Tasche Estrada v. Andrew Saul, No. 5:2019cv01829 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2020)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion. (sp)

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Tasche Estrada v. Andrew Saul Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 TASCHE E., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of ) Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) NO. ED CV 19-1829-E MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND 17 18 Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), IT IS 19 HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s motions for summary 20 judgment are denied, and this matter is remanded for further 21 administrative action consistent with this Opinion. 22 23 PROCEEDINGS 24 25 Plaintiff filed a complaint on September 24, 2019, seeking review 26 of the Commissioner’s termination and denial of disability benefits. 27 The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate 28 Judge on November 5, 2019. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary Dockets.Justia.com 1 judgment on February 26, 2020. Defendant filed a motion for summary 2 judgment on March 27, 2020. 3 submission without oral argument. 4 September 26, 2019. The Court has taken the motions under See L.R. 7-15; “Order,” filed 5 6 BACKGROUND 7 8 9 Plaintiff was found disabled as of May 1, 2008, because of major depressive disorder (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 31, 35, 126-28). 10 Subsequently, the Administration found that Plaintiff had medically 11 improved such that, as of November 1, 2014, Plaintiff supposedly was 12 no longer disabled1 (A.R. 31, 126). 13 14 On February 18, 2016, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) heard 15 testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert (A.R. 90-120). 16 Plaintiff was not then represented (id.). 17 March 16, 2016, the ALJ agreed that Plaintiff’s disability supposedly 18 had ended as of November 1, 2014 (A.R. 126-34). 19 found that: (1) Plaintiff did not develop any additional impairments 20 beyond major depressive disorder through November 1, 2014;2 21 (2) Plaintiff’s depression medically improved as of November 1, 2014; 22 and (3) Plaintiff had a residual functional capacity to perform work 23 at all levels of exertion, limited to simple, routine, repetitive In a decision dated Specifically, the ALJ 24 25 26 27 28 1 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f) (eight step sequential evaluation process to assess continued disability). 2 Plaintiff had testified at the February, 2016 hearing that she also had fibromyalgia, carpal tunnel syndrome and back pain (A.R. 100, 104). 2 1 tasks, with incidental contact with coworkers and no public contact 2 (A.R. 128-32).3 3 perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy 4 (A.R. 132-34 (adopting vocational expert testimony at A.R. 115-16)). The ALJ found that a person with this capacity could 5 6 Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision and also filed new 7 applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 8 security income (A.R. 54, 58-59). 9 on major depression, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, right lateral 10 Plaintiff alleged disability based epicondylitis, fibromyalgia and bilateral ulnar neuropathy (A.R. 305). 11 12 The Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s March 16, 2016 decision and 13 remanded the matter for an ALJ to: (1) consider the severity or 14 effects of Plaintiff’s mental impairment under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a; 15 (2) provide rationale with specific references to the medical evidence 16 in support of assessed limitations per Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 17 and evaluate treating/examining source opinions per 20 C.F.R. § 18 404.1527, requesting further evidence and/or clarification from those 19 sources “as appropriate”; and (3) obtain supplemental evidence from a 20 vocational expert, if warranted by the expanded record (A.R. 54-55). 21 The Appeals Council ruled that there was “no support” for the ALJ’s 22 residual functional capacity assessment because the ALJ’s decision 23 3 24 25 26 27 28 In assessing this residual functional capacity, the ALJ reportedly did not give great weight to the state agency physicians’ opinions, gave little weight to an opinion from treating psychiatrist Dr. Harry Lewis and gave no weight to treating physician Dr. Karen Keiko Murata’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s physical impairments (A.R. 131). As discussed in the medical record summary herein, it appears that none of these opinions are included in the Administrative Record presently before the Court. 3 1 assertedly lacked an evaluation of the mental impairment’s severity or 2 a rationale for the limitations assessed (A.R. 54). 3 4 On February 14, 2018, a new ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff 5 and a vocational expert (A.R. 56-89). Plaintiff then was represented 6 by counsel (id.).4 7 bound by the prior ALJ’s determination, which the ALJ erroneously 8 believed had been based on a finding that Plaintiff had performed 9 substantial gainful activity (A.R. 59-60). At the hearing, the ALJ stated that he was not On June 6, 2018, the ALJ 10 issued a decision purportedly addressing the Appeals Council’s remand 11 order and Plaintiff’s new applications for benefits (A.R. 31-46). 12 Although the Appeals Council had vacated the prior ALJ’s decision, and 13 had ruled specifically that there had been “no support” for the prior 14 ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment, the new ALJ deemed the 15 prior ALJ’s decision to be res judicata through the March, 2016 date 16 of that decision (A.R. 31).5 17 circumstances” because Plaintiff then had “more functional limitations 18 than she did when the case was considered by [the prior ALJ]” (A.R. 19 31). Even so, the new ALJ also found “changed The new ALJ went on to find: (1) Plaintiff’s disability had 20 21 22 23 4 The ALJ’s ensuing decision erroneously states that Plaintiff was not represented at the February 14, 2018 hearing (A.R. 32). 5 24 25 26 27 28 “[T]he Commissioner may not apply res judicata where the claimant raises a new issue, such as the existence of an impairment not considered in the previous application. . . . Nor is res judicata to be applied where the claimant was unrepresented by counsel at the time of the prior claim.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 827–28 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Both of these conditions apply in the present case. Thus, the new ALJ would have erred by invoking res judicata, even if the Appeals Council had not vacated the prior decision. 4 1 ended on November 1, 2014; and (2) Plaintiff had not become disabled 2 again since that date (A.R. 32-46). 3 4 Specifically, the ALJ found that, after November 1, 2014: 5 (1) Plaintiff has had severe bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, 6 bilateral epicondylitis, bilateral ulnar neuropathy, lumbar back pain, 7 cervical stenosis, affective disorder, anxiety disorder and obesity 8 (A.R. 35, 38);6 (2) Plaintiff’s previously disabling depression 9 medically improved, as reportedly evidenced by her mental status 10 examinations and activities of daily living (A.R. 37-38);7 11 (3) Plaintiff had a residual functional capacity to perform light 12 work, limited to the following: frequently pushing and pulling with 13 the bilateral upper and lower extremities, occasionally climbing ramps 14 and stairs, no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, occasionally 15 balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling, frequently 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 The ALJ acknowledged that the record also notes fibromyalgia, sickle cell traits, cholelithiasis, “allegories” [allergies] and tendinitis of the left ankle, which the ALJ found nonsevere (A.R. 36, 38-39). According to the ALJ, there was insufficient evidence to find that fibromyalgia is a severe impairment per American College of Rheumatology guidelines (A.R. 39; see also A.R. 142 (state agency physician’s finding that Plaintiff did not meet criteria for fibromyalgia by history or examination)). 