Michael Guzman v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 5:2017cv01190 - Document 24 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. (sp)
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Michael Guzman v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 MICHAEL A. GUZMAN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Deputy ) Commissioner for Operations, ) Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ) ___________________________________) NO. ED CV 17-1190-E MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 20 Plaintiff filed a complaint on June 16, 2017, seeking review of 21 22 the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits. The parties filed a 23 consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on July 28, 24 2017. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on March 19, 25 2018. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on April 18, 26 2018. The Court has taken the motions under submission without oral 27 argument. 28 /// See L.R. 7-15; “Order,” filed June 20, 2017. Dockets.Justia.com BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 1 2 Plaintiff, a 23 year old skateboarder with an 11th grade 3 4 education, asserted disability since May 29, 2012 (the day before his 5 18th birthday), based on alleged anxiety, depression, anger, 6 schizoaffective disorder and migraines (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 7 21, 38-39, 44, 69, 77-78, 249-60, 266, 442; but see A.R. 247-48 8 (application for child benefits dated May 17, 2012, reflecting that 9 Plaintiff declined to file for “SSI” because he is not disabled)). 10 Plaintiff stated and later testified that his asserted impairments 11 cause him to have limitations that allegedly prevent him from working 12 (A.R. 51-52). 13 14 An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) reviewed the medical record 15 and heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert (A.R. 21- 16 79). 17 disorder, bipolar disorder, mood disorder, a history of schizophrenia, 18 paranoid type, and a history of post-traumatic stress disorder (A.R. 19 24). 20 functional capacity to perform work at all exertional levels with the 21 following non-exertional limitations: (1) he can understand, remember 22 and carry out simple job instructions; (2) he can maintain attention 23 and concentration to perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks; (3) 24 he can have occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors and the 25 public; (4) he can work in an environment with occasional changes to 26 the work setting and with occasional work-related decision making. 27 See A.R. 24-28 (adopting state agency physicians’ residual functional 28 /// The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from severe schizoaffective However, the ALJ also found that Plaintiff retains the residual 2 1 capacity assessments at A.R. 80-101).1 2 such capacity, Plaintiff could perform medium work as a hand packager, 3 laundry laborer or industrial cleaner, and therefore is not disabled. 4 See A.R. 29-30 (adopting vocational expert testimony at A.R. 70-72). 5 The Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 1-3). The ALJ determined that, with 6 7 In reaching his decision, the ALJ deemed Plaintiff’s statements 8 and testimony concerning the severity of his alleged symptoms not 9 entirely credible (A.R. 26-28). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s 10 reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s statements and testimony were not 11 legally sufficient. See Plaintiff’s Motion, pp. 1-10. 12 STANDARD OF REVIEW 13 14 15 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the 16 Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s 17 findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the 18 Administration used correct legal standards. 19 Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Brewes v. 20 Commissioner, 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). 21 evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept See Carmickle v. Substantial 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 The state agency physicians found Plaintiff would have no significant limitation in: (1) carrying out short and simple instructions; (2) performing activities within a schedule, maintaining regular attendance, and being punctual within customary tolerances; (3) sustaining an ordinary routine without special supervision; (4) making simple work-related decisions; (5) asking simple questions or requesting assistance; and (6) maintaining socially appropriate behavior and adhering to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness (A.R. 87-89, 98-100). The record contains no other medical evidence directly opining on Plaintiff’s work capacity. 3 1 as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 2 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see Widmark v. 3 Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 4 5 If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may 6 not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 7 Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by 8 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. 9 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, But the 10 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 11 detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 12 13 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 14 quotations omitted). 15 DISCUSSION 16 17 After consideration of the record as a whole, Defendant’s motion 18 19 is granted and Plaintiff’s motion is denied. The Administration’s 20 findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from 21 material2 legal error. Plaintiff’s contrary argument is unavailing. 22 23 I. Summary of the Medical Record 24 25 The medical records are intermittent and somewhat sparse, with 26 2 27 28 The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding disability. See Garcia v. Commissioner, 768 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2014); McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886-88 (9th Cir. 2011). 4 1 many of the records dating before the period of claimed disability. 2 The first treatment notes are from Loma Linda University Behavioral 3 Medicine Center for a hospital stay from January 19, 2011 through 4 January 24, 2011 (A.R. 313-34). 