Adrienna Simpson v. Andrew Saul, No. 5:2019cv01782 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Autumn D. Spaeth. The decision of the Social Security Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. (see document for further details) (hr)
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Adrienna Simpson v. Andrew Saul Doc. 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ADRIENNA S., an Individual, 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. Case No.: 5:19-0 1782 ADS MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 14 ANDREW M. SAUL, Com m issioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 I. IN TROD U CTION 18 Plaintiff Adrienna S.1 (“Plaintiff”) challenges Defendant Andrew M. Saul, 19 Com m issioner of Social Security’s (hereinafter “Com m issioner” or “Defendant”) denial 20 of her applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB) and 21 supplem ental security incom e (“SSI”). Plaintiff contends that the Adm inistrative Law 22 23 24 1 Plaintiff’s nam e has been partially redacted in com pliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recom m endation of the Com m ittee on Court Adm inistration and Case Managem ent of the J udicial Conference of the United States. -1Dockets.Justia.com 1 J udge (“ALJ ”) im properly rejected her subjective sym ptom testim ony. For the reasons 2 stated below, the decision of the Com m issioner is affirm ed, and this m atter is dism issed 3 with prejudice. 4 II. 5 FACTS RELEVAN T TO TH E APPEAL Plaintiff reported that she last worked as a teacher’s aide for students ages 7 to 22 6 with behavioral issues and/ or autism . (Adm inistrative Record “AR” 41, 276). Plaintiff 7 com pleted a Work History Report stating that she worked in the capacity of teacher 8 from J uly 20 0 7 through May 20 15. (AR 276). At the adm inistrative hearing, Plaintiff 9 testified that she stopped working because she was laid off from her job and that she did 10 not try to find work thereafter because she then started to get “bad neck and back pains 11 and then started going to the doctor.” (AR 41). 12 Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on J une 9, 20 16, alleging a disability 13 onset date of May 22, 20 15. Plaintiff stated on her applications that she filed for 14 disability due to the following conditions: “osteoporosis in m y back; high blood 15 pressure; asthm a; isom onia[sic]; sciatic nerve; arthritis in neck; num bness in feet and 16 hands; headaches; and depression.” (AR 62-23). At the adm inistrative hearing, 17 Plaintiff testified that she did not attem pt to find em ploym ent after she was laid off in 18 May 20 15 because she had “[r]eal crucial pain in m y neck and that it would go into m y 19 shoulders and then it got into m y back.” Plaintiff, however, did not seek m edical care 20 for her m usculoskeletal com plaints until October 27, 20 15. (AR 21, 333-34). Indeed, 21 the m edical note from that visit indicated that she had not been seen since Septem ber 22 20 14. (AR 333-34). 23 When asked what other conditions would m ake it difficult for her to work full- 24 tim e, Plaintiff also testified of issues related to arthritis in her neck and back, a nerve -2- 1 condition in her left foot and both legs, high blood pressure, num bness in her feet and 2 hands, headaches, depression, inability to sit or stand for longer than 10 -15 m inutes at a 3 tim e and asthm a. (AR 43-46). Plaintiff stated that she has m ore bad days than good 4 days. (AR 48). Plaintiff also said that she does no chores, lives with her sister who does 5 alm ost everything around the house, and m ostly spends her days sleeping and watching 6 television (AR 48, 52-55). As for treatm ent, Plaintiff takes Tylenol for her headaches, 7 uses a cane, sees a psychiatrist for her depression, takes pain m edication, has had one 8 injection in her lower back and attended 3 physical therapy sessions before stopping. 9 (AR 45, 49-50 ). Plaintiff also stated that no doctor has recom m ended or spoken to her 10 about surgery, other than for fiber tum ors. (AR 51). 11 III. PROCEED IN GS BELOW 12 A. Pro ce d u ral H is to ry 13 Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for DIB and SSI on J une 9, 20 16, 14 alleging disability beginning May 22, 20 15. (AR 215-28, 233-34). Plaintiff’s claim s were 15 denied initially on Septem ber 22, 20 16 (AR 110 -14), and upon reconsideration on 16 Decem ber 8, 20 16 (AR 119-23). A hearing was held before ALJ J oel Tracy on Novem ber 17 16, 20 18. (AR 36-62). Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at the 18 hearing, as did vocational expert Gloria J . Lasoff. (Id.) 19 On December 27, 20 18, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was “not disabled” within the 20 m eaning of the Social Security Act.2 (AR 15-25). The ALJ ’s decision becam e the 21 Com m issioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for 22 23 24 2 Persons are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or m ental im pairm ent expected to result in death, or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 m onths. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). -3- 1 review on August 5, 20 19. (AR 1-6). Plaintiff then filed this action in District Court on 2 Septem ber 17, 20 19, challenging the ALJ ’s decision. [Dkt. No. 1]. On March 4, 20 20 , Defendant filed an Answer, as well as a copy of the Certified 3 4 Adm inistrative Record. [Dkt. Nos. 17, 18]. The parties filed a J oint Subm ission on J une 5 2, 20 20 . [Dkt. No. 19]. The case is ready for decision.3 6 B. Su m m ary o f ALJ D e cis io n Afte r H e arin g 7 In the decision (AR 15-25), the ALJ followed the required five-step sequential 8 evaluation process to assess whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security 9 Act.4 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1520 (a).5 At s te p o n e , the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been 10 engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 22, 20 15, the alleged onset date. (AR 11 17). At s te p tw o , the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe im pairm ents: (a) 12 obesity; (b) degenerative disc disease of the lum bar spine; (c) degenerative disc disease 13 of the thoracic spine; (d) cervical spinal stenosis; (e) asthm a, m ild and persistent; (f) 14 obstructive sleep apnea; and (g) bipolar disorder. (AR 17). At s te p th re e , the ALJ 15 found that Plaintiff “does not have an im pairm ent or com bination of im pairm ents that 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 3 The parties filed consents to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate J udge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), including for entry of final J udgm ent. [Dkt. Nos. 11, 12]. 4 The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether a claim ant is disabled: Step one: Is the claim ant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claim ant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. Step two: Does the claim ant have a “severe” im pairm ent? If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate. Step three: Does the claim ant’s im pairm ent or com bination of im pairm ents m eet or equal an im pairm ent listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 40 4, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claim ant is autom atically determ ined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. Step four: Is the claim ant capable of perform ing his past work? If so, the claim ant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. Step five: Does the claim ant have the residual functional capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claim ant is not disabled. If not, the claim ant is disabled. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 5 For sim plicity, the Court will only cite the DIB regulations, which are essentially parallel to the SSI regulations found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.90 0 -416.999. -4- 1 m eets or m edically equals the severity of one of the listed im pairm ents in 20 CFR Part 2 40 4, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 40 4.1520 (d), 40 4.1525 and 40 4.1526).” (AR 18). The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) 6 3 4 to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1567(b) 7, further restricted by the 5 following lim itations: occasionally reach overhead with the bilateral upper extrem ities; occasionally clim b ram ps and stairs; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and balance; can tolerate occasional exposure to pulm onary irritants such as dusts, gases fum es, and odors; never clim b ladders, ropes and scaffolds; m ust avoid extrem e cold; m ust avoid working at heights, unprotected places and around heavy m achinery with unguarded m oving parts; and she can understand, rem em ber and carry out sim ple, routine tasks and can occasionally interact with the general public. 6 7 8 9 10 11 (AR 20 ). At s te p fo u r, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant 12 13 work. (AR 23). At s te p five , considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience 14 and RFC, the ALJ found that “there are jobs that exist in significant num bers in the 15 national econom y that the [Plaintiff] can perform .” (AR 24). The ALJ accepted the 16 17 6 18 19 20 21 22 23 An RFC is what a claim ant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional lim itations. See 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1545(a)(1). 7 “Light work” is defined as lifting no m ore than 20 pounds at a tim e with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted m ay be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting m ost of the tim e with som e pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of perform ing a full or wide range of light work, you m ust have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1567(b); see also Rendon G. v. Berryhill, 20 19 WL 20 0 6688, at *3 n.6 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 20 19). 24 -5- 1 vocational expert’s testim ony that Plaintiff would be able to perform the representative 2 occupations of: m aterial distributor (DOT 230 .687-0 10 ); cleaner (DOT 323.687-0 14); 3 and assem bler (DOT 70 6.684-0 22). Accordingly, the ALJ determ ined that Plaintiff had 4 not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 22, 20 15, 5 through the date of the decision, Decem ber 27, 20 18. (AR 25). 6 IV. AN ALYSIS 7 A. Is s u e o n Ap p e al 8 Plaintiff raises one issue for review: whether the ALJ has properly considered 9 Plaintiff’s testim ony. [Dkt. No. 19 (J oint Subm ission), 4]. 