Monica Renee Kumar v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 8:2019cv00685 - Document 19 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Autumn D. Spaeth. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits, and REMANDING the matter for further proceedings consistent with this Order. Judgement shall be entered accordingly. (see document for further details) (hr)
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Monica Renee Kumar v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MONICA R. K., an Individual, 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 Case No.: 8:19-0 0 685 ADS MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND ANDREW M. SAUL, Com m issioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 I. IN TROD U CTION Plaintiff Monica R. K.1 (“Plaintiff”) challenges Defendant Andrew M. Saul2 , 19 Com m issioner of Social Security’s (hereinafter “Com m issioner” or “Defendant”) denial 20 of her application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). 21 22 23 24 1 Plaintiff’s nam e has been partially redacted in com pliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recom m endation of the Com m ittee on Court Adm inistration and Case Managem ent of the J udicial Conference of the United States. 2 On J une 17, 20 19, Saul becam e the Com m issioner of Social Security. Thus, he is autom atically substituted as the defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). -1Dockets.Justia.com 1 For the reasons stated below, the decision of the Com m issioner is REVERSED and 2 REMANDED. 3 II. 4 FACTS RELEVAN T TO TH E APPEAL A review of the entire record reflects certain uncontested facts relevant to this 5 appeal. Prior to filing her application for social security benefits, Plaintiff worked as a 6 custodian for the state in the Em ploym ent Developm ent Departm ent from 20 0 1 until 7 20 15. (Adm inistrative Record “AR” 73, 225, 231, 278). In that capacity, she perform ed 8 vacuum ing, dusting, m opping, sweeping, stocking, receiving and shipm ent, rearranged 9 furniture, and rem oved trash. (AR 73, 232). In March 20 14, she injured herself while 10 grabbing a trash can, which flipped over. (AR 34, 2977). She stopped working March 11 10 , 20 15, because of her condition, and she received a worker’s com pensation settlem ent 12 and state disability. (AR 71-73, 224, 238, 255). She alleged disability in the underlying 13 application based on problem s with her back, shoulder, knee, legs, as well as 14 hypertension and m ental health issues. (AR 224, 241, 258). 15 On J uly 10 , 20 17, in conjunction with Plaintiff’s workers’ com pensation claim, 16 orthopedic surgeon Dr. Charles Schwarz com pleted an “Agreed Medical Examination 17 Supplem ental Report.” (AR 2976-80 ). In a detailed discussion, he sum m arized 18 Plaintiff’s m edical history since her 20 14 injury. (AR 2976-78). Her initial treatm ent 19 included a cortisone injection in her left shoulder, m edication, physical therapy, and 20 acupuncture. (AR 2977). In April 20 14, she was given a lidocaine and Depo-Madrol 21 injection, was treated with naproxen and tram adol and referred to physical therapy, and 22 her evaluating doctor recom m ended “[m ]odified duty.” (AR 3977). Dr. Schwartz 23 explained that Plaintiff then had an x-ray on April 5, 20 14, which showed m ild 24 degenerative changes at the acrom ioclavicular joint, and m agnetic resonance im aging -2- 1 (“MRI”) on August 2, 20 14, which showed rotator cuff tendinosis. (AR 2977). On 2 August 6, 20 14, she received another steroid injection. (AR 2977). 3 In J anuary 20 15, Plaintiff was referred to a different physician, who provided her 4 with m ore physical therapy, m edication, and chiropractic treatm ent. (AR 2977). By 5 May 20 15, shoulder surgery was recom m ended. (AR 2977). 6 On J uly 29, 20 15, Plaintiff had surgery. Dr. Schwarz described her condition as 7 “arthroscopic decom pression for the left shoulder with arthroscopic distal clavicle 8 resection, extensive debridem ent of the supraspinatus, and infraspinatus rotator cuff 9 tear.” (AR 2977). Her postoperative diagnosis was “im pingem ent syndrom e, left 10 shoulder degenerative joint disease acrom ioclavicular joint, and bursal surface partial 11 thickness rotator cuff tear for the left shoulder.” (AR 2977). 