Jeremy R. Ochoa v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 5:2017cv02297 - Document 26 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Rozella A. Oliver. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits. (see document for details) (hr)
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Jeremy R. Ochoa v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 26 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 JEREMY R. O., 1 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 15 16 Case No. ED CV 17-02297-RAO NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Deputy Commissioner of Operations of Social Security, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 17 18 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 Plaintiff Jeremy R. O. (“Plaintiff”) challenges the Commissioner’s denial of 21 his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). 22 For the reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. 23 II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW 24 On September 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of 25 disability and DIB alleging disability beginning January 20, 2013. (Administrative 26 27 28 1 Partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Dockets.Justia.com 1 Record (“AR”) 90-91, 108.) His application was denied initially on February 13, 2 2014, and upon reconsideration on May 6, 2014. (AR 134, 142.) On May 14, 3 2014, Plaintiff filed a written request for hearing, and a hearing was held on May 2, 4 2016. (AR 40, 149.) Represented by counsel, Plaintiff appeared and testified, 5 along with an impartial vocational expert. (AR 42-89.) 6 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff had not been under a 7 disability, pursuant to the Social Security Act, 2 since January 20, 2013. (AR 34.) 8 The ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals 9 Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1.) Plaintiff filed this action on 10 On June 1, 2016, the November 13, 2017. (Dkt. No. 1.) 11 The ALJ followed a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether 12 Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 13 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged 14 in substantial gainful activity since January 20, 2013, the alleged onset date 15 (“AOD”). (AR 23.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following 16 severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine; 17 obesity; and major depressive disorder. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that 18 Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 19 medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, 20 Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (AR 24.) Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual 21 22 functional capacity (“RFC”) to: [P]erform a limited range of unskilled sedentary work . . . with the following limitations: The claimant can lift and lift/carry 3 to 5 pounds occasionally. He can stand for 15 minutes at a time for a total of 2 hours in an 8-hour workday with a cane option for walking. He can sit 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Persons are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment expected to result in death, or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 2 45 minutes at a time for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. He can occasionally stoop, bend, twist, or squat. He cannot kneel, crouch, or crawl. He can climb or descend a few steps up and down, but cannot climb full flights of stairs. He cannot overhead lift or reach. He can frequently reach, handle, and finger. He cannot have foot control duties. He will have to work with a restroom nearby for quick access. He is limited to unskilled work and requires a low stress work environment, which means no working with the general public or crowds of coworkers. He also needs a low concentration, unskilled work environment, which means he could be alert and attentive but only to unskilled work tasks. He needs a low-memory, unskilled work environment, which means [he can] understand, remember, and carry out only simple work instructions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (AR 26.) At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past 11 relevant work. (AR 32.) At step five, based on Plaintiff’s RFC and the vocational 12 expert’s testimony, the ALJ found that “there are jobs that exist in significant 13 numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” 14 Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not been under a disability from 15 the AOD through the date of decision. (AR 34.) 16 III. (AR 33.) STANDARD OF REVIEW 17 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner’s 18 decision to deny benefits. A court must affirm an ALJ’s findings of fact if they are 19 supported by substantial evidence and if the proper legal standards were applied. 20 Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001). “‘Substantial evidence’ 21 means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant 22 evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 23 Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Robbins v. Soc. 24 Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). An ALJ can satisfy the substantial 25 evidence requirement “by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts 26 and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 27 findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 28 /// 3 1 “[T]he Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a 2 specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record 3 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from 4 the Secretary’s conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 5 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 6 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,’ the ALJ’s decision should be 7 upheld.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 8 Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)); see Robbins, 466 F.3d at 9 882 (“If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s 10 conclusion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.”). The Court 11 may review only “the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination 12 and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn v. 13 Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 14 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)). 15 IV. “‘Where evidence is DISCUSSION 16 Plaintiff raises a single issue for review: whether the ALJ properly 17 considered the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. (See Joint Stipulation 18 (“JS”) 5.) For the reasons below, the Court affirms. 19 A. Applicable Legal Standards 20 Courts give varying degrees of deference to medical opinions based on the 21 provider: (1) treating physicians who examine and treat; (2) examining physicians 22 who examine, but do not treat; and (3) non-examining physicians who do not 23 examine or treat. Valentine v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th 24 Cir. 2009). Most often, the opinion of a treating physician is given greater weight 25 than the opinion of a non-treating physician, and the opinion of an examining 26 physician is given greater weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician. 27 See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014). 28 /// 4 1 The ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons to reject the ultimate 2 conclusions of a treating or examining physician. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 3 422 (9th Cir. 1988); Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. When a treating or examining 4 physician’s opinion is contradicted by another opinion, the ALJ may reject it only 5 by providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in 6 the record. Orn, 495 F.3d at 633; Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Carmickle v. Comm’r, 7 Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). “An ALJ can satisfy the 8 ‘substantial evidence’ requirement by ‘setting out a detailed and thorough summary 9 of the facts and conflicting evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 10 findings.