Justin Ritchie Bogan v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 5:2018cv00457 - Document 25 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER by Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth. IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered AFFIRMING the Commissioner's decision, DENYING Plaintiff's request for payment of benefits or remand, and DISMISSING this action with prejudice. (See document for details.) (sbou)
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Justin Ritchie Bogan v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUSTIN RITCHIE B.,1 Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 15 NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. ) Case No. EDCV 18-0457-JPR ) ) ) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ) AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 17 18 19 I. PROCEEDINGS Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner’s final decision 20 denying his applications for Social Security disability insurance 21 benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income benefits 22 (“SSI”). 23 undersigned under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 24 Court on the parties’ Joint Stipulation, filed October 12, 2018, The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the The matter is before the 25 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 which the Court has taken under submission without oral argument. 2 For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner’s decision is 3 affirmed. 4 II. 5 BACKGROUND Plaintiff was born in 1979. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 6 66.) 7 at a tire center changing and selling tires (AR 192, 195). 8 Before that, he was a ride operator at a theme park and a night 9 manager at a store. 10 He completed high school (AR 66) and last worked full-time (AR 67, 192-94.) On April 29, 2014, Plaintiff applied for DIB, alleging that 11 he had been unable to work since June 11, 2011, because of 12 “[d]egenerative disc L3-L4.” 13 application was denied initially (AR 86-96) and on 14 reconsideration (AR 97-109), he requested a hearing before an 15 Administrative Law Judge (AR 122). 16 on January 22, 2015, but as the ALJ noted (AR 32, 67), that 17 application is not in the record. 18 28, 2016, at which Plaintiff was not represented by counsel but 19 chose to proceed and testify anyway. 20 expert also testified (AR 75-79, 82-84), as did Plaintiff’s wife 21 (AR 79-81). (AR 86, 152-53.) After his He apparently applied for SSI A hearing was held on October (AR 62-75.) A vocational 22 In a written decision issued December 23, 2016, the ALJ 23 found Plaintiff not disabled since December 3, 2013, the day 24 following a prior determination of nondisability. 25 42; see also generally AR 29-42.) 26 from the Appeals Council (AR 150-51), which denied it on January 27 26, 2018 (AR 1-4). Plaintiff requested review This action followed. 28 2 (See AR 33, 1 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 3 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The ALJ’s findings and 4 decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and 5 supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. 6 See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra v. 7 Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). 8 means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept as 9 adequate to support a conclusion. Substantial evidence Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; 10 Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). 11 is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. 12 Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 13 Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). 14 meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for 15 such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” 16 __ U.S. __, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2480, at *10 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2019). 17 determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the 18 reviewing court “must review the administrative record as a 19 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence 20 that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” 21 Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). 22 reasonably support either affirming or reversing,” the reviewing 23 court “may not substitute its judgment” for the Commissioner’s. 24 Id. at 720-21. 25 IV. 26 It “[W]hatever the Biestek v. Berryhill, To Reddick v. “If the evidence can THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY People are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social 27 Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial 28 gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is 3 1 expected to result in death or has lasted, or is expected to 2 last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 3 § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 4 1992). 