Socorro Aide Rodriguez v. Andrew Saul, No. 5:2019cv02069 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Autumn D. Spaeth. The decision of the Social Security Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. (see document for further details) (hr)
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Socorro Aide Rodriguez v. Andrew Saul Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SOCORRO AIDE R., an Individual, 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. Case No.: 5:19-0 20 69 ADS MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 14 ANDREW M. SAUL, Com m issioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 I. IN TROD U CTION Plaintiff Socorro Aide R.1 (“Plaintiff”) challenges Defendant Andrew M. Saul, 19 Com m issioner of Social Security’s (hereinafter “Com m issioner” or “Defendant”) denial 20 of her application for supplem ental security incom e (“SSI”). Plaintiff contends that the 21 Adm inistrative Law J udge (“ALJ ”) im properly rejected her testim ony regarding her 22 23 24 1 Plaintiff’s nam e has been partially redacted in com pliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recom m endation of the Com m ittee on Court Adm inistration and Case Managem ent of the J udicial Conference of the United States. -1Dockets.Justia.com 1 subjective lim itations due to her fibrom yalgia. For the reasons stated below, the 2 decision of the Com m issioner is affirm ed, and this m atter is dism issed with prejudice. 3 II. 4 FACTS RELEVAN T TO TH E APPEAL Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on J uly 12, 20 16, alleging a disability onset 5 date of February 1, 20 16. (Adm inistrative Record “AR” 138-43). Plaintiff stated on her 6 application that she filed for disability due to fibrom yalgia. (AR 71). When asked at the 7 Adm inistrative hearing what prevents her from working, Plaintiff testified of the 8 following conditions: com plications from fibrom yalgia, problem s with sleeping and 9 issues with her left hand for which she recently had surgery. (AR 46-48). 10 Plaintiff’s attorney at the hearing stated that she is seeking disability prim arily for 11 fibrom yalgia, but that she also has polyarthralgia related to post traum atic arthritis, 12 obstructive sleep apnea, and a hem angiom a on her left hand. (AR 37). The attorney 13 stated that it is a com bination of these conditions that keeps Plaintiff from being able to 14 work. Id. The attorney also stated that Plaintiff was currently being worked up for in- 15 hom e support services, which establishm ent was likely im m inent. Id. 16 Plaintiff testified that she lives with her boyfriend of 17 years and her son. (AR 17 34). Plaintiff stated that her adult daughter helps her to get out of bed, get dressed, 18 washes her hair and cleans and cooks for her. (AR 40 ). Plaintiff also testified that her 19 daughter had recently quit her job and was preparing to be her in-hom e caretaker. Id. 20 Plaintiff stated she does no housework and that her typical day consists of sitting in a 21 recliner or lying in bed and watching television. 22 Plaintiff’s rather negligible docum ented work history, evidences that Plaintiff last 23 worked in 20 0 3, earning $ 8340 that year. (AR 144, 148). Plaintiff testified that her last 24 em ploym ent was at In-N-Out Burger where she worked from approxim ately 20 0 0 thru -2- 1 20 0 3. (AR 44). Plaintiff stated that stopped working at In-N-Out burger when she got 2 pneum onia and could no longer perform her job duties. (AR 44-45). Plaintiff also 3 testified that, shortly after stopping work, she began having her current sym ptom s and 4 that for a long period of tim e she was told she m ight have lupus and only in 20 16 was 5 she diagnosed with fibrom yalgia. (AR 50 -54). 6 III. PROCEED IN GS BELOW 7 A. Pro ce d u ral H is to ry 8 Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on J uly 12, 20 16, alleging disability beginning 9 February 1, 20 16. (AR 138-43). Plaintiff’s claim s were denied initially on Septem ber 30 , 10 20 16 (AR 71-82), and upon reconsideration on Decem ber 28, 20 16 (AR 84-93). A video 11 hearing was held before ALJ Louis M. Catanese on October 31, 20 18. (AR 33-70 ). 12 Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at the hearing. Appearing and 13 testifying by phone was vocational expert Daniel Kennan. (Id.) 14 On Novem ber 19, 20 18, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was “not disabled” within the 15 m eaning of the Social Security Act.2 (AR 18-29). The ALJ ’s decision becam e the 16 Com m issioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for 17 review on Septem ber 23, 20 19. (AR 1-6). Plaintiff then filed this action in District Court 18 on October 29, 20 19, challenging the ALJ ’s decision. [Docket “Dkt.” No. 1]. 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 Persons are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or m ental im pairm ent expected to result in death, or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 m onths. