Brandy L. Anderson v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 5:2017cv01063 - Document 22 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion. (sp)
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Brandy L. Anderson v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 BRANDY L. ANDERSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) NO. ED CV 17-1063-E MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND 17 18 Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), IT IS 19 HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s motions for summary 20 judgment are denied, and this matter is remanded for further 21 administrative action consistent with this Opinion. 22 23 PROCEEDINGS 24 25 Plaintiff filed a complaint on May 26, 2017, seeking review of 26 the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. The parties consented to 27 proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on June 27, 2017. 28 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on December 18, 2017. Dockets.Justia.com 1 Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on January 17, 2018. 2 The Court has taken the motions under submission without oral 3 argument. See L.R. 7-15; “Order,” filed June 5, 2017. 4 5 BACKGROUND 6 7 Plaintiff asserts disability since October 1, 2011, based on 8 alleged physical and psychological impairments (Administrative Record 9 (“A.R.”) 16-741). The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found 10 Plaintiff suffers from several severe impairments, including 11 “generalized anxiety disorder” and “depression” (A.R. 18). 12 13 In assessing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ 14 purportedly gave “great weight” to the opinions of Dr. Roger Tilton, a 15 consultative examining psychologist (A.R. 26, 364-69). 16 those opinions, Dr. Tilton stated that Plaintiff’s “ability to perform 17 work activities without special or additional supervision is judged to 18 be moderately limited” (A.R. 369). 19 residual functional capacity for Plaintiff that does not appear to 20 acknowledge any need for “special or additional supervision” (A.R. 21 21). 22 residual functional capacity defined by the ALJ is the limitation 23 “to unskilled work with occasional contact with the public” (id.). In one of Yet, the ALJ defined a light work The only arguable psychologically-based limitation in the 24 25 In response to a hypothetical question assuming this residual 26 functional capacity, a vocational expert identified jobs a person so 27 limited assertedly could perform (A.R. 59-60). 28 testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled (A.R. 28-29). 2 In reliance on this The 1 Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 1-3). 2 3 STANDARD OF REVIEW 4 5 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the 6 Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s 7 findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the 8 Administration used correct legal standards. 9 Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 10 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner 11 of Social Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). 12 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 13 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 14 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); 15 see Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). See Carmickle v. Richardson v. 16 17 DISCUSSION 18 19 Plaintiff argues, inter alia, that the ALJ erred by failing to 20 account for Dr. Tilton’s opinion that Plaintiff is moderately limited 21 in the ability to perform work activities without special or 22 additional supervision. 23 Plaintiff to “unskilled work with occasional contact with the public” 24 properly accounted for Dr. Tilton’s supervision-related opinion. Defendant argues that the ALJ’s limitation of 25 26 Contrary to Defendant’s argument, a limitation to unskilled work 27 does not account for a need for special or additional supervision. 28 The recent decision of Jaquez v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 5989197 (D.N.M. 3 1 Dec. 1, 2017) (“Jaquez”) is instructive. 2 the claimant was moderately 3 ordinary routine without special supervision. 4 argued that such limitation “is adequately accounted for in the ALJ’s 5 ‘limiting Plaintiff to simple instructions and [simple] work-related 6 decisions. . . .’” 7 observed that the Social Security Administration’s Program Operations 8 Manual Systems states that one of the mental abilities “critical” for 9 performing unskilled work is the ability to “sustain an ordinary Id. There, doctors opined that limited in the ability to sustain an Id. at *5. Defendant In rejecting this argument, the Jaquez Court 10 routine without special supervision.” Id. The Jaquez Court concluded 11 that “[i]t was reversible error for the ALJ to purportedly adopt the 12 doctors’ [supervision-related] opinions while assessing an RFC 13 [residual functional capacity] that conflicted with them” (id.). 14 Other district courts are in accord with the Jaquez decision. 15 Davis v. Colvin, 2014 WL 3890495, at *13 (W.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2014) (“a 16 restriction to simple unskilled work does not address a limitation 17 that [the claimant] requires additional supervision and instruction 18 . . .”); Gonzales v. Astrue, 2010 WL 4392911, at *13 (E.D. Cal. 19 Oct. 29, 2010) (ALJ’s limitation of the claimant to unskilled work 20 failed to account for the claimant’s alleged need for additional 21 supervision). See 22 23 Thus, if (as it appears) the ALJ accepted Dr. Tilton’s opinion 24 regarding a limitation on Plaintiff’s ability to perform work 25 activities without special or additional supervision, then the ALJ 26 erred by failing without explanation to account for this limitation in 27 the residual functional capacity assessment and the hypothetical 28 questioning of the vocational expert. 4 See id. Such errors may have 1 been material. Where a hypothetical question fails to include all of 2 the claimant’s limitations, the vocational expert’s answer to the 3 question cannot constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s 4 decision. 5 1991); Gamer v. Secretary, 815 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1987); 6 Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984); cf. Molina v. 7 Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (an ALJ’s error is 8 harmless only where the error is “inconsequential to the ultimate 9 nondisability determination”). See, e.g., DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 10 11 Remand is appropriate because the circumstances of this case 12 suggest that further administrative review could remedy the ALJ’s 13 errors. 14 also INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (upon reversal of an 15 administrative determination, the proper course is remand for 16 additional agency investigation or explanation, except in rare 17 circumstances); Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) 18 (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative 19 proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a 20 direction to provide benefits”); Treichler v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 21 1090, 1101 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014) (remand for further administrative 22 proceedings is the proper remedy “in all but the rarest cases”); 23 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (court will 24 credit-as-true medical opinion evidence only where, inter alia, “the 25 record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings 26 would serve no useful purpose”); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180- 27 81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1038 (2000) (remand for further 28 proceedings rather than for the immediate payment of benefits is See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011); see 5 1 appropriate where, as here, there are “sufficient unanswered questions 2 in the record”). 3 present record. There remain significant unanswered questions in the 4 5 CONCLUSION 6 7 For all of the foregoing reasons,1 Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s 8 motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded 9 for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion. 10 11 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 12 13 DATED: January 23, 2018. 14 15 /s/ CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 The Court has not reached any other issue raised by Plaintiff except insofar as to determine that reversal with a directive for the immediate payment of benefits would not be appropriate at this time. “[E]valuation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that [Plaintiff] is in fact disabled.” See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d at 1021. 6
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