Carlos Castaneda v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 5:2017cv01352 - Document 18 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Chooljian. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. (See memorandum for details) (hr)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Carlos Castaneda v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CARLOS CASTANEDA, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 v. Case No. EDCV 17-1352 JC MEMORANDUM OPINION NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 18 I. On July 6, 2017, plaintiff Carlos Castaneda filed a Complaint seeking 19 20 21 22 review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of plaintiff’s application for benefits. The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary 23 24 25 26 27 28 SUMMARY judgment, respectively (“Plaintiff’s Motion”) and (“Defendant’s Motion”) (collectively “Motions”). The Court has taken the Motions under submission without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15; July 7, 2017 Case Management Order ¶ 5. /// 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Based on the record as a whole and the applicable law, the decision of the 2 Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The findings of the Administrative Law Judge 3 (“ALJ”) are supported by substantial evidence and are free from material error. 4 II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE 5 DECISION 6 On June 27, 2013, plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security 7 Income alleging disability beginning on May 13, 2006, due to anxiety, psychosis, 8 auditory hallucinations, and diabetes. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 19, 210, 9 233). The ALJ examined the medical record and heard testimony from plaintiff 10 (who was represented by counsel), plaintiff’s father, and a vocational expert on 11 September 8, 2015. (AR 62-96). 12 On December 29, 2015, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not been 13 disabled since June 27, 2013. (AR 19-30). Specifically, the ALJ found: 14 (1) plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairment: schizophrenia (AR 15 22); (2) plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 16 met or medically equaled a listed impairment (AR 23); (3) plaintiff retained the 17 residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels 18 with additional nonexertional limitations1 (AR 25); (4) plaintiff had no past 19 relevant work (AR 29); (5) there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 20 national economy that plaintiff could perform (AR 29-30); and (6) plaintiff’s 21 statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of subjective 22 symptoms were not entirely credible (AR 26). 23 On May 23, 2017, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s application for 24 review. (AR 1). 25 26 27 28 1 The ALJ determined that plaintiff: (i) was precluded from working around heavy machinery; (ii) could never operate a motor vehicle during the workday; (iii) was limited to simple and routine, repetitive tasks; (iv) was limited to simple work-related decisions; and (v) could have occasional interaction with the public. (AR 25). 2 1 III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 2 A. 3 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that he is unable “to Administrative Evaluation of Disability Claims 4 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 5 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 6 has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 7 months.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 8 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be considered 9 disabled, a claimant must have an impairment of such severity that he is incapable 10 of performing work the claimant previously performed (“past relevant work”) as 11 well as any other “work which exists in the national economy.” Tackett v. Apfel, 12 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)). 13 To assess whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is required to use the five- 14 step sequential evaluation process set forth in Social Security regulations. See 15 Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th 16 Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (describing five-step sequential evaluation process) 17 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920). The claimant has the burden of proof at 18 steps one through four – i.e., determination of whether the claimant was engaging 19 in substantial gainful activity (step 1), has a sufficiently severe impairment (step 20 2), has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals a listing 21 in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (step 3), and retains the residual 22 functional capacity to perform past relevant work (step 4). Burch v. Barnhart, 400 23 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The Commissioner has the 24 burden of proof at step five – i.e., establishing that the claimant could perform 25 other work in the national economy. Id. 26 B. 27 A federal court may set aside a denial of benefits only when the Federal Court Review of Social Security Disability Decisions 28 Commissioner’s “final decision” was “based on legal error or not supported by 3 1 substantial evidence in the record.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 2 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The 3 standard of review in disability cases is “highly deferential.” Rounds v. 4 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 5 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, an ALJ’s decision must be 6 upheld if the evidence could reasonably support either affirming or reversing the 7 decision. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 674-75 (citations omitted). Even when an ALJ’s 8 decision contains error, it must be affirmed if the error was harmless. Treichler v. 9 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 10 2014) (citation omitted). 11 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 12 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 674 (citation 13 and quotation marks omitted). It is “more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 14 preponderance.” Id. When determining whether substantial evidence supports an 15 ALJ’s finding, a court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both 16 the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s 17 conclusion[.]” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation 18 and quotation marks omitted). 19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed properly to consider the opinions 21 plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. John Benson, expressed in a May 30, 2014 22 letter to plaintiff’s attorney. (Plaintiff’s Motion at 2-5). For the reasons discussed 23 below, a remand or reversal is not warranted on this basis. 24 A. 25 In Social Security cases, the amount of weight given to medical opinions Pertinent Law 26 generally varies depending on the type of medical professional who provided the 27 opinions, namely “treating physicians,” “examining physicians,” and 28 “nonexamining physicians” (e.g., “State agency medical or psychological 4 1 consultant[s]”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(c)(1)-(2) & (e), 416.902, 416.913(a); 2 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (citation and quotation marks omitted). A treating 3 physician’s opinion is generally given the most weight, and may be “controlling” 4 if it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 5 techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the 6 claimant’s] case record[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2); Revels v. Berryhill, 874 7 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). In turn, an examining, but non8 treating physician’s opinion is entitled to less weight than a treating physician’s, 9 but more weight than a nonexamining physician’s opinion. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 10 1012 (citation omitted). 11 A treating physician’s opinion, however, is not necessarily conclusive as to 12 either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability. Magallanes v. 13 Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). An ALJ may reject 14 the uncontroverted opinion of a treating physician by providing “clear and 15 convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence” for doing so. 16 Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 17 Where a treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, 18 an ALJ may reject such opinion “by providing specific and legitimate reasons that 19 are supported by substantial evidence.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (citation and 20 footnote omitted). In addition, an ALJ may reject the opinion of any physician, 21 including a treating physician, to the extent the opinion is “brief, conclusory and 22 inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Bray v. Commissioner of Social 23 Security Administration, 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 24 B. 25 Here, in his May 30, 2014 letter, Dr. Benson essentially opined that Analysis 26 (i) plaintiff “is permanently and totally disabled due to the symptoms and 27 impairments related to his primary diagnosis of [] Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type”; 28 (ii) plaintiff is taking a long acting injectable anti-psychotic medication and 5 1 requires the “top dose” on a more frequent basis than usually prescribed; 2 (iii) plaintiff “is one of the most severely ill patients [Dr. Benson] has ever treated 3 with [this] illness,” and the severity of plaintiff’s condition “would correspond to 4 . . . the very highest acuity level on the Clinical Global Index-severity rating 5 scale[]”; and (iv) “[plaintiff’s] symptoms and psychosocial deficits preclude 6 employment[]” (collectively “Dr. Benson’s Opinions”). (AR 389). Plaintiff 7 contends that a reversal or remand is necessary because the ALJ failed properly to 8 consider Dr. Benson’s Opinions. The Court disagrees. 9 First, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Benson’s conclusory statements that 10 plaintiff “is permanently and totally disabled” and that plaintiff’s condition would 11 “preclude employment.” (AR 28) (citing Exhibit B8F [AR 389]); cf. Vincent v. 12 Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (ALJ must provide explanation 13 only when rejecting “significant probative evidence”) (citation and quotation 14 marks omitted). Non-medical, conclusory opinions that a plaintiff is disabled or 15 unable to work are not binding on the Commissioner, and may be rejected 16 outright. See Boardman v. Astrue, 286 Fed. Appx. 397, 399 (9th Cir. 2008) 17 (“[The] determination of a claimant’s ultimate disability is reserved to the 18 Commissioner . . . a physician’s opinion on the matter is not entitled to special 19 significance.”); Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005) 20 (“Although a treating physician’s opinion is generally afforded the greatest weight 21 in disability cases, it is not binding on an ALJ with respect to the existence of an 22 impairment or the ultimate determination of disability.”) (citation omitted); 20 23 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1) (“We are responsible for making the determination or 24 decision about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability. . . . A 25 statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not 26 mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”). 