42 U.S.C. 5 A. The Five-Step Evaluation Process 6 The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to 7 assess whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. 8 §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 9 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended Apr. 9, 1996). In the first 10 step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is 11 currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the 12 claimant is not disabled and the claim must be denied. 13 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). 14 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful 15 activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine 16 whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of 17 impairments significantly limiting his ability to do basic work 18 activities; if not, the claimant is not disabled and his claim 19 must be denied. 20 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of 21 impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to 22 determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments 23 meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments set 24 forth at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1; if so, 25 disability is conclusively presumed. 26 416.920(a)(4)(iii). §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 27 If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments 28 does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth 4 1 step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant 2 has sufficient residual functional capacity (“RFC”)2 to perform 3 his past work; if so, he is not disabled and the claim must be 4 denied. 5 has the burden of proving he is unable to perform past relevant 6 work. 7 burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. The claimant If the claimant meets that Id. 8 If that happens or if the claimant has no past relevant 9 work, the Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that 10 the claimant is not disabled because he can perform other 11 substantial gainful work available in the national economy. 12 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. 13 That determination comprises the fifth and final step in the 14 sequential analysis. 15 Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); 16 B. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Process 17 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured 18 status requirements through December 31, 2016, and had not 19 engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 3, 2013. 20 (AR 34.) 21 impairments of “lumbar spine herniated nucleus pulposus, major 22 depression and agoraphobia.” 23 At step two, he determined that he had severe (AR 35.) At step three, he found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not 24 25 26 27 28 2 RFC is what a claimant can do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; see also Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). The Commissioner assesses the claimant’s RFC between steps three and four. Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing § 416.920(a)(4)). 5 1 meet or equal a listing. (AR 35-37.) At step four, he concluded 2 that he had the RFC to perform “sedentary work”3 with some 3 limitations: 4 He can lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally. 5 perform primarily seated work, but must be allowed to sit 6 and/or stand at will. 7 perform simple, repetitive tasks with limited public 8 contact. 9 10 11 (AR 37.) He cannot bend or stoop. He can He can Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could not do his past relevant work. (AR 40.) At step five, he found that given Plaintiff’s age, 12 education, work experience, and RFC, he could perform at least 13 two representative jobs in the national economy: “[d]ocument 14 preparer, sticker,” DOT 734.687-090, 1991 WL 679968 (Jan. 1, 15 2016);4 and “table worker,” DOT 739.687-182, 1991 WL 680217 (Jan. 16 3 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 “Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.” §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a); see also SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5 (Jan. 1, 1983) (“Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. By its very nature, work performed primarily in a seated position entails no significant stooping.”). 4 The DOT number corresponds with the job title “sticker.” See DOT 734.687-090, 1991 WL 679968. The VE suggested that Plaintiff could perform the occupation of “document preparer, . . . DOT 249.587-01[8],” 1991 WL 672349 (Jan. 1, 2016) (AR 78), in response to the ALJ’s first hypothetical and stated, “I would say the document preparer. . . . A job called sticker” in response to his third hypothetical (AR 82). As Respondent notes, “[t]his may have been why the two jobs were confused in the ALJ’s decision.” (J. Stip. at 11 (citing AR 41).) Although the DOT description for document preparer appears to accommodate Plaintiff’s RFC, the Court declines to consider it because the (continued...) 6 1 1, 2016). 2 42.) 