Thomas Clifton Dease v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 5:2017cv01932 - Document 24 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision. (mr)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Thomas Clifton Dease v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THOMAS CLIFTON DEASE, Plaintiff, 12 13 14 15 16 CASE NO. EDCV 17-1932 SS v. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 21 Plaintiff (“Plaintiff”) brings this action seeking to reverse 22 or, in the alternative, to remand the decision of the Commissioner 23 of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner” or the 24 “Agency”) denying his application for social security benefits. 25 The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to the 26 jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. 27 (Dkt. Nos. 12-14). For the reasons stated below, the decision of 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 the Agency is REVERSED and REMANDED for further administrative 2 proceedings. 3 III. 4 5 THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 6 7 8 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must 9 demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 10 that prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity1 11 and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous 12 period of at least twelve months. 13 721 14 impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the 15 work she previously performed and any other substantial gainful 16 employment that exists in the national economy. 17 180 18 § 423(d)(2)(A)). (9th F.3d Cir. 1998) 1094, (citing 1098 (9th 42 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, U.S.C. Cir. § 423(d)(1)(A)). 1999) The Tackett v. Apfel, (citing 42 U.S.C. 19 To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ 20 21 conducts a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The steps are: 22 (1) 23 Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial 24 gainful activity? 25 disabled. If so, the claimant is found not If not, proceed to step-two. 26 1 27 28 Substantial gainful activity means work that involves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties and is done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 416.910. 2 1 (2) Is the claimant’s impairment severe? 2 claimant is found not disabled. 3 If not, the step-three. 4 (3) If so, proceed to Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal the 5 requirements of any impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. 6 Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? 7 claimant is found disabled. 8 step-four. 9 (4) If so, the If not, proceed to Is the claimant capable of performing his past 10 work? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. 11 If not, proceed to step-five. 12 (5) Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, 13 the claimant is found disabled. If so, the claimant 14 is found not disabled. 15 16 17 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 18 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); 20 C.F.R. 19 § 416.920(b)-(g)(1). 20 21 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps-one through - 22 four and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step-five. 23 Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54. 24 meets her burden of establishing an inability to perform the past 25 work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform some 26 other work that exists in “significant numbers” in the national 27 economy, taking into account the claimant’s residual functional If, at step-four, the claimant 28 3 1 capacity (“RFC”),2 age, education, and work experience. 2 180 F.3d at 1100; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)(1). 3 do so by the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to 4 the Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 5 Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as “the Grids”). 6 v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). 7 has 8 limitations, the Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the 9 testimony of a vocational expert. 10 both exertional (strength-related) Tackett, The Commissioner may and Osenbrock When a claimant nonexertional Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000). 11 V. 12 13 STANDARD OF REVIEW 14 15 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 16 17 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. “[The] court may set 18 aside the Commissioner’s denial of benefits when the ALJ’s findings 19 are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial 20 evidence in the record as a whole.” 21 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097); see 22 also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 23 Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)). Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 24 25 26 Residual functional capacity is “the most [one] can still do despite [her] limitations” and represents an assessment “based on all the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). 2 27 28 4 “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than 1 2 a preponderance.” 3 Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). 4 evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to 5 support a conclusion.” 6 evidence supports a finding, the court must “‘consider the record 7 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 8 detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’” Aukland, 257 F.3d 9 at 1035 (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson v. (Id.). It is “relevant To determine whether substantial 10 1993)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming 11 or reversing that conclusion, the court may not substitute its 12 judgment for that of the Commissioner. 13 21 (citing Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 14 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720- 15 VI. 16 17 DISCUSSION 18 19 20 A. Introduction 21 22 The ALJ found that Plaintiff's mental impairment 23 nonsevere, at step-two of the five-step evaluation. 24 asserts that this finding was error. 25 26 27 28 5 This Court agrees. was Plaintiff 1 B. The Step-Two Evaluation 2 3 4 By its own terms, the evaluation at step-two is a de minimis 5 test intended to weed out the most minor of impairments. 6 v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153-154 (1987); Edlund v. Massanari, 253 7 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the step-two inquiry 8 is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims) 9 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290); Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, See Bowen 10 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (step-two is a “de minimis threshold”). An 11 impairment is not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight 12 abnormality that has only a minimal effect on an individual’s 13 ability to work. 14 citations omitted) (emphasis added). Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290 (internal quotations and 15 At step-two of the evaluation, the ALJ is bound by 20 C.F.R. 16 17 §404.1520a. 18 psychiatric review technique. 19 claimant has a medically determinable mental impairment, rate the 20 degree 21 determine the severity of the mental impairment and then, if 22 severe, proceed to step-three of the five-step evaluation. 23 v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721 (9th Cir. 2011). of That regulation requires the ALJ to follow a special functional The ALJ must determine whether the limitation for four functional areas, Keyser 24 The 25 evidence regarding Plaintiff's 26 sufficient to meet a de minimis standard. 27 after 28 breakdown. he lost his home (AR 39-40). to mental impairmemt was Plaintiff testified that foreclosure, he had an emotional He described feeling deeply depressed and 6 1 being socially isolated. (AR 40-42). Plaintiff testified that he 2 sees his treating doctor for psychological counseling once a month. 3 (AR 46). 4 health issues. He also receives prescription medication for his mental (AR 46-47). 5 6 The medical 7 February 8 complaining of memory issues, poor concentration, lack of energy, 9 anhedonia, spontaneous crying and poor sleep. 3, records 2015, support Plaintiff diagnosed visited Fitzgerald, (AR 372). moderate. 12 Plaintiff continued to see Dr. Fitzgerald for treatment for his 13 mental 14 counseling from Dr. Watson during this time. 15 that 16 continued to see Dr. Watson through 2017. 17 Watson completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment 18 and found Plaintiff had moderate to marked to extreme limitations 19 in various functions. health conditions Plaintiff's prognosis prescribed in 2015. was poor. episode, Dr. 11 He depressive Daniel On Fitzgerald 372). major Dr. testimony. 10 (AR a Plaintiff's Cymbalta Plaintiff (AR to recurrent, Plaintiff. also received Dr. Watson observed 374). Plaintiff (AR 413-422). Dr. 20 21 Plaintiff also was treated at the Island Psychiatric Group. 22 (AR 387-398). He was assessed with a major depressive disorder 23 and a GAF of 45. (AR 398). 24 25 26 27 28 7 1 The testimony and medical evidence establishes a mental 2 impairment that has more than a minimal impact on the ability to 3 work. 4 consider Plaintiff's mental impairment as a "groundless claim." 5 such, remand is required. Given the quantity and quality of evidence, it was error to As 6 VII. 7 8 CONCLUSION 9 10 11 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered REVERSING 12 the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this matter for 13 further proceedings consistent with this decision. 14 ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Order and 15 the Judgment on counsel for both parties. IT IS FURTHER 16 17 DATED: July 13, 2018 18 /S/ __________ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION LEXIS/NEXIS OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE. 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 IN WESTLAW,
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
