Max Owen Young v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 8:2015cv00726 - Document 18 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar. The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (See Order for complete details) (afe)
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Max Owen Young v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA-SOUTHERN DIVISION 11 12 MAX OWEN YOUNG, Case No. SA CV 15-00726-AS 13 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 14 15 16 17 18 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) Acting Commissioner of the ) Social Security Administration,) ) Defendant. ) ) 19 ORDER OF REMAND Pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 20 that this matter is remanded for further administrative action 21 consistent with this Opinion. 22 23 PROCEEDINGS 24 On May 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking review of the 25 26 27 28 denial of his application for Disability Insurance Benefits. Entry No. 1). The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. On September (Docket 11, 2015, Defendant filed (Docket Entry Nos. 9, 11). an Answer along with the Dockets.Justia.com 1 Administrative Record (“AR”). (Docket Entry Nos. 15-16). The parties 2 filed a Joint Position Statement (“Joint Stip.”) on December 3, 2015, 3 setting forth their respective positions regarding Plaintiff’s claims. 4 (Docket Entry No. 17). 5 6 The Court has taken this matter under submission without oral 7 argument. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15; “Order Re: Procedures In Social 8 Security Case,” filed May 12, 2015 (Docket Entry No. 7). 9 10 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 11 12 On January 23, 2013, Plaintiff, formerly employed as a operating 13 engineer in the medical industry, an electrical maintenance mechanic in 14 the food industry, a college adjunct professor, a field engineer in the 15 oil industry and a programmable logic control technician in the food 16 industry (see AR 45-47, 212-17), filed an application for Supplemental 17 Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging an inability to work because of 18 his disabling condition since November 25, 2012. (AR 172-73). On 19 September 17, 2014, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Helen E. 20 Hesse, heard testimony from Plaintiff, medical expert Kenneth Layton, 21 and vocational expert Ronald Hatakeyama. (See AR 41-73). On December 22 5, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application. 23 (See AR 17-33). 24 25 After determining that Plaintiff had severe impairments –- 26 “degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine; degenerative disc 27 disease of the lumbar spine; bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; fecal 28 incontinence/leakage; major depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder, not otherwise specified/post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)” (AR 192 1 20)1 --, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional 2 capacity (“RFC”)2 to perform light work3 with the following limitations: 3 sitting 6 hours out of an 8-hour day; standing or walking 6 hours out of 4 an 8-hour day with normal breaks; must have a restroom within 50 yards 5 of his work site; lifting and carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 6 pounds frequently; can perform frequent gross and fine manipulation 7 bilaterally; precluded from jobs requiring hyper-vigilance; should not 8 be in charge of safety operations of others; can have brief superficial 9 contacts with co-workers, supervisors and the public; and precluded from 10 intense interpersonal interactions such as taking complaints or 11 encounters similar to those experienced by law enforcement or emergency 12 personnel. (AR 24-32). After finding that Plaintiff was unable to 13 perform any past relevant work (AR 35-32), the ALJ found that jobs 14 existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff 15 could perform, and therefore found that Plaintiff was not disabled 16 within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (AR 32-33). 17 18 Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s 19 decision. (AR 12). The request was denied on March 10, 2015. (AR 1- 20 21 1 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s rib fractures, right wrist 22 fracture, right arm regional complex pain syndrome, hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea-hypoapnea, and sinusitis were non-severe 23 impairments. (See AR 19-20). 24 25 26 27 28 2 A Residual Functional Capacity is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). 3 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). 3 1 4). The ALJ’s decision then became the final decision of the 2 Commissioner, allowing this Court to review the decision. See 42 U.S.C. 3 §§ 405(g), 1383(c). 4 5 PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS 6 7 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in failing to: (1) properly 8 reject the mental function limitations assessed by Plaintiff’s treating 9 psychologist (Dr. Messinides), examining psychologist (Dr. Cleary), and 10 examining psychiatrist (Dr. Aguilar); (2) properly reject the physical 11 function limitations assessed by Plaintiff’s examining physiatrist, Dr. 12 Cragg; and (3) adequately consider the disability determination made by 13 the Department of Veteran’s Affairs. (See Joint Stip. at 6-21, 26-29, 14 31-32). 