5 presented to the emergency room as “psychotic,” destructive and 6 belligerent, after an incident at home where he hit his brother-in-law 7 in the jaw and raced through the house (A.R. 313, 315, 319). Plaintiff 8 reportedly had a history of property destruction and assaultive 9 behavior, struggled in school, and was stressed at home and at school Plaintiff, who then was 16 years old, 10 (A.R. 315-16, 320). He also reportedly drank alcohol until he was 11 drunk and used “THC” (marijuana) “all the time” (A.R. 315). 12 On mental status examination, Plaintiff reportedly had poor 13 14 hygiene, was guarded, agitated, pacing, angry, avoided eye contact, 15 had delusions of grandeur, had visual and auditory hallucinations, had 16 aggressive thought content and had poor intellectual functioning (A.R. 17 317). 18 “alcohol and marijuana dependence versus abuse,” and migraines, with a 19 “severe” prognosis, and was assigned a Global Assessment of 20 Functioning (“GAF”) score of 25 (A.R. 318-19). 21 Psychological Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 22 Disorders (“DSM-IV-TR”) 34 (4th Ed. 2000).3 23 /// 24 involuntarily admitted to the hospital as a danger to himself (A.R. He was diagnosed with psychosis, not otherwise specified, See American Plaintiff was 25 3 26 27 28 A GAF score of 21–30 indicates that “[b]ehavior is considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations OR serious impairment in communication or judgment (e.g., sometimes incoherent, acts grossly inappropriately, suicidal preoccupation) OR inability to function in almost all areas (e.g., stays in bed all day; no job, home, or friends).” DSM-IV-TR, p. 34. 5 1 318, 320). 2 3 Plaintiff was prescribed Zyprexa for his psychosis and Depakote 4 for mood stabilization, which reportedly helped Plaintiff become 5 stable and stay calm (A.R. 320-21). 6 Plaintiff was given additional diagnoses of bipolar disorder and 7 substance-induced psychotic disorder, and he was assigned a GAF of 38 8 (A.R. 319).4 9 abnormalities, and his intellectual functioning, insight and judgment At discharge on January 24, 2011, On mental status examination, there reportedly were no 10 were “fair” (A.R. 321). Plaintiff was ordered to follow up with 11 Victor Valley Behavioral Health Center, and was discharged with 12 prescriptions for Cogentin, Zyprexa, and Depakote (A.R. 321-27). 13 14 Plaintiff followed up with the San Bernardino County Department 15 of Behavioral Health (A.R. 335-47). A treatment note dated February 16 17, 2011, indicates diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder, post 17 traumatic stress disorder (late onset), and chronic pain, with notes 18 that Plaintiff was withdrawn, failing school and aggressive toward 19 people around him (A.R. 335). 20 outbursts followed by blackouts, limited appetite, minimal sleep, was 21 withdrawn, was having “premonitions” (i.e., flashes of images), 22 believed he had special powers, was out of touch with reality, had no 23 friends, and had some grief because his mother had cancer (A.R. 341). Plaintiff reportedly had anger 24 4 25 26 27 28 A GAF score of 31–40 indicates “[s]ome impairment in reality testing or communication (e.g., speech is at times illogical, obscure, or irrelevant) OR major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood (e.g., depressed man avoids friends, neglects family, and is unable to work; child frequently beats up younger children, is defiant at home, and is failing at school).” DSM-IVTR, p. 34. 6 1 Plaintiff was taking Cogentin, Zyprexa, and Depakote as prescribed 2 (A.R. 341, 344). 3 calm himself down (A.R. 341). Plaintiff also admittedly was using marijuana to 4 5 On mental status examination, Plaintiff reportedly was 6 disheveled, cooperative with appropriate behavior, and he reportedly 7 had tangential, clear and bizarre speech, average intellectual 8 functioning, impaired memory, limited concentration and attention, 9 delusional thinking (“I am God” and a belief that he had special 10 powers), limited insight, poor judgment, dysphoric mood, flat affect, 11 and he appeared to be having visual hallucinations (A.R. 345). 12 Plaintiff was assigned a GAF of 41 (A.R. 335).5 13 14 Psychiatrist Dr. Maged Estafan evaluated Plaintiff on March 4, 15 2011 (A.R. 337-40). Plaintiff requested a change in his medications 16 (A.R. 337). 17 what direction he is going to go” (A.R. 337). 18 he had been up for four days and had been seeing things just prior to 19 the incident where he hit his brother-in-law and ended up in Loma 20 Linda hospital (A.R. 337). 21 capable of hearing, seeing and telling the future, he was “very over 22 confident” and omnipotent, had bizarre thoughts, and was in “a daze” 23 with repetitive behavior and suicidal ideations (A.R. 337). 24 reported that he had not experienced any of these symptoms since being Plaintiff reportedly was confused and “unable to know Plaintiff stated that Plaintiff reported that he had felt Plaintiff 25 26 27 28 5 A GAF score of 41-50 denotes “Serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting), OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).” DSM-IV-TR, p. 34. 7 1 placed on Depakote (A.R. 337). Plaintiff was taking Seroquel, 2 Cogentin and Depakote as prescribed (A.R. 337). 3 using cannabis (A.R. 338). Plaintiff also was 4 On mental status examination, Plaintiff reportedly had a 5 6 despondent mood and affect, spontaneous speech and thought processes 7 (i.e., “free flow speaking”), and “good” impulse control, calculation, 8 general fund of information, abstraction, insight and judgment (A.R. 9 338-39). Dr. Estafan diagnosed bipolar disorder and cannabis abuse, 10 with noted problems of limited sociability and poor academics (A.R. 11 339). 12 recommended that Plaintiff continue his Seroquel and Depakote and have 13 individual counseling (A.R. 340). Dr. Estafan assigned a GAF of 35-40 (A.R. 339). Dr. Estafan 14 15 The next available medical records are from treatment by the Los 16 Angeles County Department of Mental Health in July of 2013 – over two 17 years later and after Plaintiff had applied for disability benefits 18 (A.R. 351-56). 19 complained of daily depression, insomnia, nightmares, poor appetite, 20 anxiety, poor concentration, racing thoughts, mood swings, anger, 21 outbursts, avoidance, paranoia, low self esteem, helplessness, 22 hopelessness, audio and visual hallucinations, and stress due to his 23 legal situation of being on probation and having to attend domestic 24 violence classes (A.R. 351, 358). 25 having hit and choked his girlfriend in March of 2013 (A.R. 353). 