James Plas Sams v. County of Riverside et al, No. 5:2017cv01848 - Document 14 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. The Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, he is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order within which to file a First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to utilize the standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of which is attached. Plaintiff is fu rther advised that if he no longer wishes to pursue this action, he may voluntarily dismiss it by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff's convenience. (See document for further details). (Attachments: # 1 Civil Rights Complaint Form, # 2 Notice of Dismissal Form) (mr)
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James Plas Sams v. County of Riverside et al Doc. 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES PLAS SAMS, Plaintiff, 12 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER v. 13 14 Case No. EDCV 17-1848 SVW (SS) DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, et al., LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants. 15 16 17 I. 18 INTRODUCTION 19 Pending before the Court is a civil complaint filed by James 20 21 Plas Sams (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, 22 alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 23 § 1983 and several state law claims. 24 Dkt. No. 1). 25 initial screening of complaints in civil actions where a prisoner 26 seeks redress from a governmental entity or employee. 27 § 1915A(a). This Court may dismiss such a complaint, or any portion 28 thereof, (“Complaint” or “Compl.,” Congress mandates that district courts perform an before service of process if the 28 U.S.C. complaint (1) is Dockets.Justia.com 1 frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which 2 relief can be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant 3 who is immune from such relief. 4 also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) 5 (en banc). For the reasons stated below, the Complaint is DISMISSED 6 with leave to amend.1 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1-2); see 7 8 II. 9 ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT 10 11 Plaintiff sues: Valley; (1) the County of Riverside; (2) the City of 12 Jurupa 13 Deputies (3) Aaron Avila, (4) Bridgette Recksiek, (5) Lycopolous, 14 and (6) Melendez; Child Protective Services (“CPS”) social workers 15 (7) Heather Polak and (8) Alison M. Amaro; attorneys (9) Anastasia 16 Georggin, (10) Dawn Shipley, (11) Theresa Devries, (12) Stacy 17 McCoy, 18 Attorney Jennifer 19 “transcriber” with the initials “CP.” All non-municipal Defendants 20 are sued in their individual capacity only. 21 (continuous pagination)). and Riverside (13) Melissa Flores; County A. Sheriff’s Chaitin; and (15) Department (14) Doe Deputy (“RCSD”) District Defendant #1, a (Compl. at 3-7 22 23 Plaintiff’s claims arise from his arrest, trial and conviction 24 on domestic violence charges and the juvenile dependency 25 proceedings that resulted in his daughter’s temporary removal from 26 27 28 A magistrate judge may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without the approval of a district judge. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 1 2 1 her parents’ care after his arrest. 2 on April 11, 2016, Deputies Recksiek and Avila questioned Plaintiff 3 without reasonable suspicion. 4 12, 2016, Recksieck and Avila returned and told Plaintiff that they 5 were not sure that they believed what he had told them the day 6 before. 7 had assaulted her and cut her shin with a pocket knife. 8 11-12). 9 arrest Plaintiff and take him to the RCSD Jurupa Valley Station. (Id. at 9). According to the Complaint, (Id. at 8). The next day, April Plaintiff’s wife told Recksiek that Plaintiff (Id. at Recksiek and Avila instructed Lycopolous and Melendez to 10 (Id. at 10). Deputies left Plaintiff with his arms handcuffed 11 behind his back for seven hours with no food, water, bathroom 12 breaks, medical attention or access to his medications. 13 Plaintiff was in “an extreme amount of pain and hunger.” (Id.). (Id.). 14 15 Recksiek and Avila wrote a police report on the day of 16 Plaintiff’s arrest and “conspire[d] to fabricate evidence” in the 17 report. 18 witness who told him that Plaintiff was the victim of his wife’s 19 physical abuse, and that his wife had “[a]lmost killed” him in the 20 past, Recksiek’s and Avila’s report stated that the witness told 21 them that she “had never talked to V-1 [presumably, Plaintiff’s 22 wife] about the abuse.” 23 that Plaintiff told the Deputies that he liked knives, and omitted 24 any 25 altercation with his wife. 26 interviewing Plaintiff’s wife that Plaintiff was “innocent and 27 could not have stabbed his wife” from where he was sitting when 28 the stabbing purportedly occurred, but falsely stated in the report (Id. at 13). reference to For example, even though Avila spoke to a (Id.). Plaintiff’s The report also falsely stated need (Id.). 3 for self-defense in the The Deputies also knew from 1 that Plaintiff was sitting next to his wife at the time of the 2 attack. (Id. at 14). 3 4 Recksiek and Avila further discriminated against Plaintiff 5 based on his race and gender because even though his wife admitted 6 to them that she tried to choke Plaintiff to death, they did not 7 arrest her for domestic violence. 8 the false statements in his report at Plaintiff’s preliminary 9 hearing, thereby committing “judicial deception” to obtain an 10 (Id. at 16). unwarranted probable cause finding. Recksiek repeated (Id. 14-15, 17). 11 12 After Plaintiff’s arrest, CPS social workers Polak and Amaro 13 “conspired to obtain jurisdiction” over Plaintiff’s daughter, even 14 though the domestic violence charges against Plaintiff involved 15 only his wife and his daughter was not in danger. 16 The attorneys in the CPS proceedings -- Georggin (representing 17 Plaintiff), Shipley (representing Plaintiff’s daughter), DeVries 18 (representing Plaintiff’s wife), and McCoy (representing child 19 welfare) -- also conspired to arrange for the “illegal detention 20 of Plaintiff’s child for ten months.” 