7 The ALJ cited “Exhibit 7E, CDR file” which appears to have been a function report completed by Plaintiff. See A.R. 38, 43; see also A.R. 129 (prior ALJ’s decision citing same, which reportedly stated that Plaintiff was able to care for her personal needs, cook and do laundry). The function report referenced in both of the ALJs’ decisions is not included in the Administrative Record. In fact, whatever comprised the “CDR file” (or “CRD file” as it is also referenced in the most recent decision) apparently is entirely missing from the Administrative Record. 5 1 handling and fingering with the bilateral hands, no concentrated 2 exposure to extreme cold, no moderate exposure to hazards, and no 3 fast-paced work, but she can maintain concentration, persistence and 4 pace for simple, routine and repetitive tasks with no interaction with 5 the general public, no jobs that require teamwork, and low demand work 6 settings consistent with simple work and gradual changes in the work 7 setting (A.R. 38-44 (giving great weight to the state agency medical 8 consultants’ opinions at A.R. 167-79, and little weight to the other 9 medical opinion evidence (not included in the record) that the prior 10 ALJ had considered and rejected8)); and (4) Plaintiff has been unable 11 to perform her past relevant work as a secretary, but she has been 12 able to perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the 13 national economy (A.R. 44-46 (adopting vocational expert testimony at 14 A.R. 80-86)).9 15 16 On May 4, 2019, the Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 10-15). 17 The Appeals Council considered a Mental Impairment Questionnaire from 18 Dr. Sajak Mahta dated July 19, 2018 (A.R. 22-27), but found that the 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 See A.R. 44 (citing other exhibits from the missing “CDR file,” apparently March, 2015 state agency medical consultants’ opinions, as well as referenced opinions from treating physicians Drs. Murata and Lewis). 9 Although the Administration had not ordered any consultative examinations and the ALJ did not seek the opinion of a medical expert, the ALJ said he thought he had “enough evidence to make an opinion” (see A.R. 63-64, 88). The ALJ did not develop the record by requesting additional evidence or clarification from Plaintiff’s treating sources concerning the bases for their opinions, as suggested in the Appeals Council’s remand order. See id. (ALJ discussing same at the hearing and declining counsel’s request for a continuance to obtain a medical source statement). 6 1 opinions expressed therein did not relate to the time period at issue 2 (A.R. 11).10 3 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 6 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the 7 Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s 8 findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the 9 Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. 10 Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 11 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner, 12 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). 13 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 14 support a conclusion.” 15 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v. 16 Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence is “such Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 17 18 If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may 19 not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 Dr. Mahta completed the questionnaire on behalf of treating psychiatrist Dr. Williams, whom Plaintiff had visited on June 12 and July 2, 2018 (A.R. 22, 27). Dr. Mahta diagnosed major depressive disorder (severe, recurrent), generalized anxiety disorder and chronic pain, and reported “poor response” to treatment with a “guarded” prognosis (A.R. 22). Dr. Mahta indicated Plaintiff is “seriously limited” (i.e., has noticeable difficulty for 11-20 percent of a work day or work week) in Plaintiff’s ability to maintain attention for two hour segments, make simple work-related decisions, deal with normal work stress, and set realistic goals or make plans independently of others (A.R. 24-25). The vocational expert had opined that, if a person were off task more than 10 percent of a workday, employment would be precluded (A.R. 87). 7 1 Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by 2 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. 3 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, 4 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 5 detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 6 7 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 8 quotations omitted). 9 10 Where, as here, the Appeals Council “considers new evidence in 11 deciding whether to review a decision of the ALJ, that evidence 12 becomes part of the administrative record, which the district court 13 must consider when reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision for 14 substantial evidence.” 15 “[A]s a practical matter, the final decision of the Commissioner 16 includes the Appeals Council’s denial of review, and the additional 17 evidence considered by that body is evidence upon which the findings 18 and decision complained of are based.” 19 omitted).11 20 the first time to the Appeals Council. 21 /// Brewes v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d at 1163. Id. (citations and quotations Thus, this Court has reviewed the evidence submitted for 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11 And yet, the Ninth Circuit sometimes had stated that there exists “no jurisdiction to review the Appeals Council’s decision denying [the claimant’s] request for review.” See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, 659 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011); but see Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765 (2019) (court has jurisdiction to review Appeals Council’s dismissal of request for review as untimely); see also Warner v. Astrue, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1115 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (remarking on the seeming irony of reviewing an ALJ’s decision in the light of evidence the ALJ never saw). 8 1 DISCUSSION 2 3 Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that the ALJ should have 4 developed the record to obtain a treating or examining opinion 5 regarding Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity, rather than 6 giving great weight to the non-examining state agency reviewer’s 7 October, 2016 opinion. 8 contends that the ALJ improperly used his own lay judgment to fill in 9 the gaps in the record to reach a residual functional capacity See Plaintiff’s Motion at 4-6. 10 determination. Id. at 5. 11 agrees. 12 the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination. Plaintiff also For the reasons discussed below, the Court On the current record, substantial evidence does not support 13 14 I. Summary of the Relevant Medical Record 15 16 The medical record, which includes a decade of treatment 17 documents from Kaiser Permanente, is extraordinarily voluminous. 