3 V. 4 (AR 41.) Accordingly, he found him not disabled. DISCUSSION5 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that he could 5 perform “alternate occupations” at step five. 6 see also J. Stip. at 4-9, 14.) 7 remand is not warranted. (J. Stip. at 4; For the reasons discussed below, 8 The ALJ Properly Found that Plaintiff Could Perform 9 Alternative Jobs at Step Five 10 (AR Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by accepting the VE’s 11 testimony that he could perform the occupations of sticker and 12 table worker. 13 that by including a “sit/stand option” in his RFC, the ALJ 14 recognized that Plaintiff would sometimes have to stand and yet 15 because he could not bend or stoop “common sense” dictates that 16 he would not be able to perform the necessary work while 17 standing. (See generally id.) Specifically, he contends (Id. at 6-7.) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 (...continued) ALJ referred to the DOT number for “sticker” only. as explained herein, remand is not warranted. 5 In any event, In Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018), the Supreme Court held that ALJs of the Securities and Exchange Commission are “Officers of the United States” and thus subject to the Appointments Clause. To the extent Lucia applies to Social Security ALJs, Plaintiff has forfeited the issue by failing to raise it during his administrative proceedings. (See AR 63-85, 150-51); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (as amended) (plaintiff forfeits issues not raised before ALJ or Appeals Council); see also generally Kabani & Co. v. SEC, 733 F. App’x 918, 919 (9th Cir. 2018) (rejecting Lucia challenge because plaintiff did not raise it during administrative proceedings), pet. for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18-1117). 7 1 2 A. Applicable law At step five, the Commissioner has the burden of showing the 3 existence of work in the national economy that the claimant can 4 perform, taking into account his age, education, and vocational 5 background. 6 2001). 7 existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that 8 claimant can perform despite his identified limitations.” 9 Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 When a VE provides evidence at step five about the See Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. To meet this burden, the ALJ must “identify specific jobs 11 requirements of a job, the ALJ has a responsibility to ask about 12 “any possible conflict” between that evidence and the DOT’s job 13 description. 14 2000); Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 2007) 15 (holding that application of SSR 00-4p is mandatory). 16 a conflict exists, the ALJ may accept VE testimony that 17 contradicts the DOT only if the record contains “persuasive 18 evidence to support the deviation.” 19 (citing Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435); see also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 20 533 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding error when “ALJ did 21 not identify what aspect of the VE’s experience warranted 22 deviation from the DOT”). 23 “obvious or apparent” to require inquiry by the ALJ. 24 Gutierrez v. Colvin, 844 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2016); Massachi, 25 486 F.3d at 1154 n.19. 26 is at odds with DOT job requirements related to tasks that are 27 “essential, integral, or expected parts of a job.” 28 844 F.3d at 808. See SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *4 (Dec. 4, When such Pinto, 249 F.3d at 846 A conflict with the DOT must be See A conflict is obvious or apparent when it 8 Gutierrez, 1 When a hypothetical includes all the claimant’s credible 2 functional limitations, an ALJ is generally entitled to rely on 3 the VE’s response to it. 4 956 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 5 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A VE’s recognized expertise provides the 6 necessary foundation for his or her testimony.”). 7 B. 10 Relevant background The ALJ asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual 8 9 See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, with Plaintiff’s age, education, and work background, with the following limitations: 11 Primarily seated work but must be able to sit and stand 12 at will as needed for comfort. 13 pulling more than ten pounds. 14 In 15 repetitive tasks, or has the ability to perform simple 16 repetitive tasks with limited public contact. addition, this individual No lifting, pushing, No bending or stooping. is limited to simple 17 (AR 82.) 18 a “sticker, DOT 734.687-090,” or a “table worker, DOT 739.687- 19 182.” 20 The VE testified that such an individual could work as (Id.) The VE confirmed that her testimony was “consistent with the 21 [DOT] and its companion publication” (AR 76) but that because 22 “sit/stand is not described” in the DOT, she relied on her 23 “professional knowledge and experience that you can do [certain 24 jobs] in a sitting and standing position” or “[s]it/stand at 25 will” (AR 78). 