21 further 22 California Rules of Court and other state statutory procedural 23 requirements during the juvenile dependency hearings, (id. at 20), 24 but none of these attorneys made any objections to the due process 25 violations. 26 juvenile proceedings, Chaitin, was also part of the conspiracy 27 because she refused “to argue the points on appeal” in order to 28 hide the constitutional violations. alleges that there (Id. at 21). were (Id. at 18). (Id. at 19). numerous Plaintiff violations of the Plaintiff’s counsel on appeal of the 4 (Id. at 19, 22). 1 At Plaintiff’s criminal trial, Avila testified that he did 2 not investigate or talk to deputies involved in prior calls, who 3 would have told him that Plaintiff’s wife “keeps making false 4 accusations.” 5 unreasonably in failing to investigate and pursue exculpatory 6 evidence.” 7 in Recksiek’s and Avila’s report and joined in a conspiracy with 8 Recksiek, 9 fabricate evidence” by falsifying testimony in a transcript of a 10 video. (Id. at 12). (Id.). Avila, Both Recksiek and Avila “acted Flores, the prosecutor, repeated the falsehoods and the unnamed transcriber “to continue to (Id. at 23-24). 11 12 Plaintiff appears to be attempting to raise constitutional 13 claims against the individual Defendants for false arrest, false 14 imprisonment, excessive force, conspiracy, equal protection, due 15 process, and malicious prosecution. 16 contends that Riverside County and Jurupa Valley are liable for 17 their failure to train and supervise the individual Defendants. 18 (See, e.g., id. at 8, 11). 19 causes of action for violations of his state constitutional rights 20 under California Civil Code §§ 51.7 and 52.1; California Penal Code 21 § 13701(b); and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 22 (Id. at 25-29). 23 punitive damages, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees. 24 30). 25 \\ 26 \\ 27 \\ 28 \\ (Id. at 8-24). Plaintiff Plaintiff also raises nine state law Plaintiff seeks unspecified compensatory and 5 (Id. at 1 III. 2 DISCUSSION 3 4 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must dismiss the 5 Complaint due to pleading defects. 6 a pro se litigant leave to amend his defective complaint unless 7 “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 8 could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 9 1212 and (9th Cir. 2012) (citation However, the Court must grant internal quotation marks 10 omitted). For the reasons discussed below, it is not “absolutely 11 clear” that at least some of the defects of Plaintiff’s Complaint 12 could not be cured by amendment. 13 DISMISSED with leave to amend. The Complaint is therefore 14 15 A. Some Claims May Be Barred By The Heck Doctrine 16 17 In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court 18 held that a civil rights complaint for money damages must be 19 dismissed if judgment in favor of the plaintiff would undermine 20 the validity of his conviction or sentence, unless the “conviction 21 or 22 executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized 23 to make such determination, or called into question by a federal 24 court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 25 However, the Heck Court also explained that if a “plaintiff’s 26 action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of 27 any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action 28 should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to sentence has been reversed on 6 direct appeal, expunged by Id. at 486-87. 1 the suit.” Id. at 487 (footnotes omitted). Even where a claim 2 survives the Heck bar, to obtain money damages, the plaintiff must 3 show that the defendant’s actions “caused him actual, compensable 4 injury,” which “does not encompass the ‘injury’ of being convicted 5 and imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned).” 6 at 487 n.7. Id. 7 8 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has found in a case where the 9 plaintiff’s assault conviction had not been overturned that the 10 Heck doctrine barred a false arrest claim that would have required 11 a finding that there was no probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest. 12 Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). 13 However, the court also concluded that Heck would not preclude the 14 same plaintiff’s excessive force claim “[b]ecause a successful 15 section 1983 action for excessive force would not necessarily imply 16 the invalidity of [plaintiff’s] arrest or conviction[.]” 17 also Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th 18 Cir. 1998) (Heck barred false arrest and false imprisonment claims 19 until conviction was invalidated); 20 572, 21 falsified warrant application was Heck-barred because it challenged 22 the “search and seizure of the evidence upon which [plaintiff’s] 23 criminal charges and convictions were based”). 583-84 (9th Cir. 2007) Id.; see Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d (claim alleging that defendants 24 25 Plaintiff alleges that RCSD Deputies arrested him without 26 probable cause, fabricated “evidence” in the form of a police 27 report, and conspired to commit “judicial deception” that resulted 28 in his wrongful conviction. The specific scope and bases of 7 1 Plaintiff’s claims are not entirely clear. 2 that Plaintiff is attempting to challenge the legal grounds for 3 his arrest or the propriety of his conviction, the Heck doctrine 4 may bar any claims that, if successful, would invalidate the 5 conviction or sentence. 6 consider 7 doctrine. 8 Plaintiff must show compensable harm or injury to him personally 9 apart from the fact of his incarceration. whether the However, to the extent In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should alleged claims are barred by the Heck Furthermore, for any claims not subject to a Heck bar, 10 11 B. Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Against Attorneys Georggin, 12 Shipley, DeVries, McCoy And Chaitin Because They Are Not State 13 Actors 14 15 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege 16 that the deprivation of a right secured by the federal constitution 17 or statutory law was committed by a person acting under color of 18 state law. 19 2006). 