18 However, the inclusion of multiple copies of identical documents 19 accounts for some of this volume. 20 with, inter alia, cholelithiasis, panic disorder and major depressive 21 disorder (recurrent, job related) in 2003, gastroesaphageal reflux 22 disease (“GERD”) and obesity in 2004, carpal tunnel syndrome in 2005, 23 sickle cell trait in 2008, morbid obesity in 2013, major depressive 24 disorder (moderate, recurrent) in January of 2015, and carpal tunnel 25 syndrome, chronic low back, thoracic pain, fibromyalgia, right elbow 26 lateral epicondylitis, and right upper extremity ulnar nerve lesion in 27 February of 2016 (A.R. 339, 362). 28 /// Plaintiff reportedly was diagnosed 9 1 A. Mental Health Treatment Records from the Alleged Onset Date 2 through the State Agency Physicians’ Review in October of 3 2016 4 5 Plaintiff was found disabled due to major depressive disorder as 6 of May of 2008, when she delivered a baby who died after only six days 7 of life (A.R. 1045, 1054). 8 counseling and taking Risperdal, Clonazepam and Imipramine (A.R. 9 1150). By November of 2008, Plaintiff was in Plaintiff pursued somewhat regular psychiatric treatment with 10 Dr. Harry Lewis in 2011 and into 2012, when her mental status 11 examinations reportedly were largely normal, apart from depressed 12 mood, and her Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF)” scores 13 reportedly fell in the 51-60 range (A.R. 1706-10, 1803-04, 1852-53, 14 1863-65, 1905-06, 1916-17, 1958-59).12 15 16 In July of 2013, Plaintiff said she had stopped taking her 17 depression medication and wanted an appointment for counseling because 18 she was under a lot of stress (A.R. 2430). 19 for August of 2013, but it appears that she did not keep the 20 appointment (A.R. 2430, 2440, 2445). 21 her primary care doctor, Dr. Sangeeta Aggarwal, for left ankle pain in 22 March of 2014, she reportedly felt her depression was stable, and she She made an appointment When Plaintiff followed up with 23 24 25 26 27 28 12 The GAF scale is used by clinicians to report an individual’s overall level of functioning. See American Psychological Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. 2000) (“DSM”). A GAF of 51-60 indicates “[m]oderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., temporarily falling behind in schoolwork).” Id. 10 1 was not then taking any depression medication or interested in 2 medications or counseling (A.R. 2544). 3 phone call, Plaintiff said that she was so depressed she was having 4 suicidal thoughts (A.R. 2581-83). 5 wellness check (id.). 6 her depression (A.R. 2592). However, in an April, 2014 The police were dispatched for a Plaintiff asked for a medication evaluation for 7 8 9 In July of 2014, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Alejandra Clark for an initial psychiatric evaluation (A.R. 2641-48). Plaintiff 10 reportedly had not taken drugs for her depression in over a year, but 11 wanted to restart medication (Celexa and Risperidone) (A.R. 2641). 12 mental status examination, Plaintiff reportedly was anxious, depressed 13 and irritable, with a congruent mood and otherwise normal findings 14 (A.R. 2644). 15 moderate) and prescribed Celexa and therapy (A.R. 2644-45).13 Dr. Clark diagnosed major depression (recurrent, 16 17 Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Clark in September of 2014, 18 reporting that her symptoms had mildly improved with medication and 19 saying that her depressed mood and anxiety were “less intense” (A.R. 20 2696). 21 anxious and depressed mood that was improving (A.R. 2696-97). On mental status examination, Plaintiff reportedly had an Dr. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13 Plaintiff had presented to a social worker earlier the same day, reporting that she has had insomnia, anhedonia, crying spells, low energy, low motivation, isolation/withdrawal and panic attacks since 2008 (A.R. 2623-24). Although Plaintiff had been seeing a psychiatrist since 2003, the record reportedly reflected “very poor attendance” and no inpatient treatment (A.R. 2624). On mental status examination, she reportedly had restricted, tearful affect, anxiety and depression (A.R. 262627). She was assigned a GAF score of 50-55 and a highest estimated GAF for the past 12 months of 55-60 (A.R. 2627). 11 On 1 Clark believed Plaintiff’s depression was then “in partial remission” 2 (A.R. 2698). 3 (id.). Dr. Clark continued Plaintiff’s medications and therapy 4 5 A note from Dr. Lewis, dated November 12, 2014, states: “Let 6 patient know that since I have not seen her since 1/31/12 I am not 7 able to provide a letter stating how she has been doing since then and 8 currently” (A.R. 2772). 9 for the Social Security Administration stating that she was not 10 Plaintiff reportedly had requested a letter capable of performing her regular job duties (A.R. 2772, 2783-84). 11 12 In January of 2015, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Aggarwal, 13 reporting that her depression was not well controlled (A.R. 2795). 14 Plaintiff also followed up with Dr. Lewis, complaining that Celexa was 15 not sufficiently helping her mood (A.R. 2823). 16 examination, Plaintiff reportedly was depressed with a congruent 17 affect (A.R. 2824). 18 referred her for therapy (A.R. 2824). On mental status Dr. Lewis increased Plaintiff’s Celexa and 19 20 In February of 2015, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Lewis, reporting 21 continued stressors (A.R. 2952). On mental status examination, she 22 reportedly was mildly anxious and mildly depressed with congruent mood 23 (A.R. 2953). 24 presented for therapy the same day and was assessed with a GAF of 75 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// Her medications were continued (A.R. 2953). 12 She also 1 (A.R. 2963-64).14 2 again assessed a GAF of 75 (A.R. 2997). At a session the next month, Plaintiff’s therapist 3 4 In March of 2015, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Lewis that she was 5 experiencing excessive sweating and nightmares with difficulty 6 sleeping (A.R. 3024-25). 7 Plaintiff’s next visit in April, where she reportedly had a normal 8 mental status examination except for mildly depressed mood (A.R. 3075- 9 76). Dr. Lewis prescribed Trazodone for sleep at 10 11 In May and June of 2015, plaintiff again requested that Dr. Lewis 12 prepare a letter for the Social Security Administration advising that 13 she was not able to work due to her condition (A.R. 3086-87, 3097). 14 Dr. Lewis advised that he would fill out any paperwork sent by the 15 Administration but would not write a separate letter (A.R. 3086). 16 Plaintiff had also requested a letter from her therapist stating why 17 she was unable to work (A.R. 3128). 18 Plaintiff reported that her mood was preventing her from working and 19 she was anxious, irritable and mildly agitated (A.R. 3142). 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// When she saw her therapist, Her 24 25 26 27 28 14 A GAF score of 71-80 indicates: “If symptoms are present, they are transient and expectable reactions to psycho-social stressors (e.g., difficulty concentrating after a family argument); no more than slight impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., temporarily falling behind in schoolwork).” See DSM, p. 34. 13 1 therapist assessed a current GAF of 65 (A.R. 3143).15 2 3 On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff reportedly again requested a letter 4 from Dr. Lewis stating that she was under treatment and currently 5 unable to work due to her diagnoses (A.R. 3153-54). 6 Lewis indicated he would provide a letter, and a follow up notation 7 states that a form was ready for pickup at the front desk (A.R. 3153- 8 54). 