Nafisa Noori v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 5:2017cv02550 - Document 27 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion. (sp)
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Nafisa Noori v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NAFISA NOORI, Plaintiff, 12 13 14 v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) NO. ED CV 17-2550-E MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND 17 18 Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), IT IS 19 HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s motions for summary 20 judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further 21 administrative action consistent with this Opinion. 22 PROCEEDINGS 23 24 25 Plaintiff filed a complaint on December 28, 2017, seeking review 26 of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. The parties filed a consent 27 to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on February 2, 28 2018. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on August 16, Dockets.Justia.com 1 2018. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on September 17, 2 2018. The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral 3 argument. See L.R. 7-15; “Order,” filed January 8, 2018. 4 5 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 6 7 Plaintiff, a former translator, asserts disability based 8 primarily on alleged mental problems (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 9 65, 213, 215, 235-41). An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) examined 10 the record and heard testimony from Plaintiff, a medical expert and a 11 vocational expert (A.R. 20-209, 213-811). 12 13 The ALJ found Plaintiff has a severe “bipolar type 14 schizoaffective disorder” which precludes the performance of 15 Plaintiff’s past relevant work (A.R. 22, 33). 16 found Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 17 “perform simple, routine tasks in a habituated work setting . . .” 18 (A.R. 27). 19 weight” to the opinions of Dr. Romualdo R. Rodriguez, a consultative 20 examining psychiatrist (A.R. 29, 32). 21 the ALJ did not acknowledge having rejected any of Dr. Rodriguez’ 22 opinions (A.R. 22-35). However, the ALJ also In making this finding, the ALJ purported to accord “great In the ALJ’s written decision, 23 24 The vocational expert testified that a person having the RFC the 25 ALJ found to exist could perform work as a “janitor” or a “laundry 26 worker” (A.R. 61-62). 27 Plaintiff not disabled (A.R. 34-35). 28 review (A.R. 1-3). In reliance on this testimony, the ALJ found 2 The Appeals Council denied STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 2 3 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the 4 Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s 5 findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the 6 Administration used correct legal standards. 7 Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 8 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). 9 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to See Carmickle v. Substantial evidence is “such 10 support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 11 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see Widmark v. Barnhart, 12 454 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 13 DISCUSSION 14 15 16 Dr. Rodriguez opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff is “[a]ble to 17 understand, remember, and carry out simple one or two-step job 18 instructions” and is “[u]nable to do detailed and complex 19 instructions” (A.R. 382) (emphasis in original). 20 entails the ability to “[a]pply common sense understanding to carry 21 out simple one- or two-step instructions. . . .” 22 Occupational Titles (“D.O.T.”) Appendix C, 1991 WL 688702 (Jan. 1, 23 2016) (emphasis added). 24 “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but 25 uninvolved written or oral instructions. . . .” 26 added). 27 worker both require Level 2 reasoning. 28 361.685-018. “Level 1” reasoning See Dictionary of “Level 2” reasoning entails the ability to See id. (emphasis According to the D.O.T., the jobs of janitor and laundry 3 See D.O.T. 381.687-018, 1 Plaintiff argues that Dr. Rodriguez’ opinions are inconsistent 2 with the RFC the ALJ found to exist and inconsistent with the 3 conclusion Plaintiff can perform jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning. 4 Defendant argues that Dr. Rodriguez’ opinions are consistent with the 5 RFC the ALJ found to exist and consistent with the conclusion 6 Plaintiff can perform jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning. 7 8 9 As expressed in his report, Dr. Rodriguez’ opinions regarding the level of Plaintiff’s reasoning ability appear ambiguous. It is 10 unclear from the report whether Dr. Rodriguez believes Plaintiff is 11 limited to Level 1 reasoning or is capable of Level 2 reasoning. 12 Without obtaining clarification from Dr. Rodriguez, the ALJ evidently 13 assumed the latter interpretation. 14 App’x 468, 469-70 (9th Cir. 2018) (“simple work” RFC contradicts 15 doctors’ opinions limiting claimant to ability to “understand, 16 remember, and carry out simple 1-2 step instructions . . .”). 17 However, the language in Dr. Rodriguez’ report is at least equally 18 consistent with the former interpretation. 19 725 Fed. App’x 575, 576 (9th Cir. 2018) (Ninth Circuit interpreted 20 doctor’s opinion that claimant is “[a]ble to carry out one-and two- 21 step instructions . . .” to limit claimant “to work requiring no more 22 than one- or two-step instructions,” i.e. work requiring no more than 23 Level 1 reasoning). See Little v. Berryhill, 708 Fed. See Flores v. Berryhill, 24 25 Clarification of this potentially material ambiguity in Dr. 26 Rodriguez’ report is required. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110- 27 11 (2000) (“Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than 28 adversarial. It is the ALJ’s duty to investigate the facts and 4 1 develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits. . . .”); 2 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If the ALJ 3 thought he needed to know the basis of Dr. Hoeflich’s opinions in 4 order to evaluate them, he had a duty to conduct an appropriate 5 inquiry, for example, by subpoenaing the physicians or submitting 6 further questions to them.”) (citations omitted); Brown v. Heckler, 7 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The ALJ has a special duty to 8 fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s 9 interests are considered. 10 This duty exists even when the claimant is represented by counsel.”). 11 12 If Dr. Rodriguez believes Plaintiff is limited to Level 1 13 reasoning, then the ALJ would be required to explain the failure to 14 incorporate such limitation into the RFC. 15 96-8p1 (“If the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a 16 medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not 17 adopted.”); see Flores v. Berryhill, 725 Fed. App’x at 576 (because 18 doctor stated claimant was “able to carry out one- and two-step 19 instructions,” and because the ALJ purportedly gave “substantial 20 weight” to this opinion, “the ALJ was required either to limit the 21 claimant’s residual functional capacity to Level 1 reasoning or 22 explain why the ALJ had not done so”); see also Little v. Berryhill, 23 708 Fed. App’x at 469-70 (doctor’s opinion that claimant could 24 “understand, remember, and carry out simple 1- to 2-step instructions” 25 conflicts with RFC that claimant could perform “simple work”); cf. 26 Rounds v. Commissioner, 807 F.3d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2015) (limitation See Social Security Ruling 27 1 28 Social Security rulings are “binding on ALJs.” v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990). 5 Terry 1 to “one to two step” tasks or instructions is inconsistent with the 2 demands of Level 2 reasoning). 3 Because the circumstances of this case suggest that further 4 5 administrative proceedings could remedy the deficiencies discussed 6 herein, remand is appropriate. 7 (9th Cir. 2011); see also INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (upon 8 reversal of an administrative determination, the proper course is 9 remand for additional agency investigation or explanation, except in McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 10 rare circumstances); Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 11 2018) (“an automatic award of benefits in a disability benefits case 12 is a rare and prophylactic exception to the well-established ordinary 13 remand rule”). 14 /// 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 6 CONCLUSION 1 2 3 For all of the foregoing reasons,2 Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s 4 motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded 5 for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion. 6 7 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 8 DATED: September 26, 2018. 9 10 /s/ CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2 27 28 The Court has not reached any other issue raised by Plaintiff except insofar as to determine that reversal with a directive for the immediate payment of benefits would not be appropriate at this time. 7
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