Gladys Pacheco v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 5:2018cv01120 - Document 27 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Gail J. Standish. (See document for details). (ib)
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Gladys Pacheco v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No. 5:18-cv-01120-GJS GLADYS P.,1 12 Plaintiff 13 v. 14 ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security,2 15 MEMORANDUM, OPINION, AND ORDER Defendant. 16 17 I. 18 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 19 Plaintiff Gladys P. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint seeking review of the 20 decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for 21 Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). 22 The parties filed consents to proceed before the undersigned United States 23 Magistrate Judge [Dkts. 10 and 11] and briefs addressing disputed issues in the case 24 [Dkt. 18 (“Pl. Br.”), Dkt. 22 (“Def. Br.”)]. The matter is now ready for decision. 25 26 27 28 In the interest of privacy, this Order uses only the first name and the initial of the last name of the non-governmental party. 1 Andrew M. Saul, now Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, is substituted as defendant for Nancy A. Berryhill. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 2 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 3 For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that this matter should be affirmed. II. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION UNDER REVIEW Plaintiff filed applications for SSI and DIB alleging disability based primarily 4 on whole body pain, possible cirrhosis, and depression. [Dkt. 15, Administrative 5 Record (“AR”) 43.] Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially, on 6 reconsideration, and after a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 7 Dante Alegre [AR 1-6, 15-28.] 8 9 Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b)-(g)(1). At step one, the 10 ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 7, 11 2013, the alleged onset date. [AR 17.] At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 12 suffered from lumbar strain and generalized arthritis. [AR 17.] The ALJ 13 determined at step three that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 14 impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 15 impairments. [AR 22.] 16 Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity 17 (“RFC”) to perform the full range of medium work. [AR 22.] Applying this RFC, 18 the ALJ found at step four that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a 19 home health aide and a general clerk and thus she is not disabled. [AR 26.] 20 Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals Council denied, 21 making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. [AR 1-6.] This 22 appeal followed. 23 24 III. GOVERNING STANDARD Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 25 determine if: (1) the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence; 26 and (2) the Commissioner used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Comm’r 27 Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Brewes v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 28 Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). 2 1 “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it 2 is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 3 conclusion.” Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522-23 (9th Cir. 4 2014) (internal citations omitted). 5 The Court will uphold the Commissioner’s decision when the evidence is 6 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 7 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). However, the Court may review only the reasons stated 8 by the ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he 9 did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court will not 10 reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, which exists if 11 the error is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination, or if despite 12 the legal error, the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Brown-Hunter v. 13 Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations 14 omitted). IV. 15 DISCUSSION 16 A. The ALJ Properly Considered Step Two 17 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred at step two of the sequential evaluation 18 process by finding that she had no severe mental impairments. Plaintiff contends 19 that she has been consistently diagnosed with depression and prescribed a variety of 20 psychotropic medications including, Prozac, Seroquel, and Citalopram. [Dkt. 18 at 21 2-3.] Defendant argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that 22 Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment. [Dkt. 22 at 3-7.] 23 1. Federal Law 24 The Commissioner defines a severe impairment as “[a]n impairment or 25 combination of impairments . . . [that] significantly limit[s] your physical or mental 26 ability to do basic work activities,” including, inter alia: “understanding, carrying 27 out, and remembering simple instructions; use of judgment; responding 28 appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and dealing with 3 1 changes in a routine work setting.