26 Plaintiff reported histories of: (1) rage with blackouts (“I used to 27 have a v. bad anger problem before”); (2) two suicide attempts when he 28 was 16 years old; (3) head trauma from being hit by a car three times On initial assessment on July 3, 2013, Plaintiff Plaintiff was on probation after 8 1 when he was riding his bicycle at the ages of 5, 7, and 8; (4) 2 physical abuse by his father; (5) sexual abuse for several months by a 3 male when he was 10 and 11 years old; and (6) being bullied when he 4 was in grade school (A.R. 351-53). 5 On mental status examination, Plaintiff reportedly had impaired 6 7 remote memory, concentration, judgment and insight, his fund of 8 knowledge was below average, his mood was dysphoric, he appeared to 9 have auditory hallucinations and he was isolated (A.R. 354). 10 Plaintiff was diagnosed with a mood disorder, not otherwise specified, 11 with a note to rule out bipolar disorder with psychotic features, and 12 he was assigned a GAF of 45. 13 licensed clinical social worker and cosigned by a psychologist). See A.R. 355 (assessment completed by a 14 On July 25, 2013, Plaintiff presented for an initial psychiatric 15 16 evaluation by a doctor whose name is not legible (A.R. 359). 17 Plaintiff complained of depression, a bad temper and poor social 18 skills (A.R. 359). 19 after choking his girlfriend for criticizing him (A.R. 359). 20 examination, Plaintiff reportedly was alert, oriented, neat, calm and 21 coherent, he reported auditory hallucinations (supposedly whispering 22 “Michael come here”) and his memory and judgment were “fair” (A.R. 23 359). 24 prescribed Zyprexa (an antipsychotic), Inderal (an antidepressant), 25 and Benadryl (A.R. 356-57, 359). 26 (A.R. 359). Plaintiff reported that he had been hospitalized The doctor diagnosed a mood disorder (A.R. 359). On Plaintiff was Plaintiff was to return in 30 days 27 28 The next treatment note is from October 2, 2013, when Plaintiff 9 1 presented to the same doctor for a medication follow up (A.R. 360). 2 Plaintiff reported benefitting from his medications (A.R. 360). 3 Plaintiff said he was “unsure” of his new stepmother (A.R. 360). 4 examination, Plaintiff reportedly was alert, neat, coherent, tense, 5 with no violent thought, and his memory and judgment were “fair” (A.R. 6 360). 7 no other treatment notes from this provider in the record. Plaintiff’s medications were continued (A.R. 360). On There are 8 The next available medical records are from a psychiatric 9 10 hospital stay at College Hospital from December 24, 2013, through 11 January 2, 2014 (A.R. 366-84). 12 features of psychosis (i.e., auditory hallucinations, thought 13 disorganization and difficulty articulating any reasonable plan of 14 self-care) (A.R. 367, 369). 15 cannabis regularly and admitted he had used cocaine more than a year 16 before (A.R. 369). 17 369). 18 malodorous, and was pacing and jumping up and down saying he was 19 getting ready for the apocalypse and that he needed to save the world 20 (A.R. 369). 21 fair eye contact, spontaneous speech, an anxious and irritable mood, 22 inappropriate affect, disorganized thought processes, internal 23 preoccupation and paranoia, and impaired insight and judgment (A.R. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 369). Plaintiff presented with claimed Plaintiff reportedly had been abusing Plaintiff denied having any “legal” history (A.R. Plaintiff reportedly appeared “intrusive,” disheveled, On mental status examination, Plaintiff reportedly had Plaintiff was diagnosed with “paranoid schizophrenia 10 1 exacerbation,” and was assigned a GAF at admission of 20 (A.R. 369).6 2 3 Plaintiff reportedly had a history of “intermittent” contact with 4 mental care providers and previous use of psychotropic medications. 5 See A.R. 367; see also A.R. 377 (medication list indicating Plaintiff 6 had taken Zyprexa, Benadryl, and Popranolol, but when he had his last 7 dose was “unknown”). 8 prescribed Latuda and Depakote, which helped him interact more readily 9 with others, made his thought processes more organized and coherent, 10 and lessened Plaintiff’s response to internal stimuli or fixation on 11 thoughts of self harm (A.R. 367, 370, 374). On discharge, Plaintiff 12 reportedly was “very cooperative and future-oriented,” his thought 13 processes were oriented and coherent, he denied suicidal or homicidal 14 ideation, and he appeared appropriate for transition to a lower level 15 of care (A.R. 367). 16 paranoid type, with a “fair” prognosis, and assigned a GAF of 40-42 17 (A.R. 367, 374). 18 Depakote (A.R. 367, 374-75). 19 with outpatient services (A.R. 368). During his hospital stay, Plaintiff was Plaintiff was diagnosed with schizophrenia, Plaintiff was discharged with a supply of Latuda and Plaintiff was encouraged to follow up 20 21 On January 3, 2013, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Clint Salo with 22 College Hospital for follow up in the “partial program for ongoing 23 care” (A.R. 383-84). Plaintiff reported that his insurance would not 24 25 26 27 28 6 On physical examination, Plaintiff reportedly said he wanted to kill himself and that he had been having suicidal ideation with plans to cut or overdose (A.R. 371). Plaintiff reportedly had been increasingly anxious and paranoid, and complained of having a headache (A.R. 371). Plaintiff was assessed with a tension headache and permitted to have Tylenol as needed (A.R. 372-73). 11 1 approve the medication he had been prescribed and that he could not 2 afford it (A.R. 383). 3 (e.g., he thought his father may be associated with “the FBI” because 4 his father monitors him) and “some simplification” in his thought 5 process, but Plaintiff reportedly was not experiencing any 6 hallucinations (A.R. 383). 7 history in his immediate family (A.R. 383). 8 he was in the process of applying for Social Security benefits (A.R. 9 383). Plaintiff reportedly exhibited some paranoia Plaintiff denied any pertinent psychiatric Plaintiff indicated that 10 On mental status examination, Plaintiff reportedly was alert and 11 12 oriented, a “little bit guarded,” with an “okay” mood, somewhat 13 restricted affect, somewhat limited judgment and insight, simplified 14 thought process, some evidence of ongoing paranoid ideation, no 15 evidence of current suicidal or homicidal ideation, he was not 16 observed responding to stimuli, and his fund of knowledge appeared 17 average (A.R. 383). 18 and assessed a GAF of 40 (A.R. 384). 19 Depakote, discontinued Latuda because it was not covered by insurance, 20 and prescribed Geodon to help with Plaintiff’s psychosis (A.R. 384). 