Fred G. Lawyer v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, No. 8:2018cv01543 - Document 23 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Autumn D. Spaeth. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits, and REMANDING the matter for further proceedings consistent with this Order. Judgement shall be entered accordingly. (see document for further details) (hr)
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Fred G. Lawyer v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration Doc. 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FRED G. L., an Individual, 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 Case No.: 8:18-0 1543 ADS MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND ANDREW M. SAUL, Com m issioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 I. IN TROD U CTION 18 Plaintiff Fred G. L.1 (“Plaintiff”) challenges Defendant Andrew M. Saul2 , 19 Com m issioner of Social Security’s (hereinafter “Com m issioner” or “Defendant”) denial 20 of his application for a period of disability an d disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). For 21 22 23 24 1 Plaintiff’s nam e has been partially redacted in com pliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recom m endation of the Com m ittee on Court Adm inistration and Case Managem ent of the J udicial Conference of the United States. 2 On J une 17, 20 19, Saul becam e the Com m issioner of Social Security. Thus, he is autom atically substituted as the defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). -1Dockets.Justia.com 1 the reasons stated below, the decision of the Com m issioner is REVERSED and 2 REMANDED. 3 II. 4 FACTS RELEVAN T TO TH E APPEAL A review of the entire record reflects certain uncontested facts relevant to this 5 appeal. Prior to filing his application for social security benefits, Plaintiff last worked as 6 a warehouse worker. (Adm inistrative Record “AR” 65, 193). Plaintiff testified that he 7 has suffered from arteriovenous m alform ation (“AVM”) 3 since he was 12 years old, at 8 one point causing him to go into a com a. (AR 51-52, 53). In the 1990 s, when he had full 9 m edical coverage, doctors perform ed experim ental surgeries on him . (AR 52). These 10 relieved som e of the headaches “a little bit.” (AR 53). Doctors thought he was cured, 11 but his head started pounding one day at work in J anuary 20 15. (AR 51, 54). He was 12 hospitalized, and they discovered he still had AVM and that bleeding in his head caused 13 the pounding. (AR 51-52, 54). Plaintiff testified he stopped working because they told 14 him to do so. (AR 51). In addition to head pounding, he experiences dizziness, vom iting, 15 and headaches. (AR 52). He has the headaches every day. (AR 58). The pain from 16 them increases when does certain activities, like clim bing stairs. (AR 58). He has to use 17 the bathroom three or four tim es in the m orning because he can’t push. (AR 58). If he 18 carries a gallon of m ilk, he has to stop, put it down, and let his heart rate com e down. 19 (AR 59). He cannot drive. (AR 61). Plaintiff used to ride a bike, but he testified he 20 crashed several tim es due to dizziness. (AR 61-62). If he stands too long, his head will 21 22 3 23 24 Generally, AVM is an “abnorm al tangle of blood vessels connecting arteries and veins, which disrupts norm al blood flow and oxygen circulation.” McGiboney v. Corizon, 20 19 WL 30 48339, at *1 (D. Idaho J uly 11, 20 19) (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). -2- 1 pound. (AR 63). Plaintiff stated he has “acute em ergencies” due to his condition about 2 once a week. (AR 54). Plaintiff also testified that the only things that have really helped reduce his 3 4 headaches is m edical m arijuana, laying down, and sleeping. (AR 53-54). He was 5 prescribed OxyContin and Norco, but he stopped taking them because of adverse side 6 effects. (AR 53-54). As follow up treatm ent after he was hospitalized, he received 7 em bolizations. 4 (AR 54). The em bolizations did not shrink his AVM enough, so 8 m edical professionals considered scheduling him for the Gam m a knife.5 (AR 63). But, 9 because his AVM “is wrapped around [his] optic nerve,” they did not adm inister that 10 procedure because they were concerned it would blind him . (AR 63). 11 During the em bolizations, m edical professionals discovered Plaintiff’s 12 hydrocephalus 6 from his “brain not draining” correctly and resulting in swelling that 13 pushes his brain against his skull. (AR 55). Plaintiff’s doctor recom m ended surgery and 14 placem ent of a stent in his head, so Plaintiff scheduled that surgery. (AR 55). Although 15 Plaintiff’s insurance com pany initially said it would pay for the procedure, four days 16 before surgery they inform ed him they would no longer cover it and told him to cancel. 