(PC) Hackworth v. Rangel et al, No. 1:2006cv00850 - Document 73 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Recommending Defendant's 58 MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT be GRANTED, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 3/8/2011, referred to Judge Ishii. Objections to F&R due by 4/11/2011. (Marrujo, C)
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(PC) Hackworth v. Rangel et al Doc. 73 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ROBERT HACKWORTH, 11 CASE NO. Plaintiff, 12 1:06-cv-00850-AWI-MJS (PC) FINDING AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED v. 13 P. RANGEL, (ECF No. 58) 14 Defendant. 15 OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS / 16 17 18 19 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff Robert Hackworth (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 20 forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action 21 proceeds on Plaintiff’s August 16, 2007 First Amended Complaint. 22 23 In its Screening Order filed on November 10, 2008, the Court found that Plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim for excessive force against Defendant Rangel. 24 25 26 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment filed September 10, 2010. (ECF No. 58.) Plaintiff filed his Opposition on December 6, 2010. 27 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 (ECF No. 65.) Defendant replied and Plaintiff filed a Surreply. (ECF Nos. 66 & 71.) II. 3 BACKGROUND The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows: On July 28, 4 5 2004, Defendant Rangel refused to exchange Plaintiff’s bed sheet for a new sheet because 6 it was torn. A verbal confrontation ensued between the two. Plaintiff’s hand was in his 7 open food port when Defendant kicked the food port’s door, catching and breaking one of 8 Plaintiff’s fingers. 9 10 In response to the incident, Plaintiff was given a rules violation report (“RVR”) initially charging him with attempted battery.1 (ECF No. 58-7 p. 2; Def.’s Motion for Summary 11 12 13 Judgment Ex. A.2) A disciplinary hearing was held on November 28, 2004 and reconvened on December 12, 2004 to allow an investigative employee additional time to conduct 14 interviews. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Hearing Officer found the following: 15 • Rangel was dispensing bed sheets on July 28, 2004 16 • Rangel refused to accept Plaintiff’s sheet because it was torn • Plaintiff became very agitated by this and began name-calling • Plaintiff stepped back from the door and then lunged forward while bending at the 17 18 19 waist and extending his hands toward the open food port 20 21 • 22 23 When Plaintiff lunged towards the food port, Rangel was standing within approximately one foot of the port • Upon Plaintiff’s movement, Rangel attempted to shut the food port with both hands 24 1 25 26 27 The charge was changed to “conduct that could lead to violence.” (ECF No. 58-7, Def.’s MSJ Ex. A.) 2 In the Order denying Defendant’s Motion to Dism iss, the Court took judicial notice of the RVR log no. 4A2-04-07-14 pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(d). (ECF No. 40, p. 4.) 2 1 2 3 • Plaintiff’s finger was caught and crushed by the hinge of the port. (ECF No. 58-7 p. 6; Def.’s MSJ Ex. A.) Based on this, Plaintiff was found guilty of conduct that could lead to violence, assessed 150 days of credit forfeiture and a 30 day loss of 4 5 privileges, among other punishments. (Id. at p. 2.) The only pertinent disputed fact relates to Plaintiff’s conduct during the incident. 6 7 Plaintiff alleges that he stood stationary with one hand resting in the open food port and 8 did not lunge at Rangel. Defendant contends, and the Hearing Officer found, that Plaintiff 9 lunged at Rangel with both hands toward the open food port. 10 III. LEGAL STANDARD 11 Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no 12 13 genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 14 a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving 15 party 16 17 18 19 20 21 [A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may 22 23 properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to 24 interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be 25 entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 26 make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 27 3 1 2 3 case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary 4 5 6 7 judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 8 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 9 opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 10 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting 11 12 13 to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of 14 affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute 15 exists. 16 demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 17 Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 18 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 19 20 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 21 could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 22 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 23 24 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the 25 claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing 26 27 versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of 4 1 2 3 summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments). 4 In resolving a summary judgment motion, the Court examines the pleadings, 5 6 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 7 if any. Rule 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be taken as true, Anderson, 8 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed 9 before the Court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 10 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)). 11 12 13 Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards 14 v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 15 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 16 17 Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the 18 record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving 19 20 21 party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). IV. ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS 22 Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims 23 against him on two grounds: (1) the claims are barred by Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 24 (1997); and (2) Plaintiff cannot prove each element of his Eighth Amendment excessive 25 force claim. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Edwards, 26 27 it does not address Defendant’s second argument. 5 1 2 3 In Edwards v. Balisok, the Supreme Court ruled that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), applied to actions “challenging the validity of the procedures used to deprive an inmate of good-time credits . . . .” 520 U.S. at 643. Stated another way, a Section 1983 4 5 6 claim is barred if the “plaintiff could prevail only by negating ‘an element of the offense of which he has been convicted.’” Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 7 2002) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.6). When the Section 1983 claim does not 8 necessarily implicate the underlying disciplinary action (or criminal conviction), it may 9 proceed. See Muhammed v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754-55 (2004). 