21 There are no other treatment notes from Dr. Salo in the record. Dr. Salo diagnosed schizophrenia, paranoid type, Dr. Salo continued Plaintiff’s 22 23 The next available medical records are for psychiatrist Dr. 24 Herbert Sim-on Chin from April of 2014 through July of 2014 (A.R. 425- 25 29). 26 reporting he had been on probation since March of 2013 for assaulting 27 his girlfriend (A.R. 427). 28 Plaintiff admitted a history of using alcohol, cocaine and marijuana Plaintiff presented for an evaluation on April 26, 2014, Plaintiff was taking Depakote (A.R. 427). 12 1 (A.R. 428). Dr. Chin diagnosed schizoaffective disorder and bipolar 2 disorder (A.R. 429). 3 Plaintiff returned on June 6, 2014, reporting that his appetite 4 5 was fair, his sleep pattern had not improved, and he had anxiety, 6 depression and mood swings (A.R. 429). 7 taking his medication as directed (A.R. 426). 8 Plaintiff’s progress was “unsatisfactory” (A.R. 426). 9 “guarded” prognosis and indicated Plaintiff’s condition had not Plaintiff reportedly was Dr. Chin indicated Dr. Chin gave a 10 improved (A.R. 426). Although Plaintiff previously was reported as 11 taking Depakote with no indication in the record that any other 12 prescriptions were given (A.R. 427), Dr. Chin listed Plaintiff’s 13 medications as Prazozim, Popranolol, Visteril, Geodon, Depakote, and 14 Wellbutrin (A.R. 426).7 15 On follow up on July 4, 2014, Plaintiff reportedly was feeling 16 17 better and his medication was helpful (A.R. 425). 18 swings reportedly were stable, he was taking his medications as 19 directed, and his progress was “satisfactory” (A.R. 425). 20 again gave a “guarded” prognosis, but indicated Plaintiff’s condition 21 was stable (A.R. 425). 22 (which are unspecified) and ordered Plaintiff to return in four weeks 23 (A.R. 425). 24 record. 25 /// 26 Plaintiff’s mood Dr. Chin Dr. Chin continued Plaintiff’s medications There are no other treatment notes from Dr. Chin in the The next available record is an “Adult Short Assessment” form 27 7 28 The record is not clear regarding whether Plaintiff then was taking some or all of these medications. 13 1 completed by Dr. Crespo, a licensed clinical social worker, dated June 2 10, 2015 – almost one year later (A.R. 444-46). 3 to request counseling to help with depression (A.R. 446). 4 reportedly had been under the care of a psychiatrist who had 5 prescribed Seroquel, but Plaintiff had discontinued psychiatric 6 treatment (A.R. 446). 7 psychiatrists from his insurance company to resume treatment (A.R. 8 446). 9 employment due to his psychiatric diagnosis and the side effects of Plaintiff presented Plaintiff Plaintiff was referred to get a list of Plaintiff claimed that he could not maintain consistent 10 his psychotropic medications, and said he spends most of his time 11 skating (A.R. 445). 12 reportedly was disheveled, restless, had a “below average” fund of 13 knowledge, with an anxious mood, sad affect, concrete abstractions, 14 “moderately” impaired judgment, claimed visual and auditory 15 hallucinations, supposed behavior disturbance (i.e., being self- 16 destructive with poor impulse control), and he was “amotivational” 17 (A.R. 446). On mental status examination, Plaintiff 18 Psychiatrist Dr. Bruce Marquez treated Plaintiff from July of 19 20 2015 through at least August of 2015 (A.R. 430-42). Plaintiff 21 presented for a new patient evaluation on July 14, 2015 (A.R. 433-42). 22 Plaintiff listed “skateboarder” as his occupation (A.R. 442). 23 Plaintiff reportedly wanted to find out if his medications were right 24 for him and said that his medications “don’t feel right” (A.R. 436, 25 442). 26 Divalprox, Prazosine, and Ziprazodone (A.R. 437, 441). 27 reported that he drank beer or wine occasionally but claimed he used 28 no other drugs (A.R. 439). Plaintiff reportedly was taking Popranolol, Hydroxyzine, Plaintiff Plaintiff complained of gastrointestinal 14 1 pain, headaches, chronic nausea and chronic leg pain, with a history 2 of three concussions (A.R. 438). 3 trying to get disability benefits (A.R. 439). Plaintiff reportedly said he was 4 5 On mental status examination, Plaintiff reportedly had a 6 depressed mood and was experiencing audio and visual hallucinations 7 (A.R. 435). 8 434). 9 and Hydroxyzine, and prescribed Seroquel, Neurontin, and Zolpidem Dr. Marquez diagnosed bipolar disorder, type II (A.R. Dr. Marquez discontinued Plaintiff’s Popranolol, Ziprazodone, 10 (A.R. 433). 11 Dr. Marquez did not refer Plaintiff for therapy (A.R. 433). 12 Plaintiff returned to Dr. Marquez on August 27, 2015, reporting 13 14 that he was “doing okay today” (A.R. 430). Plaintiff said he liked 15 the dose/effect of Seroquel and said that he “[felt] much better” 16 (A.R. 430). 17 and that he was sleeping “ok” (A.R. 430). 18 be out of the house from 6 a.m. until 9 p.m. because he did not get 19 along with his stepmother (A.R. 430). 20 Plaintiff was compliant with and responding to his medications, had no 21 side effects, was eating well, sleeping well and had no suicidal or 22 homicidal ideations (A.R. 430). 23 no need to adjust Plaintiff’s medications (A.R. 430). 24 Marquez did not refer Plaintiff for therapy (A.R. 430). 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 II. Plaintiff also reported that the Neurontin was helpful Plaintiff reportedly had to Dr. Marquez indicated that Dr. Marquez also indicated there was Again, Dr. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Plaintiff Can 15 1 Work. 2 3 Substantial evidence supports the administrative conclusion that 4 Plaintiff can work. The state agency physicians reviewed the record 5 and found Plaintiff capable of maintaining persistence, pace, and 6 attention for at least simple tasks and/or routines when he is 7 compliant with medication, and capable of performing tasks with 8 moderate exposure to public and others (A.R. 80-103). 9 the opinions of a non-examining physicians do not contradict “all Where, as here, 10 other evidence in the record,” the opinions may furnish substantial 11 evidence to support the administrative decision. 12 Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see 13 also Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) 14 (opinion of non-examining medical expert “may constitute substantial 15 evidence when it is consistent with other independent evidence in the 16 record”) (citation omitted). 17 during the period of claimed disability that Plaintiff was totally 18 disabled from all employment. 19 680 (9th Cir. 1993); Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 n.1 (9th 20 Cir. 1990). 