20 § 1983 action can lie against a private party when he is a willful 21 participant in joint action with the State or its agents.” 22 v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092-94 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing 23 “public function,” “joint action,” “governmental compulsion,” and 24 “government nexus” tests under which a private actor may be deemed 25 to be acting under color of state law). Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. “While generally not applicable to private parties, a Kirtley 26 27 Plaintiff does not state whether Georggin, Shipley, DeVries, 28 and McCoy, who were involved in his daughter’s juvenile dependency 8 1 hearings, are private 2 appointed attorneys. 3 on appeal of those proceedings, was appointed. 4 However, for purposes of § 1983, any such distinctions may be 5 largely irrelevant. 6 when public defenders or court-appointed attorneys are acting in 7 their role as advocates, they are not acting under color of state 8 law for § 1983 purposes. 9 (1992); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320–25 (1981); see 10 also Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008); Miranda 11 v. Clark County, Nev., 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 12 (clarifying 13 unconstitutional policies). 14 public defenders do not act under color of state law because their 15 conduct as legal advocates is controlled by professional standards 16 independent of state authority. that attorneys, public defenders, or court- He does note that Chaitin, who was his lawyer (Compl. at 21). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 public defender's office may be sued for As the Supreme Court has explained, See Polk County, 454 U.S. at 321. 17 18 Furthermore, Plaintiff’s complaint that the attorneys are 19 liable for failing to raise certain objections on his behalf during 20 the juvenile dependency proceedings lack substance. Plaintiff does 21 not allege that Shipley, DeVries and McCoy represented him in those 22 proceedings, so these defendants owed no duty to him. 23 extent 24 Georggin or Chaitin committed professional malpractice by failing 25 to object, (Compl. at 21), the court does not have “subject matter 26 jurisdiction to consider these claims of tortious conduct because 27 they 28 protected right.” that fail to Plaintiff allege is the contending tortious in the violation To the alternative of any that federally Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 9 1 662 F.2d 1337, 2 malpractice 3 jurisdiction). 4 1344 leave to amend. claim (9th against Cir. his 1981) appellate (dismissing counsel prisoner’s for lack of Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed, with 5 6 C. 7 Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Against Deputy District Attorney Flores 8 9 Plaintiff alleges that after Deputies Recksiek and Avila 10 “fabricated evidence in their police report” by including false 11 witness statements, the “Riverside County District Attorneys Office 12 then 13 different transcripts of the videos” from his criminal proceedings. 14 (Compl. at 23). 15 “Riverside County District Attorney’s Office” and does not clearly 16 articulate 17 personally, Plaintiff appears to contend that Flores is liable for 18 repeating in some fashion the alleged falsehoods in the police 19 report and for conspiring with a transcriber (perhaps a court 20 reporter) 21 transcripts. 22 be able to allege, Flores may be entitled to protection from suit 23 pursuant to the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. continued a to the same fabrications then added more to the Although this allegation identifies only the claim include against Deputy District misrepresentations in Attorney one or Flores more video Depending on the facts that Plaintiff may ultimately 24 25 The doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity “applies to 26 § 1983 claims.” Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 842 27 (9th Cir. 2016). 28 are absolutely immune from § 1983 actions when performing functions Pursuant to that doctrine, “[s]tate prosecutors 10 1 ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 2 process,’ or, phrased differently, “when performing the traditional 3 functions of an advocate.” 4 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997)). 5 Prosecutorial immunity applies in such instances even when the act 6 is “malicious or dishonest.” 7 637 (9th Cir. 2005). 8 immune from suit for “‘initiating a prosecution’ and ‘presenting 9 the State’s case,’ and during ‘professional evaluation of the 10 evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for 11 its 12 indictment has been made.’” 13 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431; Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 14 (1993)). 15 connection with the preparation of an arrest warrant,” during 16 “appearances before a grand jury,” “in a probable cause hearing,” 17 and “in trial.” 18 at 129; Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 & n.6 (1991); Imbler, 424 19 U.S. at 430-31); see also Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1012 20 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Appearing in court to argue a motion is a 21 quintessential act of advocacy.”). presentation at Id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, Accordingly, a prosecutor is absolutely trial . . . after a decision to seek an Garmon, 828 F.3d at 843 (quoting A prosecutor is also protected by absolute immunity “in Lacey, 693 F.3d at 933 (citing Kalina, 522 U.S. 22 23 Absolute immunity applies even if it “leave[s] the genuinely 24 wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose 25 malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.” 26 424 U.S. at 432; see also Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1029–30 27 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability 28 for failure to investigate the accusations against a defendant 11 Imbler, 1 before filing charges. . . . A prosecutor is also absolutely 2 immune from liability for the knowing use of false testimony at 3 trial.”). 