(PC) Chatman v. Tyner, et al, No. 1:2003cv06636 - Document 204 (E.D. Cal. 2010)

Court Description: ORDER DENYING 200 Plaintiff's Motion for Settlement Consent to be Deemed Void signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 7/21/2010. (Jessen, A)

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(PC) Chatman v. Tyner, et al Doc. 204 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 CHARLES CHATMAN, 10 Plaintiff, 11 12 CASE NO. 1:03-cv-06636-AWI-SMS PC ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR SETTLEMENT CONSENT TO BE DEEMED VOID v. SERGEANT C. TYNER, et al., (Doc. 200) 13 Defendants. / 14 15 I. Relevant Procedural History 16 This is a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Charles 17 Chatman, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. This action was set for jury 18 trial to commence May 18, 2010. However, Defendants submitted a notice of disposition based 19 on Plaintiff’s acceptance of an offer pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 681 – which 20 resulted in entry of judgment and case closure. (Docs. 194 and 199.) At proceedings held May 21 13, 2010, Plaintiff expressed his desire to be relieved from the settlement such that a briefing 22 schedule was set for motions for enforcement of acceptance of the Rule 68 offer. (Doc. 195.) 23 Rather than Defendants filing motions to enforce Plaintiff’s acceptance of the offer, Plaintiff 24 filed the present request that his settlement consent be deemed void. (Doc. 200.) Defendants 25 filed oppositions. (Docs. 201 and 202.) Plaintiff did not file a reply. 26 /// 27 28 1 All references herein to rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Though Plaintiff did not correctly identify his motion, it is construed as, a motion for 2 relief from a judgment or order under Rule 60(b). The matter is deemed submitted. For the 3 reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s request is denied. 4 II. 5 Plaintiff’s Motion Plaintiff requests that his consent to settlement be voided based on his uncertainty in as 6 much as he was not aware when the payment of settlement monies would be made, where the 7 settlement monies would be deposited, and what, if any, tax ramifications he would encounter 8 (i.e. mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1)); that Defendants’ 9 counsel were secretive in the process as to how it was presented, in answering his questions, and 10 in discussing Plaintiff’s desire to be relieved from the settlement in the May 13, 2010 court 11 proceeding (i.e. fraud and/or misrepresentations under Rule 60(b)(3)); and that he signed the 12 acceptance under duress. (Doc. 200, Plntf. Mot.) 13 A. 14 Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may Rule 60(b)(1) 15 relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, 16 surprise, or excusable neglect . . . .” Misunderstanding an offer’s terms is not the same as 17 misunderstanding factors to be weighed in deciding whether to accept the offer. Latshaw v. 18 Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (the plaintiff understood the 19 unambiguous settlement terms – that she would receive $15,000 in exchange for terminating the 20 litigation – when signing the offer of judgment such that the district court did not abuse its 21 discretion in denying the plaintiff relief under Rule 60(b)(1)). 22 Plaintiff has shown that when he signed the offer of judgment, he understood the 23 unambiguous settlement terms – that he would receive $10,000 in exchange for an entry of 24 judgment of dismissal with prejudice in this matter.2 The timing of payment, where settlement 25 26 27 28 2 None of the parties have requested an evidentiary hearing on this matter. Erdman v. Chochise County , Ariz., 926 F.2d 877, 879 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1991) (evidentiary hearing neither held nor requested by either side). The terms of the Rule 68 offer, $10,000.00 in exchange for judgment of dismissal with prejudice are articulated in writing, Doc. 194, Def. Offer of Judg. & Plntf Accept., p. 3-5, and are not in dispute so as to necessitate an evidentiary hearing as was required in Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987), noted in Erdman. 2 1 monies would be deposited, and possible tax consequences thereof were not part of the 2 settlement terms. Ramifications caused by and/or factors to be weighed in deciding to accept the 3 offer (i.e. when he would receive the settlement monies payment, that the monies would be 4 deposited into his trust account, and whether he would be taxed on the monies) do not equate to a 5 misunderstanding of the terms of settlement offered by Defendants. Plaintiff’s subsequent 6 concerns as to the timing of, place of deposit, and possible tax consequences of payment of the 7 settlement monies are collateral matters, insufficient to void his consent to the settlement offer. 8 An offer under Rule 68, “once made, is non-negotiable; it is either accepted, in which case it is 9 automatically entered by the clerk of court, or rejected, in which case it stands as the marker by 10 which the plaintiff’s results are ultimately measured.” Nusom v. Comh Woodburn, Inc., 122 F.3d 11 803, 834 (9th Cir. 1997). “[A] party who simply misunderstands or fails to predict the legal 12 consequences of his deliberate acts cannot later, once the lesson is learned, turn back the clock to 13 undo those mistakes.” Latshaw, 452 F.3d at 1011, quoting Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 14 1231 (10th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff’s retrospective contemplations of possible settlement 15 ramifications do not equate to his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to entitle 16 him to have the settlement voided under Rule 60(b)(1). 17 B. 18 Plaintiff also seeks to be relieved from his acceptance of Defendants’ Rule 68 offer on the Rule 60(b)(3) 19 basis that Defense counsel did not tell the Court of his requirement that he be paid within forty- 20 eight (48) hours or he would void the settlement. (Doc. 200, Plntf. Mot., 3:10-15, 20-22.) 