27 Second, the ALJ also properly rejected Dr. Benson’s Opinions because they 28 are internally inconsistent and unsupported by the physician’s own treatment notes 6 1 and the record as a whole. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2 2014) (“A conflict between treatment notes and a treating provider’s opinions may 3 constitute an adequate reason to discredit the opinions of a treating physician or 4 another treating provider.”) (citations omitted); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 5 875 (9th Cir. 2003) (ALJ properly rejected treating physician’s opinion where 6 “treatment notes provide[d] no basis for the functional restrictions [physician] 7 opined should be imposed on [claimant]”); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 8 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, 9 including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and 10 inadequately supported by clinical findings.”). For example, as the ALJ noted, Dr. 11 Benson’s treatment records reflect that plaintiff’s condition significantly improved 12 over time with medication. (See AR 352-65). Moreover, in his letter, Dr. Benson 13 himself opined that plaintiff’s medication “has shown marked effectiveness with 14 target symptoms of suspiciousness, thought distortions, and auditory 15 hallucinations.” (AR 389). In addition, as the ALJ also noted, Dr. Benson 16 provided no objective findings to support his opinion that plaintiff was in the 17 “very highest acuity level on the Clinical Global Index.” (AR 28, 389). Plaintiff 18 points to nothing in Dr. Benson’s treatment records for plaintiff which note 19 plaintiff as having such an extreme acuity level. (AR 352-65). To the contrary, 20 several times Dr. Benson documented plaintiff’s “global illness severity [level]” as 21 “medium” and opined that plaintiff was “[g]lobally improved” although “still 22 symptomatic for [auditory hallucinations]. . . .” (AR 358 [February 21, 2014 Case 23 Note], 362 [June 21, 2013 Case Note], 363 [March 29, 2013 Case Note], 364-65 24 [February 8, 2013 Case Note]). In fact, on March 21, 2014 – slightly over two 25 months before the date of Dr. Benson’s letter – Dr. Benson opined “[plaintiff] is 26 globablly [sic] much better than I have ever seen him” (AR 357); Which is 27 consistent with the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Benson’s medical records reflect 28 that plaintiff significantly improved with medication. To the extent plaintiff 7 1 argues that Dr. Benson’s Opinions “[are] entirely consistent with the totality of 2 Plaintiff’s record” (Plaintiff’s Motion at 4), this Court will not second guess the 3 ALJ’s reasonable determination to the contrary, even if the evidence could give 4 rise to inferences more favorable to plaintiff. See Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 674-75 5 (citations omitted). 6 Finally, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Benson’s Opinions in favor of the 7 conflicting opinions of the state agency examining psychiatrist, Dr. Rathana8 Nakintara, who essentially opined that plaintiff had no more than slight symptoms 9 or difficulty with mental functioning (AR 27; AR 334), and the state agency 10 mental consultants, both of whom determined that plaintiff was “limited to simple 11 and routine repetitive tasks, simple work related decisions, and to occasional 12 interaction with the public” (AR 27-28; AR 122, 139). The opinions of Dr. 13 Rathana-Nakintara were supported by such psychiatrist’s independent examination 14 of plaintiff (AR 331-35), and thus, without more, constituted substantial evidence 15 upon which the ALJ could properly rely to reject Dr. Benson’s Opinions. See, 16 e.g., Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (examining 17 physician’s opinion on its own constituted substantial evidence, because it rested 18 on physician’s independent examination of claimant) (citations omitted). The 19 state agency mental consultants’ opinions also constituted substantial evidence 20 supporting the ALJ’s decision since they were supported by other independent 21 medical evidence in the record, specifically Dr. Rathana-Nakintara’s opinions and 22 underlying independent examination of plaintiff. See id. (opinions of nontreating 23 or nonexamining doctors may serve as substantial evidence when consistent with 24 independent clinical findings) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Sportsman v. Colvin, 25 637 Fed. Appx. 992, 995 (9th Cir. 2016) (“ALJ did not err in assigning substantial 26 weight to the state agency medical consultant whose opinion relied on and was 27 consistent with the medical evidence of record.”) (citing id.). 28 Accordingly, a reversal or remand on the asserted basis is not appropriate. 8 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner of Social 3 Security is affirmed. 4 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 5 DATED: March 27, 2018 6 7 8 _____________/s/____________________ Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