4 immunity, 5 administrative 6 performed by a detective or police officer.’” 7 at 636 (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 126).2 However, prosecutors are entitled only to “qualified rather than absolute functions, or immunity, ‘investigative when they functions perform normally Genzler, 410 F.3d 8 9 Courts look to the “nature of the function performed” when 10 determining if a prosecutor’s actions are those of an advocate, 11 which are protected by absolute immunity, or of an administrator 12 or investigator, which are not. 13 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269). 14 promote, transfer and terminate” employees, “which do not affect 15 the prosecutor’s role in any particular matter,” are generally 16 deemed administrative functions not protected by absolute immunity. 17 Lacey, 693 F.3d at 931. 18 apply when a prosecutor ‘gives advice to police during a criminal 19 investigation,’ ‘makes statements to the press,’ or ‘acts as a 20 complaining witness in support of an arrest warrant application.’ ” Garmon, 828 F.3d at 843 (quoting For example, “decisions to hire, Similarly, “[a]bsolute immunity does not 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation omitted). In analyzing whether qualified immunity applies, a court must determine “whether, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ conduct amounted to a constitutional violation, and . . . whether or not the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Bull v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and alteration omitted). 2 12 1 Garmon, 828 F.3d at 843 (quoting Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 2 335, 343 (2009)) (brackets omitted; emphasis added); see also 3 Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1101 (filing a false crime report is not 4 protected by absolute immunity). 5 apply if a prosecutor knowingly fabricates evidence. 6 F.3d at 843; see also Genzler, 410 F.3d at 638 (absolute immunity 7 did not apply where prosecutor told witness to lie in meeting held 8 prior to preliminary hearing because the prosecutor was “engaged 9 in 10 the process of acquiring or Absolute immunity also does not manufacturing Garmon, 828 evidence during performance of police-type investigative work”). 11 12 It is entirely unclear what Plaintiff means by the allegation 13 that the 14 fabrications” in Recksiek’s and Avila’s report. 15 For example, if by “continued” Plaintiff means that Flores merely 16 accepted the allegations in the report and relied on them (unaware 17 that they were fabricated) in court proceedings, Flores’ actions 18 would arguably appear to be protected by absolute prosecutorial 19 immunity. Furthermore, even the allegation that Flores “conspired” 20 with 21 transcript of “the video” is ambiguous. 22 Plaintiff may be referring to a video of his interview with Avila 23 following his arrest. 24 any facts showing why he believes the prosecutor had any role in 25 preparing the transcript. 26 assertions in the transcript were ever used against him in a 27 criminal proceeding. Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed, 28 with leave to amend. the District transcriber Attorney’s and others (Id.). Office to “continued insert the same (Compl. at 23). falsehoods into a It is possible that However, Plaintiff does not allege Nor does he state if the allegedly false 13 1 D. 2 Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Against CPS Social Workers Polak And Amaro 3 4 Plaintiff’s only allegation against social workers Polak and 5 Amaro is that they “conspired” to “obtain jurisdiction,” by which 6 Plaintiff apparently means temporary custody, of his daughter 7 following his arrest. 8 a well-elaborated constitutional right to live together without 9 governmental interference. . . . That right is an essential liberty 10 interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that 11 parents and children will not be separated by the state without 12 due process of law except in an emergency.” 13 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Keates v. Koile, 883 14 F.3d 1228, 1236(9th Cir. 2018) (explaining constitutional standards 15 for evaluating claims based upon removal of children). 16 however, Plaintiff alleges that his daughter’s removal was pursuant 17 to juvenile dependency proceedings in which he, his wife, his 18 daughter, and “social services” were each separately represented 19 by counsel. 20 fact afforded the bedrock due process rights of notice and an 21 opportunity to be heard. 22 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Procedural due process requires adequate notice 23 and an opportunity to be heard.”). (Compl. at 18). “Parents and children have Wallis v. Spencer, Here, Therefore, Plaintiff appears to allege that he was in See Kirk v. I.N.S., 927 F.2d 1106, 1107 24 25 At most, Plaintiff alleges that the proceedings were marked 26 by certain irregularities, such as the failure to strictly adhere 27 to 28 requirements. California Rules of Court and other state law procedural (See Compl. at 20) (alleging, inter alia, violations 14 1 of California Rules of 2 petition and distributing social study). 3 clearly explain how or if Polak and Amaro were responsible for 4 these 5 somehow 6 responsibility for the procedural irregularities, the Complaint 7 still fails to state a claim against these two Defendants. violations. be Court However, able to show deadlines even that for filing dependency The Complaint does not assuming Polak that and Plaintiff Amaro bore may some 8 9 “A procedural due process claim has two distinct elements: 10 (1) a deprivation 11 property 12 protections.” 13 Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998). 14 arise 15 implicit in the word ‘liberty,’ or it may arise from an expectation 16 or interest created by state laws or policies.” 17 Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). 18 interest if it places substantive limitations on the exercise of 19 official discretion.” 