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). -3- On April 6, 20 20 , Defendant filed an Answer, as well as a copy of the Certified 1 2 Adm inistrative Record. [Dkt. Nos. 16, 17]. The parties filed a J oint Stipulation on 3 August 5, 20 20 . [Dkt. No. 20 ]. The case is ready for decision.3 4 B. Su m m ary o f ALJ D e cis io n Afte r H e arin g 5 In the decision (AR 18-29), the ALJ followed the required five-step sequential 6 evaluation process to assess whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security 7 Act.4 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (a). At s te p o n e , the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been 8 engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 11, 20 16, the application date. (AR 21). 9 At s te p tw o , the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe im pairm ents: 10 (a) fibrom yalgia/ polyarthralgia; (b) asthm a; (c) sleep apnea; and (d) m orbid obesity. 11 (AR 21). At s te p th re e , the ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an im pairm ent or 12 com bination of im pairm ents that m eets or m edically equals the severity of one of the 13 listed im pairm ents in 20 CFR Part 40 4, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920 (d), 14 416.925 and 416.926).” (AR 22). 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 3 The parties filed consents to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate J udge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), including for entry of final J udgm ent. [Dkt. Nos. 11, 12]. 4 The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether a claim ant is disabled: Step one: Is the claim ant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claim ant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. Step two: Does the claim ant have a “severe” im pairm ent? If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate. Step three: Does the claim ant’s im pairm ent or com bination of im pairm ents m eet or equal an im pairm ent listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 40 4, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claim ant is autom atically determ ined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. Step four: Is the claim ant capable of perform ing his past work? If so, the claim ant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. Step five: Does the claim ant have the residual functional capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claim ant is not disabled. If not, the claim ant is disabled. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). -4- The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) 5 1 2 to perform no greater than light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) 6, restricted by 3 the following lim itations: could not clim b ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and could perform all other postural activities on an occasional basis (clim bing ram ps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling); would also need to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards and also pulm onary irritants in the workplace; and could also frequently handle with the left upper extrem ity. 4 5 6 7 (AR 23). 8 At s te p fo u r, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (AR 28). 9 At s te p five , considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience and RFC, the ALJ 10 found that “there are jobs that exist in significant num bers in the national econom y that 11 the [Plaintiff] can perform .” (AR 28). The ALJ accepted the vocational expert’s 12 testim ony that Plaintiff would be able to perform the representative occupations of: 13 cashier II (DOT 211.462-0 10 ); ticket taker (DOT 233.677-0 10 ); and router (DOT 14 222.587-0 38). (AR 29). Accordingly, the ALJ determ ined that Plaintiff had not been 15 16 17 5 18 19 20 21 22 23 An RFC is what a claim ant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional lim itations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). 6 “Light work” is defined as lifting no m ore than 20 pounds at a tim e with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted m ay be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting m ost of the tim e with som e pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of perform ing a full or wide range of light work, you m ust have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b); see also Rendon G. v. Berryhill, 20 19 WL 20 0 6688, at *3 n.6 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 20 19). 24 -5- 1 under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since May 11, 20 16, the date the 2 application was filed. (AR 29). 3 IV. AN ALYSIS 4 A. Is s u e o n Ap p e al 5 Plaintiff raises one issue for review: whether the ALJ failed to provide clear and 6 convincing reasons to reject her subjective lim itations due to her fibrom yalgia? [Dkt. 7 No. 20 (J oint Stipulation), 4]. 8 B. Stan d ard o f Re vie w 9 A United States District Court m ay review the Com m issioner’s decision to deny 10 benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 40 5(g). The District Court is not a trier of the facts but 11 is confined to ascertaining by the record before it if the Com m issioner’s decision is 12 based upon substantial evidence. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 10 10 (9th Cir. 20 14) 13 (District Court’s review is lim ited to only grounds relied upon by ALJ ) (citing Connett v. 14 Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 20 0 3)). A court m ust affirm an ALJ ’s findings of 15 fact if they are supported by substantial evidence and if the proper legal standards were 16 applied. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 20 0 1). An ALJ can satisfy 17 the substantial evidence requirement “by setting out a detailed and thorough sum m ary 18 of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and 19 m aking findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation 20 om itted). 21 “[T]he Com m issioner’s decision cannot be affirm ed sim ply by isolating a specific 22 quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court m ust consider the record as a whole, 23 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the Secretary’s 24 conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 10 33, 10 35 (9th Cir. 20 0 1) (citations and -6- 1 internal quotation m arks om itted). “‘Where evidence is susceptible to m ore than one 2 rational interpretation,’ the ALJ ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. Com m ’r of Soc. 3 Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 40 0 F.3d 676, 679 4 (9th Cir. 20 0 5)); see Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Adm in., 466 F.3d 880 , 882 (9th Cir. 20 0 6) (“If 5 the evidence can support either affirm ing or reversing the ALJ ’s conclusion, we m ay not 6 substitute our judgm ent for that of the ALJ .”). However, the Court m ay review only “the 7 reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determ ination and m ay not affirm the ALJ 8 on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 9 20 0 7) (citation om itted). 10 Lastly, even if an ALJ errs, the decision will be affirm ed where such error is 11 harm less, that is, if it is “inconsequential to the ultim ate nondisability determ ination,” 12 or if “the agency’s path m ay reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains its 13 decision with less than ideal clarity.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 80 6 F.3d 487, 492 (9th 14 Cir. 20 15) (citation omitted); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 110 4, 1115 (9th Cir. 20 12). 15 C. W h e th e r th e ALJ Pro p e rly Evalu ate d Plain tiff’s Te s tim o n y 16 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not properly evaluate her testim ony regarding 17 her lim itations due to fibrom yalgia. Defendant, on the other hand, contends the ALJ 18 properly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective statem ents, finding them inconsistent with and 19 unsupported by the record. 20 21 1. Legal Standard for Evaluating Claim ant’s Testim ony A claim ant carries the burden of producing objective m edical evidence of his or 22 her im pairm ents and showing that the im pairm ents could reasonably be expected to 23 produce som e degree of the alleged sym ptom s. Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 24 F.3d 10 30 , 10 40 (9th Cir. 20 0 3). Once the claim ant m eets that burden, m edical -7- 1 findings are not required to support the alleged severity of pain. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 2 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Light v. Soc. Sec. Adm in., 119 F.3d 3 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (“claim ant need not present clinical or diagnostic evidence to 4 support the severity of his pain”) (citation om itted)). Defendants does not contest that 5 Plaintiff carried her burden of producing objective m edical evidence of her im pairm ents 6 and showing that the im pairm ents could reasonably be expected to produce som e 7 degree of the alleged sym ptom s. 8 9 Once a claim ant has m et the burden of producing objective m edical evidence, an ALJ can reject the claim ant’s subjective complaint “only upon (1) finding evidence of 10 m alingering, or (2) expressing clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Benton, 331 11 F.3d at 10 40 . To discredit a claimant's sym ptom testim ony when the claim ant has 12 provided objective m edical evidence of the im pairm ents which m ight reasonably 13 produce the sym ptom s or pain alleged and there is no evidence of m alingering, the ALJ 14 “m ay reject the claim ant’s testim ony about the severity of those sym ptom s only by 15 providing specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Brown-Hunter, 80 6 F.3d 16 at 489 (“we require the ALJ to specify which testim ony she finds not credible, and then 17 provide clear and convincing reasons, supported by evidence in the record, to support 18 that credibility determ ination”); Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 20 17). 19 The ALJ m ay consider at least the following factors when weighing the claim ant’s 20 credibility: (1) his or her reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies either in the 21 claim ant’s testim ony or between the claim ant’s testim ony and his or her conduct; (3) his 22 or her daily activities; (4) his or her work record; and (5) testim ony from physicians and 23 third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the sym ptom s of which she 24 com plains. Thom as v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 948, 958-59 (9th Cir. 20 0 2) (citing Light, 119 -8- 1 F.3d at 792). “If the ALJ ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 2 record, [the court] m ay not engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 959 (citing Morgan v. 3 Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 60 0 (9th Cir. 1999)). 