9 stating that a letter had been provided for her to pick up which This time, Dr. Plaintiff’s therapist also emailed Plaintiff on July 8, 2015, 10 stated that Plaintiff had been receiving treatment from him (A.R. 11 3166). 12 have to come from Plaintiff’s medical records (A.R. 3166). 13 letters that Dr. Lewis and Plaintiff’s therapist reportedly provided 14 to Plaintiff are not in the Administrative Record.16 Plaintiff’s therapist advised that any other information would The actual 15 16 Plaintiff returned to Dr. Lewis in November of 2015, reporting 17 back pain, ankle pain and concern that she might need surgery (A.R. 18 3488). 19 motor activity, somewhat depressed mood and congruent affect (A.R. On mental status examination, Plaintiff reportedly had slowed 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15 A GAF score of 61-70 indicates “[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) OR some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships.” See DSM, p. 34. 16 It appears that Dr. Lewis’s letter may have been among the records reviewed by both ALJs. See A.R. 44 (ALJ giving little weight to Dr. Lewis’s opinion that “due to her condition she is not able to work,” and citing an exhibit from “the CDR file”); A.R. 131 (prior ALJ also rejecting Dr. Lewis’s referenced opinion). 14 1 3489). Dr. Lewis continued Plaintiff’s medications (A.R. 3489). The 2 same day, Plaintiff discussed with her therapist her physical 3 ailments, disability claim and difficulty with finances, but she 4 reportedly was alert, cooperative and pleasant and had appropriate 5 engagement and expression with good insight and judgment (A.R. 3477). 6 Her GAF was assessed at 75 (A.R. 3478). 7 8 9 At her therapy session in January of 2016, Plaintiff reported that she did not want to leave her room or talk to anybody, could not 10 walk far because her leg hurt and she wore a brace, her mind was 11 always racing, she had gone to the emergency room because she thought 12 she was having a heart attack, her back hurt all the time, her doctors 13 thought she has fibromyalgia, she had GERD, and she had an upcoming 14 disability hearing (A.R. 3705). 15 and was making poor progress (A.R. 3705). 16 (A.R. 3706). Plaintiff reportedly appeared anxious Her GAF was assessed at 65 17 18 Plaintiff returned to Dr. Lewis in March of 2016, reporting 19 nightmares and a recent fibromyalgia diagnosis (A.R. 371-72). 20 Plaintiff’s mental status examination reportedly was normal except for 21 slightly slowed motor activity and mildly anxious/depressed mood (A.R. 22 372). Dr. Lewis lowered Plaintiff’s Celexa dose (A.R. 372). 23 24 Plaintiff’s next psychiatric session was in September of 2016, by 25 telephone with Dr. Nadia Haddad (A.R. 4954-55). 26 Effexor on May 9, 2016, prescribed by her pain doctor (A.R. 4955). 27 Plaintiff reported that she was not feeling better, had not been the 28 same since she lost her baby, felt depressed, in pain, and was having 15 Plaintiff had started 1 difficulty adjusting to life after the devastation of losing her job, 2 house, fiancé and baby (A.R. 4955). 3 palpitations, shortness of breath, dizziness, inability to think, 4 frozen speech, panic attacks, nightmares, hearing things and seeing 5 shadows passing (A.R. 4955). 6 reportedly had psychomotor retardation, reduced vocal inflection, 7 homicidal ideation and depressed and hopeless mood with congruent and 8 constricted affect (A.R. 4956-57). 9 depressive disorder (severe), mild psychotic symptoms with panic and Plaintiff reported anxiety, On mental status examination, Plaintiff Dr. Haddad diagnosed major 10 fibromyalgia (A.R. 4957). Dr. Haddad increased Plaintiff’s Effexor 11 dose, discontinued Trazodone, continued Celexa, started melatonin and 12 Benadryl, and recommended grief group psychotherapy and increased 13 physical activity (A.R. 4958). 14 15 B. Treatment Records for Physical Conditions from the Alleged 16 Onset Date through the State Agency Physicians’ Review in 17 October of 2016 18 19 The record also reflects ongoing treatment with various providers 20 for ankle pain/tibialis tendon tear/tendinosis following a car 21 accident in 2009, lumbar and cervical radiculopathy, knee pain, carpal 22 tunnel syndrome and right epicondylitis, for which Plaintiff was 23 prescribed Flexeril, Mobic, Lidocaine ointment, splints, a CAM boot, a 24 tennis elbow band and physical therapy. 25 95, 1263, 1284, 1411-12, 1418, 1894, 1978-81, 2003-05, 2027-30, 2034- 26 39, 2107, 2124-25, 2544, 2609-11, 3212-16, 3245-48, 3306-09, 3327-34, 27 3374-76, 3403-06, 3449-52, 3559-60 (treatment notes from April of 2009 28 through December of 2015). 16 See, e.g., A.R. 361-63, 1193- 1 The first treatment note following Plaintiff’s alleged medical 2 improvement in November of 2014 is an emergency room visit from July 3 of 2015, when Plaintiff presented complaining of low back pain 4 radiating to her left leg, for which she was given Toradol and 5 referred to her primary doctor (A.R. 3212-16). 6 with Dr. Aggarwal in August of 2015 requesting a referral to a 7 specialist for her back pain (A.R. 3245-46). Plaintiff followed up 8 9 In September of 2015, Plaintiff consulted with Dr. Eckhardt 10 Campos of Kaiser’s Physical Medicine Department in regard to 11 Plaintiff’s back pain (A.R. 3306). On examination, Plaintiff 12 reportedly had nonantalgic, narrow based gait without the cane she 13 sometimes used, and also had tenderness to palpation and tenderness 14 with range of motion (A.R. 3307-08). 15 pain with some extension into the left lower extremity which was 16 suspicious of myofascial syndrome (pain from spastic neck muscles) 17 versus lumbar strain (A.R. 3308-09). 18 Mobic, Lidocaine ointment, weight loss, physical therapy and possible 19 trigger point injections. 20 therapy appointment later in September (A.R. 3327-30). Dr. Campos diagnosed low back Dr. Campos prescribed Flexeril, Plaintiff returned for her first physical 21 22 Plaintiff also followed up in October of 2015 with her podiatrist 23 regarding left ankle pain and swelling, which Plaintiff stated was 24 getting worse (A.R. 3374). 25 continue taking Mobic as needed (A.R. 3375-76). 26 physical therapy goals noted in October of 2015, were to be 27 independent with a home exercise program, to be able to bend 28 forward/squat to lift from the floor, and to tolerate 30 minutes of She was given a splint and told to 17 Three of Plaintiff’s 1 standing to do housework without limitations before taking a break 2 (A.R. 3449).17 3 4 Plaintiff returned to Dr. Campos in November of 2015 (A.R. 3501). 5 At that time, she reportedly was exercising zero minutes per week 6 (A.R. 3513). 7 standing, that she had frequent intermittent numbness in both legs and 8 arms, she had widely diffuse pain in her shoulders and neck, and she 9 had right tennis elbow (A.R. 3501). She stated that her pain was worse with prolonged Her examination results were 10 consistent with her last visit with Dr. Campos (A.R. 3502-03). Dr. 11 Campos ordered nerve conduction studies, stressed the importance of 12 weight loss, and continued Flexeril, Mobic and physical therapy, with 13 a note that Plaintiff could try trigger point injections, which she 14 declined (A.R. 3503-04). Dr. Campos stated: 15 16 At the end of the encounter, at checkout desk, patient 17 inquires about a letter to [assist] her in re-establishing 18 long-term disability through social security, which she 19 states has previously secured. 