17 (AR 55). The insurance com pany explained that he had been out of work for a year, and 18 they no longer were required to insure him . (AR 55-56). Plaintiff stated that ever since 19 4 20 21 22 23 24 Em bolization procedures are perform ed “by injecting a substance which blocks the sources of bleeding into the blood stream .” McCord v. Maguire, 873 F.2d 1271, 1272 (9th Cir.), as am ended, 885 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1989). 5 The Gam m a knife procedure involves providing “intense doses of radiation given to target area(s) while largely sparing the surround tissues.” Silvis v. California Dep’t of Corr., 20 11 WL 766130 , at *9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 20 11). 6 “Hydrocephalus results from an excessive accum ulation of cerebrospinal fluid . . . in the brain, causing abnorm al widening of spaces in brain ventricles and potentially harm ful pressure on brain tissues.” Howard v. Colvin, 20 16 WL 5420 558, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 20 16). -3- 1 then his headaches have grown exponentially. (AR 55). He can hear his heart beat in 2 his head due to the swelling. (AR 55-56, 63). After his insurance com pany cancelled his insurance, Plaintiff stated that he 3 4 obtained Medi-Cal, but the hospital wouldn’t take that coverage. (AR 56). He is angry 5 that they cancelled his insurance and surgery, but he’s also scared that if he has it done 6 they will “m ess[] with m y head.” (AR 56). He tried to buy a better insurance plan 7 through Obam acare, but the plan he found charged even m ore for the procedure, and he 8 couldn’t afford it. (AR 56; see also AR 242). 9 Plaintiff testified that his headaches and overall condition have stopped him from 10 being able to work and having a norm al life. (AR 63). 11 III. PROCEED IN GS BELOW 12 A. Pro ce d u ral H is to ry 13 Plaintiff filed a claim for Title II social security benefits on Septem ber 3, 20 15, 14 alleging disability beginning J anuary 5, 20 15. (AR 162-63). Plaintiff’s DIB application 15 was denied initially on May 5, 20 16 (AR 71), and upon reconsideration on J une 30 , 20 16 16 (AR 94). A hearing was held before ALJ Susanne M. Cichanowicz on February 16, 20 18. 17 (AR 43-70 ). Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at the hearing, as 18 well as vocational expert Alan Boroskin. (AR 43-70 ). 19 On April 16, 20 18, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was “not disabled” within the 20 m eaning of the Social Security Act.7 (AR 29-36). The ALJ ’s decision becam e the 21 Com m issioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for 22 23 24 7 Persons are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or m ental im pairm ent expected to result in death, or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 m onths. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). -4- 1 review on J uly 22, 20 18. (AR 1-7). Plaintiff then filed this action in District Court on 2 August 29, 20 18, challenging the ALJ ’s decision. [Docket (“Dkt.”) No. 1]. On J anuary 28, 20 19, Defendant filed an Answer, as well as a copy of the 3 4 Certified Adm inistrative Record. [Dkt. Nos. 19, 20 ]. The parties filed a J oint 5 Subm ission on April 18, 20 19. [Dkt. No. 22]. The case is ready for decision.8 6 B. Su m m ary o f ALJ D e cis io n Afte r H e arin g 7 In the ALJ ’s decision of April 16, 20 18 (AR 29-36), the ALJ followed the required 8 five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether Plaintiff was disabled under 9 the Social Security Act.9 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1520 (a)(4). At s te p o n e , the ALJ found that 10 Plaintiff had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since J anuary 5, 20 15, the 11 alleged onset date. (AR 31). At s te p tw o , the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following 12 severe im pairm ents: AVM; status-post intraventricular hem orrhage; hydrocephalus; 13 and obesity. (AR 32). At s te p th re e , the ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an 14 im pairm ent or com bination of impairm ents that m eets or m edically equals the severity 15 of one of the listed im pairm ents in 20 CFR Part 40 4, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 8 The parties filed consents to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate J udge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), including for entry of final J udgm ent. [Dkt. Nos. 7, 12]. 