Shannon C. Strnad v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 5:2019cv00874 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2020)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Walsh. For these reasons, the Agency's decision is affirmed and the case is dismissed with prejudice. (es)

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Shannon C. Strnad v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SHANNON C. S., Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 13 14 ANDREW M. SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. 15 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. ED CV 19-874-PJW MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 17 I. 18 INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff appeals a decision by Defendant Social Security 20 Administration (“the Agency”), denying her application for 21 Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). 22 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred when he determined that she 23 could perform the jobs of marker and cleaner. 24 explained below, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s finding that 25 Plaintiff could perform the job of marker is supported by substantial 26 evidence and, therefore, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed.1 She contends that the For the reasons 27 28 1 Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of the Social Security (continued...) Dockets.Justia.com 1 II. 2 SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS In July 2013, Plaintiff was found to be disabled due to affective 3 4 and anxiety disorders. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 112-121.) In 5 February 2017, the Agency conducted a continuing disability review and 6 determined that Plaintiff was no longer disabled. 7 180.) 8 (AR 181-197.) 9 testified at the hearing. (AR 141-148, 177- Plaintiff requested and was granted a hearing before an ALJ. In May 2018, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and (AR 46-47, 67-78.) That same month, the 10 ALJ found that Plaintiff was no longer disabled. (AR 10-24.) 11 Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied review. 12 1-3.) (AR She then filed the instant action. 13 III. 14 ANALYSIS The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform fast-paced 15 16 work. (AR at 19.) Despite this limitation, he found that she could 17 perform the job of marker (i.e., someone who attaches price tags to 18 products in a store). 19 erred in doing so because the marker job requires frequent handling 20 and reaching as well as “repetitive or short-cycle work,” both of 21 which Plaintiff equates with fast-paced work. 22 Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) No. 209.587-034.) 23 argument is rejected. 24 frequent handling and reaching or “repetitive or short-cycle work” as 25 fast-paced. (AR 24, 78-82.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ (Joint Stip. at 8; There is nothing in the DOT that defines See DOT No. 209.587-034. Nor has Plaintiff cited to any 26 27 1 28 This (...continued) Administration, is substituted in as the defendant. 2 1 case law to support her argument that the requirements are 2 interchangeable with fast-paced work. Plaintiff looks for support in the Social Security 3 4 Administration’s Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”). As she 5 points out, POMS specifies that unskilled work, like the job of 6 marker, is to be performed “at a consistent pace without an 7 unreasonable number and length of rest periods.” 8 8-9.) 9 paced work. (Joint Stip. at In Plaintiff’s view, this description translates into fastHere, again, the Court disagrees. To begin with, POMS is 10 not binding on the ALJ or the Court. 11 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Lockwood v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 12 616 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010)). 13 authority and it does not describe the job of marker as fast-paced. 14 See Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding 15 DOT is the rebuttable presumptive authority on job classifications). 16 Second, even assuming that POMS was controlling, it would not mandate 17 reversal here because the POMS section cited by Plaintiff describes 18 the mental abilities needed for the job, not the physical abilities, 19 which is Plaintiff’s focus in the case at bar. 20 25020.010(B)(3)(I). 21 Shaibi v. Berryhill, 870 F.3d The DOT is the presumptive POMS DI Plaintiff argues that the Court should rely on its common 22 experience to conclude that most people would consider the marker job 23 fast-paced. 24 argument persuasive. 25 markers and has no idea what most people would think about the pace of 26 the work. 27 will uphold the ALJ’s reliance on the DOT and the vocational expert to 28 conclude that Plaintiff could perform the work of a marker. (Joint Stip. at 9.) The Court does not find this The Court has had limited experience with In the absence of such contradictory experience, the Court 3 Further,

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