10 As a result of his disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty of conduct that could 11 12 13 lead to violence in violation of California Code of Regulations § 3005(c).3 Section 3005(c) provided, at the time: “Inmates shall not willfully commit or assist another person in the 14 commission of a violent injury to any person or persons, including self mutilation or 15 attempted suicide, nor attempt or threaten the use of force or violence upon another 16 person. Inmates shall not willfully attempt to incite others, either verbally or in writing, or 17 by other deliberate action, to use force or violence upon another person.” 15 Cal. Code 18 Regs. § 3005(c) (2004); ECF No. 58-7, p. 6; Def.’s MSJ, Ex. A, p. 5. 19 20 Defendant contends that for Plaintiff to succeed on his excessive force claim, the 21 finding of guilt in his prison disciplinary hearing concerning the same incident would have 22 to be invalidated. Defendant states that Plaintiff’s version of the incident—that he was not 23 the initial aggressor but only the victim—impermissibly negates the disciplinary finding that 24 he attempted or threatened violence. 25 26 3 27 This section has since been renum bered and am ended as § 3005(d)(1) and (2). 6 1 2 3 Plaintiff notes that the Court previously rejected the same Edwards argument in its Order denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 40, p. 6.) In that Order, the Court noted that “Plaintiff may still prevail on his claim even accepting that the institutional 4 5 6 hearing officer correctly found that Plaintiff had committed conduct that could lead to violence. For example, it is possible that Plaintiff did swear at Plaintiff and lunge at the 7 door, but Defendant then proceeded to use excessive force by closing the door on 8 Plaintiff’s finger. 9 challenges, directly or indirectly, the constitutionality of the disciplinary conviction.” (Id.) 10 The [C]ourt finds that nothing in Plaintiff’s excessive force claim At the time the Court made that observation, it was required to accept as true all 11 12 13 allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and was not permitted to consider any other evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The case has now progressed beyond that point 14 and is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. At this stage in the 15 proceeding, the Court must consider all of the evidence before it. Though it must view that 16 evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record has changed significantly since 17 the Court’s prior ruling. 18 On the record before the Court now, it can no longer say that Plaintiff could prevail 19 20 on his excessive force case without calling in question the validity of the prison disciplinary 21 hearing. The hearing officer specifically found that Plaintiff had lunged forward with his 22 hands outstretched toward the open food port causing Defendant Rangel to shut the port 23 door. To prevail on his excessive force claim in this case, Plaintiff must show that there 24 is a genuine dispute of material fact as to “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort 25 to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson 26 27 v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). 7 1 2 3 To meet this standard, Plaintiff has continuously maintained that he was not the initial aggressor. (ECF Nos. 1, 17, 31, 37, 58-4, 65, & 71.) In his deposition, Plaintiff denied that he moved forward at all during the verbal confrontation; he maintains that he 4 5 6 simply stood at his cell door, never became aggressive toward Defendant, and did not rush toward the open food port. (ECF No. 58-4, pp. 15 & 24.) Plaintiff states that while one of 7 his hands was resting in the open food port, Defendant Rangel, without provocation, 8 slammed the port’s door closed. 9 10 If Plaintiff rushed the food port and aggressively stuck his hands through the port, Defendant’s use of force could have been justified as an effort to defend himself and 11 12 13 maintain discipline and order. Such a justification would be inconsistent with the claim that Defendant acted with a purely malicious motive. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim could succeed only 14 if he could prove that his allegations of innocent inaction were true. However, Plaintiff’s 15 claim to that effect directly conflicts with the findings of the hearing officer. (ECF No. 58-7 16 p. 6; Def.’s MSJ Ex. A.) Adoption of Plaintiff’s claim would directly conflict with and 17 undermine the finding of guilt in the disciplinary hearing. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is barred 18 by Edwards v. Balisok. 19 20 Plaintiff argues that the finding of guilt in his disciplinary hearing could be attributed 21 to the verbal confrontation and name-calling by Plaintiff and claims that such an 22 interpretation is consistent with the fact that the hearing officer did not find Plaintiff guilty 23 of attempted battery. However, the above-listed findings by the hearing officer in the RVR 24 rule out that interpretation; the hearing officer specifically found that Plaintiff had lunged 25 at Defendant. 26 27 In his pleadings, declaration, and deposition, Plaintiff repeatedly questions the 8 1 2 3 alleged loss of good time credit asserting that he did not lose any or, if he did, he was not aware of it. Defendant points out that Plaintiff did lose some credit (though it is difficult to determine the quantity) as demonstrated in both the RVR and Chronological History 4 5 6 attached to the Motion. (ECF No. 58-7.) Moreover, in the operative Complaint, Plaintiff states “FACT: [Hearing Officer] took my . . . privileges for 90 days and a 150 days los[s] 7 of good time credit . . . .” 8 acknowledged some loss of good time credit, and is now judicially estopped from claiming 9 otherwise or that he was unaware of the lost credit.4 10 (ECF No. 17, Pl.’s Am. Compl. p. 5.) Thus, Plaintiff If Plaintiff succeeded in showing that Defendant engaged in excessive force, it 11 12 13 would necessarily undermine the prison’s disciplinary hearing. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot proceed on his Section 1983 claims unless and until his disciplinary conviction is 14 invalidated. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648-49. 15 V. 16 17 CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 10, 2010, be GRANTED. As such a ruling would 18 19 20 dispose of the only claim argued by Plaintiff, the Court further RECOMMENDS that JUDGMENT be entered in favor of Defendant and that the case be CLOSED. 21 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States 22 District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 23 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and 24 25 26 27 4 Rissetto v. Plum bers & Steam fitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1996) (judicial estoppel “precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incom patible position) . 9 1 2 3 Recommendations, the parties may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive 4 5 6 the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 Dated: 92b0h March 8, 2011 /s/ Michael J. Seng UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 10
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