21 activities (discussed infra) demonstrate that he retains the capacity 22 to work, at least when he is medicated appropriately. See Andrews v. Significantly, no physician opined See Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, Furthermore, Plaintiff’s own admissions of extensive 23 24 To the extent the evidence of record is conflicting, the ALJ 25 properly resolved the conflicts. See Treichler v. Commissioner, 775 26 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014) (court “leaves it to the ALJ” to 27 resolve conflicts and ambiguities in the record); Andrews v. Shalala, 28 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995) (court must uphold the 16 1 administrative decision when the evidence “is susceptible to more than 2 one rational interpretation”). 3 4 The vocational expert testified that a person with the residual 5 functional capacity the ALJ found to exist could perform medium jobs 6 existing in significant numbers (A.R. 70-72). 7 on this testimony in denying disability benefits. 8 Secretary, 882 F.2d 1474, 1478-80 (9th Cir. 1989); Martinez v. 9 Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1986). The ALJ properly relied See Barker v. 10 11 12 III. The ALJ Stated Sufficient Reasons for Finding Plaintiff’s Statements and Testimony Less Than Fully Credible. 13 14 Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the ALJ’s reasons for 15 finding Plaintiff’s statements and testimony not entirely credible. 16 See Plaintiff’s Motion, pp. 1-10. 17 credibility is entitled to “great weight.” 18 F.2d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1990); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 19 (9th Cir. 1985). 20 medically determinable impairments reasonably could be expected to 21 cause some degree of the alleged symptoms of which the claimant 22 subjectively complains, any discounting of the claimant’s complaints 23 must be supported by specific, cogent findings. 24 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 25 834 (9th Cir. 1995); but see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282-84 26 (9th Cir. 1996) (indicating that ALJ must offer “specific, clear and 27 convincing” reasons to reject a claimant’s testimony where there is no An ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s Anderson v. Sullivan, 914 Where, as here, an ALJ finds that a claimant’s 28 17 See Berry v. Astrue, 1 evidence of malingering).8 2 sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ 3 rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not 4 arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony.” 5 Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations and 6 quotations omitted); see also Social Security Ruling 96-7p (explaining 7 how to assess a claimant’s credibility), superseded, Social Security 8 Ruling 16-3p (eff. Mar. 28, 2016).9 9 stated sufficient reasons for deeming Plaintiff’s subjective 10 An ALJ’s credibility findings “must be See Moisa v. As discussed below, the ALJ complaints less than fully credible. 11 12 A. Summary of Plaintiff’s Testimony and Statements 13 14 At the hearing on September 14, 2015, Plaintiff testified that he 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 In the absence of an ALJ’s reliance on evidence of “malingering,” most recent Ninth Circuit cases have applied the “clear and convincing” standard. See, e.g., Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015); Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014); Treichler v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014-15 & n.18 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Ballard v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1899797, at *2 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2000) (collecting earlier cases). In the present case, the ALJ’s findings are sufficient under either standard, so the distinction between the two standards (if any) is academic. 9 Social Security Rulings (“SSRs”) are binding on the Administration. See Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990). The appropriate analysis in the present case would be substantially the same under either SSR. See R.P. v. Colvin, 2016 WL 7042259, at *9 n.7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2016) (observing that only the Seventh Circuit has issued a published decision applying SSR 16-3p retroactively; also stating that SSR 16-3p “implemented a change in diction rather than substance”) (citations omitted); see also Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 n.5 (9th Cir. 2017) (suggesting that SSR 16-3p “makes clear what our precedent already required”). 18 1 had been living at home with his father and stepmother for the past 2 two years since he was placed on probation for domestic violence 3 against his girlfriend (A.R. 39, 48). 4 had completed 180 days of community service work by picking up trash 5 at a park and cleaning a lake two days a week with up to 40 other 6 people (A.R. 40-41).10 7 his community service, apart from supposedly feeling awkward 8 socializing with others, arriving late once, and having one incident 9 where Plaintiff argued angrily with one of the park rangers (for which While on probation, Plaintiff Plaintiff said he had no problems performing 10 Plaintiff later apologized) (A.R. 40-43). Plaintiff also attended 11 weekly behavior classes for a year along with 13 other students (A.R. 12 42-43). Plaintiff said he had no problems in the class (A.R. 43). 13 Plaintiff then was seeing a psychiatrist monthly, a therapist 14 15 weekly, and taking Popranolol, Seroquel and two other medications that 16 he could not remember (A.R. 44, 50-51, 66-68). 17 anxiety, depression because his mother passed away, his home situation 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// Plaintiff said he has 22 23 10 24 25 26 27 28 The record is missing a page from the transcript of Plaintiff’s administrative hearing. See A.R. 40-41 (skipping page 6 of the transcript). This omission does not appear to be material. See Brady v. Apfel, 41 F. Supp. 2d 659, 668-69 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 1999) (rejecting the notion that an incomplete administrative record constitutes a per se denial of due process; “[i]nstead, the touchstone is whether the administrative record that does exist permits meaningful appellate review”); accord Edwards v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2787847, at *4 (D. Kan. June 30, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 2787833 (D. Kan. July 15, 2010). 