20 1993) interest, from of a and constitutionally (2) a denial protected of liberty adequate or procedural Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. the Constitution itself, “A liberty interest may by reason of guarantees Wilkinson v. “State law establishes a liberty Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983)). 21 22 The rules and regulations which Plaintiff contends were 23 violated appear to set forth purely procedural, not substantive, 24 standards. 25 were 26 constitutionally 27 Rowland, 769 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“While these 28 regulations may indicate that plaintiff has a protected liberty not However, the mere fact that certain state law deadlines met, without more, cognizable does liberty 15 not provide interest. a basis See for Pratt a v. 1 interest in not being subject to discipline without due process of 2 law, he has no federal constitutional right to the particular 3 procedures established by state law. 4 that is due plaintiff is determined by federal, not state law.”); 5 Campbell v. Woodford, 2006 WL 2849883, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 6 2006) (“State laws and regulations that contain merely procedural 7 requirements, even if those requirements are mandatory under state 8 law, do not give rise to a constitutionally cognizable liberty 9 interest.”). The nature of the process These claims are dismissed, with leave to amend. 10 11 E. 12 Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Against Deputies Lycopolous And Melendez 13 14 The only allegations in the Complaint specifically mentioning 15 Deputies Lycopolous and Melendez by name assert that they were 16 ordered by Recksiek and Avila to arrest Plaintiff and take him to 17 the RCSD Jurupa Valley Station, and that Lycopolous and Melendez 18 “had 19 treatments” at the Station. 20 rights violation, a plaintiff must show either the defendant’s 21 direct, personal participation in the constitutional violation, or 22 some sufficient causal connection between the defendant’s conduct 23 and the alleged violation. 24 06 (9th Cir. 2011). 25 any 26 Lycopolous or Melendez (or, for that matter, Recksiek or Avila) 27 actually 28 Plaintiff, and if so, what each Defendant separately did. an agreement factual to subject (Compl. at 10). to . . . inhumane To establish a civil See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205- However, the Complaint is utterly devoid of allegations personally Plaintiff identifying inflicted 16 any specifically “inhumane whether treatment” on 1 Nor does the Complaint allege any facts, as opposed to legal 2 conclusions, that would support the existence of a conspiracy. 3 establish a conspiracy under section 1983, a plaintiff must show 4 “an agreement or meeting of minds” by defendants to violate the 5 plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 6 Okl., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). 7 have, 8 unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another which results 9 in damage.” by some concerted action, To Woodrum v. Woodward County, intended “The defendants must to accomplish some Mendocino Evntl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 10 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999) (footnote, internal quotation marks, 11 and brackets omitted). 12 Lycopolous and Melendez individually did, it is not possible to 13 determine whether they “committed acts that are unlikely to have 14 been undertaken without an agreement,” which would allow for an 15 inference of a conspiracy. 16 be dismissed, with leave to amend. Because Plaintiff does not describe what Id. Accordingly, the Complaint must 17 18 F. Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Against The Video Transcriber 19 20 Plaintiff claims that the person who transcribed the audio 21 portion of a video (or videos) conspired with Recksiek, Avila and 22 Flores to “continue to fabricate evidence” by inserting errors in 23 the transcript. (Compl. at 24). Plaintiff does not clearly explain 24 what the video was and whether and how the transcript was used in 25 any of his criminal proceedings. 26 state a claim against the “transcriber.” 27 28 17 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to 1 Court reporters do not enjoy absolute judicial immunity for 2 their actions. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 3 (1993). 4 depending on the factual circumstances. 5 1013, 1018 (2d Cir. 1983); Shahin v. Darling, 606 F. Supp. 2d 525, 6 543 (D. Del. 2009) (“While court reporters are not entitled to 7 absolute judicial immunity simply by virtue of their position, 8 quasi-judicial immunity applies to court staff, such as clerks of 9 judicial records and court reporters, who are acting in their 10 official capacities.”) (internal citations omitted); Samuel v. 11 Michaud, 980 F. Supp. 1381, 1404 (D. Idaho 1996) (federal clerks 12 responsible 13 qualified immunity); Taylor v. Sacramento Cnty., 2009 WL 545784, 14 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2009) (“Court reporters enjoy qualified, 15 not absolute immunity.”). However, they may be entitled to qualified immunity, for transcribing Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d proceedings may be protected by 16 17 Whether or not qualified immunity applies on the facts alleged 18 here, to state a civil rights claim based on an inaccurate 19 transcript, the plaintiff must allege that the error had a material 20 adverse effect on his criminal proceedings. 21 explained in a section 1983 case, As the Third Circuit 22 23 Analysis properly begins 24 plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a 25 totally accurate transcript of his criminal trial. 26 constitutional 27 inaccuracies in the transcript adversely affected the 28 outcome of the criminal proceeding. rights with would 18 the be observation violated only that His if And, since the jury 1 which convicted plaintiff and sentenced him to death 2 acted on the basis of the evidence they saw and heard, 3 rather than on the basis of the written transcript of 4 the trial -- which was, of course, non-existent until 5 after the trial was completed -- this means that a 6 constitutional 7 inaccuracies 8 appellate review in the state courts. violation in the would occur transcript only adversely if the affected 9 10 Tedford v. Hepting, 990 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1993); see also 11 Shahin, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (“[A] plaintiff does not have a 12 constitutional 13 threshold question, therefore, is . . . whether plaintiff has 14 alleged deficiencies in the trial transcript substantial enough to 15 call into question the validity of the appellate process in the 16 state courts.