9 The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether a claim ant is disabled: Step one: Is the claim ant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claim ant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. Step two: Does the claim ant have a “severe” im pairm ent? If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate. Step three: Does the claim ant’s im pairm ent or com bination of im pairm ents m eet or equal an im pairm ent listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 40 4, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claim ant is autom atically determ ined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. Step four: Is the claim ant capable of perform ing his past work? If so, the claim ant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. Step five: Does the claim ant have the residual functional capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claim ant is not disabled. If not, the claim ant is disabled. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 20 C.F.R. §40 4.1520 ). -5- 1 40 4.1520 (d), 40 4.1525 and 40 4.1526).” (AR 32). None of these findings are challenged 2 by Plaintiff. The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the following Residual Functional Capacity 3 4 (“RFC”) 10 to: [P]erform a reduced range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 40 4.1567(b) as follows: lift, carry, push, and pull 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently; sitting for 6 of an 8[-]hour day, standing and walking for no m ore than 2 hours out of an 8-hour day; frequent clim bing of ram ps and stairs, no clim bing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; frequent balancing, stooping, kneeling; occasionally crouching and crawling; and avoid exposure to hazards such as m oving m echanical parts and unprotected heights. 5 6 7 8 9 10 (AR 32). At s te p fo u r, based on Plaintiff’s RFC and the vocational expert’s testim ony, the 11 12 ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work as a warehouse 13 worker or warehouse supervisor. (AR 35). At s te p five , the ALJ found that, “[c]onsidering the claim ant’s age, education, 14 15 work experience and [RFC], there are jobs that exist in significant num bers in the 16 national econom y that [Plaintiff] can perform .” (AR 35). The ALJ accepted the 17 vocational expert’s testim ony that Plaintiff would be able to perform the representative 18 occupations of: Packaging (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 559.687-0 14); 19 Docum ent Preparer (DOT 249.587-0 18); and Assem bly (DOT 734.687-0 18). (AR 36). 20 As such, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was “not disabled,” as defined in the Social Security 21 Act, at any tim e from J anuary 5, 20 15, through the date of the ALJ ’s decision. (AR 36). 22 23 24 10 An RFC is what a claim ant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional lim itations. See 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1545(a)(1). -6- 1 IV. AN ALYSIS 2 A. Is s u e s o n Ap p e al 3 Plaintiff raises four issues for review: (1) whether the ALJ properly considered his 4 subjective allegations; (2) whether the ALJ properly considered a borderline-age 5 situation; (3) whether the ALJ properly considered the consultative exam iner’s opinion; 6 and (4) whether the ALJ properly developed the record. [Dkt. No. 22 (J oint 7 Stipulation), pp. 2-3]. For the reasons below, the Court agrees with Plaintiff regarding 8 the ALJ ’s failure to properly consider his subjective allegations, and rem ands on that 9 ground. 10 B. Stan d ard o f Re vie w 11 A United States District Court m ay review the Com m issioner’s decision to deny 12 benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 40 5(g). The District Court is not a trier of the facts but 13 is confined to ascertaining by the record before it if the Com m issioner’s decision is 14 based upon substantial evidence. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 10 10 (9th Cir. 20 14) 15 (District Court’s review is lim ited to only grounds relied upon by ALJ ) (citing Connett v. 16 Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 20 0 3)). A court m ust affirm an ALJ ’s findings of 17 fact if they are supported by substantial evidence and if the proper legal standards were 18 applied. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 20 0 1). An ALJ can satisfy 19 the substantial evidence requirement “by setting out a detailed and thorough sum m ary 20 of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and 21 m aking findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation 22 om itted). 