19 1 “is not very good” and he feels overwhelmed (A.R. 46-47).11 2 said when he does not take his medication he is “very not calm.” 3 A.R. 47; see also A.R. 263 (Plaintiff reporting in April of 2013 that 4 he supposedly gets into trouble when he is not taking his 5 medications). 6 the time of his domestic violence incident (A.R. 49). Plaintiff See Plaintiff reportedly was not taking his medications at 7 8 9 Plaintiff testified that his medication, psychiatric treatment and classes helped him a “great deal.” See A.R. 49-50; see also A.R. 10 300 (Plaintiff reporting in June of 2014 that he “[felt] confident 11 that the meds. are helping a lot” with his mental condition). 12 Plaintiff claimed he was taking his medication when he had the 13 argument with the park ranger and when he was taking his behavior 14 class (A.R. 47). 15 three months before the hearing, when he and a friend supposedly got 16 into an altercation (A.R. 49). Plaintiff said the last time he had been violent was Plaintiff said that, when he is on his 17 11 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 In a Pain Questionnaire dated June 1, 2013, Plaintiff reported that he: (1) gets headaches when he is stressed; (2) has paranoia, depression and anger; (3) has problems getting along with others because he feels unloved; (4) has problems controlling his anger; (5) does not get along with authority figures very well; (6) does not handle stress very well; and (7) does not like changes in routine (A.R. 272-79). Plaintiff claims that he blacks out when he gets angry, stresses easily, gets angry quickly, is depressed frequently and feels worthless (A.R. 279). Plaintiff asserted that his conditions affect squatting, bending, kneeling, seeing, memory, completing tasks, concentration, understanding, following instructions, and getting along with others. See A.R. 274 (emphasis added). Plaintiff stated that he could walk two miles before needing to rest 10 minutes, could pay attention for 40 minutes at a time, does not finish what he starts, gets confused sometimes following written instructions, but easily follows spoken instructions when told how to do something three or more times (A.R. 274-75). Plaintiff admitted he is able to skateboard almost every day with others at skate parks, ride a bicycle, shop in stores, prepare his own meals, and do daily housework (A.R. 275-77). 20 1 medication, he is “very mellow, calm, cool, and collected, but it’s 2 hard for [him] to like kind of like speak and express [himself]” (A.R. 3 47-48). 4 be auditory.” See A.R. 47; but see A.R. 57 (Plaintiff testifying that 5 his medication makes it “a lot easier to be able to talk to people”). 6 Plaintiff said that during the last two years he had been consistent 7 and regimented with taking his medications by using phone reminders 8 (A.R. 52).12 He stated he is more in his head “instead of like trying to 9 On examination by Plaintiff’s attorney, Plaintiff claimed that 10 11 his medications do not take away all of his problems (A.R. 59). 12 Plaintiff claimed he still has hallucinations like “creepy voices” 13 telling him to do bad things, but his purported hallucinations are now 14 easier to ignore (A.R. 59-61). 15 make it harder for him to eat (A.R. 61). 16 energy drinks so as not to feel tired, and claimed that sometimes the 17 medications make it harder for him to think (A.R. 61-62). 18 claimed that he still has the urge to hit someone or get into an 19 altercation while on his medication, but he also said he walks away to 20 remove himself from the trigger and admitted he is better with 21 medication (A.R. 63-65). 22 to calm himself (A.R. 65). 23 /// Plaintiff alleged that his medications He said that he drinks He also Plaintiff said it takes him about 15 minutes 24 25 26 27 28 12 Plaintiff admitted a history of using marijuana on a regular basis, drinking alcohol and using cocaine (A.R. 49-50). Plaintiff said he still drank alcohol occasionally, but said he was staying away from “all the drugs” because he was on probation (A.R. 50). 21 1 With regard to Plaintiff’s claim that he could not work because 2 of his medications, Plaintiff stated: “They said [] that I’m a risk. 3 I have always came straightforward [sic] when I. . . try to get a 4 job[,] and they [end] up shooting me down because of the fact that I’m 5 taking medication.” 6 reporting no work history as of June of 2014, supposedly because he is 7 “High Risk”). 8 hired, Plaintiff said the biggest issue would be getting to a job 9 because he cannot get a driver’s license due to his medications (A.R. See A.R. 51; see also A.R. 301 (Plaintiff When asked whether he could perform work if he were 10 51-52). Plaintiff said that, if the task were simple, he could try 11 his best to do what he could but he claimed he has a problem with 12 “constantly” forgetting (A.R. 52). 13 first quarter of 2015 he had earnings because he was trying to get a 14 job, and that he worked for a total of about a month through a 15 temporary agency at six different jobs. 16 259 (record of earnings for temporary work). 17 had problems at his temporary jobs staying within his schedule of 18 taking Popranolol every two to three hours or as needed (A.R. 74). 19 Plaintiff claimed he was fired because he needed to take Propranolol 20 to deal with his frustration with the people around him (A.R. 74-75). Plaintiff admitted that in the See A.R. 69-70; see also A.R. Plaintiff said that he 21 22 Plaintiff testified that he likes to skateboard, draw, listen to 23 music, and “hang out” with his two children, who were five and three 24 years old and lived with their mother in Apple Valley (A.R. 52-54). 25 Plaintiff said he gets to and from Apple Valley from Los Angeles 26 (where he lives) either by having his father drive him, his girlfriend 27 pick him up, or by taking a Greyhound bus (A.R. 53). 28 Apple Valley to see his children four or five times in the past year, 22 He had been to 1 visiting for one or two weeks at a time, and he sometimes watches the 2 children by himself (A.R. 53-54). 3 4 Plaintiff said he skateboards every day or every other day at a 5 skate park in Pico Rivera (A.R. 54). Plaintiff said he spends his 6 days taking his medication, cleaning the house, eating a meal, taking 7 a bus to a stop, and riding his skateboard from the stop to the skate 8 park where he skateboards for as long as he can (A.R. 55). 9 can take the bus from skate park to skate park where he sees his Plaintiff 10 friends (A.R. 56). Plaintiff said it is difficult for him to stay at 11 his house because his stepmother only lets him spend the night there 12 (i.e., he must be out of the house during the day) (A.R. 55-56). 