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 17 Stewart v. Banuelos, 2016 WL 922551, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 18 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1032762 (C.D. 19 Cal. Mar. 9, 2016) (“Because causation is an element of a Section 20 1983 claim, a plaintiff states a claim for a violation of his 21 constitutional 22 transcript 23 proceedings.”). right rights adversely to an only error if free the affected transcript. inaccuracies the outcome in of . . . the The trial appellate 24 25 Furthermore, several courts have concluded that civil rights 26 claims against court reporters for transcription errors, even when 27 the errors are alleged to have had a material adverse effect on 28 criminal proceedings, may be barred 19 by Heck. As one court 1 explained, “a successful 2 transcripts would imply the invalidity of his conviction, but 3 because 4 conviction has been invalidated, his claim against the Defendant 5 is not cognizable pursuant to Heck.” Dyches v. Martin, 2014 WL 6 1093133, at *4 (D. S.C. Mar. 17, 2014), aff’d, 579 F. App’x 162 7 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Murphv v. Bloom, 443 F. App’x 668, 669 8 (3d Cir. 2011) (allegation in civil rights action that prosecutor 9 altered [plaintiff] inmate’s has trial claim not by [plaintiff] demonstrated transcript was that regarding his Heck-barred his underlying because it 10 implied the invalidity of his conviction); Tedford, 990 F.2d at 11 749–50 (due process claim for damages against court reporters for 12 allegedly tampering with transcript was not cognizable in a section 13 1983 14 conviction”). action “absent a successful challenge to the underlying 15 16 Plaintiff’s vague allegations do not describe whether the 17 transcript was used in any criminal proceeding, and if so, whether 18 it had an adverse material effect on those proceedings. 19 cannot state on the facts alleged whether success on Plaintiff’s 20 claim against the transcriber would undermine the validity of his 21 conviction, and thus be subject to a Heck bar. 22 Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend. 23 24 25 26 27 28 20 The Court Accordingly, the 1 G. 2 Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Against The County Of Riverside And The City Of Jurupa Valley 3 4 1. Riverside County 5 6 Plaintiff summarily asserts that Riverside County is liable 7 for its failure to train and supervise the individually named 8 Defendants. 9 and City of Jurupa Valley failed to train employees in adequate 10 programs addressing false statements and omissions, the failure to 11 train 12 governmental entity may be liable under section 1983 where a 13 policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a 14 moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights. 15 v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 16 (1978). 17 plaintiff 18 constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the 19 municipality 20 deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; 21 and, 22 constitutional violation.” 23 Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation 24 marks and citation omitted; alterations in original). (See, e.g., Compl. at 15 (“The County of Riverside was (4) the moving force behind the violation.”)). A Monell To hold a governmental entity liable under Monell, a must had that prove a the “(1) that policy; policy (3) is [the that the plaintiff] this moving policy force possessed amounts behind a to the Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of 25 26 The Supreme Court instructs that to state a claim, a plaintiff 27 must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 28 plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 21 1 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 2 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 3 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added). 5 Ninth Circuit has addressed these standards in the context of a 6 Monell claim. 7 901 (9th Cir. 2011). 8 train” may state a cognizable Monell claim where “the need to train 9 was obvious The See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900- and The Doughterty Court noted that “failure to the failure to do so made violation of 10 constitutional rights likely.” 11 also emphasized that pursuant to Twombly, “[t]he complaint must 12 contain more than ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 13 cause of action’ . . . [and] must plead ‘enough facts to state a 14 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 15 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & 570). 16 the 17 alleged 18 constitutional 19 affirmative link behind the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional 20 rights,” failed to state a claim. 21 Court 22 factual allegations regarding key elements of the Monell claims, 23 or, more specifically, any facts demonstrating that [plaintiff’s] 24 constitutional deprivation was the result of a custom or practice 25 of the City of Covina or that the custom or practice was the ‘moving 26 force’ behind his constitutional deprivation.” Court concluded only that that determined that the the violations Id. at 900. a and such were the 28 22 Monell policies “moving claim, which caused force assertions the and/or Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900. conclusory 27 Id. at 897 Applying that standard, plaintiff’s defendant’s However, the Court “lacked The any Id. at 900-901. 1 Here, Plaintiff’s conclusory, factually devoid claims against 2 the County of Riverside are nothing more than the “formulaic 3 recitation of a cause of action’s elements” proscribed by the 4 Supreme Court in Twombly and by the Ninth Circuit in the specific 5 context of a Monell claim in Dougherty. 