Valerie Lynn Jacquez v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 5:2016cv02239 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Gail J. Standish. IT IS ORDERED that: (1) the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings consistent with thisMemorandum Opinion and Order; and (2) Judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff. 5 (SEE ORDER FOR FURTHER INFORMATION) (gr)
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Valerie Lynn Jacquez v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VALERIE LYNN JACQUEZ Plaintiff 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case No. 5:16-cv-02239-GJS MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL1, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. I.PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff Valerie Lynn Jacquez (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint seeking review of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The parties filed consents to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge [Dkts. 10, 12] and briefs addressing disputed issues in the case [Dkt. 17 (“Pltf.’s Br.”) and Dkt. 18 (“Def.’s Br.”).] The Court has taken the parties’ briefing under submission without oral argument. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that this matter should be remanded for further proceedings. II.ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION UNDER REVIEW On April 29, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI. [Dkt. 15, Administrative Record (“AR”) 9, 121-126.] The Commissioner denied her initial claim for benefits on August 20, 2013, and upon reconsideration on February 24, 2014. [AR 9, 40-50, 53-65.] On June 3, 2015, a hearing was held before Dockets.Justia.com 1 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Dante M. Alegre. [AR 24-39.] On August 5, 2 2015, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s request for benefits. [AR 9-23.] 3 Plaintiff requested review from the Appeals Council, which denied review on 4 September 7, 2016. [AR 1-5.] 5 Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that 6 Plaintiff was not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b)-(g)(1). At step one, the 7 ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 8 April 29, 2013, the alleged onset date. [AR 11.] At step two, the ALJ found that 9 Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder; psychotic 10 disorder; and post-traumatic stress disorder. [Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c)).] 11 Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 12 of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 13 impairments. [AR 13 (citing 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; 20 C.F.R. 14 §§ 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926).] 15 16 17 18 19 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following residual functional capacity (RFC): [C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: unskilled work with occasional public contact. 20 [AR 15.] Applying this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant 21 work, but determined that based on her age (37 years old), high school education, 22 and ability to communicate in English, she could perform representative occupations 23 such as cleaner (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 381.687-018), hand 24 packager (DOT 920.587-018), and packing machine operator (DOT 920.685-078) 25 and, thus, is not disabled. [AR 18-19.] 26 III.GOVERNING STANDARD 27 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 28 determine if: (1) the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence; 2 1 and (2) the Commissioner used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Comm’r 2 Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 3 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 4 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 5 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal citation and quotations omitted); see 6 also Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1074. 7 8 IV.DISCUSSION Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to articulate valid reasons for 9 assigning “little weight” to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Jeremiah 10 Umakanthan, M.D. [Pltf.’s Br. at 2-5.] The Court agrees. 11 “The medical opinion of a [Plaintiff’s] treating physician is given controlling 12 weight’ so long as it ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and 13 laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial 14 evidence in [the Plaintiff’s] case record.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 15 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). “When a treating physician’s opinion is 16 not controlling, it is weighted according to factors such as the length of the 17 treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the 18 treatment relationship, supportability, consistency with the record, and 19 specialization of the physician.” Id. 20 “To reject [the] uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining doctor, an 21 ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial 22 evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 23 2008) (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). “If a treating or 24 examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may 25 only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 26 substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005); see 27 also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[The] reasons for 28 rejecting a treating doctor’s credible opinion on disability are comparable to those 3 1 required for rejecting a treating doctor’s medical opinion.”). “The ALJ can meet 2 this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 3 conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 4 findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal 5 quotation omitted). 6 On April 28, 2015, Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Umakanthan, wrote a 7 letter indicating that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, psychotic 8 disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. [AR 342.] Dr. Umakanthan reported 9 that these disorders manifest themselves in “depression, visual and auditory 10 hallucinations, paranoia, mania, nightmares, and black outs.” [Id.] Dr. Umakanthan 11 opined that Plaintiff’s “condition causes a lack of motivation and causes her to 12 isolate and at this time [she] is unable to work.” [Id.] 13 The ALJ provided only one reason for assigning less weight to Dr. 14 Umakanthan’s opinion: “the evidence of the record…does not support such an 15 extreme statement.” [AR 17.] However, this reason was an inadequate basis for 16 rejecting Umakanthan’s opinion because it fails to reach the level of specificity 17 required for rejecting a treating source opinion. See Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 18 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988) (“To say that medical opinions are not supported by 19 sufficient objective findings or are contrary to the preponderant