23 24 “[T]he Com m issioner’s decision cannot be affirm ed sim ply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court m ust consider the record as a whole, -7- 1 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the Secretary’s 2 conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 10 33, 10 35 (9th Cir. 20 0 1) (citations and 3 internal quotation m arks om itted). “‘Where evidence is susceptible to m ore than one 4 rational interpretation,’ the ALJ ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. Com m ’r of Soc. 5 Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 40 0 F.3d 676, 679 6 (9th Cir. 20 0 5)); see Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Adm in., 466 F.3d 880 , 882 (9th Cir. 20 0 6) (“If 7 the evidence can support either affirm ing or reversing the ALJ ’s conclusion, we m ay not 8 substitute our judgm ent for that of the ALJ .”). However, the Court m ay review only “the 9 reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determ ination and m ay not affirm the ALJ 10 on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 11 20 0 7) (citation om itted). 12 13 14 C. Th e ALJ Faile d to Pro p e rly Co n s id e r Plain tiff’s Su bje ctive Co m p lain ts Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ im properly evaluated his credibility and subjective 15 com plaints. Defendant contends that the ALJ appropriately found Plaintiff’s testim ony 16 not fully supported by the record. 17 18 1. Legal Standard for Evaluating Claim ant’s Testim ony A claim ant carries the burden of producing objective m edical evidence of his or 19 her im pairm ents and showing that the im pairm ents could reasonably be expected to 20 produce som e degree of the alleged sym ptom s. Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 21 F.3d 10 30 , 10 40 (9th Cir. 20 0 3). Once the claim ant m eets that burden, m edical 22 findings are not required to support the alleged severity of pain. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 23 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Light v. Soc. Sec. Adm in., 119 F.3d 24 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (“claim ant need not present clinical or diagnostic evidence to -8- 1 support the severity of his pain”) (citation omitted)). Defendant does not contest, and 2 thus appears to concede, that Plaintiff carried his burden of producing objective m edical 3 evidence of his im pairm ents and showing that the im pairm ents could reasonably be 4 expected to produce som e degree of the alleged sym ptom s. 5 Once a claim ant has m et the burden of producing objective m edical evidence, an 6 ALJ can reject the claim ant’s subjective complaint “only upon (1) finding evidence of 7 m alingering, or (2) expressing clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Benton, 331 8 F.3d at 10 40 ; Brown– Hunter v. Colvin, 80 6 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 20 15) (“we require 9 the ALJ to specify which testim ony she finds not credible, and then provide clear and 10 convincing reasons, supported by evidence in the record, to support that credibility 11 determ ination”); Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 20 17). 12 The ALJ m ay consider at least the following factors when weighing the claim ant’s 13 credibility: (1) his or her reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies either in the 14 claim ant’s testim ony or between the claim ant’s testim ony and his or her conduct; (3) his 15 or her daily activities; (4) his or her work record; and (5) testim ony from physicians and 16 third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the sym ptom s of which she 17 com plains. Thom as v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 20 0 2) (citing Light, 119 18 F.3d at 792). “If the ALJ ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 19 record, [the court] m ay not engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 959 (citing Morgan v. 20 Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 60 0 (9th Cir. 1999)). 21 22 23 24 -9- 2. The ALJ Failed to Provide Clear and Convincing Reasons Supported by Substantial Evidence 1 2 3 Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to 4 articulate specific clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testim ony. 11 5 The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective com plaints because he had m inim al treatm ent 6 since J uly 20 15, and because they were not consistent with the objective m edical 7 evidence. (AR 33-34). 