13 Plaintiff said the biggest stressor in his life was his living 14 situation, and said that, if that situation got resolved, 75 percent 15 of his stress would be gone (A.R. 56-57). 16 live with his girlfriend while he is on probation (A.R. 57). Plaintiff reportedly cannot 17 18 B. The ALJ’s Reasoning is Legally Sufficient. 19 20 The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s impairments limit certain 21 aspects of his functioning, but found “no evidence establishing the 22 impairments are so severe as to prevent the claimant from basic work 23 activities” (A.R. 26). 24 evidence does not support the claimant’s allegations of severity 25 (e.g., the record showed “minimal treatment” and that Plaintiff’s 26 symptoms are adequately controlled and stable when he is compliant 27 with medication); (2) Plaintiff has a “wide range of daily 28 activities,” and his ability to participate in such activities The ALJ reasoned that: (1) the objective 23 1 diminished the credibility of Plaintiff’s allegations of functional 2 limitations; and (3) during the hearing, the ALJ observed that 3 Plaintiff was able to follow questions posed and answer the questions 4 appropriately, without difficulty or undue delay, and Plaintiff was 5 able to pay attention throughout the entire hearing (A.R. 26-28). 6 /// 7 /// An ALJ permissibly may rely on a lack of objective medical 8 9 evidence fully supporting the alleged severity of a claimant’s 10 symptomatology to discount a claimant’s testimony and statements. 11 Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (2005) (“Although lack of medical 12 evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it 13 is a factor the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.”); 14 Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); see 15 also Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d at 1161 (“Contradiction with 16 the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant's 17 subjective testimony.”) (citation omitted); SSR 16–3p, 2016 WL 18 1119029, at *4 (“[O]bjective medical evidence is a useful indicator to 19 help make reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence 20 of symptoms, including the effects those symptoms may have on the 21 ability to perform work-related activities . . .”); SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 22 374186, at *6 (“[O]bjective medical evidence is a useful indicator to 23 assist us in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and 24 persistence of an individual’s symptoms and the effects those symptoms 25 may have on an individual’s ability to function.”) (citation and 26 internal quotation marks omitted). 27 /// 28 /// 24 See 1 In the present case, as summarized above (and as discussed by the 2 ALJ at A.R. 27), although Plaintiff had been diagnosed with 3 schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, and a mood disorder, and 4 Plaintiff was aware of these diagnoses, he sought minimal treatment 5 and he discontinued treatment for lengthy periods of time despite 6 reported improvement. 7 based on a claimant’s failure to seek treatment or to follow a 8 prescribed course of treatment. 9 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (in assessing a claimant’s credibility the ALJ An ALJ may discount a claimant’s allegations See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 10 may properly rely on “unexplained or inadequately explained failure to 11 seek treatment or to follow prescribed course of treatment”) 12 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also SSR 16-3p 13 at *9 (“Persistent attempts to obtain relief of symptoms, such as 14 increasing dosages or changing medications, trying a variety of 15 treatments, referrals to specialists, or changing treatment sources 16 may be an indication that an individual’s symptoms are a source of 17 distress and may show that they are intense and persistent. ¶ In 18 contrast, if the frequency or extent of the treatment sought. . . is 19 not comparable with the degree of the individual’s subjective 20 complaints, or if the individual fails to follow prescribed treatment 21 that might improve symptoms, we may find the alleged intensity and 22 persistence of an individual’s symptoms are inconsistent with the 23 overall evidence of record.”); SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7 24 (“[Claimant’s] statements may be less credible if the level or 25 frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of 26 complaints[.]”). 27 failure consistently to seek treatment and take his medications. 28 e.g., Tadman v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 1073341, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. The ALJ did not err in considering Plaintiff’s 25 See, 1 21, 2017) (finding ALJ did not err in considering sporadic nature of 2 claimant’s mental health treatment after receiving a diagnosis for a 3 mental health impairment; distinguishing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 4 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996));13 Lucker-McVae v. Commissioner, 2013 WL 5 712276, at *6 (D. Or. Feb. 27, 2013) (same where claimant did not seek 6 consistent mental health treatment until the year she filed her social 7 security applications); Beasley v. Astrue, 2010 WL 4717108, at *5 & 8 n.1 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 2010) (same where claimant had been advised 9 to seek mental health treatment for diagnosed mental illness but did 10 not follow recommendations for a two-year period); Judge v. Astrue, 11 2010 WL 3245813, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2010) (same where claimant 12 underwent bi-weekly therapy to address trauma for a finite period of 13 time but thereafter did not get any treatment, which “seems more a 14 function of the fact that she did not need it, as opposed to her 15 inability to comprehend that she needed it”); Parks v. Astrue, 2010 WL 16 424609, at *8 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 29, 2010) (same where claimant failed 17 to keep mental health appointments after referral and was familiar 18 with psychotropic treatment for her condition). 19 20 As summarized above (and by the ALJ at A.R. 26-28), the medical 21 evidence showed that Plaintiff’s symptoms were largely controlled when 22 he took his medication. 23 Plaintiff’s medications and treatment in discounting Plaintiff’s The ALJ did not err in citing the efficacy of 24 13 25 26 27 28 In Nguyen, the Ninth Circuit found it “questionable” to “chastise” one with a mental impairment for failure to seek psychiatric treatment, where the claimant had neither sought nor received any mental health treatment. Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1465. Unlike Nguyen, Plaintiff is not someone who failed to “recognize that [his] condition reflects a potentially serious mental illness.” Id. Plaintiff is well aware of his mental condition and of the benefits of regular treatment. 26 1 subjective complaints. See Warre v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 2 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled effectively with 3 medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining 4 eligibility for SSI benefits.”) (citations omitted). 5 6 The ALJ also permissibly cited Plaintiff’s ability to concentrate 7 and to answer questions appropriately at the hearing (A.R. 28). See 8 Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 1992) (ALJ’s 9 observation of claimant at hearing permissible where such observation 10 was one of several factors affecting credibility determination); see 11 also Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (although 12 Ninth Circuit has disapproved of so-called “sit and squirm” 13 jurisprudence, the inclusion of the ALJ’s observations does not render 14 the decision improper; ALJ did not comment on fact that claimant 15 failed to manifest symptoms of pain at the hearing, but rather on the 16 claimant’s symptoms that were inconsistent with the medical record and 17 with other behavior exhibited at the hearing) (citing Morgan v. 18 Commissioner, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999)). 19 accounted for any mental limitations Plaintiff may have (when 20 Plaintiff is compliant with his medications) by limiting Plaintiff to 21 simple, routine and repetitive tasks with occasional interaction with 22 others, with occasional changes in the work setting and occasional 23 work-related decisions, consistent with the state agency physician 24 opinions and with Plaintiff’s own testimony. 25 A.R. 87-89, 98-100 (state agency physicians’ opinions); and A.R. 51- 26 52, 55 (Plaintiff testifying at the hearing that his biggest hurdle to 27 working would be getting to the job site because he does not have a 28 driver’s license, but admitting that he takes daily public 27 Here, the ALJ See A.R. 25-28; compare 1 transportation to skate parks and that he could “try [his] best” to do 2 simple tasks). 3 4 Assuming, arguendo, that the ALJ’s reliance on his own 5 observations of Plaintiff at the hearing to discount Plaintiff’s 6 subjective complaints was improper, the Court nevertheless upholds the 7 ALJ’s determination. 8 1163, the infirmity of one or two supporting reasons for an ALJ’s 9 determination regarding subjective symptoms does not require Under Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d at 10 overturning the determination if independently valid supporting 11 reasons remain. 12 between Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and his admitted daily 13 activities. 14 squatting, bending, kneeling, seeing, and getting along with others 15 (A.R. 274). 16 problems completing his community service and required classwork (A.R. 17 40-42). 18 previously attended classes, previously performed community service, 19 is out of the house all day every day, goes to skate parks daily, 20 takes public transportation, spends time with his friends and 21 girlfriend and spends time with and cares for his young children. 22 also sought work previously. 23 activities and claimed incapacity properly may impugn the accuracy of 24 Plaintiff's testimony and statements under the circumstances of this 25 case. 26 discredited allegations that claimant could not tolerate minimal human 27 interaction where daily activities included walking grandchildren to 28 and from school, attending church, shopping, and taking walks); Thune Here, the ALJ properly relied on inconsistencies For example, Plaintiff claimed to be limited in Yet, he skateboards all day with others and had few or no As summarized above (and by the ALJ at A.R. 26-27), Plaintiff He Such inconsistencies between admitted See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d at 1112 (ALJ properly 28 1 v. Astrue, 499 Fed. App'x 701, 703 (9th Cir. 2012) (ALJ properly 2 discredited pain allegations as contradicting claimant's testimony 3 that she gardened, cleaned, cooked, and ran errands); Bray v. 4 Commissioner, 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (fact that claimant 5 has sought out employment weighs against a finding of disability); 6 Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) 7 (claimant's "normal activities of daily living, including cooking, 8 house cleaning, doing laundry, and helping her husband in managing 9 finances" was sufficient explanation for discounting claimant's 10 testimony). 11 12 The lack of objective medical evidence suggesting greater 13 limitations and the fact that Plaintiff could engage in significant 14 daily activities consistent with an ability to do work are 15 independently valid reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony and 16 statements. 17 this Court to conclude that the Administration discounted Plaintiff’s 18 testimony and statements on permissible grounds. 19 Barnhart, 367 F.3d at 885. 20 determination. 21 Cir. 2007) (court will defer to Administration’s credibility 22 determination when the proper process is used and proper reasons for 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 the decision are provided); accord Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Accordingly, the ALJ stated sufficient reasons to allow See Moisa v. The Court therefore defers to the ALJ’s See Lasich v. Astrue, 252 Fed. App'x 823, 825 (9th 29 1 Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9h Cir. 1995).14 2 CONCLUSION 3 4 5 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary 6 judgment is denied and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 7 granted. 8 9 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 10 DATED: June 6, 2018 11 12 /s/ CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14 The Court should not and does not determine de novo the accuracy of Plaintiff’s testimony and statements concerning his subjective symptomatology. It is for the Administration, and not this Court, to evaluate the accuracy of Plaintiff’s testimony and statements regarding the intensity and persistence of Plaintiff’s subjective symptomatology. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750, 755–56 (9th Cir. 1989). 30
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