Jeffery Lynne Crews v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 5:2017cv01956 - Document 34 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. (sp)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Jeffery Lynne Crews v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 34 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 JEFFERY L.C., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________) NO. ED CV 17-1956-E MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 20 Plaintiff filed a Complaint on September 26, 2017, seeking review 21 of the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits. On April 25, 22 2018, this action was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Eick upon the 23 resignation of Magistrate Judge Gandhi (to whom the action originally 24 was assigned). 25 before a Magistrate Judge. 26 “Joint Stipulation.” 27 Stipulation” as the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 28 Court has taken these motions under submission without oral argument. On April 26, 2018, the parties consented to proceed On February 12, 2019, the parties filed a The Court construes the arguments in the “Joint The Dockets.Justia.com 1 BACKGROUND 2 3 Plaintiff asserted disability since December 18, 2013, based 4 primarily on alleged knee, back and hip pain (Administrative Record 5 (“A.R.”) 36-53). 6 record and heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert 7 (A.R. 16-686). An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) examined the 8 9 The ALJ found Plaintiff “has the following severe impairments: 10 subtle tear in the medial meniscus right knee; degenerative changes 11 lumbar spine; osteoarthritis in the right hip; and obesity” (A.R. 19). 12 The ALJ also found, however, that Plaintiff retains the residual 13 functional capacity to perform a reduced range of light work (A.R. 14 22). 15 determined that a person having such capacity could perform jobs 16 existing in significant numbers in the national economy (A.R. 27; see 17 A.R. 59-61). In reliance on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ The Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 1-4). 18 19 Plaintiff now raises a single issue. Plaintiff argues that the 20 ALJ erred by failing to accept the opinions of Dr. Troy Handojo 21 regarding Plaintiff’s functional capacity. 22 Plaintiff’s primary care physicians, opined Plaintiff lacks any 23 capacity for light work (A.R. 684-86). Dr. Handojo, one of 24 25 STANDARD OF REVIEW 26 27 28 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s 2 1 findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the 2 Administration used correct legal standards. 3 Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 4 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner, 5 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). 6 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 7 support a conclusion.” 8 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v. 9 Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). See Carmickle v. Substantial evidence is “such Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 10 11 If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may 12 not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 13 Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by 14 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. 15 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, 16 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 17 detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. But the 18 19 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 20 quotations omitted). 21 22 DISCUSSION 23 24 After consideration of the record as a whole, Defendant’s motion 25 is granted and Plaintiff’s motion is denied. 26 findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from 27 /// 28 /// 3 The Administration’s 1 material1 legal error. 2 3 The ALJ did not err by discounting Dr. Handojo’s opinions 4 regarding Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. Unlike the other 5 physicians of record who rendered opinions regarding Plaintiff’s 6 functional capacity,2 Dr. Handojo opined Plaintiff cannot perform any 7 light work. 8 lift and carry as much as ten pounds and cannot stand and walk as much 9 as a total of two hours during an eight hour day (A.R. 684). According to Dr. Handojo, Plaintiff cannot frequently Where, 10 as here, a treating physician’s opinion is contradicted, “if the ALJ 11 wishes to disregard the opinion[s] of the treating physician he [or 12 she] . . . must make findings setting forth specific, legitimate 13 reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the 14 record.” 15 (citation, quotations and brackets omitted); see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 16 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The ALJ may disregard the treating 17 physician’s opinion, but only by setting forth specific, legitimate 18 reasons for doing so, and this decision must itself be based on 19 substantial evidence”) (citation and quotations omitted). 20 Plaintiff’s arguments, the ALJ stated sufficient reasons for 21 discounting Dr. Handojo’s opinions. 22 /// 23 /// Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987) Contrary to 24 25 26 27 28 1 The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding disability. See Garcia v. Commissioner, 768 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2014); McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886-88 (9th Cir. 2011). 2 See A.R. 72-74, 97-104, 110-17, 418-22. 4 1 The ALJ aptly characterized Dr. Handojo’s assessment of 2 Plaintiff’s standing and walking restrictions as “excessive” in 3 comparison with “examination findings in the record,” and the ALJ 4 accurately stated that “the weight of the evidence simply does not 5 support a sedentary functional capacity” (A.R. 25). 6 examination findings included the following: Plaintiff was able to 7 walk without a cane; a March, 2014 xray of Plaintiff’s knee was 8 “unremarkable without fracture or degenerative disease”; in late 2015, 9 knee xrays showed only early osteoarthritis; at the same time, an MRI 10 showed only a possible subtle meniscus tear; at the same time, lumbar 11 spine xrays showed only moderate degenerative change; scans of 12 Plaintiff’s right hip in 2014 and 2015 showed only moderate 13 osteoarthritis; Plaintiff had normal range of motion of his knees and 14 hips; and Plaintiff had normal muscle bulk and tone without atrophy 15 (A.R. 420-21, 513, 559-60, 563, 685). 16 treating physician’s opinion that is “unsupported by the record as a 17 whole . . . or by objective medical findings.” 