Kathleen Rita Rejniak v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 8:2015cv00565 - Document 19 (C.D. Cal. 2015)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and dismissing this case with prejudice. (See Order for Further Details) (kl)

Download PDF

Kathleen Rita Rejniak v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 12 KATHLEEN RITA REJNIAK, Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 15 Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. SACV 15-00565-JEM MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 On April 10, 2015, Kathleen Rita Rejniak (“Plaintiff” or “Claimant”) filed a complaint 20 seeking review of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) 21 denying Plaintiff’s applications for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and 22 Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. The Commissioner filed an Answer on July 15, 23 2015. On October 5, 2015, the parties f iled a Joint Stipulation (“JS”). The matter is now ready 24 for decision. 25 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties consented to proceed bef ore this 26 Magistrate Judge. After reviewing the pleadings, transcripts, and administrative record (“AR”), 27 the Court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed and this case 28 dismissed with prejudice. Dockets.Justia.com 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a 62-year-old female who applied for Social Security Disability Insurance 3 benefits on May 29, 2012 and for Supplemental Security Income benefits on May 31, 2012, 4 alleging disability beginning March 28, 2012. (AR 22.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had 5 not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 28, 2012, the alleged onset date. (AR 6 24.) 7 Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially on November 15, 2012, and on reconsideration on 8 July 8, 2013. (AR 22.) Plaintiff filed a timely request for hearing, which was held before 9 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Helen H. Hesse on May 14, 2014, in Orange, California. (AR 10 22.) Plaintiff appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel. (AR 22.) 11 Vocational expert (“VE”) David A. Rinehart also appeared and testified at the hearing. (AR 22.) 12 The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on June 17, 2014. (AR 22-36.) T he Appeals 13 Council denied review on February 9, 2015. (AR 1-3.) 14 DISPUTED ISSUES 15 As reflected in the Joint Stipulation, Plaintiff raises the following disputed issues as 16 grounds for reversal and remand: 17 1. Whether the finding that Plaintiff could perform a reduced range of exertionally 18 light work is based on legally valid rejection of the more restrictive opinions of 19 treating family practitioner Ford and treating oncologist Sharma. 20 21 22 23 2. Whether the finding that Plaintiff’s claims are not credible to the extent alleged is supported by clear and convincing evidence. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether 24 the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. Smolen v. 25 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also DeLorm e v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 26 (9th Cir. 1991) (ALJ’s disability determination must be supported by substantial evidence and 27 based on the proper legal standards). 28 2 1 Substantial evidence means “‘more than a mere scintilla,’ but less than a 2 preponderance.” Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. 3 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 4 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 5 401 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 This Court must review the record as a whole and consider adverse as well as 7 supporting evidence. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). W here 8 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision m ust be 9 upheld. Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). 10 “However, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 11 simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 12 (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Orn v . Astrue, 495 13 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION 14 15 The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial 16 gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which 17 can be expected to result in death or . . . can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 18 less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner has 19 established a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 21 The first step is to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial 22 gainful activity. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). If the claimant is engaging 23 in substantial gainful activity, disability benefits will be denied. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 24 140 (1987). Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or 25 combination of impairments. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. An impairment is not severe if it does not 26 significantly limit the claimant’s ability to work. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. Third, the ALJ must 27 determine whether the impairment is listed, or equivalent to an impairment listed, in 20 C.F.R. 28 Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appendix I of the regulations. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. If the impairment 3 1 meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is presumptively disabled. Bowen, 2 482 U.S. at 141. Fourth, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment prevents the 3 claimant from doing past relevant work. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir. 4 2001). Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant’s 5 residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is “the most [one] can 6 still do despite [his or her] limitations” and represents an assessment “based on all the relevant 7 evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). T he RFC must consider all of the 8 claimant’s impairments, including those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 9 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p. 10 If the claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant work or has no past relevant work, 11 the ALJ proceeds to the fifth step and must determine whether the impairment prevents the 12 claimant from performing any other substantial gainful activity. Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 13 869 (9th Cir. 2000). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four, 14 consistent with the general rule that at all times the burden is on the claimant to establish his or 15 her entitlement to benefits. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. Once this prima facie case is established 16 by the claimant, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant may perform 17 other gainful activity. Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). T o support 18 a finding that a claimant is not disabled at step five, the Commissioner must provide evidence 19 demonstrating that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the 20 claimant can do, given his or her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. 21 § 416.912(g). If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is disabled and 22 entitled to benefits. Id. 23 24 THE ALJ DECISION In this case, the ALJ determined at step one of the sequential process that Plaintiff has 25 not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 28, 2012, the alleged onset date. (AR 26 24.) 27 28 4 1 At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following medically determinable 2 severe impairments: history of colon/rectal cancer status post resection and chem otherapy; 3 irritable bowel syndrome; and obesity. (AR 24-28.) 4 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 5 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 6 impairments. (AR 28.) 7 The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work, as defined in 20 8 C.F.R. §§ 416.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with the following limitations: 9 Claimant must have restroom facilities within 25 yards of her work station; 10 she can occasionally climb stairs, bend, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or 11 crawl; she cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolding or work at unprotected 12 heights or around dangerous or fast moving machinery. 13 (AR 28-35.) In determining the above RFC, the ALJ made an adverse credibility determination. 14 (AR 30.) 15 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is able to perform her past relevant work as a 16 clerk-food and operator-phone company. (AR 35.) 17 Consequently, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled, within the meaning of the 18 Social Security Act. (AR 35.) DISCUSSION 19 20 The ALJ decision must be affirmed. The ALJ properly considered the medical evidence 21 and properly discounted the severity of Plaintiff’s subjective symptom allegations. The ALJ’s 22 RFC is supported by substantial evidence. 23 I. THE ALJ PROPERLY TREATED THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE 24 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting 25 the opinions of Dr. Ford, Plaintiff’s treating physician, and her oncologist Dr. Sharma. The 26 Court disagrees. 27 28 5 1 A. Relevant Federal Law 2 In evaluating medical opinions, the case law and regulations distinguish among the 3 opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) 4 those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who 5 neither examine nor treat the claimant (non-examining, or consulting, physicians). See 20 6 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927; see also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). In 7 general, an ALJ must accord special weight to a treating physician’s opinion because a treating 8 physician “is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient 9 as an individual.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation om itted). If 10 a treating source’s opinion on the issues of the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments 11 is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and is 12 not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record, the ALJ must give it 13 “controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). 14 Where a treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be 15 rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. However, if the 16 treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, such as an examining physician, 17 the ALJ may reject the treating physician’s opinion by providing specific, legitimate reasons, 18 supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; see also Orn, 495 19 F.3d at 632; Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). W here a treating 20 physician's opinion is contradicted by an examining professional’s opinion, the Commissioner 21 may resolve the conflict by relying on the examining physician’s opinion if the examining 22 physician’s opinion is supported by different, independent clinical findings. See Andrews v. 23 Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995); Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. Sim ilarly, to reject an 24 uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician, an ALJ must provide clear and convincing 25 reasons. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). If an examining physician’s 26 opinion is contradicted by another physician’s opinion, an ALJ must provide specific and 27 legitimate reasons to reject it. Id. However, “[t]he opinion of a non-examining physician cannot 28 by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an 6 1 examining physician or a treating physician”; such an opinion may serve as substantial 2 evidence only when it is consistent with and supported by other independent evidence in the 3 record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. 