(PC) Curtis v. Buckley et al, No. 1:2006cv00230 - Document 56 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING 47 Motion for Preliminary Injunction signed by Senior Judge Stephen M. McNamee on 8/5/2009. (Figueroa, O)
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(PC) Curtis v. Buckley et al Doc. 56 1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 Parnell Curtis, Plaintiff, 10 11 vs. 12 Buckley, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 06-CV-00230-SMM ORDER 15 16 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Relief (Dkt. 47), which the 17 Court construes as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In Plaintiff’s motion filed on 18 January 26, 2009, Plaintiff stated that he sought declaratory relief. A party seeking 19 declaratory relief must show an actual controversy and satisfy all jurisdictional requirements. 20 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998). However, in his 21 motion, Plaintiff actually seeks a preliminary injunction. Because Plaintiff is a pro se 22 litigant, the Court must construe his motion as one for injunctive relief. Bernhardt v. Los 23 Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). 24 BACKGROUND 25 Defendants Alverez and Munoz are correctional officers at the California State Prison 26 Corcoran. (Dkt. 18, Am. Compl. 2.) Defendants are responsible for enforcing laws, 27 regulations, and procedures which govern the activities of prisoners. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff 28 alleges that on June 13, 2005, Defendant Alverez handed him a receipt for a cell search and Dockets.Justia.com 1 removed property. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff argues that Alverez threatened to keep him in the cage 2 all day if he did not sign the receipt, which stated that Plaintiff destroyed some state issued 3 property. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff argues that when he refused to sign the receipt, Alverez then 4 stated “that’s what happens to inmates who rat on officers, saying they’ve seen an assault on 5 an inmate.” (Id. at 5.) To avoid further confrontation, Plaintiff signed the receipt. (Id. at 5.) 6 Plaintiff brought this Amended Complaint and presented several claims for relief against 7 multiple defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In May 2007, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A), 8 a magistrate judge screened the order and sent the suggested Findings and Recommendations 9 to the District Court. (Dkt. 20, R&R 9.) In August 2007, the District Court adopted the 10 Findings and Recommendations in full. (Dkt. 24, Order Adopting R&R 1.) Only Plaintiff’s 11 First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Alverez and Munoz remains. On 12 November 24, 2008, this case was reassigned from the Eastern District of California to the 13 undersigned judge. (Dkt. 46.) Plaintiff now moves for preliminary injunctive relief for his 14 retaliation claim against Defendants Alverez and Munoz. STANDARD OF REVIEW 15 16 The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the relative positions of the 17 parties - the status quo - until a full trial on the merits can be conducted. See Univ. of Tex. 18 v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). In the Ninth Circuit, two interrelated tests exist for 19 determining the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The moving party 20 carries the burden of proof on each element of either test. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n 21 v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir. 1980). Under the first “traditional” 22 test, the court may not issue a preliminary injunction unless each of the following 23 requirements is satisfied: (1) the moving party has demonstrated a likelihood of success on 24 the merits, (2) the moving party will suffer irreparable injury and has no adequate remedy 25 at law if injunctive relief is not granted, (3) in balancing the equities, the non-moving party 26 will not be harmed more than the moving party is helped by the injunction, and (4) granting 27 the injunction is in the public interest. Martin v. Int’l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 674- 28 675 (9th Cir. 1984). -2- 1 Under the second “alternative” test, the court may not issue a preliminary injunction 2 unless the moving party demonstrates either “probable success on the merits and irreparable 3 injury . . . or . . . sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make the case a fair 4 ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in favor of the party 5 requesting relief.” Topanga Press Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1528 (9th Cir. 6 1993). The Ninth Circuit has explained that the two parts of the alternative test are not 7 separate and unrelated, but are “extremes of a single continuum.” Benda v. Grand Lodge of 8 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 584 F.2d 308, 315 (9th Cir. 1978). DISCUSSION 9 10 Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of a order compelling Defendants to perform their 11 existing duties under the United States Constitution. (Mot. for Declaratory Relief 2.) 12 Furthermore, Plaintiff requests that this Court order Defendants return his property under all 13 circumstances that do not present safety and security threats. Plaintiff also requests that this 14 Court order Defendants not to retaliate against him for pursuing legal actions. (Id. at 3.) As 15 stated earlier, Plaintiff must show four factors: 1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits, 16 2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 3) that the 17 balance of equities tips in his favor, and 4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter 18 v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008). 19 I. Success on the Merits 20 Within the prison context, a First Amendment retaliation claim has five elements: (1) 21 an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) 22 that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his 23 First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 24 correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). In order for 25 Plaintiff to be successful, he must show that Defendants Alverez and Munoz took adverse 26 action by wrongfully charging him with the destruction of state property because he was a 27 witness against another officer in a prisoner assault case. Plaintiff must also show that 28 -3- 1 Defendants chilled his First Amendment rights. Furthermore, Plaintiff must show that 2 Defendants’ actions did not reasonably advance any legitimate correctional goal. 3 In this case, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants charged him with the destruction of state 4 property, but he has not shown that they did so wrongfully or in retaliation for him being a 5 witness. Moreover, he has produced no documents, statements, or any other kind of evidence 6 to support his claim that Defendants chilled his First Amendment rights or that Defendants’ 7 actions did not reasonably advance any legitimate correctional goal. Because Plaintiff has 8 not produced any evidence demonstrating his likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiff’s 9 motion should not be granted. 