20 involved in that past history and presently see no medically 21 justifiable reason to argue for long-term disability that I 22 am aware of. 23 KP-covered benefit and that she will need to seek out a 24 Qualified Medical Examiner certified by the state of (SSI) I have not been I advise the patient such letters are not a 25 26 27 28 17 Although Plaintiff reportedly had a “good” “rehab potential” according to her physical therapist, she went to three appointments and then was discharged from physical therapy in December of 2015, because she did not return for scheduled treatment (A.R. 3529-31). 18 1 California for just such purposes. 2 3 (A.R. 3501).18 4 5 In December of 2015, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Gerald Goodlow 6 complaining of numbness in both hands (A.R. 361-63). A nerve 7 conduction study reportedly showed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome 8 (A.R. 361-63). 9 but positive for tingling in the hands and sensory deficits (A.R. Plaintiff tested negative for myalgias and neck pain 10 363). Dr. Goodlow diagnosed mild carpal and ulnar neuropathy and 11 right lateral epicondylitis and skin numbness (A.R. 363). 12 referred Plaintiff for physical therapy, and ordered her to continue 13 /// 14 /// 15 /// Dr. Goodlow 16 17 18 Dr. Campos subsequently wrote a note to Plaintiff’s physical therapist which states: 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 . . . In reviewing her chart, a few issues concern me with regards to this patient previously seeking to get me to support her [c]ause to extend medicallysanctioned permanent disability [t]hrough Social Security. (I do not see how she secured this in the first place). On the other hand, she has clearly dragged her feet when it comes [t]o pursuing her end of the recommendations to loose [sic] weight, [v]isit regularly with Physical Therapy and implement their recommendations, [o]r to try a series of offered trigger-point injections (has declined this twice) for her very diffuse upper and lower back pains that she describes as “severe.” 27 28 (A.R. 3528). Dr. Campos apparently did not know that Plaintiff’s prior disability had been based on her mental condition. 19 1 wearing hand braces and a right tennis elbow band (A.R. 363).19 2 Goodlow reported that he would “notify Dr. Campos to consider 3 fibromyalgia and a rheumatology referral,” trigger point injections 4 and acupuncture (A.R. 363). 5 visits or any trigger point examination findings. Dr. There are no records of any rheumatology 6 7 In January of 2016, Plaintiff spoke with Dr. Aggarwal, reporting 8 that she was on Social Security disability for major depression, and 9 requesting a “DMI or letter stating she [is] unable to work 10 permanently due to current medical conditions[.] Reports severe 11 mental problem (major depression), generalized body pains, unable to 12 function at work, unable to walk or lift and recent MD office visit 13 stated possible fibromyalgia, she also states she is wearing a brace 14 which covers left foot, left ankle and left knee” (A.R. 3666). 15 Plaintiff reported that she already had letters from her psychiatrist 16 and therapist (A.R. 3666). Dr. Aggarwal stated: 17 18 Advised that I cannot write a letter for chronic disability 19 but can write a temporary “DMI” as she is continuing to 20 undergo [t]reatments by various specialists. 21 fill it out from when I last saw her [in October of 2015] 22 until the beginning of March. Requests I DMI written. 23 24 (A.R. 3666). Dr. Aggarwal’s office reportedly mailed the “DMI” to 25 Plaintiff (A.R. 3666). Any “DMI” that Dr. Aggarwal completed for 26 27 28 19 Orthopedic surgeon Dr. Paul C. Liu subsequently recommended carpal tunnel release surgery, and rated the chance of helping at 95 percent (A.R. 363-64). 20 1 Plaintiff appears to be missing from the Administrative Record.20 2 3 On January 26, 2016, Plaintiff left a message at Kaiser 4 requesting a letter stating that she is not able to stand for long 5 periods of time, along with a diagnosis and a treatment plan (A.R. 6 3732). 7 Anthony Kimball for evaluation of left ankle pain and swelling (A.R. 8 3762). 9 supports, Mobic and ice (A.R. 3762). On January 29, 2016, Plaintiff presented to podiatrist Dr. She reportedly was using shoe inserts, supportive shoes, ankle A left ankle MRI showed likely 10 tenosynovitis, high grade chondrosis, small tibular joint effusion 11 with fluid, small plantar calcaneal heel spur and small Haglund’s 12 deformity at the posterior superior calcaneus (A.R. 3766-67). 13 14 In February of 2016, Plaintiff presented to physical medicine Dr. 15 Karen Keiko Murata for a second opinion regarding her lumbar 16 radiculopathy, carpal tunnel syndrome and lateral epicondylitis (A.R. 17 3835). 18 legs aggravated by walking, bending and standing less than five 19 minutes (A.R. 3836). 20 without her ankle brace/shoes, tenderness on palpation, and positive 21 Tinel’s and Phalen’s tests (A.R. 3839-40). 22 chronic back pain radiating to the bilateral lower extremities with 23 bilateral upper extremity paresthesias, bilateral carpal tunnel 24 syndrome, and possible bilateral cervical and lumbar radiculopathy Plaintiff reported that she had back pain radiating to her On examination, she reportedly had a slow gait Dr. Murata diagnosed 25 26 27 28 20 Yet, the ALJ appears to have had a copy of Dr. Aggarwal’s DMI. See A.R. 44 (ALJ giving limited weight to Dr. Aggarwal’s report that Plaintiff was “placed off work” from October 19, 2015 through March 1, 2016). 21 1 (A.R. 3840-41). Dr. Murata prescribed a low back brace as needed, 2 increased Plaintiff’s Mobic, discontinued Flexeril, prescribed 3 methocarbomal as needed, and ordered cervical, thoracic and lumbar MRI 4 studies which showed degenerative disc disease of the lower cervical 5 spine from C4-C5 through C6-C7 (A.R. 382-83, 3841-42). 6 7 Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Murata by telephone in March of 8 2016 (A.R. 367). She reportedly had tried physical therapy and found 9 the exercises “difficult to tolerate” (A.R. 367). Plaintiff had 10 declined acupuncture or local injection for pain (A.R. 368). Dr. 11 Murata referred Plaintiff to the Kaiser pain program (A.R. 368). 12 13 Plaintiff had requested that Dr. Murata complete a form for in 14 home health services to help her with her activities of daily living 15 due to pain (A.R. 377). 16 patient does not want off work note but wants letter with [diagnoses] 17 and Not able to work” (A.R. 368). 18 to state she would be faxing over a doctor statement to be completed 19 by Dr. Murata for General Relief because she is unable to work, which 20 she needed completed by March 30, 2016 (A.R. 365-66). 21 completed a form and sent it to Plaintiff on or around March 25, 2016, 22 indicated that Plaintiff had submitted two more types of forms, and 23 asked that all future forms be sent through Kaiser’s Insurance 24 Department (A.R. 4202). 25 referenced in the record, any form(s) Dr. Murata completed are absent 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// It is noted, “[a]t the end of appointment, On March 22, 2016, Plaintiff called Dr. Murata As with many of the other forms/letters 22 1 from the present Administrative Record.21 2 3 In April of 2016, Plaintiff presented for an initial pain 4 psychologist assessment as part of Kaiser’s integrated pain management 5 program (A.R. 355-56). 6 neck, shoulder, arms, hands, back, chest, hip, lower leg and ankle 7 with numbness and tingling, increased with standing, walking, lifting, 8 bending, twisting, weather changes, fatigue, stress and tension, and 9 decreased by lying down, sleeping or resting (A.R. 356). Plaintiff complained of chronic pain in her Plaintiff 10 reportedly was taking Tylenol #3, Relafen, Meloxicam, Flexeril, 11 Robaxin, Trazodone, Celexa, Ativan and Imitrex (A.R. 356). 12 reportedly was not exercising (A.R. 357). 