Laureen May Ralls v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 5:2018cv02197 - Document 22 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar. The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (See Order for complete details) (afe)
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Laureen May Ralls v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LAUREEN MAY RALLS, Plaintiff, 12 MEMORANDUM OPINION v. 13 14 CASE NO. ED CV 18-2197 AS ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security,1 AND ORDER OF REMAND 15 Defendant. 16 17 For the reasons discussed below, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, 18 pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this matter is 19 remanded for further administrative action consistent with this 20 Opinion. 21 22 PROCEEDINGS 23 24 On October 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking 25 review of the denial of her application for Disability Insurance 26 1 27 28 Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for his predecessor. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Dockets.Justia.com 1 Benefits. 2 before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. 3 9-11). 4 the Administrative Record (“AR”). 5 filed a Joint Stipulation (“Joint Stip.”) on July 24, 2019, setting 6 forth their respective positions regarding Plaintiff’s claims. 7 (Dkt. No. 21). (Dkt. No. 1). The parties have consented to proceed (Dkt. Nos. On March 25, 2019, Defendant filed an Answer along with (Dkt. Nos. 17-18). The parties 8 9 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 10 11 On March 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for 12 Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to Title II of the 13 Social Security Act (the “Act”) alleging a disability onset date 14 of September 18, 2008. 15 Plaintiff’s application initially and on reconsideration. 16 97). 17 testified 18 Fernandez (the “ALJ”). 19 from Gregory S. Jones, an impartial vocational expert (“VE”). 20 64-69; see id. 238-40). (AR 83, 172). The Commissioner denied (AR 72- On February 28, 2017, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, at a hearing before Administrative (AR 38-71). Law Judge Laura The ALJ also heard testimony (AR 21 22 On July 3, 2017, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s request for 23 benefits. 24 the ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff has not engaged in 25 substantial gainful activity from September 18, 2008, her alleged 26 onset date, through December 31, 2013, her date last insured. 27 17). At step two, the ALJ found that through the date last insured, 28 Plaintiff’s irritable bowel syndrome, osteoporosis, cervical spine (AR 15-25). Applying the five-step sequential process, 2 (AR 1 degenerative 2 disorder were severe impairments.2 3 ALJ determined that through the date last insured, Plaintiff did 4 not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or 5 medically equaled the severity of any of the listings enumerated 6 in the regulations.3 disc disease, depressive disorder, (AR 17). and anxiety At step three, the (AR 18). 7 8 The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity 9 (“RFC”)4 and concluded that through the date last insured, she had 10 the capacity to perform medium work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. 11 § 404.1567(c),5 except: 12 13 [Plaintiff] was able to sit, stand, or walk for 6 hours 14 each in an 8-hour day; she was able to engage in frequent 15 postural activities but was limited to occasional 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2 The ALJ found that through the date last insured, Plaintiff’s temporomandibular joint disorder did not cause more than a minimal limitation on Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities and is therefore nonsevere. (AR 17-18). 3 Specifically, the ALJ considered whether Plaintiff met the criteria of Listings 1.04 (disorders of the spine), 5.06 (inflammatory bowel disease), 5.08 (weight loss due to any digestive disorder), 12.04 (depressive, bipolar and related disorders), or 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders) and concluded that she did not. (AR 18-19). 4 24 25 26 27 28 A Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). 5 “Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. If someone can do medium work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary and light work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c). 3 1 climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and she was 2 limited to performing simple and routine tasks with only 3 occasional public contact. 4 5 (AR 19). 6 insured, Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. 7 (AR 8 experience, and the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined at step five 9 that through the date last insured, there were jobs that existed 10 in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could 11 have performed, including hand packager, laundry laborer, and 12 industrial cleaner. 13 Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined in the Act from 14 September 18, 2008, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 15 2013, the date last insured. At step four, the ALJ found that through the date last 23-24). Based on Plaintiff’s (AR 24-25). RFC, age, education, work Accordingly, the ALJ found that (AR 25). 16 17 The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on 18 August 30, 2018. (AR 1-6). 19 the ALJ’s decision, which stands as the final decision of the 20 Commissioner. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c). 21 22 STANDARD OF REVIEW 23 24 This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine 25 if: (1) the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial 26 evidence; and (2) the Commissioner used proper legal standards. 27 U.S.C § 405(g); see Carmickle v. Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th 28 Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). 4 42 1 “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a 2 preponderance.” 3 1998). 4 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 5 1074; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). 