10 II. Irreparable Harm or Injury 11 Plaintiff’s failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits alone precludes 12 issuance of a preliminary injunction, but the Court will consider whether Plaintiff has 13 established the existence of irreparable harm. See MMJK, Inc. v. Ultimate Blackjack Tour 14 LLC, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Plaintiff must do more than allege 15 imminent harm to obtain preliminary injunctive relief; he must demonstrate immediate 16 threatened injury. L.A. Mem’l. Coliseum Comm’n, 634 F.2d at 1201. 17 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is at risk from suffering repeated 18 and future atypical hardships, severe physical injury, and psychological and emotional pain 19 and suffering unless the Court grants his preliminary injunction. (Am. Compl. 15.) However, 20 Plaintiff has not presented any evidence or facts that he would indeed suffer any future 21 atypical hardships, severe physical injury, or psychological and emotional pain and suffering. 22 He has not produced any medical records of his physical injuries, such as doctor’s exams or 23 diagnoses. Neither has he produced any evidence of his psychological and emotional pain, 24 such as psychological evaluations or recommendations. As Plaintiff has not produced any 25 evidence demonstrating that he will suffer irreparable harm or injury if the preliminary 26 injunction is not granted, his motion should not be granted. 27 Plaintiff cannot meet the burden of proof under the alternative test either. As noted, 28 under the alternative test, the balance of hardships and the probability of success on the -4- 1 merits are “the outer reaches of a single continuum.” Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 2 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation and internal quotation omitted). “If the balance of hardships tips 3 decidedly toward the plaintiff, then he need not show as robust a likelihood of success on the 4 merits as when the balance tips less decidedly.” Benda, 584 F.2d at 315. Here, Plaintiff 5 needed to show a high probability of irreparable harm or injury because he could not show 6 that he would be likely to succeed on the merits. He failed to do so, therefore his motion 7 should be denied. 8 III. The Balance of Equities & The Public Interest 9 Courts have analyzed the balance of equities and the public interest together. See 10 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 378; see also Am. Trucking Assn’s, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 11 F.3d 1046, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2009). The court must consider whether its “exercise of 12 equitable discretion . . . heel[s] to the identified violation and respect[s] the interests of state 13 and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution.” 14 Gilmore v. People of the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 1005 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations 15 omitted). When a state agency is involved, these considerations are strengthened because 16 of federalism concerns. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974). Any injunctive 17 relief awarded must avoid unnecessary disruption to the state agency’s normal course of 18 proceedings. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). 19 As noted, relief is not appropriate because Plaintiff has not presented any evidence 20 that Defendants in this case have engaged or will engage in any retaliatory conduct. Plaintiff 21 argues that if the injunctive relief is not granted, then he will suffer from atypical hardships 22 and severe physical, psychological, and emotional pain. However, as noted, Plaintiff has not 23 shown that he will suffer a real or immediate threat of harm. With regards to how the scope 24 of the relief should be tailored, Plaintiff requests that the Court take an active role in 25 enforcing the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) rules and 26 regulations regarding a correctional officer’s behavior toward inmates. (Am. Compl. 23.) 27 Plaintiff has alleged that only two correctional officers violated his rights, yet he asks the 28 Court to enforce CDCR rules throughout the prison system and for every correctional officer. -5- 1 Thus, the Court would unnecessarily interfere with the state’s managing of its own affairs 2 and disrupt its normal course of proceedings. See O’Shea, 414 at 501. Moreover, other than 3 his own statements, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence showing that Defendants acted 4 in a retaliatory manner, so it would not be in the public’s interest to enforce the preliminary 5 injunction. Because the balance of equities does not tip in Plaintiff’s favor and the granting 6 of the motion would not be in the public’s interest, the Court should deny the motion for 7 injunctive relief. CONCLUSION 8 9 For his First Amendment claim against Defendants Alverez and Munoz, Plaintiff 10 cannot show that he will succeed on the merits, he is likely to suffer irreparable or imminent 11 harm, the balance of equities tips in his favor, or the injunction is in the public interest. The 12 public interest lies with the state in this case because of the latitude of discretion afforded to 13 them. Furthermore, the preliminary injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks is what he would 14 obtain after a successful full trial on the merits, and thus, the granting of such relief at this 15 time would not preserve the status quo. See Univ. of Tex., 451 U.S. at 395. 16 17 18 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Relief (Dkt. 47), which the Court construes as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, is DENIED. 19 20 DATED this 5th day of August, 2009. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -6-
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