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522. “An impairment or 2 combination of impairments may be found not severe only if the evidence 3 establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an 4 individual’s ability to work.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) 5 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Step two “is a de 6 minimis screening device [used] to dispose of groundless claims, and an ALJ may 7 find that a claimant lacks a medically severe impairment or combination of 8 impairments only when his conclusion is clearly established by medical evidence.” 9 Id. (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The claimant 10 bears the burden of proof at step two. See Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 11 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001). Significantly, the Ninth Circuit has determined that “[t]he 12 mere existence of an impairment is insufficient proof of a disability.” Matthews v. 13 Shalala, 10 F.3d 678 (9th Cir. 1993). In other words, a medical diagnosis alone 14 does not make an impairment qualify as “severe.” 15 16 2. Analysis In this case, the ALJ made extensive findings to support his determination 17 that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe. First, the ALJ gave “great 18 weight” to the opinions of consultative physician, Earbin Stanicell, M.D., Board 19 Certified in psychiatry, who conducted a complete consultative psychiatric 20 evaluation of Plaintiff and the State Agency medical consultants who reviewed 21 Plaintiff’s medical records. These physicians concluded that Plaintiff’s mental 22 impairments were not severe. [AR 22.] In weighing this evidence, the ALJ found 23 that the consultative psychiatrist examined Plaintiff personally, and his assessment 24 was consistent with the longitudinal record. [AR 22.] Similarly, the ALJ noted that 25 the State Agency medical consultants’ opinions were consistent with the opinion of 26 Dr. Stanicell and there was nothing in the record to contradict their collective 27 findings that Plaintiff lacked a severe mental impairment. The ALJ found that their 28 assessments were supported by the record and other evidence demonstrating that 4 1 Plaintiff’s mental impairments caused no more than a mild limitation. AR 22. 2 Second, the ALJ gave detailed consideration to the four functional areas 3 known as the “paragraph B” criteria. AR 20-21. In the first functional area 4 examining Plaintiff’s ability to understand, remember, or apply information, the 5 ALJ found no limitation. The ALJ found that throughout the record, Plaintiff was 6 noted to be alert and oriented with an adequate fund of knowledge. [AR 20.] In the 7 second area, social functioning, the ALJ found Plaintiff had no limitation. [AR 21.] 8 The ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s relationship with her family is okay, she grocery 9 shops and goes to church, and she had no difficulty interacting with clinical staff or 10 the consultative examiner. [AR 21.] In the third functional area—concentration, 11 persistence, or pace—the ALJ found Plaintiff had a mild limitation. [AR 21.] The 12 ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s ability to concentrate was diminished by her “brain fog” 13 stemming from her depression. However, her thought processes were linear and 14 goal directed, she was able to perform serial threes and serial sevens and she could 15 spell the word “world” forwards and backwards. Further, during the hearing, 16 Plaintiff did not demonstrate any difficulty with understanding and she was able to 17 respond to questions appropriately and without delay. [AR 21.] In the last area, 18 adapting and managing oneself, the ALJ found Plaintiff experienced a mild 19 limitation because she had difficulty sleeping, crying spells, and intermittent suicidal 20 ideations. However, she had no problems with self-care, she could manage money 21 and she was able to maintain relationships with family and friends. Accordingly, 22 because Plaintiff’s mental impairments caused no more than “mild” limitation in 23 any area, the ALJ determined her mental impairments were not severe. [AR 21.] 24 Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s reliance on the “outdated” opinions of the 25 state agency reviewing physicians and the psychiatric consultative examiner Dr. 26 Stanciell because those opinions, provided in 2014, predate the clear worsening of 27 her mental impairments demonstrated in 2016. [Dkt. 18 at 3.] According to 28 5 1 Plaintiff, the ALJ should have focused on her 2016 medical records which show 2 frequent abnormal mental status examination findings and suicidal ideation. 