12 After surgery, Dr. Schwarz explained how Plaintiff again took part in physical 13 therapy from 20 15-20 16, and in J uly 20 16 received another cortisone injection. (AR 14 2977-78). She also received prescription m edication, including pain m edication and 15 m uscle relaxants, but they were discontinued due to adverse side effects. (AR 2978). 16 She had another postoperative MRI, and her doctor recom m ended a hom e exercise 17 program to strengthen her left-upper extrem ity and shoulder. (AR 2978). 18 After reviewing this history, Dr. Schwarz diagnosed Plaintiff with: (1) partial 19 rotator cuff tear, left shoulder; (2) subacrom ial im pingem ent syndrom e, left shoulder; 20 (3) acrom ioclavicular degenerative joint disease, left shoulder; and (4) status post 21 arthroscopic decom pression with distal clavicle resection and debridem ent, left 22 shoulder. (AR 2978). Dr. Schwarz explained that, as of his last evaluation of Plaintiff on 23 August 26, 20 16, Plaintiff reached “m axim um m edical im provem ent,” and she was not 24 capable of returning to her “usual custom ary work.” (AR 2976, 2978). He further -3- 1 concluded that “she cannot perform work at or above shoulder level. In addition, there 2 is a lim itation of lifting to no m ore than 20 pounds with the left upper extrem ity.” (AR 3 2978). Dr. Schwarz also com pleted a “Physicians Return To Work and Voucher Report,” 4 5 and attached it to his supplem ental report. (AR 2978). That form indicated Plaintiff 6 “[m ]ay not lift/ carry at a height of 36 [inches] m ore than 20 lbs. for m ore than 2 hours 7 per day” with her left upper extrem ity; and reiterated that Plaintiff could not work at or 8 above shoulder level with her left upper extrem ity. (AR 2980 ). 9 III. PROCEED IN GS BELOW 10 A. Pro ce d u ral H is to ry 11 Plaintiff protectively filed her application for DIB on Septem ber 14, 20 16, alleging 12 disability beginning March 10 , 20 15. (AR 27, 197-20 1). Plaintiff’s application was 13 denied on February 17, 20 17. (AR 10 4). A hearing was held before ALJ Cynthia Floyd 14 on Septem ber 5, 20 18. (AR 68-85). Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and 15 testified at the hearing, as did vocational expert Robin Generaux. (Id.). 16 On Septem ber 25, 20 18, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was “not disabled” within 17 the m eaning of the Social Security Act (“SSA”).3 (AR 27-40 ). The ALJ ’s decision 18 becam e the Com m issioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 19 request for review on February 12, 20 19. (AR 1-7). Plaintiff then filed this action in 20 District Court on April 10 , 20 19, challenging the ALJ ’s decision. [Docket (“Dkt.”) No. 1]. 21 22 23 24 3 Persons are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or m ental im pairm ent expected to result in death, or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 m onths. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). -4- 1 On Septem ber 23, 20 19, Defendant filed an Answer, as well as a copy of the 2 Certified Adm inistrative Record. [Dkt. Nos. 16, 17]. The parties filed a J oint Stipulation 3 on Decem ber 13, 20 19. [Dkt. No. 18]. The case is ready for decision.4 4 B. Su m m ary o f ALJ D e cis io n Afte r H e arin g 5 In the ALJ ’s Septem ber 25, 20 18 decision (AR 27-40 ), the ALJ followed the 6 required five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether Plaintiff was disabled 7 under the SSA.5 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1520 (a)(4). At s te p o n e , the ALJ found that Plaintiff 8 had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 10 , 20 15, the alleged onset 9 date. (AR 29). At s te p tw o , the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe 10 im pairm ents: (a) history of partial rotator cuff tear; (b) left shoulder with subacrom ial 11 im pingem ent syndrom e; (c) acrom ioclavicular degenerative joint disease; and (d) status 12 post arthroscopic decom pression with distal clavicle resection and debridement, J uly 13 29, 20 15. (AR 29). At s te p th re e , the ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an 14 im pairm ent or com bination of impairm ents that m eets or m edically equals the severity 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 4 The parties filed consents to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate J udge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), including for entry of final J udgm ent. [Dkt. Nos. 12, 13]. 