13 using THC for pain in January of 2016, but agreed not to use it while 14 working in a pain program (A.R. 357). 15 Depression Inventory with suicidal thoughts in the past two weeks, 16 moderate opioid risk score due to her age, anxiety and depression, and 17 presentation consistent with chronic pain (A.R. 357-58). She Plaintiff admitted also Testing showed high Beck 18 19 Plaintiff had a physical therapy evaluation in April of 2016 20 (A.R. 346). She said she had upper back pain radiating to her low 21 back and extremities with tingling (id.). 22 reportedly showed disc osteophytes with mild spinal stenosis (A.R. An MRI of her spine 23 21 24 25 26 27 28 Yet, it appears that the record reviewed by both ALJs did include an opinion from Dr. Murata. See A.R. 44 (ALJ giving little weight to Dr. Murata’s opinion that Plaintiff was unable to work due to chronic thoracic and lumbar pain, fibromyalgia, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, cervical and lumbar radiculopathy, and right lateral epicondylitis, and citing an exhibit from “the CDR file”); A.R. 131 (prior ALJ giving no weight to Dr. Murata’s opinion as based on Plaintiff’s physical impairments, which the prior ALJ declined to consider). 23 1 346). Plaintiff’s goals included improving gait tolerance to one hour 2 and improving sitting tolerance to two hours (A.R. 346). 3 reported that she could stand for up to 10 minutes, walk for up to 10 4 minutes, sit for up to 15 minutes, and sleep for up to six hours at 5 one time (A.R. 348). 6 do any household chores (A.R. 348; see also A.R. 353-54 (Plaintiff 7 reporting to another provider that she did zero exercise)). Plaintiff She reported that she did not drive and did not 8 9 In May of 2016, Plaintiff consulted with Dr. Chakradhar Penta for 10 pain management, at which time Plaintiff showed signs of depression 11 and was nervous/anxious (A.R. 341). 12 chronic pain for the past five years (A.R. 342). 13 declined carpal tunnel release surgery and trigger point injections, 14 and claimed that physical therapy had not helped (A.R. 342-43). 15 Plaintiff reported that standing more than five minutes, walking more 16 than 10 minutes, sitting more than five minutes, bending, twisting, 17 fatigue, stress and tension increased her pain, and lying down/ 18 sleeping/resting decreased her pain (A.R. 342-43). 19 wrist splints most days, and previously had used a back brace (A.R. 20 343). 21 was interested in using it again since there were no reported side 22 effects (A.R. 344). 23 depressed mood, stiff gait, and tenderness to palpation along the 24 axial spine and at some trigger points (A.R. 344). 25 diagnosed chronic pain syndrome, myofascial pain syndrome, 26 cervicogenic headache and fibromyalgia (A.R. 344). 27 encouraged to continue with physical therapy to build a tolerance to 28 activity, to pace activities to prevent flares, to take prescribed Plaintiff reported suffering from Plaintiff had Plaintiff wore Plaintiff had used marijuana for pain four months prior, and On examination, Plaintiff reportedly had a 24 Dr. Penta Plaintiff was 1 medications (Effexor, Celexa, lidocaine ointment, Relafen and 2 Robaxin), and to postpone resuming medical marijuana while she tried 3 other pain medicine options (A.R. 344-45). 4 trigger point injections in the bilateral upper trapezius might be 5 needed in the future (A.R. 345). Dr. Penta noted that 6 7 At a follow up physical therapy appointment in May of 2016, 8 Plaintiff reported that she was “doing ok,” and she was prescribed a 9 TENS unit (A.R. 640-42). Plaintiff thereafter attended 12 pain 10 management classes and group cognitive behavioral therapy sessions for 11 pain (A.R. 654-779). 12 weeks of physical therapy and cognitive behavioral group therapy (A.R. 13 780-81). 14 (A.R. 783). 15 783). On July 20, 2016, she was approved for 12 more She again reported that she did not drive and did no chores She was given a portable neck traction machine (A.R. 16 17 Plaintiff returned to Dr. Penta in June of 2016, reporting 18 continuous, fluctuating pain, left knee “giving out,” left arm 19 numbness, tightness in the bilateral trapezius, and lateral left hip 20 pain when she lies on that side (A.R. 690-91). 21 long sitting or walking or any amount of exercise bothered her left 22 side but she was walking “some” (A.R. 691). 23 Effexor in addition to the other medications Plaintiff was taking 24 (A.R. 691-93). Dr. Penta also prescribed a cane (A.R. 4718). She also reported that Dr. Penta prescribed 25 26 Plaintiff returned to Dr. Penta in August of 2016, reporting that 27 her pain was the same or slightly improved (A.R. 790). 28 Plaintiff previously had reported doing no chores, she now reported 25 Where 1 that she had been taking breaks with shopping and cleaning and was 2 delegating more work to her son (A.R. 791). 3 walking, using a cane for left foot pain as needed (A.R. 791). 4 However, she reported that she was unable to do a home exercise 5 program due to pain (A.R. 791). 6 reportedly was “really interested” in trying marijuana again (A.R. 7 791-92). 8 physical therapy (A.R. 791). 9 stable on her current pain medications (A.R. 801). She reportedly also was Her medications were refilled and she She denied a trial of trigger point injections in favor of On August 17, 2016, she reportedly was In October of 10 2016, Plaintiff requested another referral for pain management after 11 she had been discharged from the program in September (A.R. 5045-46, 12 5057). 13 14 C. The State Agency Physicians’ Opinions 15 16 State agency review physicians examined Kaiser records received 17 in May of 2016, as well as the March, 2016 adverse decision which had 18 not considered Plaintiff’s alleged physical impairments (A.R. 139-51). 19 These physicians opined in June/July of 2016 that Plaintiff was not 20 disabled (A.R. 139-51). 21 medical opinions in the record for the physicians to review (A.R. 22 145). 23 beginning March 17, 2016 – the day after the first ALJ’s adverse 24 decision – Plaintiff was capable of light work with occasional 25 postural activities, some bilateral upper extremity and left lower 26 extremity limitations, and some environmental limitations (A.R. 142, 27 145-47). 28 Plaintiff was capable of performing simple tasks in a non-public At that time, there reportedly were no Dr. Stuart L. Laiken, M.D., Ph.D., found that for the period Dr. P.G. Hawkins, Ph.D., found for the same period that 26 1 setting, finding no material change in Plaintiff’s mental condition 2 since the first ALJ’s adverse decision (A.R. 142-44, 147-49). 3 4 On reconsideration as of October of 2016, state agency review 5 physicians examined additional records from Kaiser received in 6 September of 2016, and again found Plaintiff not disabled (A.R. 167- 7 79). 8 and that, due to her left trochanteric bursitis, she has to use a cane 9 (A.R. 168, 170, 318). 10 Plaintiff reportedly asserted that her fibromyalgia had worsened She was morbidly obese (A.R. 170). Again, the state agency physicians had no medical opinions to review (A.R. 172). 11 12 13 D. Treatment Records Post-Dating the State Agency Physicians’ Review 14 15 Plaintiff returned to Dr. Haddad in October of 2016, reporting 16 feeling overwhelmed from taking care of her mother after her mother 17 had cataract surgery, and not knowing if there was any improvement 18 from the increased Effexor dose (A.R. 5074-75). 19 she had no time for herself in the last month because she was 20 caretaking, and she was irritable, not enjoying life, having bad 21 migraines, not sleeping well with poor energy, felt unsettled and was 22 seeing shadows and hearing someone calling her name (A.R. 5075-76). 