6 determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, “a court 7 must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that 8 supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] 9 conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. It is relevant evidence “which a reasonable person might Hoopai, 499 F. 3d at To Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 10 2001) (citation omitted); see Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 11 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (inferences “reasonably drawn from the record” 12 can constitute substantial evidence). 13 14 This Court “may not affirm [the Commissioner’s] decision 15 simply by isolating a specific quantum of support evidence, but 16 must also consider evidence that detracts from [the Commissioner’s] 17 conclusion.” 18 (citation omitted). 19 supported by substantial evidence, even though there may exist 20 other 21 Richardson, 484 F.2d 59, 60 (9th Cir. 1973). 22 reasonably 23 [Commissioner’s] conclusion, [a] court may not substitute its 24 judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” 25 720-21 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 915 (9th Cir. 1987) evidence However, the Court cannot disturb findings supporting support Plaintiff’s either claim. affirming 26 27 28 5 See Torske v. “If the evidence can or reversing the Reddick, 157 F.3d 715, 1 DISCUSSION 2 3 Plaintiff raises two claims for relief: (1) whether the ALJ 4 properly 5 Plaintiff’s claim of disability in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC; and 6 (2) whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s subjective 7 statements in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. 8 16). 9 as a whole, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims of error warrant 10 considered relevant medical evidence supportive of (Joint Stip. at 4-9, 12- After consideration of the parties’ arguments and the record remand for further consideration. 11 12 A. ALJ’s RFC Assessment Is Not Supported By Substantial Evidence 13 14 “A claimant’s residual functional capacity is what he can 15 still do despite his physical, mental, nonexertional, and other 16 limitations.” 17 Cir. 1989) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545). 18 requires the ALJ to consider a claimant’s impairments and any 19 related symptoms that may “cause physical and mental limitations 20 that affect what [he] can do in a work setting.” 21 §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). In determining a claimant’s RFC, 22 the 23 functional capacity assessments made by consultative examiners, 24 State 25 §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 26 416.913(c). ALJ Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th considers Agency all relevant physicians, and 416.945(a)(3); 27 28 6 evidence, An RFC assessment including medical experts. see id. also 20 C.F.R. 20 residual C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(c), 1 In her decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retains the RFC 2 to perform a limited range of medium work. 3 through the date last insured, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff 4 was able to “lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds 5 frequently; . . . sit, stand, or walk for 6 hours each in an 8- 6 hour day; . . . engage in frequent postural activities but was 7 limited to occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.” 8 (AR 19). 9 medical (AR 14). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “selectively utilized evidence . . . to support her determination that 10 [Plaintiff] is capable of performing and persisting at medium work 11 activity while simultaneously minimizing or ignoring other evidence 12 which is . . . supportive of Plaintiff’s claim of disability.” 13 (Joint Stip. at 5; see id. at 8). The Court agrees. 14 15 In determining that Plaintiff was capable of medium work, the 16 ALJ 17 physicians. 18 functional capacity assessments from [the] State agency medical 19 consultants”). 20 the State agency medical consultants, may serve as substantial 21 evidence only when their opinions “are consistent with independent 22 clinical findings or other evidence in the record.” 23 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); cf. Neugebauer v. 24 Barnhart, 154 F. App’x 649, 650 (9th Cir. 2005) (“the ALJ was free 25 to rely on non-treating agency physician reports that contained 26 specific clinical support”). 27 do not reference any clinical findings or other medical evidence 28 in support of their conclusion that Plaintiff is capable of lifting relied exclusively on the opinions of the State agency (AR 22) (giving “great weight to the medium residual But the opinions of non-examining physicians, like Thomas v. The State agency medical consultants 7 1 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently. 2 AR 75-76, 87-88). Indeed, the medical consultants recommended that 3 a 4 current severity of [Plaintiff’s] impairments.” 5 While the Agency ordered a complete psychiatric evaluation (AR 694- 6 97), no physical consultative examination was ordered.6 consultative examination was necessary “to (See generally establish [the] (AR 74, 87). 7 8 While 9 musculoskeletal the ALJ vaguely mentions examinations and “consistently “minimal normal” symptoms of 10 musculoskeletal pain or limitations” (AR 22), these findings do 11 not establish that a woman over 55 years of age is capable of 12 lifting 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently.7 13 at least one normative study found that most women over the age of 14 50 are unable to lift more than 40 pounds. 15 al., Age and Gender Normative Data for Lift Capacity 265 (2013).8 16 A 17 cervical spinal degenerative disc disease, which the ALJ found were 18 severe impairments, would likely have a strength deficit. Further, 19 throughout the relevant time period, Plaintiff had poor exercise 20 habits (AR 253, 259, 263, 274, 428, 898) and was consistently person, like Plaintiff, who suffers Indeed, Leonard A. Matheson et from osteoporosis and 21 6 22 23 24 25 While a physical consultative examination would likely have been performed a few months after Plaintiff’s date last insured, it still would have provided significant, circumstantial evidence of Plaintiff’s physical impairments prior to her date last insured. 