10 B. Stan d ard o f Re vie w 11 A United States District Court m ay review the Com m issioner’s decision to deny 12 benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 40 5(g). The District Court is not a trier of the facts but 13 is confined to ascertaining by the record before it if the Com m issioner’s decision is 14 based upon substantial evidence. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 10 10 (9th Cir. 20 14) 15 (District Court’s review is lim ited to only grounds relied upon by ALJ ) (citing Connett v. 16 Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 20 0 3)). A court m ust affirm an ALJ ’s findings of 17 fact if they are supported by substantial evidence and if the proper legal standards were 18 applied. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 20 0 1). An ALJ can satisfy 19 the substantial evidence requirement “by setting out a detailed and thorough sum m ary 20 of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and 21 m aking findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation 22 om itted). 23 24 “[T]he Com m issioner’s decision cannot be affirm ed sim ply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court m ust consider the record as a whole, -6- 1 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the Secretary’s 2 conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 10 33, 10 35 (9th Cir. 20 0 1) (citations and 3 internal quotation m arks om itted). “‘Where evidence is susceptible to m ore than one 4 rational interpretation,’ the ALJ ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. Com m ’r of Soc. 5 Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 40 0 F.3d 676, 679 6 (9th Cir. 20 0 5)); see Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Adm in., 466 F.3d 880 , 882 (9th Cir. 20 0 6) (“If 7 the evidence can support either affirm ing or reversing the ALJ ’s conclusion, we m ay not 8 substitute our judgm ent for that of the ALJ .”). However, the Court m ay review only “the 9 reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determ ination and m ay not affirm the ALJ 10 on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 11 20 0 7) (citation om itted). 12 Lastly, even if an ALJ errs, the decision will be affirm ed where such error is 13 harm less, that is, if it is “inconsequential to the ultim ate nondisability determ ination,” 14 or if “the agency’s path m ay reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains its 15 decision with less than ideal clarity.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 80 6 F.3d 487, 492 (9th 16 Cir. 20 15) (citation omitted); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 110 4, 1115 (9th Cir. 20 12). 17 C. W h e th e r th e ALJ Pro p e rly Evalu ate d Plain tiff’s Te s tim o n y 18 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ im perm issibly rejected her subjective sym ptom 19 testim ony. Defendant, on the other hand, contends the ALJ properly evaluated 20 Plaintiff’s subjective statem ents, finding them inconsistent with the record. 21 22 1. Legal Standard for Evaluating Claim ant’s Testim ony A claim ant carries the burden of producing objective m edical evidence of his or 23 her im pairm ents and showing that the im pairm ents could reasonably be expected to 24 produce som e degree of the alleged sym ptom s. Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 -7- 1 F.3d 10 30 , 10 40 (9th Cir. 20 0 3). Once the claim ant m eets that burden, m edical 2 findings are not required to support the alleged severity of pain. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 3 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Light v. Soc. Sec. Adm in., 119 F.3d 4 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (“claim ant need not present clinical or diagnostic evidence to 5 support the severity of his pain”) (citation omitted)). Defendant does not contest, and 6 thus appears to concede, that Plaintiff carried her burden of producing objective m edical 7 evidence of her im pairm ents and showing that the im pairm ents could reasonably be 8 expected to produce som e degree of the alleged sym ptom s. 9 Once a claim ant has m et the burden of producing objective m edical evidence, an 10 ALJ can reject the claim ant’s subjective complaint “only upon (1) finding evidence of 11 m alingering, or (2) expressing clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Benton, 331 12 F.3d at 10 40 . To discredit a claimant's sym ptom testim ony when the claim ant has 13 provided objective m edical evidence of the im pairm ents which m ight reasonably 14 produce the sym ptom s or pain alleged and there is no evidence of m alingering, the ALJ 15 “m ay reject the claim ant’s testim ony about the severity of those sym ptom s only by 16 providing specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Brown-Hunter, 80 6 F.3d 17 at 489 (“we require the ALJ to specify which testim ony she finds not credible, and then 18 provide clear and convincing reasons, supported by evidence in the record, to support 19 that credibility determ ination”); Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 20 17). 