3 The ALJ did not err in relying on the 2014 psychiatric opinions for two 4 reasons. First, Plaintiff’s symptoms, found to be mild, were consistent throughout 5 the record. For example, Plaintiff points to her “recent suicidal ideation in 2016” 6 and her more recent medical appointments where she was found to have a sad, 7 depressed, lethargic or slow affect as evidence that her depression worsened. [Dkt. 8 18 at 3; AR 443.] However, the findings from Dr. Stanciell’s 2014 consultative 9 examination included a review of Plaintiff’s “episodic suicidal thoughts” and her 10 “depressed and tearful mood.” [AR 20, 406.] Despite these objective findings, Dr. 11 Stanicell found that Plaintiff would have no more than mild limitations due to her 12 mental impairments. [AR 409.] Thus, the consistent symptoms of Plaintiff’s 13 depression demonstrated in both 2014 and 2016 were analyzed by Dr. Stanicell, but 14 ultimately found to be nonsevere. 15 Second, in addition to evaluating the medical opinion evidence, the ALJ 16 reviewed all of the medical evidence related to Plaintiff’s mental impairments from 17 2016. [AR 20.] The ALJ noted that despite Plaintiff’s continued struggle with 18 depression in April, May, and June 2016, medical records from her emergency room 19 visits in 2016 regularly noted that Plaintiff was oriented with a normal mood and 20 affect. [AR 20, 481.] The ALJ thus looked to the overall objective medical 21 evidence in the record when concluding that Plaintiff’s mental impairment did not 22 affect her ability to work. This was not error. 23 Finally, even assuming, without deciding, that the ALJ technically erred by 24 not finding Plaintiff’s mental impairments severe for the purposes of step two, such 25 error was harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 (“we may not reverse an ALJ’s 26 decision on account of an error that is harmless”). Here, because the ALJ found 27 other impairments to be severe at step two, he proceeded to subsequent steps of the 28 sequential disability evaluation process. [AR 22-28.] Then, when crafting 6 1 Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered the effect of all of her alleged limitations. See 2 Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (any error in failing to find an 3 impairment severe at step two is harmless if the ALJ considers any resulting 4 limitations in assessing a claimant’s RFC). Accordingly, the Court finds no 5 prejudicial error at step two. 6 B. The ALJ Properly Considered the Treating Physician’s Opinion 7 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of her treating 8 physician, Dr. Marc Debay. [Dkt. 18 at 3-7.] The Court finds that a remand or 9 reversal on this basis is not warranted. 1. 10 Federal Law “There are three types of medical opinions in social security cases: those 11 12 from treating physicians, examining physicians, and non-examining physicians.” 13 Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 14 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. In general, a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to more 15 weight than an examining physician’s opinion and an examining physician’s opinion 16 is entitled to more weight than a nonexamining physician’s opinion. See Lester v. 17 Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). “The medical opinion of a claimant’s 18 treating physician is given ‘controlling weight’ so long as it ‘is well-supported by 19 medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not 20 inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’” Trevizo v. 21 Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)).3 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the opinions of treating physicians are not given deference over the opinions of non-treating physicians. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (providing that the Social Security Administration “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from your medical sources”); 81 Fed. Reg. 62560, at 62573-74 (Sept. 9, 2016). Because Plaintiff’s claims for SSI and DIB were filed before March 27, 2017, the medical evidence is evaluated pursuant to the treating physician rule discussed above. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. 7 3 1 An ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial 2 evidence to reject the uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician. 3 Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 4 830-31). Where such an opinion is contradicted, however, an ALJ may reject it only 5 by stating specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. 6 Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216; Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675. The ALJ can satisfy this 7 standard by “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 8 conflicting clinical evidence, stating [her] interpretation thereof, and making 9 findings.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reddick 10 v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)- 11 (6) (when a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight, factors such 12 as the nature, extent, and length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of 13 examinations, the specialization of the physician, and whether the physician’s 14 opinion is supported by and consistent with the record should be considered in 15 determining the weight to give the opinion). 