18 Commissioner, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). Relevant An ALJ properly may reject a Batson v. 19 20 More specifically, the ALJ stressed the disconnect between the 21 profound functional restrictions embodied in Dr. Handojo’s opinions 22 and the records reflecting the medical treatment (or lack thereof) 23 received by Plaintiff (A.R. 25). 24 surgery beyond an arthroscopic knee surgery occurring years before the 25 period of claimed disability. 26 Orthopedic surgical management [was] planned” (A.R. 563). 27 time, which was during the period of claimed disability, Plaintiff 28 rejected the offer of a steroid injection for his supposedly disabling Plaintiff did not receive any As of the end of 2015, “[n]o further 5 At the same 1 hip pain (A.R. 563). Despite opining Plaintiff has disabling 2 standing/walking limitations from knee, back and hip impairments, Dr. 3 Handojo’s treatment notes nowhere suggested Plaintiff might benefit 4 from surgery or even from the use of a cane. 5 discount a treating physician’s opinion where the opinion is 6 unsupported by the claimant’s treatment history and the physician’s 7 own treatment notes. 8 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion that is 9 inconsistent with other medical evidence, including the physician’s 10 own treatment notes); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th 11 Cir. 2005) (conflict between treating physician’s assessment and 12 clinical notes justifies rejection of assessment); Batson v. 13 Commissioner, 359 F.3d at 1195 (“an ALJ may discredit treating 14 physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by 15 the record as a whole . . . or by objective medical findings”); 16 Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2003) (treating 17 physician’s opinion properly rejected where physician’s treatment 18 notes “provide no basis for the functional restrictions he opined 19 should be imposed on [the claimant]”); see also Kessler v. Colvin, 20 2016 WL 2654274, at *18 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2016) (in rejecting 21 physician’s opinion, court noted that the claimant had “abandoned 22 steroid injection treatments after one attempt”). An ALJ properly may See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 23 24 The ALJ also expressly relied on the nature of Plaintiff’s 25 admitted activities, stating that “the effort involved in doing those 26 types of activities suggest [sic] that [Plaintiff] is not as limited 27 as indicated by Dr. Handojo” (A.R. 25). 28 during the period of claimed disability, Plaintiff engaged in 6 The record does reflect that, 1 relatively extensive exertional activities. Plaintiff’s activities 2 included: watching his grandson; visiting with his children; 3 performing electrical work; doing home remodeling; drywalling a 4 bathroom; gardening; mowing the lawn; cleaning; taking out the trash; 5 doing laundry; ironing; running errands; and shopping in stores for 6 food and clothing (A.R. 47, 49-52, 267-69, 460). 7 between a treating physician’s opinion and a claimant’s admitted 8 activities can furnish a sufficient reason for discounting the 9 treating physician’s opinion. Inconsistencies See, e.g., Rollins v. Massanari, 261 10 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001). From the nature of the activities 11 cited, it is reasonable to conclude Plaintiff is not as functionally 12 limited as Plaintiff claimed or as Dr. Handojo reportedly believed. 13 See id.; see also Thune v. Astrue, 499 Fed. App’x 701, 703 (9th Cir. 14 2012) (ALJ properly discredited pain allegations as contradicting 15 claimant’s testimony that she gardened, cleaned, cooked, and ran 16 errands); Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 17 2008) (claimant’s “normal activities of daily living, including 18 cooking, house cleaning, doing laundry, and helping her husband in 19 managing finances” was sufficient explanation for discounting 20 claimant’s testimony). 21 22 The ALJ also observed that Dr. Handojo is a “primary care 23 physician,” rather than “an orthopedic specialist” (A.R. 25). The 24 applicable regulation provides that ALJs “generally give more weight 25 to the medical opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to 26 his or her area of speciality than to the medical opinion of a source 27 who is not a specialist.” 28 Astrue, 364 Fed. App’x 353, 355 (9th Cir. 2010) (ALJ properly 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5); see Belknap v. 7 1 discounted the opinions of a treating physician based on, inter alia, 2 the fact that the treating physician was not a specialist). 3 that an ALJ cannot properly discount a treating physician’s opinion in 4 exclusive reliance on the physician’s lack of specialization. 5 Kennelly v. Astrue, 313 Fed. App’x 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2009); Lester v. 6 Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 833 (9th Cir. 1995); Hickle v. Acting 7 Commissioner, 2017 WL 1731567, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2017). 8 present case, however, any such reliance was not exclusive. It may be See In the 9 10 It is the prerogative of the ALJ to resolve the types of 11 conflicts in the medical evidence that exist in the present case. 12 Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,” the Court must 14 uphold the administrative decision. 15 at 1039-40; accord Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 16 2002); Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 17 Court will uphold the ALJ’s rational interpretation of the evidence in 18 the present case. 19 for the ALJ to find the opinions of the other physicians of record 20 more persuasive than the opinions of Dr. Handojo. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// See When evidence “is See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d The Under the circumstances, it was plainly rational 8 1 CONCLUSION 2 3 For all of the foregoing reasons,3 Plaintiff’s motion for summary 4 judgment is denied and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 5 granted. 6 7 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 8 9 DATED: March 26, 2019. 10 11 /s/ CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 3 25 26 27 28 The Court has considered and rejected each of Plaintiff’s arguments. Neither Plaintiff’s arguments nor the circumstances of this case show any “substantial likelihood of prejudice” resulting from any error allegedly committed by the Administration. See generally McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 887-88 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the standards applicable to evaluating prejudice). 9
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