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (citation omitted). 11 B. Discussion 12 In addition to the opinions provided by Plaintiff’s two treating physicians, the 13 ALJ considered the opinions of a consultative examiner, a treating mental health 14 provider, and state agency medical consultants who reviewed Plaintiff’s 15 application. (See AR 30-31.) Because these opinions conflict with the treating 16 physicians’ opinions, the ALJ must provide specific and legitimate reasons 17 supported by substantial evidence in order to reject the treating opinions. See Orn, 18 495 F.3d at 633. 1. 19 Opinion of Robert Santella, M.D. 20 Dr. Santella completed a medical source statement on March 10, 2014. (AR 21 379-80.) He indicated that Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work. (AR 379.) Dr. 22 Santella opined that Plaintiff could lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and less 23 than 10 pounds frequently, could stand and/or walk less than 2 hours in an 8-hour 24 workday, and could sit for less than 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. (Id.) He 25 assessed that Plaintiff could occasionally perform postural activities, but could 26 never climb. 27 limitations. (AR 380.) 28 /// (Id.) Dr. Santella also assessed handling and environmental 5 2. 1 Opinion of Casey Fisher, M.D. 2 Dr. Fisher completed a medical source statement on March 16, 2016. (AR 3 402-03.) He opined that Plaintiff could lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally and 4 less than 10 pounds frequently, could stand and/or walk less than 2 hours in an 8- 5 hour workday, and could sit for 2 to 3 hours of an 8-hour workday. (AR 402.) Dr. 6 Fisher limited Plaintiff’s postural activities to “occasional” or “never,” and he 7 limited manipulative activities to “frequent” or “occasional.” (AR 403.) 3. 8 Discussion The ALJ gave little weight to the opinions of Dr. Santella and Dr. Fisher. 9 10 (AR 30-31.) The ALJ noted that medical imaging reports and other medical 11 evidence did not support the degree of limitations imposed by their opinions. (AR 12 31.) 13 medical imaging reports may suggest that a limitation to sedentary work is 14 appropriate, Plaintiff has shown consistently normal motor strength and full range 15 of motion in his cervical and lumbar spine. 3 (Id.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that although positive straight leg tests and 16 A finding that a treating physician’s opinion is inconsistent with other 17 evidence in the record “means only that the opinion is not entitled to ‘controlling 18 weight.’” SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). “Even when 19 there is substantial evidence contradicting a treating physician’s opinion such that it 20 is no longer entitled to controlling weight, the opinion is nevertheless ‘entitled to 21 deference.’” Weiskopf v. Berryhill, 693 F. App’x 539, 541 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 22 Orn, 495 F.3d at 633); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (effective Aug. 24, 2012 to 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Although Plaintiff contends that the consultative examiner provided conflicting reports about Plaintiff’s spinal range of motion (see JS 8), the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence as a whole is a rational one, and therefore it must be upheld. See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198; Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Commissioner’s findings are upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record, and if evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, we must defer to the Commissioner’s decision.” (citations omitted)). 6 1 Mar. 26, 2017) (when a treating source’s medical opinion is unsupported by 2 medical evidence or is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, such that it does 3 not receive controlling weight, the ALJ must apply the listed factors to determine 4 its weight). The opinion “must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 5 C.F.R. 404.1527 and 416.927.” SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4. For a treating 6 physician, these factors include the length of relationship, frequency of 7 examination, and the nature and extent of the treatment relationship. 20 C.F.R. 8 § 404.1527(c). 9 Here, the ALJ acknowledged the physicians’ treating relationships with 10 Plaintiff, but noted that “the treatment history appears quite brief prior to providing 11 a medical source statement.” (AR 31.) The ALJ noted that the record did not show 12 a treating relationship with Dr. Santella until three months prior to Dr. Santella’s 13 opinion. (AR 31; see AR 350-51.) The ALJ also noted that Dr. Fisher had seen 14 Plaintiff only about three times before providing his opinion. (AR 31; see AR 404, 15 413, 419.) The Court therefore finds that the ALJ appropriately considered and 16 weighed the relevant factors. Moreover, the ALJ provided additional valid reasons for discounting Dr. 17 18 Santella’s and Dr. Fisher’s opinions. 19 The ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Santella’s lifting and carrying restrictions 20 generally appeared to be supported by medical imaging reports. (AR 31; see AR 21 373-77, 428-29.) However, with respect to other limitations, the ALJ determined 22 that Dr. Santella and Dr. Fisher appeared to “rel[y] quite heavily on the subjective 23 report of symptoms and limitations provided by the claimant, and [they] seemed to 24 uncritically accept as true most, if not all, of what the claimant reported.” (AR 31.) 25 An opinion that is based on a claimant’s discredited subjective complaints may be 26 rejected. 4 27 28 Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008); see 4 Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding, and thus that issue is not before this Court. See Guith v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-CV-00625 GSA, 7 1 Khanishian v. Astrue, 238 F. App’x 250, 253 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ince the treating 2 physicians’ diagnoses of symptoms were based on the claimant’s subjective 3 complaints that were found not credible, and not on objective medical evidence, it 4 was appropriate to discount the treating physicians’ opinions.”). 5 The ALJ also observed that Dr. Santella’s and Dr. Fisher’s own progress 6 notes fail to support the abnormalities that would be expected if Plaintiff were as 7 limited as they opined. (AR 31.) The ALJ properly rejected the opinions on this 8 basis. See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 692-93 (finding that a contradiction between a 9 physician’s opinion and his own treatment notes is a specific and legitimate reason 10 to reject that opinion); Matney on Behalf of Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 11 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (an ALJ need not accept an opinion that is unsupported by 12 clinical findings). In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ’s reasons for discounting the opinions of 13 14 Dr. Santella and Dr. Fisher are supported by substantial evidence. 15 V. 16 17 18 19 CONCLUSION IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties. 20 21 22 DATED: November 21, 2018 ROZELLA A. OLIVER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 NOTICE 25 THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN WESTLAW, LEXIS/NEXIS, OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE. 26 27 28 2017 WL 4038105, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2017) (“Plaintiff has not contested the ALJ’s credibility determination and therefore, he has waived that argument.”) (citing Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 n.2). 8
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