15 16 DISCUSSION 17 18 After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds that 19 Plaintiff’s third claim of error warrants a remand for further 20 consideration. Since the Court is remanding the matter based in 21 Plaintiff’s third claim of error, the Court will not address Plaintiff’s 22 first and second claims of error. 23 24 A. The ALJ Failed to Adequately Consider the Disability Determination 25 by the Department of Veteran’s Affairs 26 27 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to give “great 28 weight” to the disability determination of the Department of Veteran’s 4 1 Affairs (“VA”). (See Joint Stip. at 6, 31-32). Defendant asserts that 2 the ALJ properly 3 determination. gave little weight to the VA’s disability (See Joint Stip. at 32-34). 4 5 On November 5, 2012 (approximately three weeks prior to the alleged 6 onset date of disability), Plaintiff received, inter alia, a 100 percent 7 disability evaluation for his post-traumatic stress disorder with major 8 depressive disorder and panic disorder with agoraphobia and alcohol 9 abuse, episodic, under the rubric of the VA. (See AR 162-63). 10 11 The ALJ addressed the VA’s disability determination as follows: 12 13 The file also contains a rating decision from the 14 Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) dated November 5, 2012. 15 Based on the information received by the VA prior to the date 16 of this decision letter, the claimant was given a 100 percent 17 disability evaluation for his impairments, specifically his 18 PTSD (Exhibit 1D/3). 19 a 20 regulations, rules and procedures. A primary consideration is 21 the 22 individuals’ past military service. 23 are 24 impairments as well as combinations of impairments. 25 Social Security disability system operates under different 26 regulations, rules and procedures. 27 severity percentages, but it examines the whole individual for 28 all federal disability connection given The VA disability rating system, while to program, between show impairments no the the impairments level matter 5 operates of their under different alleged and the In addition, percentages disability for single The It also does not give source to determine an 1 individuals’ maximum residual functional capacity. 2 effort or explanation is made in the VA decision letter. 3 Furthermore, the VA decision letter includes a reference to a 4 GAF score of 30 (see Exhibit 1D/3). That GAF score is not 5 repeated alleged 6 Additionally, 7 require immediate action to institutionalize the claimant 8 because of mental impairments so severe he could not function 9 appropriately in society, which is what that score represents. 10 As such, the score cited and the lack of a psychiatric 11 hospitalization are not medically consistent. 12 undersigned notes the presence of the VA decision letter, but 13 finds 14 unpersuasive and not relevant to the current disability case 15 under a completely different set of regulations, rules and 16 procedures. in the the that file as score conclusions of the represents reached and onset symptoms the No such date. that would Therefore, the rationale given 17 18 (AR 29-30). 19 20 “[I]n an [Social Security Disability] case an ALJ must ordinarily 21 give great weight to a VA determination of disability.” McCartey v. 22 Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002)(“Both programs serve the 23 same governmental purpose–-providing benefits to those unable to work 24 because of a serious disability. Both programs evaluate a claimant’s 25 ability to perform full-time work in the national economy on a sustained 26 and continuing basis; both focus on analyzing a clamant’s functional 27 limitations; and both require claimants to present extensive medical 28 documentation in support of their claims. 6 . . . Both programs have a 1 detailed regulatory scheme that promotes consistency in adjudication of 2 claims. Both are administered by the federal government, and they share 3 a common incentive to weed out meritless claims. The VA criteria for 4 evaluating disability and translate easily into SSA’s disability 5 framework. Because the VA and SSA criteria for determining disability 6 are not identical, however, the ALJ may give less weight to a VA 7 disability rating if he gives persuasive, specific, valid reasons for 8 doing so that are supported by the record.” Id. (Internal citations 9 omitted). 10 11 Here, the 12 determination ALJ’s little reasons weight, for giving specifically, the (1) VA’s the disability criteria for 13 determining disability under the VA program and the Social Security Act 14 are different, (2) the percentage of disability is not indicative of any 15 specific limitations on Plaintiff’s abilities to perform work-related 16 activity, and (3) the VA, in the section discussing its disability 17 determination, assigned Plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning 18 (“GAF”) score of 30,4 which is a GAF score not found in any records as 19 of the November 25, 2012 onset date of disability, and a GAF score that 20 would have required psychiatric hospitalization (but there are no 21 records showing such hospitalization), were improper. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 A GAF score of 21 to 30 indicates “[b]ehavior . . . considerably influenced by delusions or hallucination OR serious impairment in communication or judgment (e.g., sometimes incoherent, acts grossly inappropriately, suicidal preoccupation) OR inability to function in almost all areas (e.g., stays in bed all day; no job, home, or friends).” See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (“DSM-IV-TR”), 34 (2000). 