conclusions 20 mandated by the objective findings does not achieve the level of specificity our prior 21 cases have required . . . The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must 22 set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are 23 correct.”) (footnote omitted). While the ALJ summarized the objective findings in 24 his decision, the ALJ failed to specifically explain how they conflicted with Dr. 25 Umakanthan’s assessment of Plaintiff’s mental impairments. Id. 26 Second, the ALJ stated that he assigned “great weight” to the opinions of the 27 State agency medical consultants who found that Plaintiff was capable of simple, 28 routine tasks in a setting ranging from no work involving extensive interactions with 4 1 the public to work in a nonpublic setting and “some weight” to the psychiatric 2 consultative examiner who found Plaintiff to have no mental limitations. [AR 16- 3 17.] Although Dr. Umakanthan’s opinion was contradicted by these doctors, the 4 ALJ could not reject Dr. Umakanthan’s opinion without providing specific, 5 legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Valentine v. 6 Commissioner, 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009) (“to reject the opinion of a 7 treating physician ‘in favor of a conflicting opinion of an examining physician[,]’ an 8 ALJ still must ‘make[ ] findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing 9 so that are based on substantial evidence in the record’”) (quoting Thomas v. 10 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002)); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 11 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, the ALJ’s mere references to the contrary findings of the 12 examining and non-examining doctors did not justify rejection of Dr. Umakanthan’s 13 opinion. 14 In response, the Commissioner suggests that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. 15 Umakanthan’s opinion because: (1) it was a “conclusion about disability” rather 16 than a “medical opinion;” (2) treatment records in April and May 2015 do not 17 support Dr. Umakanthan’s opinion; and (3) to the extent Dr. Umakanthan relied on 18 self-reports from Plaintiff those statements are not credible. [Def.’s Br. at 2-8.] The 19 ALJ, however, did not rely on these reasons to discredit Dr. Umakanthan’s opinion. 20 The ALJ’s decision cannot be affirmed based on the Commissioner’s post hoc 21 rationalizations. See Bray v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th 22 Cir. 2009) (“Long-standing principles of administrative law require [the Court] to 23 review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and actual findings offered by the 24 ALJ - not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may 25 have been thinking.”); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (“we 26 may not uphold an agency’s decision on a ground not actually relied on by the 27 agency”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ rejected the opinion of Dr. 28 Umakanthan without setting forth the required specific and legitimate reasons. This 5 1 was error, and the Court cannot say that it was harmless. Remand is warranted. 2 V.CONCLUSION 3 When the Court reverses an ALJ’s decision for error, the Court “ordinarily 4 must remand to the agency for further proceedings.” Leon v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 5 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2017); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) 6 (“the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for 7 additional investigation or explanation”); Treichler v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 8 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). But the Court does have discretion to make a direct 9 award of benefits under the “credit-as-true” rule, which asks whether: “(1) the 10 record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve 11 no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 12 rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the 13 improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to 14 find the claimant disabled on remand.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th 15 Cir. 2014). Each part of this three-part standard must be satisfied for the Court to 16 remand for an award of benefits, id., and it is only the “unusual case” that meets this 17 standard, Benecke, 379 F.3d at 595. See, e.g., Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105 (“[A] 18 reviewing court is not required to credit claimants’ allegations regarding the extent 19 of their impairments as true merely because the ALJ made a legal error in 20 discrediting their testimony.”). Moreover, if “an evaluation of the record as a whole 21 creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled,” a court must remand for 22 further proceedings “even though all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are 23 satisfied.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021; see also Leon, 874 F.3d at 1133 (“an award 24 under [the credit-as-true] rule is a rare exception, and the rule was intended to deter 25 ALJs from providing boilerplate rejections without analysis”); Brown-Hunter v. 26 Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015) (as amended) (“The touchstone for an 27 award of benefits is the existence of a disability, not the agency’s legal error.”). 28 Here, questions as to the extent of Plaintiff’s impairments remain unresolved, 6 1 given the ALJ’s insufficient consideration of Dr. Umakanthan’s opinion. Further 2 proceedings would be useful to allow the ALJ to resolve conflicts in the medical 3 evidence, clarify his assessment of Dr. Umakanthan’s opinion, and reevaluate 4 Plaintiff’s RFC in light of the medical evidence. And despite the ALJ’s failure to 5 properly explicate his evaluation of Umakanthan’s opinion, the Court, after 6 reviewing the record, believes that this case raises serious doubt as to whether 7 Plaintiff is, in fact, disabled. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021. Therefore, remand 8 for further proceedings is required. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1107; see also 9 Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003). 10 For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that: 11 (1) the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this matter is 12 REMANDED for further administrative proceedings consistent with this 13 Memorandum Opinion and Order; and 14 (2) Judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff. 15 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 18 DATED: December 28, 2017 19 20 21 22 23 24 __________________________________ GAIL J. STANDISH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1. The Court notes that Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on January 23, 2017. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court orders that the caption be amended to substitute Nancy A. Berryhill for Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this action. 25 26 27 28 7
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