20 The ALJ m ay consider at least the following factors when weighing the claim ant’s 21 credibility: (1) his or her reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies either in the 22 claim ant’s testim ony or between the claim ant’s testim ony and his or her conduct; (3) his 23 or her daily activities; (4) his or her work record; and (5) testim ony from physicians and 24 third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the sym ptom s of which she -8- 1 com plains. Thom as v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 948, 958-59 (9th Cir. 20 0 2) (citing Light, 119 2 F.3d at 792). “If the ALJ ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 3 record, [the court] m ay not engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 959 (citing Morgan v. 4 Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 60 0 (9th Cir. 1999)). 5 2. The ALJ provided Clear and Convincing Reasons Supported by Substantial Evidence 6 7 Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the ALJ provided 8 specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective com plaints. 8 9 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective com plaints were not entirely consistent with 10 the m edical evidence of record, Plaintiff’s lim ited and conservative treatm ent and the 11 m edical opinion evidence. (AR 20 -23). 12 Im portant to note, the ALJ did not entirely reject Plaintiff’s testim ony concerning 13 her pain, sym ptom s, and level of lim itation. The ALJ stated that he had considered 14 Plaintiff’s testim ony in lim iting her work at the less than light exertional level, which 15 was less than had been assessed by one of the State agency m edical exam iners. (AR 23, 16 63-72). Accordingly, the ALJ included lim itations in Plaintiff’s RFC that she only 17 occasionally “reach overhead with the bilateral upper extrem ities”, “clim b ram ps and 18 stairs”, “stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and balance”, and “tolerate exposure to pulm onary 19 irritants such as dusts, gases, fum es and odors.” (AR 20 ). The ALJ further lim ited 20 Plaintiff in that she “can never clim b ladders, ropes and scaffolds”, “m ust avoid extrem e 21 cold”, “avoid working at heights, unprotected places and around heavy m achinery with 22 unguarded parts.” (Id.) In order to accom m odate Plaintiff’s asserted m ental 23 24 8 The ALJ did not m ake a finding of m alingering in his opinion. (AR 15-25). -9- 1 im pairm ents, the ALJ also included that Plaintiff “can understand, rem em ber, and carry 2 out sim ple, routine tasks and can occasionally interact with the general public.” (Id.). 3 The ALJ did a thorough sum m ary of Plaintiff’s subjective sym ptom testim ony 4 and then noted that while Plaintiff’s m edically determ inable im pairm ents could be 5 reasonably expected to cause these sym ptom s, Plaintiff’s statem ents concerning “the 6 intensity, persistence and lim iting effects of these sym ptom s are not entirely consistent 7 with the m edical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 21). The ALJ then set 8 forth a detailed review of Plaintiff’s m edical records, noting initially that the first 9 m edical record in evidence is from an office visit on October 27, 20 15, which “indicated 10 the [Plaintiff] was reestablishing care since she had not been seen since Septem ber 11 20 14.” (AR 21, citing AR 333-34). The ALJ discussed in detail the findings of m edical 12 records related to Plaintiff’s m usculoskeletal com plaints, asthm a, pain m anagem ent, 13 MRI reports, injections, physical therapy, arthritis and sleep issues. (AR 21, 22). The 14 ALJ found that the records case doubt on the consistency of Plaintiff’s allegations. (AR 15 22). Notably, Plaintiff does not now raise any issue with the ALJ ’s review and analysis 16 of the m edical records. Nor does the Plaintiff cite to any evidence to contradict the 17 ALJ ’s analysis and findings of these records. 18 It was proper for the ALJ to consider how consistent Plaintiff’s subjective 19 sym ptom statem ents were with this objective m edical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 20 40 4.1529(c)(2). This could not be the ALJ ’s sole reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s 21 statem ents about her sym ptom s, but it was a factor that the ALJ is perm itted to 22 consider. Id.; see also Burch, 40 0 F.3d at 681 (“Although lack of m edical evidence 23 cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testim ony, it is a factor that the ALJ can 24 consider in his credibility analysis.”); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. -10 - 1 20 0 1) (while a claim ant’s subjective statem ents about sym ptom ology “cannot be 2 rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective m edical 3 evidence, the m edical evidence is still a relevant factor”). Thus, the lack of consistency 4 between Plaintiff’s m edical records and her testim ony was a proper basis for the ALJ ’s 5 discounting Plaintiff’s testim ony. 6 The ALJ also found doubt with Plaintiff’s alleged severe and disabling pain, given 7 that Plaintiff’s m edical record “is relatively sparse.” “The [Plaintiff] has not sought the 8 type of treatm ent one would expect of a totally disabled individual.” The ALJ noted: Given the allegations of such severe and disabling im pairm ents, one m ight expect to see a great level of intervention and/ or m ore aggressive treatm ent options. On the contrary, what few m edical records are available indicate a rather m ild and conservative course of treatm ent in the form of m edical m anagem ent. This suggests that the [Plaintiff] m ay have exaggerated her sym ptom s and their true lim itations. 