7 Plaintiff turned 55 on July 17, 2013, several months prior to her date last insured. (AR 172). 26 8 27 28 A copy of the study is available at <https://content. iospress.com/download/work/wor01671?id=work%2Fwor01671> (last visited Aug. 8, 2019). 8 1 overweight (AR 247, 254, 259, 274, 280, 283, 286, 392, 401, 404, 2 406, 408, 425, 433, 893, 898). 3 was obese. (AR 909). This evidence, which the ALJ did not discuss, 4 undermines her conclusion that Plaintiff was capable of a medium 5 level of exertion. 6 unfavorable to the claimant while ignoring evidence favorable to 7 the claimant.” 8 2016) (citing Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 9 2014)). Indeed, by August 2013, Plaintiff “[A]n ALJ may not pick and choose evidence Cox v. Colvin, 639 F. App’x 476, 477 (9th Cir. 10 11 In sum, the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by 12 substantial evidence.9 13 relevant evidence in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC and in deciding 14 whether Plaintiff truly was capable of medium work. On remand, the ALJ shall consider all 15 16 B. The ALJ Failed To Provide Specific, Clear, and Convincing 17 Reasons 18 Testimony for Rejecting Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom 19 20 Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he ALJ has simply opted to ignore 21 Plaintiff’s subjective statements . . . in order to arrive at her 22 determination 23 activity.” that Plaintiff is persisting at medium work (Joint Stip. at 13). 24 25 26 9 27 28 Defendant did not address Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s physical RFC assessment was not supported by substantial evidence. (Joint Stip. at 9-12). 9 1 Plaintiff’s testimony indicated an inability to consistently 2 perform at a medium level of exertion. 3 husband takes care of most of the household chores, including 4 cleaning, vacuuming, and shopping. 5 able to lift and carry one or two gallons of milk, but if she 6 overexerts herself, she gets shoulder pain. 7 twice a month, she is able to help her husband bring in the 8 groceries. 9 and she has trouble with protein absorption and maintaining muscle 10 mass. (AR 55). She testified that her (AR 49). On occasion, she is (AR 54). Once or Plaintiff suffers from severe osteoporosis, (AR 47). 11 12 When assessing a claimant’s credibility regarding subjective 13 pain or intensity of symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step 14 analysis. 15 First, the ALJ must determine if there is medical evidence of an 16 impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms alleged. 17 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). 18 analysis, the claimant is not required to show that her impairment 19 could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom 20 she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have 21 caused some degree of the symptom.” 22 (citation omitted). “Nor must a claimant produce objective medical 23 evidence of the pain or fatigue itself, or the severity thereof.” 24 Id. (citation omitted). Trevizo v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). “In this Id. (emphasis in original) 25 26 If the claimant satisfies this first step, and there is no 27 evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and 28 convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony about 10 1 the symptom severity. 2 see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (“[T]he ALJ may reject the 3 claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms only 4 if he makes specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons 5 for doing so.”); Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 6 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering 7 based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find an 8 applicant 9 credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.”). 10 “This is not an easy requirement to meet: The clear and convincing 11 standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.” 12 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (citation omitted). not Trevizo, 874 F.3d at 678 (citation omitted); credible by making specific findings as to 13 14 15 In discrediting the claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ may consider the following: 16 17 (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such 18 as 19 inconsistent 20 other testimony by the claimant that appears less than 21 candid; 22 failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed 23 course 24 activities. the claimant’s (2) of reputation statements concerning unexplained treatment; for or and (3) the lying, symptoms, inadequately the prior and explained claimant’s daily 25 26 Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163 (citation omitted). 27 between 28 contradictions in the claimant’s testimony, also may be relevant. a claimant’s testimony 11 and Inconsistencies conduct, or internal 1 Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014); Light v. 2 Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). 3 the ALJ may consider the observations of treating and examining 4 physicians 5 restrictions caused by the claimant’s symptoms. 6 at 1284; accord Burrell, 775 F.3d at 1137. 7 for an ALJ to reject subjective testimony based “solely” on its 8 inconsistencies with the objective medical evidence presented. 9 Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 10 regarding, among other matters, the In addition, functional Smolen, 80 F.3d However, it is improper 2009) (citation omitted). 11 12 Further, the ALJ must make a credibility determination with 13 findings that are “sufficiently specific to permit the court to 14 conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s 15 testimony.” 16 2008) (citation omitted); see Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 17 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A finding that a claimant’s testimony is not 18 credible must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court 19 to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on 20 permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s 21 testimony regarding pain.”) (citation omitted). 