26 27 28 C. Analysis Plaintiff does not argue that the VE’s testimony conflicted with the DOT, cf. Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808, or that the ALJ’s 9 1 hypothetical to the VE excluded any of his functional 2 limitations, cf. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 956. 3 that “common sense and reason dictate” that his limitations would 4 prevent him from working as a sticker or table worker. 5 at 7.) 6 a person standing without the ability to bend or stoop, a posture 7 akin to standing like ‘Herman Munster,’ at a work station, can 8 perform the requirements of jobs of sticker . . . and table 9 worker.” 10 Instead, he argues (J. Stip. He states that “it belies common sense to assert [] that (Id.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument otherwise (id. at 5), the 11 ALJ’s step-five finding was supported by substantial evidence, 12 including the DOT and VE testimony. 13 1898704, at *2 (SSA relies “primarily on the DOT” at step five 14 and may use VE “to resolve complex vocational issues”); see also 15 §§ 404.1566(d), 416.966(d). 16 table-worker jobs as “[s]edentary” and lists “[s]tooping” and 17 “[c]rouching” as “[n]ot [p]resent,” clarifying that such 18 “[a]ctivit[ies] or condition[s] do[] not exist.” 19 090, 1991 WL 679968 (sticker); DOT 739.687-182, 1991 WL 680217 20 (table worker). 21 10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 (Jan. 1, 1983), defines stooping and 22 crouching as types of bending. 23 for sticker indicates that any form of bending would be required: 24 “Glues paper-covered wire to artificial flowers to stiffen and 25 strengthen them[;] [m]ay emboss simulated veins on leaves.” 26 734.687-090, 1991 WL 679968. 27 also reveals no obvious need for bending; such a worker 28 “[e]xamines squares (tiles) of felt-based linoleum material See SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL The DOT categorizes the sticker and DOT 734.687- Bending is not addressed by the DOT, but SSR 83- Nothing in the DOT description DOT The description of a table worker 10 1 passing along on conveyer and replaces missing and substandard 2 titles.” 3 DOT 739.687-182, 1991 WL 680217. Plaintiff argues that he could not perform these jobs while 4 standing without needing to “bend over.” (J. Stip. at 7.) This 5 argument may have some merit as to the table-worker job because 6 it is described as sedentary work in front of a conveyer belt. 7 See DOT 739.687-182, 1991 WL 680217. 8 conveyer belt comfortably while sitting, he might need to bend to 9 reach it while standing, thus conflicting with Plaintiff’s RFC. If a worker can reach the 10 (AR 37.) The DOT description for sticker, however, does not 11 indicate a fixed workstation, and a worker could presumably pick 12 up his project to continue working while standing. 13 090, 1991 WL 679968. 14 thus harmless because at least one of the jobs the VE proposed is 15 consistent with Plaintiff’s uncontested RFC. 16 §§ 404.1566(b), 416.966(b) (noting that step five requires 17 significant number of jobs “in one or more occupations”); 18 Hernandez v. Berryhill, 707 F. App’x 456, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2017) 19 (any error in ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could perform 20 two particular jobs was harmless because he properly found that 21 Plaintiff could perform one job). DOT 734.687- Any error as to the table-worker job is See 22 Plaintiff’s reliance on SSR 96-9p is misplaced. 23 at 8); see also SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185 (July 2, 1996). 24 ruling does state that a “complete inability to stoop would 25 significantly erode the unskilled sedentary occupational base”; 26 but it then clarifies that “[c]onsultation with a vocational 27 resource may be particularly useful for cases where the 28 individual is limited to less than occasional stooping.” 11 (J. Stip. The SSR 96- 1 9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *8 (emphasis in original). Here, the ALJ 2 properly consulted with and relied on the VE, who confirmed that 3 her testimony was consistent with the DOT. 4 (VE testimony); see also AR 41-42 (ALJ stating that he relied on 5 VE’s testimony, which he “determined [was] consistent with the 6 information contained in the [DOT]).) 7 stand is not described in the [DOT], so these are jobs that I 8 know from professional knowledge and experience that you can do 9 in a sitting and standing position.” (See AR 75-79, 82-84 The VE noted that “sit/ (AR 78); see also Biestek, 10 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2480, at *18-19 (even without providing 11 “underlying data,” “expert’s testimony still will clear (even 12 handily so) the more-than-a-mere-scintilla threshold”); Bayliss, 13 427 F.3d at 1217. 14 positions available to Plaintiff, presumably at least in part 15 because of the “sit/stand” option and the prohibition on bending 16 and stooping. 17 She then eroded the number of table-worker (AR 83.) Thus, the ALJ satisfied his burden at step five and 18 appropriately found that Plaintiff could perform alternative work 19 in the national economy. 