5 The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether a claim ant is disabled: Step one: Is the claim ant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claim ant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. Step two: Does the claim ant have a “severe” im pairm ent? If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate. Step three: Does the claim ant’s im pairm ent or com bination of im pairm ents m eet or equal an im pairm ent listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 40 4, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claim ant is autom atically determ ined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. Step four: Is the claim ant capable of perform ing her past work? If so, the claim ant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. Step five: Does the claim ant have the residual functional capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claim ant is not disabled. If not, the claim ant is disabled. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1520 ); see also Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148-49 (9th 20 20 ). -5- 1 of one of the listed im pairm ents in 20 CFR Part 40 4, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 2 40 4.1520 (d), 40 4.1525[,] and 40 4.1526).” (AR 33). The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) 6 3 4 to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1567(b) 7, further restricted by the 5 following lim itations: lift and/ or carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally; stand and/ or walk 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; occasionally reach overhead and occasionally reach in any direction with the left upper extrem ity. 6 7 8 (AR 33). 9 At s te p fo u r, based on the vocational expert’s testim ony, the ALJ found that 10 Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a janitor (Dictionary of 11 Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 382.664-0 10 ). (AR 38). 12 At s te p five , the ALJ found that, “[c]onsidering the [Plaintiff]’s age, education, 13 work experience, and [RFC], there are jobs that existed in significant num bers in the 14 national econom y that [Plaintiff] can perform . . ..” (AR 39). The ALJ accepted the 15 vocational expert’s testim ony that Plaintiff would be able to perform the representative 16 17 6 18 19 20 21 22 23 An RFC is what a claim ant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional lim itations. See 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1545(a)(1). 7 “Light work” is defined as lifting no m ore than 20 pounds at a tim e with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted m ay be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting m ost of the tim e with som e pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of perform ing a full or wide range of light work, you m ust have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1567(b); see also Rendon G. v. Berryhill, 20 19 WL 20 0 6688, at *3 n.6 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 20 19). 24 -6- 1 occupations of: m ail clerk (DOT 20 9.687-0 26); m ailing clerk (DOT 20 9.587-0 34); and 2 production helper (DOT 524.687-0 22). (AR 39-40 ). As such, the ALJ found that 3 Plaintiff “has not been under a disability,” as defined in the SSA, from March 10 , 20 15, 4 through the date of the decision, Septem ber 25, 20 18. (AR 40 ). 5 IV. AN ALYSIS 6 A. Is s u e s o n Ap p e al 7 Plaintiff raises two issues for review, reordered as: (1) whether the ALJ provided 8 specific and legitim ate reasons to reject the lim itations assessed by the agreed upon 9 m edical exam iner, Dr. Schwarz; and (2) whether evidence subm itted to the Appeals 10 Council renders the ALJ ’s step-five conclusion no longer supported by substantial 11 evidence. [Dkt. No. 18 (J oint Stipulation), p. 4]. For the reasons below, the Court 12 agrees with Plaintiff regarding the ALJ ’s failure to give proper consideration to Dr. 13 Schwarz’s m edical opinion, and rem ands on that ground. 14 B. Stan d ard o f Re vie w 15 A United States District Court m ay review the Com m issioner’s decision to deny 16 benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 40 5(g). The District Court is not a trier of the facts but 17 is confined to ascertaining by the record before it if the Com m issioner’s decision is 18 based upon substantial evidence. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 10 10 (9th Cir. 20 14) 19 (District Court’s review is lim ited to only grounds relied upon by ALJ ) (citing Connett v. 20 Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 20 0 3)). A court m ust affirm an ALJ ’s findings of 21 fact if they are supported by substantial evidence and if the proper legal standards were 22 applied. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 20 0 1). 23 24 “[T]he Com m issioner’s decision cannot be affirm ed sim ply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court m ust consider the record as a whole, -7- 1 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the Secretary’s 2 conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 10 33, 10 35 (9th Cir. 20 0 1) (citations and 3 internal quotation m arks om itted). “‘Where evidence is susceptible to m ore than one 4 rational interpretation,’ the ALJ ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. Com m ’r of Soc. 5 Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 40 0 F.3d 676, 679 6 (9th Cir. 20 0 5)); see Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Adm in., 466 F.3d 880 , 882 (9th Cir. 20 0 6) (“If 7 the evidence can support either affirm ing or reversing the ALJ ’s conclusion, we m ay not 8 substitute our judgm ent for that of the ALJ .”). However, the Court m ay review only “the 9 reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determ ination and m ay not affirm the ALJ 10 on a ground upon which [s]he did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 11 20 0 7) (citation om itted). 12 C. Th e ALJ Faile d to Pro p e rly Evalu ate D r. Sch w arz’s Op in io n . 13 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not provide specific and legitim ate reasons for 14 discounting the opinion of Dr. Schwarz. [Dkt. No. 18, pp. 18-21, 25-27]. 15 1. Standard for Weighing Medical Opinions 16 The ALJ m ust consider all m edical opinion evidence. 20 C.F. R. § 40 4.1527(b). 17 “As a general rule, m ore weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than 18 to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claim ant.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing 19 Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)). Where the treating doctor’s 20 opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it m ay only be rejected for “clear and 21 convincing” reasons. Id. (citing Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 20 0 5)). 22 “If a treating or exam ining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, 23 an ALJ m ay only reject it by providing specific and legitim ate reasons that are supported 24 -8- 1 by substantial evidence.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 20 17) (quoting 2 Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216). 3 “Substantial evidence” m eans m ore than a m ere scintilla, but less than a 4 preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person m ight accept as 5 adequate to support a conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 50 4 F.3d 10 28, 10 35 (9th Cir. 6 20 0 7) (citing Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882). “The ALJ can m eet this burden by setting out a 7 detailed and thorough sum m ary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating 8 [her] interpretation thereof, and m aking findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 9 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation om itted); see also Tom m asetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 10 35, 10 10 41 (9th Cir. 20 0 8) (finding ALJ had properly disregarded opinion by setting forth 11 specific and legitim ate reasons for rejecting it that were supported by the entire record). 12 2. The ALJ Failed to Provide Specific and Legitim ate Reasons, Supported by Substantial Evidence, for Rejecting the Opinion of Dr. Schwarz. 13 14 Here, the ALJ provided a brief sum m ary of Dr. Schwarz’s J uly 10 , 20 17 agreed 15 m edical exam ination supplem ental report (AR 37), and then later in the decision 16 provided the following analysis of it, in its entirety: 17 The undersigned gives less than full weight to Dr. Schwarz’s opinion at Exh. 10 4F/ 30 8 because it is not consistent with the subsequent MRI scan which showed only m ild deform ity of distal clavicle (Ex. 10 4F/ 3) 9 . 18 19 (AR 38). 20 21 Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the analysis of the opinion is insufficient, for three reasons. 