4 B. 5 Plaintiff is a 62 year old female who alleges she suffers from depression, colon cancer, Analysis 6 abdominal pain, neuropathy in hands and feet, and irritable bowel syndrome. (AR 29.) The 7 ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairments are nonsevere (AR 25-28), a finding 8 that is not challenged here. The ALJ did find that Plaintiff has the medically determinable 9 severe impairments of colon/rectal cancer post resection, irritable bowel syndrome, and 10 obesity. (AR 28.) The ALJ, however, found that, following surgery and seven months of 11 chemotherapy, Plaintiff’s colorectal cancer has remained in remission, a 2013 colonoscopy was 12 unremarkable, and there is no need for ongoing regular care. (AR 30.) Although reporting 13 irregular bowel movements, she was advised of the importance of a special high fiber diet to 14 manage her leakage. (AR 30.) In sum, Claimant has not required a higher level of care or 15 further surgical treatment or other treatments for her cancer and residual effects from 16 treatment. (AR 30.) Accordingly, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff with a reduced range of light work 17 RFC. (AR 28.) The ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence. 18 19 1. Dr. Ford Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Annie Ford, submitted a medical source statement 20 dated April 9, 2014. (AR 33, 1058-1061.) Dr. Ford diag nosed malignant rectal neoplasm, 21 fibromyalgia, chemotherapy induced neuropathy, and diarrhea/leakage due to cancer 22 treatment. (AR 33.) Dr. Ford opined severe limitations, including pain severe enough to 23 constantly interfere with attention and concentration needed to perf orm even simple tasks. (AR 24 33.) Dr. Ford also opined that she would need assistive devices for ambulation, could only lift 25 10 pounds occasionally, and would miss work more than four days a month. (AR 33.) 26 The ALJ gave Dr. Ford’s opinion little weight. (AR 33.) The ALJ observed that 27 Dr. Ford’s opinion “includes little discussion of the findings, studies and symptoms which 28 support the limitations” and that Dr. Ford’s treatment notes do not indicate Claimant was 7 1 medically restricted in her activities. (AR 33.) An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion 2 that is not supported or is contradicted by his or her treatment notes. Batson v. Comm’r, 359 3 F.3d 1190, 1195 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005); Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s 4 findings, but Dr. Ford’s comments on the checkbox form are conclusory and Plaintiff does not 5 cite specifically to any objective medical evidence or clinical observations in Dr. Ford’s 6 treatment notes that would support the limitations assessed. Rather, Plaintiff cites to medical 7 findings of other physicians not contained in Dr. Ford’s notes. 8 The ALJ also noted that Dr. Ford’s opinion is inconsistent with the objective medical 9 evidence. An ALJ may reject a physician’s opinion that is contradicted by other assessments 10 of a claimant’s medical condition. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195. Here, the ALJ noted that the 11 evidence shows Claimant’s cancer remains in remission, her neuropathy has improved, and 12 her bowel pattern has or can be improved with proper diet. (AR 33, 31.) A physical 13 examination in 2014 was unremarkable. (AR 31.) The ALJ found Claimant has not required 14 further treatment for her cancer or its residual effects. (AR 30.) The ALJ did not fully adopt the 15 June 4, 2013, consulting examining opinion of internist Dr. Reuben Ustaris, but did accept his 16 findings that Plaintiff had normal gait and balance, did not need an assistive device, and had 17 full range of motion of her back and ankle. (AR 32, 1005-1008.) T he ALJ also gave partial 18 weight to Dr. J. Berry, a State agency reviewer, who assessed a light work RFC. (AR 32.) The 19 contradictory opinions of other physicians provide specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting a 20 physician’s opinion. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 21 The ALJ’s next reason for rejecting Dr. Ford’s opinion is that Claimant’s activities 22 indicate a higher level of functioning. (AR 33.) Indeed, she was often advised to increase her 23 physical activity. (AR 33.) An ALJ may reject a physician’s opinion that is contradicted by a 24 claimant’s own admitted or observed abilities. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. Plaintiff argues that 25 the ALJ did not even specify the activities in question. This contention has no merit. The ALJ 26 explicitly catalogued Plaintiff’s activities that are inconsistent with disabling limitations (AR 30), 27 which are discussed below. 28 8 1 Because of the lack of objective medical support for Dr. Ford’s opinion, the ALJ 2 observed that her opinion “appears to rely largely upon the subjective complaints of the 3 claimant.” (AR 33.) A treating physician’s opinion based on subjective complaints of a 4 claimant whose credibility has been discounted can be properly disregarded. Tonapetyan, 242 5 F.3d at 1149. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ cites no actual support for her assertion that Dr. Ford 6 relied on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, but as noted above the ALJ cited the lack of objective 7 evidence cited by Dr. Ford and inconsistency with other medical evidence. 8 Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence, but it is the ALJ’s 9 responsibility to resolve the conflicts in the medical evidence. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. 10 Where the ALJ’s interpretation of the record is reasonable, as it is here, it should not be 11 second-guessed. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). 12 The ALJ rejected Dr. Ford’s opinion for specific, legitimate reasons supported by 13 substantial evidence. 14 15 2. Dr. Sharma The ALJ also gave little weight to the March 28, 2014, opinion of Plaintiff’s treating 16 oncologist, Dr. Sanjay Sharma. (AR 34, 1031-1034.) Dr. Sharma diagnosed rectal cancer in 17 remission and neuropathy. (AR 34.) He opined that Claimant’s pain would interfere with her 18 ability to perform even simple tasks, and she can lift but 10 pounds. (AR 34.) The ALJ 19 rejected Dr. Sharma’s opinion because it is not supported by objective medical evidence. (AR 20 34.) As previously noted, an ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion that is not supported 21 by his or her treatment notes. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 n.3; Bay liss, 427 F.3d at 1216. Here, 22 Dr. Sharma indicated the Claimant was not currently on any treatment and none was 23 anticipated, which was inconsistent with his opinion regarding Plaintiff’s inability to work. (AR 24 34.) The ALJ also noted that Dr. Sharma’s opinion was inconsistent with the evidence in the 25 record. (AR 34.) See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195. 