20 1:10–cv–00198 SKO., 2011 WL 2493759, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 21 2011) (finding that “[b]ased on SSR 96-9p . . . the ALJ correctly 22 elicited testimony from a VE to determine whether, despite the 23 erosion of a full range of sedentary work [in part because 24 Plaintiff could not stoop at all], there were still significant 25 numbers of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could 26 perform”). See Hernandez v. Astrue, No. And because no obvious or apparent conflict between 27 28 12 1 the VE’s testimony and the DOT existed,6 the ALJ did not err in 2 relying on the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could do the jobs 3 she suggested. 4 See Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808. As part of his step-five argument, Plaintiff contends that 5 the ALJ failed to fulfill his “heightened” duty to develop the 6 record. 7 114, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001)).) 8 the hearing, Plaintiff remained responsible for producing 9 evidence in support of his disability claim. (J. Stip. at 8 (citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d But despite being unrepresented at See Mayes v. 10 Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001) (as amended); Muro 11 v. Astrue, No. EDCV 12-0058-DTB., 2013 WL 327468, at *3 (C.D. 12 Cal. Jan. 29, 2013) (finding that “fact that plaintiff was 13 unrepresented during the administrative hearing does not, without 14 more, constitute good cause for failure to submit [medical 15 evidence]” in support of disability claim). 16 reveals no reason why a duty to further develop the record was 17 triggered; it occurs only when there is “ambiguous evidence” or 18 when the ALJ finds that “the record is inadequate to allow for 19 proper evaluation of the evidence.” 20 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended May 19, 2011) (citing 21 Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150). 22 And the record McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d As Defendant argues, “[a] common sense review of the record” 23 shows that Plaintiff’s difficulties with bending and stooping 24 stem from an issue with his lumbar spine (J. Stip. at 12; see 25 26 27 28 6 The ALJ noted in the RFC that Plaintiff would perform work primarily in a seated position. (AR 37.) Thus, a need to stand infrequently while working was not an “essential, integral, or expected” part of the jobs and did not constitute an “obvious or apparent conflict” with the DOT. See Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808. 13 1 also AR 35 (ALJ finding “severe” lumbar-spine impairment)), and 2 the DOT descriptions of the sticker and table-worker jobs 3 indicate that the only necessary movement would be mild neck 4 mobility. 5 (sticker); DOT 739.687-182, 1991 WL 680217 (table worker). 6 record unambiguously reveals that Plaintiff had no issues with 7 such range of motion; indeed, as the ALJ noted (AR 36), he 8 testified that he spent “three to four hours a week” shooting and 9 editing videos (AR 72) and “a couple hours a day” playing guitar See generally DOT 734.687-090, 1991 WL 679968 The 10 (AR 73). 11 which necessarily requires some neck and spine manipulations to 12 get in and out of the vehicle. 13 weight” to a doctor who found that Plaintiff had “reduced lumbar 14 spine range of motion” but normal results otherwise. 15 also generally AR 562-68.)7 16 findings regarding the medical-opinion evidence, his subjective 17 pain testimony, or his RFC, nor does he specify any ambiguities 18 or inadequacies in the record. 19 As such, the ALJ had no reason to further develop the record. Moreover, Plaintiff drove – including to the hearing – (AR 66.) And the ALJ gave “great (AR 39; see Plaintiff does not contest the ALJ’s (See generally J. Stip. at 8.) 20 Because nothing indicates that Plaintiff could not perform 21 work that was “essential, integral, or expected” in either job, 22 Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808, the ALJ reasonably relied on the VE’s 23 testimony and appropriately determined that Plaintiff could 24 perform alternative work at step five. 25 26 27 28 7 Defendant also points out (see J. Stip. at 12) that Plaintiff testified that he could bend at the waist (AR 74), and medical records showed no neck or upper-back impairments (see, e.g., AR 577). 14 1 2 VI. CONCLUSION Consistent with the foregoing and under sentence four of 42 3 U.S.C. § 405(g),8 IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered 4 AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s decision, DENYING Plaintiff’s 5 request for payment of benefits or remand, and DISMISSING this 6 action with prejudice. 7 8 DATED: April 11, 2019 9 _____________________________ JEAN ROSENBLUTH U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 That sentence provides: “The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 15
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