16 17 2. Background The record indicates that Plaintiff began treating with Dr. Debay on January 18 8, 2016. [AR 629.] Two months later on March 2016, Dr. Debay completed a 19 questionnaire on Plaintiff’s behalf in which he listed Plaintiff’s impairments as 20 “fibromyalgia/depression.” [AR 622.] Dr. Debay assessed Plaintiff’s residual 21 functional capacity stating that Plaintiff can: occasionally lift less than 10 pounds; 22 sit less than 2 hours total in an 8-hour workday with normal breaks; stand/walk less 23 than 2 hours total in an 8-hour workday with normal breaks; and she can never 24 crouch, climb stairs, or climb ladders. [AR 623.] 25 26 27 28 The ALJ addressed Dr. Debay’s opinion as follows: This opinion is without substantial support from any objective clinical or diagnostic findings, which obviously renders this opinion less persuasive. Moreover, the opinion expressed is quite conclusory, 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 providing very little explanation of the evidence relied on in forming that opinion. The doctor apparently relied quite heavily on the subjective report of symptoms and limitations provided by the claimant, and seemed to uncritically accept as true most, if not all, of what the claimant reported. Yet, as explained elsewhere in this decision, there exist good reasons for questioning the reliability of the claimant’s subjective complaints. This opinion is also inconsistent with the claimant’s admitted activities of daily living that have already been described above in this decision. [AR 26.] 3. Analysis As the ALJ pointed out, Dr. Debay’s opinion was not persuasive because it was conclusory, without supporting explanation; not supported by objective clinical or diagnostic findings; overly reliant on Plaintiff’s subjective self-reports about the extent of her limitations; and inconsistent with Plaintiff’s own statements about her functional abilities to undertake daily activities. [AR 26.] These constitute specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Debay’s opinion. First, Dr. Debay’s opinion as to functional impairment was contradicted by the bulk of the other medical opinions in the record. For instance, consultative examining physician Dr. Seung Ha Lim performed an evaluation of Plaintiff on May 15, 2014. Plaintiff presented with a history of fibromyalgia, sleep apnea, restless leg syndrome, kidney infection and hypertension. [AR 415.] Dr. Lim opined that while Plaintiff’s symptoms suggested fibromyalgia, Plaintiff could complete the full range of medium work. [AR 415.] In addition, the state agency medical consultants, found similar limitations, but also concluded that Plaintiff could perform the equivalent of “medium work.” [AR 26.] Of the medical opinions addressing Plaintiff’s impairments, three out of four of those opinions found that Plaintiff could complete medium work. [AR 25.] The ALJ legitimately concluded that Dr. Debay’s opinion was an outlier among the opinion evidence, unsupported by the 28 9 1 other evidence in the record, and thus entitled to less weight. This was a specific 2 and legitimate reason to discount Dr. Debay’s opinion. 3 Second, Dr. Debay’s opinion was unreliable because it was unsupported by 4 his treatment records. [AR 26.] While Dr. Debay referred to Plaintiff’s depression 5 and fibromyalgia, these diagnoses resulted in mild findings inconsistent with the 6 extent of limitations opined by Dr. Debay. As the ALJ explained, despite being 7 diagnosed with fibromyalgia, Plaintiff did not establish that it was a “medically 8 determinable” impairment (much less, that it was “severe”) because it did not meet 9 the diagnostic criteria in SSR 12-2p. [AR 18-19.] In particular, there was no 10 evidence that other disorders that could cause the symptoms were excluded such as 11 her generalized arthritis. In regard to tender points, the ALJ explained that the 12 limited evidence noting some tender points was not specific, with no details about 13 the number or location of tender points. [AR 19.] This limited evidence was also 14 inconsistent with numerous examinations revealing no tender points. [AR 19, citing 15 AR 336, 425.] Further, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s depression resulted in no 16 more than mild limitations. Dr. Debay’s opinion that Plaintiff’s non-severe 17 impairments resulted in extreme limitations is contradicted by substantial evidence. 18 Relatedly, the ALJ correctly found that Dr. Debay’s opinion was conclusory. 19 See Batson v. Comm’r, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (an ALJ may reject a 20 physician’s opinion if it is conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record); 21 Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (an ALJ does not need to 22 accept opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by clinical findings). 23 The form opinion asked Dr. Debay to identify the medical findings to support his 24 opined postural, non-postural, and environmental limitations. [AR 622-624.] Each 25 time, Dr. Debay did not identify any medical findings to support his opinion and 26 simply wrote “fibromyalgia and depression”—two diagnoses that do not support a 27 total disability finding in this case. 28 10 Third, without supporting clinical and objective testing, the ALJ correctly 1 2 rationalized that Dr. Debay relied quite heavily on Plaintiff’s subjective self-reports 3 regarding the extent of her symptoms and limitations. [AR 26.] An ALJ may 4 discount a treating physician’s opinion when it is based on subjective symptoms that 5 have been discredited. