4 unsuitable for parole violated his due process rights because it 5 was not supported by some evidence and, therefore, was arbitrary. 6 The Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole 7 board's decision deprives a prisoner of due process with respect to 8 his constitutionally protected liberty interest in a parole release 9 date if the board's decision is not supported by "some evidence in 10 the record," or is "otherwise arbitrary." 11 of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 12 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985)). 13 of the entire record is not required nor is an independent weighing 14 of the evidence. 15 assures that "the record is not so devoid of evidence that the 16 findings of the disciplinary board were without support or 17 otherwise arbitrary." 18 U.S. at 457). 19 evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by 20 the administrative board. 21 Id. Sass v. California Bd. An examination The "some evidence" standard is minimal, and Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 The relevant question is whether there is some Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. When assessing whether a state parole board's unsuitability 22 determination is supported by “some evidence,” the court's analysis 23 is framed by the guidelines set forth in the statutes and 24 regulations governing parole suitability determinations in the 25 relevant state. 26 "Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be 27 found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the 28 [Board] the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. 10 California law provides, 1 society if released from prison." 2 15, § 2404(a).4 3 reliable information available," such as: 4 The Board is required to consider "all relevant, the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of unsuitability. 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Cal. Code Regs. (C.C.R.) title 11 C.C.R. § 2404(b). 12 Circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole include 13 the nature of the commitment offense and whether “[t]he prisoner 14 committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel 15 manner.” C.C.R. § 2402(c). This includes consideration of the 16 number of victims, whether “[t]he offense was carried out in a 17 dispassionate and calculated manner,” whether the victim was 18 “abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense,” whether 19 “[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an 20 exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering,” and whether 21 “[t]he motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in 22 relation to the offense.” Id. Other circumstances tending to show 23 unsuitability for parole are a previous record of violence, an 24 unstable social history, previous sadistic sexual offenses, a 25 history of severe mental health problems related to the offense, 26 27 4 28 All further references to the California Code of Regulations are to Title 15. 11 1 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 2 and serious misconduct in prison or jail. Id. In contrast, circumstances tending to support a finding of 3 suitability for parole include no juvenile record, a stable social 4 history, signs of remorse, that the crime was committed as a result 5 of significant stress in the prisoner's life, a lack of criminal 6 history, a reduced possibility of recidivism due to the prisoner's 7 present age, that the prisoner has made realistic plans for release 8 or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon 9 release, and that the prisoner's institutional activities indicate 10 an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release. 11 C.C.R. § 2402(d). 12 Applying these guidelines here, the California court of 13 appeal's determination that Petitioner "would pose an unreasonable 14 risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released 15 from prison" was supported by the evidence of Petitioner's 16 commitment offense, his extensive criminal record prior and 17 subsequent to incarceration, his substance abuse and his unstable 18 social history. 19 nature of Petitioner's commitment offense factored into the Board's 20 determination, Petitioner's escalating pattern of criminal conduct 21 and violence leading up to his commitment offense, his 22 unpredictability, his failure to assume full responsibility and 23 lack of insight regarding the offense, and the insufficiency of his 24 plan to prevent relapse into drug or alcohol addiction upon release 25 also weighed against parole. 26 Furthermore, although the "cruel and callous" Despite the evidence that the court of appeal cited to support 27 its decision, Petitioner argues that his young age at the time of 28 the commitment offense and the district attorney's plea offer 12 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 justify granting parole. 2 parents, his attorney and the district attorney that he would be 3 released in seventeen to twenty years. 4 not attach the plea bargain to his petition or traverse. 5 Petitioner attaches the transcript of the hearing on his plea of 6 guilty which reveals that the court warned Petitioner that the 7 maximum penalty for the crimes to which he was pleading guilty was 8 twenty-six year to life with a possibility of an extra seven years 9 for the arson. He asserts that he was told by his Traverse, Ex. C at 9. However, Petitioner does Petitioner responded that he 10 understood the possible sentence. 11 that he would be paroled in seventeen to twenty years. 12 Id. The court did not tell him The superior court addressed Petitioner's argument that his 13 continued incarceration violated his plea agreement. 14 denied the claim because Petitioner failed to meet the burden of 15 supporting his claim by failing to provide a copy of his guilty 16 plea or a transcript of those proceedings establishing that he was 17 promised he would be paroled after seventeen years as a condition 18 of his plea. 19 Jeffrey Inglett, at 4. 20 The court Resp's Ex. D, In the Matter of the Application of Plea agreements with specific promises are enforceable. 21 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) ("when a plea 22 rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 23 prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement 24 or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled"); Brown v. Poole, 25 337 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). 26 such a promise, the defendant can seek to withdraw from the plea 27 agreement or demand specific performance. 28 Sandoval-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1997). 13 Should the government breach United States v. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 Apparently, Petitioner has tried to remedy the deficiency 2 noted by the state court by submitting a copy of the transcript of 3 his plea hearing. 4 claim that he was promised a sentence of seventeen to twenty years, 5 or that he would be paroled in that length of time. 6 transcript suggests that Petitioner was or should have been aware 7 that his guilty plea would not secure a reduced sentence. 8 in his state petition, Petitioner has failed to show the existence 9 of such a plea contract establishing that he would receive a However, the transcript does not support his Indeed, the Thus, as 10 seventeen to twenty year sentence in exchange for his guilty plea. 11 Therefore, the state court's denial of this claim was not contrary 12 to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. 13 The Court cannot re-weigh evidence already considered by the 14 Board. 15 see if the record supports the minimally stringent "some evidence" 16 standard. 17 appeal's finding that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole, its 18 decision complied with the requirements of due process in 19 accordance with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Sass, 461 F.3d at 20 1128. 21 not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 22 established federal law. 23 II. Immutable Circumstances Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. Id. Instead, the Court looks only to Because some evidence supports the court of Therefore, the court of appeal's denial of this claim was 24 Petitioner argues that, in denying parole, the Board violated 25 his right to due process by relying on the immutable circumstances 26 of the commitment offense. 27 28 The Ninth Circuit holds that the denial of parole based solely on the gravity of the commitment offense can initially satisfy due 14 1 process requirements. 2 However, in dicta, the Biggs court stated that "continued reliance 3 in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the 4 offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the 5 rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result 6 in a due process violation." 7 Id. at 917. Here, the California court of appeal correctly found that the 8 Board relied on more than the "unchanging factor" of Petitioner's 9 commitment offense and criminal history in denying him parole. 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (2003). However, the Ninth Circuit's evolving guidance in Biggs, Sass, 11 and Irons suggests that the Board may continue to evaluate static 12 factors, including the nature of the commitment offense and 13 pre-conviction criminality, in deciding whether to grant parole. 14 See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 15 immutable events, however, should decrease as a predictor of future 16 dangerousness as the years pass and the prisoner demonstrates 17 favorable behavior. 18 at 851. 19 parole denials based on Petitioner's commitment offense alone could 20 eventually give rise to a due process violation. 21 F.3d at 916-17. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17; Irons, 505 F.3d Should Petitioner follow the Board's advice, continued 22 23 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 25 close the file. 27 See Biggs, 334 CONCLUSION 24 26 The weight to be attributed to those The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 9/30/09 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 28 15
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