21 Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3), “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 22 relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . fraud . . . , 23 misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party. . . .” “Acts of ‘fraud on the court’ can 24 sometimes constitute extraordinary circumstances meriting relief under Rule 60(b)(6).” Latshaw, 25 452 F.3d at 1104, ref. In re Intermagnetics America, Inc., 926 F.2d 912, 916-17 (9th Cir.1991). 26 “Such fraud on the court ‘embrace[s] only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile 27 the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can 28 not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for 3 1 adjudication.’ ” Id. quoting Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir.1989) quoting J. 2 Moore & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 60.33, at 515 (2d ed.1978)). “Liberal application 3 is not encouraged, as fraud on the court ‘should be read narrowly, in the interest of preserving the 4 finality of judgments.’ ” Id. quoting Toscano v. Comm’r, 441 F.2d 930, 934 (9th Cir.1971). The 5 Ninth Circuit “places a high burden on a plaintiff seeking relief from a judgment based on fraud 6 on the court. For example, in order to provide grounds for relief, the fraud must ‘involve an 7 “unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its 8 decision.” ’ ” Id. quoting Abatti v. Comm’r, 859 F.2d 115, 118 (9th Cir.1988) quoting Toscano, 9 441 F.2d at 934. Even a forged signature on a settlement agreement that is submitted to the court 10 was found to fall far short of “defiling the court itself” and did not resemble “an unconscionable 11 plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.” Id. 12 Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants did not advise the Court of his forty-eight (48) hour 13 payment requirement – that was not one of the terms of the Rule 68 offer and acceptance, does 14 not even begin to approach “defiling the court itself” and is not “an unconscionable plan or 15 scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.” Id. Accordingly, 16 Plaintiff is not entitled to have the settlement voided under Rule 60(b)(1). 17 C. 18 Rule 60(b)(6) allows a court to “relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or 19 20 Rule 60(b)(6) proceeding for . . . any other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment.” “Judgments are not often set aside under Rule 60(b)(6). Rather, the Rule is “ ‘ “used 21 sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice” and “is to be utilized only where 22 extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an 23 erroneous judgment.” ’ ” Latshaw, 452 F.3d at 1103 quoting United States v. Washington, 394 24 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 25 1047, 1049 (9th Cir.1993)). “Accordingly, a party who moves for such relief ‘must demonstrate 26 both injury and circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from proceeding with . . . 27 the action in a proper fashion.’ ” Id, quoting Community Dental Services v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 28 1168 (9th Cir.2002). 4 1 Plaintiff’s willing and voluntary signing of acceptance of a Rule 68 offer, which he later 2 regrets and/or seeks to add additional terms to, does not present extraordinary circumstances so 3 as to justify relieving him from a settlement under Rule 68. 4 D. 5 Plaintiff also appears to seek relief from his acceptance of the Rule 68 by asserting that 6 his agreement was secured under duress. (Doc. 200, Plntf. Mot., 3:9.) While Plaintiff uses the 7 word “duress” in his motion, id., he fails to identify any factual basis upon which this assertion is 8 based. Plaintiff’s only argument on this point is that “defendants’ were secretive in presenting it 9 by failing to answer [his] questions surrounding the process and [his] voice in the matter.” Id. Duress 10 Defendants evidence shows that not only did they properly serve Plaintiff with a Offer of 11 Judgment under Rule 68, their offer was accompanied by a letter of explanation which advised 12 Plaintiff of the results in cases similar to his, of the potential negative effects of if he did not 13 accept the offer, and of the time frame within which Plaintiff must accept if he so desired. (Doc. 14 201, Def. Opp., Attach. A., pp. 10-11.) It is common knowledge in the practice of law that 15 receipt of an offer under Rule 68, and the possible ramifications of nonacceptance, gives even 16 seasoned lawyers some pause. However, requiring a party to assess his chance of success at trial 17 and whether he wants to risk the negative effects of failing to obtain a better result than that made 18 in an offer under Rule 68 is not duress, but “is the sword which encourages plaintiffs to settle.” 19 Hopper v. Euclid Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 295 (6th Cir. 1989). Indeed, the 20 purpose of Rule 68 is to force plaintiffs to “think very hard before proceeding with their suits.” 21 Id. Plaintiff has not shown that he was placed under duress at the time he signed the acceptance 22 of Defendants Rule 68 offer. 23 III. Conclusion 24 Plaintiff failed to show: (1) that he was laboring under a mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 25 or excusable neglect at the time he signed the offer of judgment; (2) that Defendants engaged in 26 fraud, made misrepresentations, or engaged in misconduct; (3) that there is any legal basis to 27 justify relieving him from the Rule 68 settlement; and/or (4) that he was under duress at the time 28 he executed the acceptance of Defendants Rule 68 offer For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Request 5 1 for Settlement Consent to Be Deemed Void, filed May 28, 2010, is DENIED WITH 2 PREJUDICE. 3 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: July 21, 2010 emm0d6 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6

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