22 23 24 8 This citation is a typographical error. Dr. Schwarz’s opinion consists of five pages at Exhibit 10 4, with no 30 th page. (AR 2976-80 ). 9 This citation is not to the MRI, but rather the third page of Dr. Schwarz’s opinion. (AR 2978). -9- 1 First, the lim itations outlined by Dr. Schwarz’s opinion are significant—including 2 restricting Plaintiff to carrying or lifting at a height of 36 inches and perform ing no work 3 at or above shoulder level—and appear to be the doctor’s m ost recent assessm ent of 4 Plaintiff’s condition. The failure to discuss any of the lim itations, let alone explain 5 which allegedly conflicted with the MRI, was error. See Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 6 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (the ALJ m ust discuss significant and probative evidence and 7 explain why it was rejected); Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 80 6 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 20 15) 8 (as am ended) (federal courts “dem and that the agency set forth the reasoning behind its 9 decisions in a way that allows for m eaningful review”); Alvarez v. Astrue, 20 12 WL 10 282110 , at *3 (C.D. Cal. J an. 26, 20 12) (“If the RFC assessm ent conflicts with a m edical 11 source opinion, the ALJ m ust explain why the opinion was not adopted.”). 12 Second, and relatedly, the ALJ failed to properly identify the allegedly conflicting 13 “subsequent” MRI. As noted, the ALJ does not cite to it, and m ultiple MRIs exist in the 14 record. The Com m issioner points to a J une 16, 20 16 MRI, [Dkt. No. 18, p. 23 (citing AR 15 20 0 4-0 5)], but that MRI was not subsequent to Dr. Schwarz’s J uly 10 , 20 17 opinion. If 16 the ALJ m eant to refer to an MRI that was conducted subsequent to surgery, but before 17 the opinion, that needed to be explained in the decision and cited or som ehow properly 18 identified for the Court to be able to conduct its review. See Brown-Hunter, 80 6 F.3d at 19 492; Blakes v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 20 0 3) (citations om itted) (“We 20 require the ALJ to build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to her 21 conclusions so that we m ay afford the claim ant m eaningful review of the SSA’s ultim ate 22 findings.”). 23 24 Third, Dr. Schwarz’s opinion contained term s, such as “m odified duty,” and “m axim um m edical im provem ent,” which m ay seem facially self-explanatory but in fact -10 - 1 refer to specialized term inology in the workers’ com pensation context. (AR 2977-78). 2 For exam ple, “m axim um m edical im provem ent” is a reference to “perm anent and 3 stationary,” a term of art in the state workers’ com pensation. See, e.g., Baltazar v. 4 Berryhill, 20 17 WL 2369363, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 20 17) (noting claim ant’s condition 5 was “‘perm anent and stationary’ (i.e., that [claim ant] had reached m axim um m edical 6 im provem ent)”); Fanale v. Astrue, 20 0 7 WL 9724147, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 20 0 7) 7 (noting that “perm anent and stationary” is a “term of art used with respect to worker’s 8 com pensation claim s” and that such term s “are not equivalent to Social Security 9 disability term inology” (citing Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540 , 544 (9th Cir. 1996)) aff'd, 10 322 F. App'x 566 (9th Cir. 20 0 9); 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 10 152. Neither “m odified duty” 11 nor “m axim um m edical im provem ent” were explained in the ALJ ’s sum m ary of Dr. 12 Schwarz’s opinion or the one-sentence assessm ent of it (AR 37-38), and, while the ALJ 13 m entioned those term s elsewhere in the decision, along with other term s specific to 14 workers’ com pensation law such as “totally tem porarily disabled” (AR 35-37), none of 15 the term inology was ever defined or otherwise translated to the Social Security context. 