6 must be dismissed, with leave to amend. Accordingly, the Complaint 7 8 2. City Of Jurupa Valley 9 10 Plaintiff also sues the City of Jurupa Valley on the ground 11 that it failed to supervise and train the individually-named 12 Defendants. 13 reasons as the claims against the County, but also because none of 14 the Defendants is alleged to be an employee of the City of Jurupa 15 Valley. 16 states that Plaintiff was taken to the RCSD Jurupa Valley Station 17 following his arrest. 18 Riverside County Sheriff’s Department; therefore, its employees 19 work for the County of Riverside, not the City of Jurupa Valley. 20 Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed, with leave to amend. 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \\ 24 \\ 25 \\ The claims against the City fail not only for the same The only reference to Jurupa Valley in the Complaint However, that station is operated by the 26 27 28 23 1 H. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Fail To State A Claim 2 3 1. California Civil Code § 52.1 (“Bane Act”) 4 5 “California’s Bane [Civil Rights] Act provides a private 6 right of action under state law for damages and injunctive relief 7 where a person ‘interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, 8 or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, 9 with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals 10 of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, 11 or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this 12 state.’” Green v. City and County of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 13 1044 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a)). 14 prevail on a Bane Act claim, a plaintiff must show “an attempted 15 or completed act of interference with a legal right, accompanied 16 by a form of coercion.” 17 334 (1998); see also Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 18 820, 843 (2004) (the provisions of § 52.1 do not extend to 19 “ordinary tort actions” but “are limited to threats, intimidation 20 or coercion that interfere with a constitutional or statutory 21 right”). To Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 22 23 As explicitly provided in the statute, however, a defendant’s 24 “‘[s]peech alone is not sufficient to support an action [under the 25 Bane Act] . . . except upon a showing that the speech itself 26 threatens violence against a specific person or group of persons’ 27 who 28 threatening violence had the apparent ability to carry out the have a reasonable fear of 24 violence because ‘the person 1 threat.’” Quezada v. City of Los Angeles, 222 Cal. App. 4th 993, 2 1007 (2014) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(j)). Furthermore, while 3 “[c]oercion is, of course, inherent in any arrest” or detention, 4 not all types of coercion will suffice to establish a claim under 5 section 52.1. 6 968, 978 (2013). 7 constitutional violation alleged, i.e., an overdetention in County 8 jail, the statutory requirement of ‘threats, intimidation, or 9 coercion’ is not met. Bender v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th For example, “where coercion is inherent in the The statute requires a showing of coercion 10 independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention 11 itself.” 12 959 (2012). Shoyoye v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 13 14 Plaintiff attempts to allege several state law claims based 15 on section 52.1. However, the claims typically do not involve any 16 form of threats, intimidation or coercion by Defendants to prevent 17 Plaintiff from exercising a constitutional right. 18 Plaintiff alleges that the alleged conspiracy to falsify a video 19 transcript, (Compl. at 29), and Recksiek’s and Avila’s insertion 20 of allegedly false statements in their police report, (id. at 26), 21 violated his rights under section 52.1, even though Plaintiff was 22 not even present when these wrongs were purportedly committed and 23 no threat or effort to intimidate or coerce was ever communicated 24 to him. 25 to amend. 26 \\ 27 \\ 28 \\ For example, Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed, with leave 25 1 2. California Civil Code § 51.7 (“Ralph Act”) 2 3 The Ralph Act guarantees people in California “the right to 4 be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, 5 committed against their persons or property because of political 6 affiliation, or on account of any [listed] characteristic.” 7 Civ. Code § 51.7(a). 8 the Ralph Act include “sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, 9 national origin, Cal. The listed characteristics protected under disability, marital 11 primary 12 (incorporating by reference Cal. Civ. Code 51(b)). 13 a section 51.7 claim, a plaintiff must show “‘(1) the defendant 14 threatened 15 (2) the defendant was motivated by his perception of plaintiff’s 16 race; (3) the plaintiff was harmed; and (4) the defendant’s conduct 17 was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm.’” Warren 18 v. Marcus, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting 19 Knapps v. City of Oakland, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 20 2009)). or orientation, genetic information, or sexual condition, 10 language, status, medical immigration committed violent acts status citizenship, . . . .” against Id. To establish the plaintiff; 21 22 Just as he did for his claims under section 52.1, Plaintiff 23 alleges that the alleged conspiracy to falsify a video transcript, 24 (Compl. 25 statements in their police report, (id. at 26), violated his rights 26 under section 51.7. 27 these actions were accompanied by threats or violent acts. 28 does at 29), Plaintiff and Recksiek’s and Avila’s allegedly false However, the Complaint does not allege that allege any facts 26 showing that the acts Nor were 1 motivated by animus against him for his race or sex. Accordingly, 2 the Complaint must be dismissed, with leave to amend. 3 4 3. California Penal Code § 13701(b) 5 6 The Complaint alleges that Defendants “failed to discharge 7 [their] statutory duty” under California Penal Code § 13701(b) to 8 “identify the dominant aggressor” and “consider continuing abuse 9 . . . history between the parties involved” in a domestic dispute. 