22 interpretation of a claimant’s testimony may not be the only 23 reasonable one, if it is supported by substantial evidence, “it is 24 not [the court’s] role to second-guess it.” 25 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. Although an ALJ’s Rollins v. Massanari, 26 27 In rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony of exertional limitations, 28 the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff has a history of osteoporosis 12 1 and degenerative changes in the cervical spine with disc space 2 narrowing. 3 “musculoskeletal 4 Plaintiff “received minimal treatment” for her cervical spine 5 issues. 6 that the ALJ’s conclusions are contrary to law and not supported 7 by clear and convincing evidence. 8 (The clear and convincing standard is “the most demanding required 9 in Social Security cases” and “is not an easy requirement to meet.”) 10 (AR 22). Nevertheless, examinations (AR 22). were the ALJ emphasized consistently normal” that and After careful consideration, the Court finds See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (citation omitted). 11 12 The ALJ’s decision is not “sufficiently specific to permit 13 the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit 14 claimant’s testimony.” 15 omitted). 16 examinations and minimal treatment targeting Plaintiff’s cervical 17 spine issues undermine Plaintiff’s testimony that she can only 18 occasionally lift and carry a gallon or two of milk or bag of 19 groceries. 20 failed to identify specifically which of Brown–Hunter’s statements 21 she found not credible and why.”); Knape v. Berryhill, 734 F. App’x 22 500, 501 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The ALJ failed to identify the parts of 23 Knape’s mental health symptom testimony he found not credible and 24 failed to provide any links to the record.”); Fritz v. Berryhill, 25 685 F. App’x 585, 586 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he ALJ did not identify 26 what 27 Fritz’s complaints.”). 28 over It is not at all clear how normal musculoskeletal See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493 (“The ALJ . . . testimony the Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (citation age was of not 55 credible and what evidence undermined As discussed above, an overweight woman with severe 13 irritable bowel syndrome, 1 osteoporosis, and cervical spine degenerative disc disease can have 2 unremarkable musculoskeletal examinations and still be unable to 3 perform medium work. 4 physical subjective statements “is not the sort of explanation or 5 the kind of ‘specific reasons’ [this Court] must have in order to 6 review the ALJ’s decision meaningfully, so that [the Court] may 7 ensure 8 discredited.” 9 never addressed Plaintiff’s testimony that she has trouble with 10 that the The ALJ’s cursory discussion of Plaintiff’s claimant’s testimony was Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494. not arbitrarily Critically, the ALJ protein absorption and maintaining muscle mass. 11 12 Further, the ALJ’s reliance on objective medical evidence is 13 insufficient 14 testimony. 15 evidence can be a factor that the ALJ may consider when evaluating 16 a 17 rejecting a claimant’s subjective testimony. 18 1227; Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005); Rollins, 19 261 F.3d at 857. 20 the ALJ does not clearly dispute Plaintiff’s subjective statements 21 regarding her exertional limitations. 22 noted, the ALJ does not clearly and convincingly explain how normal 23 musculoskeletal 24 ability to perform medium work. to undermine While claimant’s Plaintiff’s inconsistencies credibility, it with cannot subjective the be symptom objective the sole medical ground for Bray, 554 F.3d at In any event, the objective evidence cited by examinations For example, as already necessarily translates into the to clear and convincing evidence, for rejecting 25 26 In sum, 27 reasons, 28 Plaintiff’s the ALJ supported by subjective failed provide substantial symptoms. 14 The matter is remanded for 1 further 2 Plaintiff’s symptoms in accordance with SSR 16-3p, taking into 3 account the full range of medical evidence. proceedings. On remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate 4 5 C. Remand Is Warranted 6 7 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or 8 order an immediate award of benefits is within the district court’s 9 discretion. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 10 2000). 11 administrative proceedings, or where the record has been fully 12 developed, it is appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct 13 an immediate award of benefits. 14 whether to remand for further proceedings turns upon the likely 15 utility of such proceedings.”). 16 circumstances of the case suggest that further administrative 17 review 18 appropriate. 19 Harman, 211 F.3d at 1179-81; see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 20 (cautioning that “the credit-as-true rule may not be dispositive 21 of the remand question in all cases”); cf. Treichler v. Comm’r of 22 Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he 23 record raises crucial questions as to the extent of Treichler’s 24 impairment given inconsistencies between his testimony and the 25 medical evidence in the record. 26 issues 27 proceedings.”). Where could that no useful remedy purpose the would be served by further Id. at 1179 (“[T]he decision of However, where, as here, the Commissioner’s errors, remand is McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011); should be remanded 28 15 These are exactly the sort of to the agency for further 1 Since the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s RFC, 2 remand is warranted. 3 that Plaintiff was truly capable of lifting and carrying 50 pounds 4 occasionally 5 affirmatively establish that Plaintiff is disabled. 6 therefore appropriate. and 25 However, if the ALJ properly demonstrates pounds frequently, the record does not Remand is 7 8 ORDER 9 10 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner 11 is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings 12 pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 13 14 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 15 16 DATED: August 12, 2019 17 /S/ _________ ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16
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