7 1 As set forth above, the ALJ was required to “give great weight to 2 a VA determination of disability,” Massanari, 298 F.3d at 1076, or to 3 provide persuasive, specific, and valid reasons for giving less weight 4 to a VA determination of disability. Id. See Allen v. Astrue, 2012 WL 5 234629, *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012)(“The ALJ stated simply she was not 6 bound by [the VA’s] disability finding. 7 specific and valid reason for This is not a persuasive, rejecting the VA’s finding of 8 disability.”). The ALJ’s rejection of the VA’s disability determination 9 based on her finding that the criteria for determining disability under 10 the VA program and the Social Security Act are different and that the 11 percentage of disability is not indicative of any specific limitations 12 on Plaintiff’s abilities to perform work-related activity are not 13 persuasive, specific and valid reasons for rejecting the VA’s 14 determination. The ALJ also stated that the VA’s finding that Plaintiff 15 had a GAF score to 30 was not consistent with the medical records as of 16 the onset date of disability but failed to explain why the VA’s finding 17 was inconsistent with the record before the VA or why the GAF score was 18 not relevant to a determination of disability or cite to any authority 19 supporting her assertion that a GAF score of 30 requires 20 hospitalization. See also Marulis v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1021117, *16 (E.D. 21 March 9, 2015)(“GAF scores are unreliable indicators of a claimant’s 22 ability to perform sustained work, as they are ‘merely a snapshot in 23 time’ that may or may not be supported by the overall medical 24 record.”)(citation ommitted); Deck v. Colvin, 2014 WL 7388792, *1 (9th 25 Cir.)(“. . . [T]he [GAF] score is used for treatment purposes and not 26 for rating a person’s ability to work.”); McFarland v. Astrue, 288 27 Fed.Appx. 357, 359 (9th Cir. 2008)(“The Commissioner has determined the 28 GAF scale ‘does not have a direct correlation to the severity 8 1 requirements in [the Social Security Administration’s mental disorders 2 listings.’”)(citation omitted). 3 4 Therefore, the ALJ failed to provide a persuasive, specific and 5 valid reason for giving little weight to the VA’s disability 6 determination. 7 8 D. Remand Is Warranted 9 10 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or order an 11 immediate award of benefits is within the district court’s discretion. 12 Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000). Where no 13 useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, or 14 where the record has been fully developed, it is appropriate to exercise 15 this discretion to direct an immediate award of benefits. Id. at 1179 16 (“[T]he decision of whether to remand for further proceedings turns upon 17 the likely utility of such proceedings.”). However, where, as here, the 18 circumstances of the case suggest that further administrative review 19 could remedy the Commissioner’s errors, remand is appropriate. McLeod 20 v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011); Harman v. Apfel, supra, 21 211 F.3d at 1179-81. 22 23 Since the ALJ failed to provide a proper reason for giving little 24 weight to the Department of Veteran’s Affairs’ disability determination, 25 remand is appropriate. Because outstanding issues must be resolved 26 before a determination of disability can be made, and “when the record 27 as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the [Plaintiff] is, in 28 fact, disabled within the meaning of Social Security Act,” further 9 1 administrative proceedings would serve a useful purpose and remedy 2 defects. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 3 2014)(citations omitted).5 4 5 ORDER 6 7 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is 8 reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings pursuant to 9 Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On remand, the ALJ should make sure 10 the record is fully developed with respect to all records relevant to 11 the VA’s disability determination 12 13 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 14 15 DATED: March 9, 2016 16 17 /s/ ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 5 The Court has not reached any other issue raised by Plaintiff 22 except insofar as to determine that reversal with a directive for the immediate payment of benefits would not be appropriate at this time. 23 “[E]valuation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that Plaintiff is in fact disabled.” See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on Plaintiff’s claims that the ALJ failed to properly reject the mental function limitations assessed by her treating psychologist, Dr. Messinides, examining psychologist, Dr. Cleary, and examining psychiatrist, Dr. Aguilar (see Joint Stip. at 6-21), and that the ALJ failed to properly reject the physical function limitations assessed by Plaintiff’s examining psychiatrist, Dr. Cragg (see Joint Stip. at 6, 26-29). Because this matter is being remanded for further consideration, these issues should also be considered on remand. 24 1021 (2014). 25 26 27 28 10
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