23 On mental status examination, she reportedly had psychomotor 24 retardation, reduced vocal inflection, normal thought content but 25 visual hallucinations, and a depressed, euthymic sustained emotional 26 state with congruent blunted dysphoric affect (A.R. 5076-77). 27 Haddad increased Plaintiff’s Effexor, discontinued Benadryl, 28 prescribed Hydroxyzine, discontinued Celexa, continued melatonin and 27 She reportedly felt Dr. 1 again recommended increased activity (A.R. 5078). When Plaintiff 2 returned for therapy with a new therapist on October 20, 2016, she 3 reportedly was negative, angry and depressed (A.R. 5099). 4 assessed with a GAF of 51-60, and the highest GAF in the last 12 5 months was estimated at 55 (A.R. 5100). She was 6 7 Plaintiff returned to Dr. Haddad in November of 2016, reporting 8 that she felt overworked from caring for her mother (A.R. 5214-16). 9 She was still feeling depressed, still seeing shadows, still hearing 10 things, and anxious with constant worrying that bad things would 11 happen after Social Security was taken away (A.R. 5216). 12 to start grief counseling the next week (A.R. 5216). 13 examination, she reportedly had mild motor retardation, reduced vocal 14 inflection, coherent yet vague thought processes, difficulty answering 15 questions with specificity, auditory misperceptions with mild paranoia 16 intermittently, visual misperceptions, inability to do serial 7s, and 17 she was anxious and irritable with depressed mood and congruent 18 blunted affect (A.R. 5217). 19 continued Effexor, discontinued Hydroxyzine, continued melatonin and 20 recommended increased physical activity (A.R. 5218-19). She was set On mental status Dr. Haddad prescribed Seroquel for sleep, 21 22 Plaintiff restarted physical therapy in November of 2016, for her 23 chronic low back pain, with a long term goal of tolerating prolonged 24 standing for 30 minutes at a time to take a shower, tolerating sitting 25 30 minutes at a time and tolerating walking 30 minutes at a time (A.R. 26 5303). 27 asserted that lying down, sitting or standing too long aggravated her 28 pain, and said she could sit less than 20 minutes at a time, stand Her “rehab potential” was “fair” (A.R. 5303). 28 Plaintiff 1 less than 10 minutes at a time and walk less than five minutes before 2 hurting (A.R. 5304). 3 4 The record includes subsequent treatment notes for Plaintiff’s 5 ailments as follows: (1) regular medication visits with Dr. Haddad 6 through May of 2017, which included increasing Plaintiff’s Seroquel 7 dose and adding Wellbutrin (A.R. 5406-10, 5531-34, 5613-16, 5677-80, 8 5759-63, 5863-66); (2) psychotherapy from February through July of 9 2017, during which time Plaintiff’s GAF was assessed at 51-60 (A.R. 10 5666-67, 5701-02, 5719-20, 5837-38, 5923-24, 5990-91); (3) treatment 11 from a new psychiatrist in July and November of 2017, which included 12 increasing Plaintiff’s Effexor dose (A.R. 6002-08, 6435-41); 13 (4) psychotherapy with a new therapist from August though November of 14 2017 (A.R. 6117-18, 6160-61, 6190-91, 6230, 6410-11); (5) physical 15 therapy through February of 2017, when Plaintiff was discharged to do 16 a home exercise program (A.R. 5389-92, 5646-48); (6) one physical 17 therapy visit in June of 2017, and a discharge from physical therapy 18 in October of 2017, because Plaintiff failed to return for treatment 19 (A.R. 5909-12, 5915); (7) pain management visits in October and 20 November of 2017 (A.R. 6260-65, 6344-48); and (8) treatment for her 21 ankle pain from April through August of 2017 (A.R. 5787-89, 5847-49, 22 6026-28). 23 on December 29, 2017, marking “permanent incapacity” (A.R. 6565-66). 24 This form is not in the Administrative Record. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// Dr. Murata reportedly also completed a General Relief form 29 1 II. 2 Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the Conclusion that Plaintiff No Longer was Disabled on and after November 1, 2014. 3 4 Substantial evidence does not support the Administration’s 5 decision that Plaintiff medically improved as of November 1, 2014, to 6 the point where she could perform light work then and thereafter. 7 vacating the ALJ’s March 16, 2016 decision, the Appeals Council ruled 8 that there was no support for the residual functional capacity the ALJ 9 had adopted for the period November 1, 2014 to March 16, 2016 (A.R. In 10 54). On remand, the new ALJ purported to adopt the non-examining 11 state agency physicians’ October, 2016 opinions in finding that 12 Plaintiff’s disability ended as of November 1, 2014 (A.R. 32, 37-44). 13 However, these state agency physicians’ opinions applied to the period 14 beginning in March of 2016 at the earliest. 15 physical residual functional capacity was for the period from 16 March 17, 2016 to the present); A.R. 175 (indicating mental residual 17 functional capacity was for the period from March 12, 2016 to the 18 present). See A.R. 173 (indicating 19 20 There is evidence suggesting that Plaintiff’s mental condition 21 did improve September, 2014 - February, 2015 (A.R. 2696-98, 2963-64). 22 See A.R. 42 (ALJ discussing evidence). 23 from a medical source to support the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff’s 24 condition, which also included severe physical impairments, improved 25 as of November 1, 2014 to the point of non-disability. 26 devoid of any medical source statement determining that Plaintiff had 27 the residual functional capacity the ALJ assessed from November 1, 28 2014 through March of 2016. However, there is no evidence The record is Further, the only medical opinions 30 1 regarding this time period that are included in the record (which are 2 the prior non-examining opinions as to which the first ALJ declined to 3 give great weight) reportedly were contradicted by the treating 4 opinions of Drs. Lewis, Murata, or Aggarwal (which are missing from 5 the record) (A.R. 43-44). 6 7 Given the lack of any medical source statements covering the 8 period from November 1, 2014 through March of 2016, and the reported 9 contradiction between the non-examining opinions and Plaintiff’s 10 missing treating source opinions, the Court cannot find that the non- 11 examining state agency physicians’ opinions are substantial evidence 12 to support the new ALJ’s decision. 13 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (opinion of non-examining physician 14 “may constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent with other 15 independent evidence in the record”); see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 16 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (where the opinions of non-examining 17 physicians do not contradict “all other evidence in the record” an ALJ 18 properly may rely on these opinions); Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 19 1127, 1130 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) (same). Compare Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 20 21 The ALJ also cited to medical recommendations from Plaintiff’s 22 treatment providers (i.e., “reconditioning with daily aerobic 23 activities” recommended by Dr. Penta (A.R. 345), and “increased 24 physical activity” recommended by Dr. Haddad (A.R. 5692)). 25 to the ALJ, these recommendations suggested that Plaintiff was capable 26 of a reduced range of light work and that her physical impairments “do 27 not preclude all activity.” 28 asserted that her impairments preclude all activity. See A.R. 41. 31 According Plaintiff has never Further, 1 recommendations for Plaintiff to increase her activity from virtual 2 inactivity do not constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s 3 lay conclusion that Plaintiff can perform light work. 4 qualified to draw such a conclusion from these sparse references in 5 the voluminous medical record. 