8 Regarding the first reason, the ALJ discussed how Plaintiff had a cerebral 9 angiogram with em bolization in J uly 20 15, and then stated “yet there is little evidence of 10 any other treatm ent or routine follow-up visits.” (AR 33). Sim ilarly, later in the 11 decision she noted a “lack of recent m edical records.” (AR 34). The ALJ noted 12 Plaintiff’s statem ent that this was “because he lacks insurance coverage to seek 13 treatm ent.” (AR 33). The ALJ fails to explain why this reason was insufficient to justify 14 Plaintiff’s gap in recent treatm ent. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly warned the agency 15 that the inability to afford treatment (particularly, one assum es, in the circum stance of a 16 person suffering from significant m ental and cognitive conditions) is not an appropriate 17 reason to reject a m edical opinion. See Warre v. Com m ’r of Soc. Security, 439 F.3d 18 10 0 1, 10 0 6 (9th Cir. 20 0 6) (“benefits m ay not be denied to a disabled claim ant because 19 of a failure to obtain treatm ent that the claim ant cannot afford”); Nguyen v. Chater, 10 0 20 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that it is a “questionable practice” for an ALJ to 21 22 23 24 11 The ALJ did not m ake a finding of m alingering in her opinion. (AR 28-36). Thus, in discounting Plaintiff’s subjective com plaints, the ALJ was required to articulate specific, clear and convincing reasons. See Benton, 331 F.3d at 10 40 ; Brown-Hunter, 80 6 F.3d at 489. -10 - 1 “chastise one with a m ental im pairm ent for the exercise of poor judgm ent in seeking 2 rehabilitation.”). 3 The Com m issioner faults Plaintiff for failing to explain why he did not seek 4 treatm ent “from clinics or resources for low incom e persons.” [Dkt. No. 22, pp. J t. Stip. 5 12-13]. But Plaintiff did seek at least one low-incom e option, Medi-Cal, only to discover 6 the hospital that was to perform the surgery would not accept Medi-Cal. (AR 56); see 7 Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923, 924 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing Medicaid as a federal 8 program that provides m edical assistance to “low-income persons” and that California 9 participates in the program through Medi-Cal); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shewry, 137 10 Cal. App. 4th 964, 969 (20 0 6) (“California’s Medi-Cal program implem ents the federal 11 Medicaid program , which funds m edical services for elderly and low-incom e persons.”). 12 Plaintiff also testified that he tried to obtain another plan through Obam acare, but that 13 plan charged even m ore for his procedure, which he could not afford. (AR 56). 14 Nowhere in the decision does the ALJ discuss Plaintiff’s attem pts at obtaining other 15 coverage, or otherwise explain what else Plaintiff should have done differently, or that 16 any low-incom e options were even available for his procedure. Accordingly, the ALJ ’s 17 reliance on the recent gap in Plaintiff’s treatm ent is neither a clear nor convincing 18 reason for discounting his testim ony. See, e.g., Surm an v. Com m ’r of Soc. Sec. Adm in., 19 20 18 WL 3491667, at *6 (C.D. Cal. J uly 19, 20 18) (noting there was no indication ALJ 20 considered explanation that low-incom e options did not provide treatm ent claim ant 21 required); Ram irez v. Colvin, 20 13 WL 1752453, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 20 13) (ALJ 22 im properly discounted claim ant’s testim ony based on failure to seek help at county 23 facilities because record did not show claim ant “unreasonably failed to avail herself of 24 such resources, and the ALJ m ade no specific finding that they were even available”). -11- The rem aining reason given by the ALJ for discounting Plaintiff’s sym ptom s is 1 2 also insufficient. On two occasions, the ALJ referenced the sam e justification for 3 doubting Plaintiff’s credibility: the lack of support in the objective m edical evidence of 4 record. See AR 33 (finding Plaintiff’s statem ents were “not entirely consistent with the 5 m edical evidence”), 34 (allegations of lim itations due to headaches “is not supported by 6 the full m edical evidence of record”). However, because the ALJ did not provide any 7 other clear and convincing reason for discounting Plaintiff's subjective com plaints, 8 reliance on the lack of support in the objective evidence alone is not a sufficient basis for 9 the ALJ ’s credibility determ ination. See Burch, 40 0 F.3d at 681 (lack of objective 10 m edical evidence to support subjective sym ptom allegations cannot form the sole basis 11 for discounting pain testim ony) ; Dschaak v. Astrue, 20 11 WL 4498835, at *1 (D. Or. 12 Sept. 27, 20 11) (“[O]nce the[] other bases for the ALJ ’s decision were discarded as 13 erroneous, the ALJ ’s credibility determ ination could not rely solely on conflicts with the 14 m edical evidence.”). Contrary to the Com m issioner’s assertion, [Dkt. No. 