26 Because Dr. Sharma provided no objective medical evidence to support his opinion, the 27 ALJ reasonably concluded that the opinion was based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, 28 which the ALJ discounted, as discussed below. Again, a treating physician’s opinion based on 9 1 subjective complaints of a claimant whose credibility has been discounted can be properly 2 disregarded. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149. Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence but, again, it is the ALJ’s 3 4 responsibility to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. W here 5 the ALJ’s interpretation is reasonable, as it is here, it should not be second-g uessed. Rollins, 6 261 F.3d at 857. The ALJ rejected Dr. Sharma’s opinion for specific, legitimate reasons supported by 7 8 substantial evidence. 9 II. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 THE ALJ PROPERLY DISCOUNTED THE SEVERITY OF PLAINTIFF’S SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOMS Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in discounting her subjective symptoms. The Court disagrees. A. Relevant Federal Law The test for deciding whether to accept a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony turns on whether the claimant produces medical evidence of an impairment that reasonably could be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998); Sm olen, 80 F.3d at 1281-82 esp. n.2. The Commissioner may not discredit a claimant’s testimony on the severity of symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 343, 345. If the ALJ finds the claimant’s pain testimony not credible, the ALJ “must specifically make findings which support this conclusion.” Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345. The ALJ must set forth “findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958; see also Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856-57; Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46. Unless there is evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of a claimant’s symptoms only by offering “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84; see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. The ALJ must identify what 27 28 10 1 testimony is not credible and what evidence discredits the testimony. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 2 722; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 3 B. Analysis 4 In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s medically determinable 5 impairments reasonably could be expected to cause her alleged symptoms. (AR 30.) The 6 ALJ, however, also found that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence and 7 limiting effects of her alleged symptoms were “not entirely credible.” (AR 30.) Because the 8 ALJ did not make any finding of malingering, she was required to provide clear and convincing 9 reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility. Smolen, 80 10 F.3d at 1283-84; Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d at 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008). T he ALJ 11 did so. 12 First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective symptom allegations were inconsistent with 13 the medical evidence. (AR 30, 34-35.) An ALJ is permitted to consider whether there is a lack 14 of medical evidence to corroborate a claimant’s alleged symptoms so long as it is not the only 15 reason for discounting a claiimant’s credibility. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th 16 Cir. 2005). Here, Plaintiff’s depressive disorder and anxiety disorder were nonsevere, 17 medications were effective, and no additional treatment or services were required. (AR 25-28.) 18 Her cancer is in remission with no need of ongoing regular care. (AR 30.) Her neuropathy 19 improved. (AR 33.) 20 Second, Plaintiff was advised by providers of the importance of following a special high 21 fiber diet to assist in managing her irritable bowel syndrome symptoms. (AR 30.) When she 22 consumed fiber, her symptoms improved. (AR 31.) She did not discuss her bowel irregularities 23 with all her providers. (AR 31.) Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication 24 are not disabling. Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). 25 Plaintiff, however, often failed to consume fiber as she had been advised to do. (AR 31.) She 26 also attended only a few sessions of physical therapy for her neuropathy. (AR 31.) An ALJ 27 may discount the subjective symptom allegations of a claimant who fails or refuses to follow a 28 prescribed treatment regimen. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). 11 1 Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s daily activities are inconsistent with disabling 2 limitations (AR 30), which is a legitimate consideration in evaluating credibility. Bunnell, 947 3 F.2d at 345-46. Here, the ALJ found that the evidence shows Claimant has the ability to 4 perform light household chores, shop, prepare simple meals, manage her finances, attend to 5 personal care, care for animals, use a telephone, go out alone, and manage her medications 6 and medical appointments. (AR 25, 30.) Plaintiff argues that these activities do not prove she 7 can work but they do suggest Claimant has greater functional abilities than alleged. See 8 Valentine v. Comm’r, 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). 9 Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination, but again it is the ALJ who 10 has the responsibility to resolve ambiguities in the record. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. W here 11 the ALJ’s interpretation of the record is reasonable, as it is here, it should not be second12 guessed. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857. 13 The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony for clear and convincing 14 reasons supported by substantial evidence. *** 15 16 The ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s nondisability 17 determination is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 18 ORDER 19 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the 20 Commissioner of Social Security and dismissing this case with prejudice. 21 22 DATED: November 13, 2015 23 /s/ John E. McDermott JOHN E. MCDERMOTT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 12

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.