6 ALJ’s own lay knowledge to make medical interpretations of examination 7 results or to determine the severity of medically determinable 8 impairments. 9 1999); Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998) (an “ALJ The ALJ was not An ALJ cannot properly rely on the See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 10 cannot arbitrarily substitute his [or her] own judgment for competent 11 medical opinion”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Rohan v. 12 Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996) (“ALJs must not succumb to 13 the temptation to play doctor and make their own independent medical 14 findings”); Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (an 15 ALJ is forbidden from making his or her own medical assessment beyond 16 that demonstrated by the record). 17 the ALJ could not competently translate the medical evidence in this 18 case into a residual functional capacity assessment. 19 Apfel, 180 F.3d at 1102-03 (ALJ’s residual functional capacity 20 assessment cannot stand in the absence of evidentiary support). Absent expert medical assistance, See Tackett v. 21 22 Rather than making his own lay assessment of Plaintiff’s 23 limitations, the ALJ should have requested clarification from 24 Plaintiff’s treatment providers regarding Plaintiff’s limitations, or 25 ordered examination and evaluation of Plaintiff by consultative 26 examiner(s). 27 v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2001) (where available 28 medical evidence is insufficient to determine the severity of the See Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d at 1156; see also Reed 32 1 claimant’s impairment, the ALJ should order a consultative examination 2 by a specialist); accord Kish v. Colvin, 552 Fed. App’x 650 (2014); 3 see generally Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) 4 (ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is triggered “when there is 5 ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for the 6 proper evaluation of the evidence”) (citation omitted); Brown v. 7 Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he ALJ has a special 8 duty to fully and fairly develop the record to assure the claimant’s 9 interests are considered. 10 This duty exists even when the claimant is represented by counsel.”). 11 12 The ALJ also referenced certain medical examination reports and 13 Plaintiff’s daily activities since November 1, 2014, as supposedly 14 proving that depression would not preclude the performance of full 15 time work (A.R. 38 (citing Exhibit 7E, CDR file); see also A.R. 43 16 (discussing daily activities of driving, taking her son to and from 17 school, and reports in the medical record that Plaintiff exercised, 18 regularly attended church, appeared to take pride in her appearance, 19 and went to an event over a weekend)). 20 not contain the function statement(s) on which the ALJ reportedly 21 relied. 22 /// The Administrative Record does See Footnote 7, supra.22 23 24 25 26 27 28 22 Plaintiff testified at the February, 2018 hearing that her activities of daily living included doing no chores, watching television, going to stores once a month, paying bills, going to doctor appointments, and getting her nails done once a month (A.R. 77-79). Plaintiff testified at the February, 2016 hearing that she watched television, made quick meals (sandwiches, microwave food), could not make her bed, could not clean her room and did not want to do anything (A.R. 106-07). 33 1 The generality of the ALJ’s findings, the lack of any medical 2 source statements for the relevant time periods and the many 3 referenced documents’ absence from the Administrative Record prevent 4 the Court from concluding that substantial evidence supports the 5 decision Plaintiff medically improved as of November 1, 2014 and was 6 no longer disabled then and thereafter. 7 8 III. Remand is Appropriate 9 10 The Court is unable to conclude that the ALJ’s errors were 11 harmless. “[A]n ALJ’s error is harmless where it is inconsequential 12 to the ultimate nondisability determination.” 13 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations and quotations omitted); 14 see Treichler v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) 15 (“Where, as in this case, an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record 16 is uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case 17 to the agency”); cf. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 18 2011) (error not harmless where “the reviewing court can determine 19 from the ‘circumstances of the case’ that further administrative 20 review is needed to determine whether there was prejudice from the 21 error”). Molina v. Astrue, 674 22 23 Remand is appropriate because the circumstances of this case 24 suggest that further development of the record and further 25 administrative review could remedy the ALJ’s errors. 26 Astrue, 640 F.3d at 888; see also INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 27 (2002) (upon reversal of an administrative determination, the proper 28 course is remand for additional agency investigation or explanation, 34 See McLeod v. 1 except in rare circumstances); Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1044 2 (9th Cir. 2017) (reversal with a directive for the immediate 3 calculation of benefits is a “rare and prophylactic exception to the 4 well-established ordinary remand rule”; Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 5 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court concludes that 6 further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it 7 may not remand with a direction to provide benefits”); Treichler v. 8 Commissioner, 775 F.3d at 1101 n.5 (remand for further administrative 9 proceedings is the proper remedy “in all but the rarest cases”); 10 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (court will 11 credit-as-true medical opinion evidence only where, inter alia, “the 12 record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings 13 would serve no useful purpose”); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180- 14 81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1038 (2000) (remand for further 15 proceedings rather than for the immediate payment of benefits is 16 appropriate where there are “sufficient unanswered questions in the 17 record”); see also Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495-96 (9th 18 Cir. 2015) (discussing the narrow circumstances in which a court will 19 order a benefits calculation rather than further proceedings). 20 remain significant unanswered questions in the present record.23 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// There 25 26 27 28 23 For example, it is not clear whether the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled for the entire claimed period of disability even if Dr. Mahta’s opinions were fully credited. See Luna v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010). 35 1 CONCLUSION 2 3 For all of the foregoing reasons,24 Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s 4 motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded 5 for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion. 6 7 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 8 9 DATED: May 20, 2020. 10 /s/ CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 24 The Court has not reached any other issue raised by Plaintiff except insofar as to determine that reversal with a directive for the immediate payment of benefits would not be appropriate at this time. 36

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