4 (a) SSR 12-2p Evaluation of Fibrom yalgia 5 Due to the com plexity and num erous cases dealing with fibrom yalgia (“FM”), the 6 SSA has issued Soc. Sec. Rul. 12-2p to provide clearer guidance and policy interpretation 7 of this im pairm ent. Social Security Claim s and Procedures, Vol. 1, 6 th Edition, 20 20 8 Supplem ent, § 8:151 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 43640 (J uly 25, 20 12)). FM is a m edically 9 determ inable im pairm ent (MDI) when the appropriate m edical evidence is established 10 from an acceptable m edical source (a licensed physician or osteopathic doctor). A 11 person will be found to have an MDI of FM if he or she is diagnosed with FM and his or 12 her physician provides evidence in accordance with the 1990 Am erican College of 13 Rheum atology Criteria for the Classification of Fibrom yalgia or the 20 10 Am erican 14 Colleges of Rheum atology Prelim inary Diagnostic Criteria. 7 15 The 1990 Am erican College of Rheum atology Criteria for the Classification of 16 Fibrom yalgia includes a finding of wide-spread history of pain in all quadrants of the 17 body and axial skeletal pain that has persisted for at least three m onths. There also 18 m ust be at least eleven positive tender points on a physical exam ination found 19 bilaterally on the body above and below the waist. (The 18 tender point sites are located 20 on each side of the body at the occiput (base of skull); low cervical spine (back and side 21 22 23 24 7 The ALJ found here that “[i]t does not appear that the claim ant has been diagnosed with fibrom yalgia as described in Social Security Ruling 12-2p, I accept the diagnosis based on the report of claim ant supported by diagnoses in the record, including from the consultative exam iner, who diagnosed a history of fibrom yalgia with polyarthralgia.” (AR 25, n. 3). -9- 1 of the neck); trapezius m uscle (shoulder); supraspinatus m uscle (near the shoulder 2 blade); second rib (top of the rib cage near the sternum or breast bone); lateral 3 epicondyle (outer aspects of the elbow); gluteal (top of the buttock); greater trochanter 4 (below the hip); and inner aspect of the knee). Additionally, there m ust be evidence that 5 other disorders that would cause the sym ptom s or signs were excluded. 6 The 20 10 Am erican College of Rheum atology Prelim inary Diagnostic Criteria 7 includes finding of widespread history of pain. There also m ust be repeated 8 m anifestation of six or m ore FM sym ptom s, signs, or co-occurring conditions such as 9 fatigue, m em ory problem s, waking unrefreshed, depression, anxiety, or irritable bowel 10 syndrom e. Additionally, there m ust be evidence that other disorders that would cause 11 the sym ptom s or signs were excluded. 12 The docum entation needed to establish the presence of MDI and FM includes 13 objective m edical evaluation from treating sources and treatm ent notes from these sam e 14 sources. Other evidence is also acceptable and includes evidence from m edical sources, 15 such as psychologists and non-m edical sources such as neighbors, friends, relatives, and 16 clergy; past em ployers, rehabilitation counselors, and teachers; and statem ents from 17 SSA personnel who interviewed the person. 18 As with any adult claim for disability benefits, the SSA will use the five-step 19 sequential evaluation process to determ ine whether an adult with an MDI of FM is 20 disabled. 21 22 23 24 -10 - 2. The ALJ provided Clear and Convincing Reasons Supported by Substantial Evidence 1 2 3 Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the ALJ provided 4 specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective lim itations of 5 fibrom yalgia.8 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective com plaints were not entirely 6 consistent with the m edical evidence of record or the m edical opinions of record, and 7 found inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s statem ents and conduct, including her own 8 statem ents of daily activities in the m edical records. (AR 23-28). Plaintiff, however, 9 contends that the ALJ did not give clear and convincing reasons to dism iss her 10 testim ony. 11 Im portant to note, the ALJ did not “dism iss” Plaintiff’s testim ony concerning her 12 pain, sym ptom s, and level of lim itation. Rather, the ALJ stated that he had considered 13 Plaintiff’s testim ony in lim iting her work at the less than light exertional level, which 14 was less than had been assessed by the State agency m edical exam iners. (AR 23-27). 