10 (Compl. at 19) (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 13701(b)). 11 even putting aside the threshold question of whether this provision 12 of the Penal Code provides for a private cause of action, Plaintiff 13 misconstrues the statute. 14 agencies to “develop, adopt, and implement written policies and 15 standards 16 § 13701(a), 17 “written policies shall encourage the arrest of domestic violence 18 offenders if there is probable cause that an offense has been 19 committed.” 20 that local policies must be available to the public and “include 21 specific standards” for felony and misdemeanor arrests, citizen 22 arrests, verification and enforcement of temporary restraining 23 orders and “stay-away” orders, etc.). 24 directs 25 policies and develop “specific standards” to be disclosed to the 26 public, 27 themselves, 28 officer’s violation of a policy that may eventually be adopted by for law but officers’ and However, Section 13701 requires law enforcement responses provides, among to domestic other violence,” requirements, that id. the Id. § 13701(b); see also id. § 13701(c) (providing enforcement does much not less agencies set to forth provide 27 In other words, the statute adopt the domestic substantive penalties for an violence standards individual 1 a local law enforcement agency. Accordingly, the Complaint must 2 be dismissed, with leave to amend. 3 4 4. Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress 5 6 “The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of 7 intentional infliction of emotional distress are: 8 and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of 9 causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, 10 emotional 11 extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation 12 of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” 13 Melorich Builders, Inc. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 931, 14 935 15 “Liability 16 extends ‘only to conduct so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond 17 all possible bonds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, 18 and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Coleman v. 19 Republic Indem. Ins. Co. of California, 132 Cal. App. 4th 403, 416 20 (2005) (quoting Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 21 499, n.5 (1970)); see also Pardi v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 22 389 F.3d 840, 852 (9th Cir. 2004) (even where a defendant’s actions 23 are unlawful, “it is not enough [under California law] that the 24 defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even 25 criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, 26 or even that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice’ or a 27 degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive 28 damages for another tort.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). (1984) distress; (internal for (2) the plaintiff’s “(1) extreme quotation intentional marks infliction 28 suffering severe or and citation omitted). of emotional distress 1 Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations fail to show “conduct so 2 extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bonds of 3 decency.” 4 Complaint must be dismissed, with leave to amend. Coleman, 132 Cal. App. 4th at 416. Accordingly, the 5 6 V. 7 CONCLUSION 8 9 For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed with 10 leave to amend. If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, 11 he is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum 12 and Order within which to file a First Amended Complaint. 13 amended complaint, the Plaintiff shall cure the defects described 14 above. 15 allegations that are not reasonably related to the claims asserted 16 in the original complaint. 17 shall be complete in itself and shall bear both the designation 18 “First Amended Complaint” and the case number assigned to this 19 action. 20 complaint in this matter. Plaintiff shall not include new defendants In any or new The First Amended Complaint, if any, It shall not refer in any manner to any previously filed 21 22 In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should confine his 23 allegations to those operative facts supporting each of his claims. 24 Plaintiff 25 Procedure 8(a), all that is required is a “short and plain statement 26 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 27 Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to utilize the standard civil 28 rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of is advised that pursuant 29 to Federal Rule of Civil 1 which is attached. In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should 2 identify the nature of each separate legal claim and make clear 3 what specific factual allegations support each of his separate 4 claims. 5 concise and to omit irrelevant details. 6 Plaintiff to cite case law, include legal argument, or attach 7 exhibits at this stage of the litigation. Plaintiff is also advised 8 to omit any claims for which he lacks a sufficient factual basis. Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to keep his statements It is not necessary for 9 10 Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file 11 a First Amended Complaint or failure to correct the deficiencies 12 described above, will result in a recommendation that this action 13 be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute and obey court 14 orders 15 Plaintiff is further advised that if he no longer wishes to pursue 16 this action, he may voluntarily dismiss it by filing a Notice of 17 Dismissal in accordance 18 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff’s 19 convenience. pursuant to Federal with Rule of Federal Civil Rule of Procedure Civil 41(b). Procedure 20 21 DATED: March 26, 2018 /S/ __________ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN LEXIS, WESTLAW OR 25 ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE. 26 27 28 30
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