16 See Desrosiers v. Sec’y Health & Hum an Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988) 17 (decision was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ had not adequately 18 considered definitional differences between the California workers’ com pensation 19 system and the SSA); Barcenas v. Berryhill, 20 17 WL 38360 40 , at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 20 20 17) (ALJ errs by failing to translate physician’s opinion about claim ant’s lim itations in 21 workers’ com pensation context into Social Security context); Rocha v. Astrue, 20 12 WL 22 60 620 81, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 20 12) (if there are term s of art utilized in the workers’ 23 com pensation context “it is the job of the ALJ to translate the m eaning of such term s 24 into the Social Security context”). -11- Fourth, and finally, because the opinion was not properly discussed and the 1 2 lim itations were not presented to the vocational expert (AR 82-84) 10 , the Court cannot 3 determ ine harm lessness. See Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991) 4 (holding vocational expert’s opinion, based on hypothetical that om itted “significant 5 lim itations” on claim ant’s ability to perform certain activity, “had no evidentiary value”), 6 abrogated on other grounds by Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140 , 1149 (9th Cir. 20 0 1); 7 Devery v. Colvin, 20 16 WL 3452487, at *5 (C.D. Cal. J une 22, 20 16) (court could not 8 determ ine harm lessness of ALJ ’s failure to discuss reasons she rejected lim itations 9 because vocational expert did not testify that a hypothetical person with those 10 lim itations could work); Dunlap v. Astrue, 20 11 WL 1135357, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 11 20 11) (court could not determ ine harm lessness of error because it was unable to 12 “determ ine how the [vocational expert] would have responded if he had been given a 13 hypothetical containing [exam ining physician]’s actual opinion.”) 14 15 As such, the Court reverses the ALJ ’s decision and rem ands for assessm ent of Dr. Schwarz’s J uly 10 , 20 17 opinion consistent with this decision. 16 D. 17 Having found that rem and is warranted, the Court declines to address Plaintiff’s Th e Co u rt D e clin e s to Ad d re s s Plain tiff’s Re m ain in g Argu m e n ts 18 rem aining argum ents. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 120 8, 1212 (9th Cir. 20 12) 19 (“Because we rem and the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we decline to reach 20 [plaintiff’s] alternative ground for rem and.”); see also Alderm an v. Colvin, 20 15 WL 21 12661933, at *8 (E.D. Wash. J an. 14, 20 15) (rem anding in light of interrelated nature of 22 23 24 10 The third hypothetical som ewhat reflected Dr. Schwarz’s assessed lim itations, and the VE testified no work would be available to Plaintiff, but it did not fully m atch. (AR 8384). -12- 1 credibility, consideration of physician’s opinions, step-two findings, and step-five 2 analysis); Augustine ex rel. Ram irez v. Astrue, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 3 20 0 8) (“[The] Court need not address the other claim s plaintiff raises, none of which 4 would provide plaintiff with any further relief than granted, and all of which can be 5 addressed on rem and.”). Because it is unclear, in light of these issues, whether Plaintiff 6 is in fact disabled, rem and here is on an “open record.” See Brown-Hunter, 80 6 F.3d at 7 495; Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 20 0 3). The parties m ay freely 8 take up all issues raised in the J oint Stipulation, and any other issues relevant to 9 resolving Plaintiff’s claim of disability, before the ALJ . 10 E. 11 Rem and for further adm inistrative proceedings, rather than an award of benefits, Re m an d Fo r Fu rth e r Ad m in is trative Pro ce e d in gs 12 is warranted here because further adm inistrative review could rem edy the ALJ ’s errors. 13 See Brown-Hunter, 80 6 F.3d at 495 (rem anding for an award of benefits is appropriate 14 in rare circum stances). On rem and, the ALJ shall properly review and evaluate Dr. 15 Schwarz’s opinion and reassess Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ shall then proceed through 16 steps four and five, if necessary, to determ ine what work, if any, Plaintiff can perform . 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 -13- 1 2 V. ORD ER IT IS ORDERED that J udgm ent shall be entered REVERSING the decision of the 3 Com m issioner denying benefits, and REMANDING the m atter for further proceedings 4 consistent with this Order. J udgem ent shall be entered accordingly. 5 6 DATE: Septem ber 25, 20 20 7 8 / s/ Autum n D. Spaeth THE HONORABLE AUTUMN D. SPAETH United States Magistrate J udge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 -14-
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