22, pp. 11-12], 15 the ALJ ’s sum m ary of the m edical evidence is not sufficient to support the finding. See 16 Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 80 6 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 20 15) (credibility determ ination 17 insufficient when ALJ “sim ply state[s] her non-credibility conclusion and then 18 sum m arize[s] the m edical evidence”). Moreover, the Court views the the consultative 19 exam iner’s “norm al” findings (AR 34), m entioned briefly in the credibility 20 determ ination, as objective evidence.12 21 22 23 24 12 Even looking to those findings, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that they do not cast doubt on the veracity of his com plaints. [Dkt. No. 22, pp. 9-10 ]. The consultative exam iner specifically said that, despite the lack of “focal findings on the exam ination,” Plaintiff had “legitim ate com plaints of significant headaches associated with his hydrocephalus.” (AR 530 ). Thus, even if the ALJ could rely on these objective findings -12- Based on the above analysis, this Court concludes the ALJ com m itted error in 1 2 discounting Plaintiff’s testim ony, without a clear and convincing explanation supported 3 by substantial evidence. In this instance, the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ ’s error 4 was harm less. See, e.g., Brown-Hunter, 80 6 F.3d at 492-93 (ALJ ’s failure adequately to 5 specify reasons for discrediting claim ant testim ony “will usually not be harm less”). In 6 light of the significant functional lim itations reflected in Plaintiff’s subjective 7 statem ents, the Court cannot “confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ , when fully 8 crediting the [Plaintiff’s] testim ony, could have reached a different disability 9 determ ination.” Stout v. Com m ’r, Soc. Sec. Adm in., 454 F.3d 10 50 , 10 55-56 (9th Cir. 10 20 0 6). 11 D. 12 Having found that rem and is warranted, the Court declines to address Plaintiff’s Th e Co u rt D e clin e s to Ad d re s s Plain tiff’s Re m ain in g Argu m e n ts 13 rem aining argum ents. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 120 8, 1212 (9th Cir. 20 12) 14 (“Because we rem and the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we decline to reach 15 [plaintiff’s] alternative ground for rem and.”); see also Alderm an v. Colvin, 20 15 WL 16 12661933, at *8 (E.D. Wash. J an. 14, 20 15) (rem anding in light of interrelated nature of 17 ALJ ’s decision to discount claim ant’s credibility and give appropriate consideration to 18 physician’s opinions, step-two findings, and step-five analysis); Augustine ex rel. 19 Ram irez v. Astrue, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 20 0 8) (“[The] Court need 20 not address the other claim s plaintiff raises, none of which would provide plaintiff with 21 any further relief than granted, and all of which can be addressed on rem and.”). Because 22 it is unclear, in light of these issues, whether Plaintiff is in fact disabled, rem and here is 23 24 as the sole reason for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility, it is not convincing considering the exam iner’s conclusion regarding the findings. -13- 1 on an “open record.” See Brown-Hunter, 80 6 F.3d at 495; Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 20 0 3). The parties m ay freely take up all issues raised in the 3 J oint Stipulation, and any other issues relevant to resolving Plaintiff’s claim of disability, 4 before the ALJ . 5 E. 6 Rem and for further adm inistrative proceedings, rather than an award of benefits, Re m an d Fo r Fu rth e r Ad m in is trative Pro ce e d in gs 7 is warranted here because further adm inistrative review could rem edy the ALJ ’s errors. 8 See Brown-Hunter, 80 6 F.3d at 495 (rem anding for an award of benefits is appropriate 9 in rare circum stances). The Court finds that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate 10 Plaintiff’s subjective com plaints. On rem and, the ALJ shall properly review and 11 evaluate Plaintiff’s testim ony and reassess Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ shall then proceed 12 through steps four and five, if necessary, to determ ine what work, if any, Plaintiff is 13 capable of perform ing. 14 V. 15 ORD ER IT IS ORDERED that J udgm ent shall be entered REVERSING the decision of the 16 Com m issioner denying benefits, and REMANDING the m atter for further proceedings 17 consistent with this Order. J udgem ent shall be entered accordingly. 18 19 DATE: March 19, 20 20 20 21 / s/ Autum n D. Spaeth THE HONORABLE AUTUMN D. SPAETH United States Magistrate J udge 22 23 24 -14-
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