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149 (a treating physician’s opinion 6 based on subjective complaints of a claimant whose credibility has been discounted 7 can be properly disregarded). The ALJ’s adverse credibility findings are a proper 8 basis for rejecting the limitations opined by Dr. Debay. Overall, the ALJ cited specific and legitimate reasons supported by 9 10 substantial evidence for rejecting Dr. Debay’s treating opinion. 11 C. 12 and Convincing Reason 13 The ALJ’s Credibility Determination is Supported by at Least One Clear Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons for 14 rejecting her testimony regarding her subjective symptoms and functional 15 limitations. [Dkt. 18 at 7-11.] 16 “Where, as here, an ALJ concludes that a claimant is not malingering, and 17 that she has provided objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 18 which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms alleged, the ALJ may 19 reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering 20 specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 21 F.3d 487, 492-93 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Even if 22 “the ALJ provided one or more invalid reasons for disbelieving a claimant’s 23 testimony,” if she “also provided valid reasons that were supported by the record,” 24 the ALJ’s error “is harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence 25 supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s 26 ultimate conclusion.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (internal citation and quotations 27 omitted). 28 11 1 “The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant’s credibility, 2 including (1) the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies in the 3 claimant’s testimony or between his testimony and conduct; (3) claimant’s daily 4 living activities; (4) claimant’s work record; and (5) testimony from physicians or 5 third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of claimant’s condition.” 6 Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). 7 Here, the ALJ provided several reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective 8 complaints. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning her 9 symptoms and functional limitations were unsupported by the objective medical 10 evidence. [AR 24.] As discussed above, many of Plaintiff’s treatment records were 11 consistently unremarkable and reflected normal to mild findings. [AR 24, 301-306, 12 316-320, 648-649, 656.] While medical evidence alone is not a basis for rejecting 13 pain testimony, it is one factor that the ALJ is permitted to consider. See Rollins v. 14 Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 15 681 (9th Cir. 2005). 16 Second, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s course of treatment was conservative and 17 routine. [AR 23.] Specifically, Plaintiff testified that her physicians stopped 18 prescribing her medication and she used only oils, hot baths, and over-the-counter 19 Tylenol to alleviate her pain. [AR 42-44.] Further, in the past, her treatment had 20 consisted solely of prescription medication and topical gels. [AR 46.] An ALJ may 21 properly rely on the fact that only routine or conservative treatment has been 22 prescribed. See Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995); Meanel, 23 172 F.3d at 1114 (finding that plaintiff’s claim that she experienced pain 24 “approaching the highest level imaginable was inconsistent with the ‘minimal, 25 conservative treatment’ that she received”). Thus, Plaintiff’s relatively routine and 26 conservative treatment was a specific, clear and convincing reason to discount her 27 subjective symptom testimony. 28 12 1 The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff’s daily activities. [AR 23.] The Court need not 2 address whether this additional reason was valid because even assuming that it was 3 not, any error was harmless in light of the other legally sufficient reasons for the 4 ALJ’s determination. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (where one or more reasons 5 supporting ALJ’s credibility analysis are invalid, error is harmless if ALJ provided 6 other valid reasons supported by the record); Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197 (even if the 7 record did not support one of the ALJ’s stated reasons for disbelieving a claimant’s 8 testimony, the error was harmless where ALJ provided other valid bases for 9 credibility determination). V. 10 11 12 CONCLUSION For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner finding Plaintiff not disabled is AFFIRMED. 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 16 17 18 DATED: July 11, 2019 ___________________________________ GAIL J. STANDISH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13
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