9 10 11 12 13 14 (AR 22). An ALJ m ay properly consider Plaintiff’s treatm ent history in analyzing her 15 asserted sym ptom s. 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1529(c)(3)(iv),(v),(vi) (factors relevant to a 16 claim ant’s sym ptom s, such as pain, which the Com m issioner will consider include 17 m edication taken to alleviate sym ptom s; treatm ent received for pain; and m easures 18 used to relieve pain); see also Burch, 40 0 F.3d at 681 (holding that “ALJ is perm itted to 19 consider lack of treatm ent in his credibility determ ination”); Moncada v. Chater, 60 20 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1995) (claim ant’s allegations of disabling pain can be discredited 21 by evidence of infrequent m edical treatm ent or by the m inim al use of pain m edication). 22 The ALJ pointed out that “in Septem ber 20 18 a specialist diagnosed the claim ant with 23 degenerative changes in the cervical spine with axial sym ptom s that he did not 24 recom m end surgery for; however, continued conservative m easures were suggested.” -11- 1 (AR 22, citing AR 70 3-0 4). Plaintiff contends that her treatm ent is not conservative as 2 she has undergone injections and takes pain m edication. 9 Plaintiff, however, testified 3 that she has had only one injection as she claim ed it did not provide her any relief. (AR 4 51). Plaintiff also testified that she only attended physical therapy on three occasions as 5 she also found no relief from the sessions. (Id.). The taking of pain m edication and 6 som e physical therapy, however, does not render erroneous the ALJ ’s finding that 7 Plaintiff’s treatm ent was conservative. See J ones v. Com m ’r of Soc. Sec., 20 14 WL 8 228590 , *7-10 (E.D. Cal. J an. 21, 20 14) (ALJ properly found Plaintiff’s treatm ent 9 conservative, which included physical therapy, both anti-inflam m atory and narcotic 10 m edications, use of a TENS unit, occasional epidural steroid injections, and m assage 11 therapy, dim inished her credibility); Higinio v. Colvin, 20 14 WL 47935, *5 (C.D. Cal. 12 J an. 7, 20 14) (holding that, despite the fact that the claim ant had been prescribed 13 narcotic medication at various tim es, the claim ant’s treatm ent as a whole was 14 conservative); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 20 0 7) (finding that proof of 15 “conservative treatm ent is sufficient to discount a claim ant's testim ony regarding 16 severity of an im pairm ent”); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding 17 that an ALJ can rely on a physician’s failure “ to prescribe… any serious m edical 18 treatm ent for [a claim ant’s] supposedly excruciating pain”). 19 20 The ALJ also properly considered that the m edical opinion evidence, finding Plaintiff capable of perform ing light work, also contradicted Plaintiff’s sym ptom 21 22 23 24 9 Plaintiff is correct that her receipt of an epidural injection does not necessarily qualify as conservative treatment. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 10 15 n.20 (9th Cir. 20 14) (expressing “doubt that epidural steroid shots to the neck and lower back qualify as ‘conservative’ m edical treatm ent”). This one injection, however, without m ore, does not change the fact that Plaintiff’s care was overall lim ited and conservative, as expressed by the ALJ . -12- 1 testim ony. (AR 23). See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2 20 0 8) (finding that the m edical evidence, including the opinions of two physicians that 3 a claim ant could work, supported the ALJ ’s credibility determ ination); Moncada, 60 4 F.3d at 524 (an ALJ m ay consider physician opinions that claim ant could work, which 5 contradict claim ant’s assertion to the contrary). Plaintiff m akes no challenge of the 6 ALJ ’s findings of the m edical opinions he relied on in his decision (AR 23) and therefore 7 concedes the ALJ ’s reliance on this evidence. See Carm ickle v. Soc. Sec. Adm in., 533 8 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 20 0 8) (declining to address credibility factor that plaintiff 9 failed to argue with any specificity in his briefing); Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 10 973 (9th Cir. 20 0 6) (claim ant waived issues not raised before the district court); Owens 11 v. Colvin, 20 14 WL 560 2884, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 20 14) (claim ant’s failure to discuss, 12 or even acknowledge, ALJ ’s reliance on certain reasons waived any challenge to those 13 aspects of ALJ ’s finding). 14 Based on these clear, convincing and specific reasons for partially rejecting 15 Plaintiff’s pain and lim itations testim ony and the substantial evidence to support his 16 determ ination, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not com m it error in discounting 17 Plaintiff’s testim ony. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 -13- 1 2 V. CON CLU SION For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Social Security Com m issioner is 3 AFFIRMED, and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice. J udgment shall be entered 4 accordingly. 5 6 DATE: Novem ber 12, 20 20 7 8 / s/ Autum n D. Spaeth THE HONORABLE AUTUMN D. SPAETH United States Magistrate J udge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 -14-
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