15 Accordingly, the ALJ reduced Plaintiff’s RFC of light work to “could not clim b ladders, 16 ropes, or scaffolds and could not perform all other postural activities on an occasional 17 basis (clim bing ram ps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and 18 crawling); would also need to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards and also 19 pulm onary irritants in the workplace; and could frequently handle with the left upper 20 extrem ity.” (AR 23). The ALJ perform ed a thorough review of Plaintiff’s m edical record and found 21 22 that it did not fully support Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling conditions. The ALJ 23 24 8 The ALJ did not m ake a finding of m alingering in her opinion. (AR 18-29). -11- 1 reviewed and cited to Plaintiff’s m edical records and finding they “are unrem arkable 2 and include clear lungs; intact sensation; norm al gait, station, and posture; and full 3 lum bar spine range of m otion with no tenderness.” (AR 24). The ALJ found that the 4 records did not dem onstrate that Plaintiff would be unable to perform a range of light 5 exertion, with the express lim itations. See Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 672 (9th 6 Cir 20 12) (the ALJ ’s determ ination should not be second-guessed where reasonable and 7 supported by substantial evidence). 8 9 The ALJ properly considered how consistent Plaintiff’s subjective sym ptom statem ents were with this objective m edical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1529(c)(2). This 10 could not be the ALJ ’s sole reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s statem ents about her 11 sym ptom s, but it was a factor that the ALJ was perm itted to consider. Id.; see also 12 Burch, 40 0 F.3d at 681 (“Although lack of m edical evidence cannot form the sole basis 13 for discounting pain testim ony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility 14 analysis.”); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 20 0 1) (while a claim ant’s 15 subjective statem ents about sym ptom ology “cannot be rejected on the sole ground that 16 it is not fully corroborated by objective m edical evidence, the m edical evidence is still a 17 relevant factor”). Thus, the lack of consistency between Plaintiff’s m edical records and 18 her testim ony was a proper basis for the ALJ ’s discounting Plaintiff’s testim ony. 19 The ALJ also properly considered that the m edical opinion evidence, all of which 20 found Plaintiff capable of perform ing m edium work, contradicted Plaintiff’s sym ptom 21 testim ony. (AR 25-30 ). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(4) (conflicts between a claim ant’s 22 statem ents and statem ents by m edical sources are considered in evaluating subjective 23 com plaints); see also Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 20 0 8) 24 (finding that the m edical evidence, including the opinions of two physicians that a -12- 1 claim ant could work, supported the ALJ ’s credibility determ ination); Moncada v. 2 Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1995) (an ALJ m ay consider physician opinions that 3 claim ant could work, which contradict claim ant’s assertion to the contrary). As 4 Defendant points out, it is notable that Plaintiff fails to point to any m edical opinion 5 indicating that she had any greater lim itations than the m edical doctors opined. The 6 ALJ , however, did take Plaintiff’s subjective com plaints and testim ony into 7 consideration, and assessed her with an RFC for light work, with lim itations – less than 8 the m edium level of work the m edical opinions assessed for Plaintiff. 9 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ im properly pointed to her level of daily activity as 10 a basis for dism issing her testim ony. This is not correct. The ALJ m erely cited to 11 Plaintiff’s statem ents in the record of her daily activities to show the inconsistency with 12 her testim ony at the Adm inistrative hearing. (AR 24). An ALJ is perm itted to consider 13 daily living activities in his credibility analysis. See 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1529(c)(3) (daily 14 activities are a relevant factor which will be considered in evaluating sym ptom s); see 15 also Bray v. Com m ’r of Soc. Sec. Adm in., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 20 0 9) (“In 16 reaching a credibility determ ination, an ALJ m ay weigh inconsistencies between the 17 claim ant’s testim ony and his or her conduct, daily activities, and work record, am ong 18 other factors”). Daily activities m ay be considered to show that Plaintiff exaggerated her 19 sym ptom s. See Valentine v. Astrue, 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 20 0 9) (ALJ properly 20 recognized that daily activities “did not suggest [claim ant] could return to his old job” 21 but “did suggest that [claim ant’s] later claim s about the severity of his lim itations were 22 exaggerated.”). Although Plaintiff takes issue with this, it was proper for the ALJ to 23 have considered daily living activities in his credibility analysis. See Burch, 40 0 F.3d at 24 681. -13- Based on these clear, convincing and specific reasons for partially rejecting 1 2 Plaintiff’s pain and lim itations testim ony and the substantial evidence to support his 3 determ ination, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not com m it error in discounting 4 Plaintiff’s testim ony. 5 V. 6 CON CLU SION For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Social Security Com m issioner is 7 AFFIRMED, and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice. J udgment shall be entered 8 accordingly. 9 10 DATE: Decem ber 30 , 20 20 11 12 / s/ Autum n D. Spaeth THE HONORABLE AUTUMN D. SPAETH United States Magistrate J udge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 -14-
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