Jimmy Wood v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 5:2016cv00534 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion. (sp)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Jimmy Wood v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 JIMMY WOOD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) NO. ED CV 16-534-E MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND 17 18 Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), IT IS 19 HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s motions for summary 20 judgment are denied, and this matter is remanded for further 21 administrative action consistent with this Opinion. 22 23 PROCEEDINGS 24 25 Plaintiff filed a Complaint on March 23, 2016, seeking review of 26 the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. The parties filed a consent to 27 proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on April 20, 2016. 28 /// Dockets.Justia.com 1 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on August 16, 2016. 2 Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on September 15, 2016. 3 The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral 4 argument. See L.R. 7-15; “Order,” filed March 29, 2016. 5 6 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 7 8 Plaintiff asserts disability since September 14, 2011, based on a 9 combination of alleged mental and physical impairments (Administrative 10 Record (“A.R.”) 34-50, 201-03). Plaintiff’s long-time treating 11 psychiatrist, Dr. Thomas B. Jackson, has opined that severe mental 12 impairments disable Plaintiff from all employment (A.R. 423-27, 474- 13 78). 14 15 An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found Plaintiff not disabled 16 (A.R. 14-26). Although the ALJ agreed that Plaintiff has severe 17 impairments, including severe mental impairments, the ALJ found 18 Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity for a limited range 19 of light work (id.). 20 Dr. Jackson (A.R. 23). The ALJ gave “little weight” to the opinions of The Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 1-4). 21 22 STANDARD OF REVIEW 23 24 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the 25 Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s 26 findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the 27 Administration used correct legal standards. 28 Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 2 See Carmickle v. 1 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner, 2 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 4 support a conclusion.” 5 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v. 6 Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence is “such Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 7 8 If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may 9 not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the 10 Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by 11 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. 12 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, 13 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 14 detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 15 16 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 17 quotations omitted). 18 19 DISCUSSION 20 21 I. The ALJ Erred in the Evaluation of Dr. Jackson’s Opinions. 22 23 The ALJ must “consider” and “evaluate” every medical opinion of 24 record. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b) and (c); see Social Security Ruling /// 3 1 (“SSR”) 96-8p.1 2 reject [medical] evidence for no reason or the wrong reason.” 3 v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706-07 (3d Cir. 1981); see Day v. Weinberger, 4 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (ALJ may not make his or her own 5 lay medical assessment). In this consideration and evaluation, an ALJ “cannot Cotter 6 7 Under the law of the Ninth Circuit, the opinions of treating 8 physicians command particular respect. “As a general rule, more 9 weight should be given to the opinion of the treating source than to 10 the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant. . . .” Lester 11 v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 12 treating physician’s conclusions “must be given substantial weight.” 13 Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988); see Rodriguez v. 14 Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989) (“the ALJ must give 15 sufficient weight to the subjective aspects of a doctor’s opinion. 16 . . . 17 physician”) (citation omitted); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 18 631-33 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing deference owed to treating 19 physicians’ opinions). 20 are contradicted,2 “if the ALJ wishes to disregard the opinion[s] of 21 the treating physician he . . . must make findings setting forth 22 specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on This is especially true when the opinion is that of a treating Even where the treating physician’s opinions 23 24 25 1 Social Security rulings are binding on the Administration. See Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990). 26 2 27 28 A Rejection of an uncontradicted opinion of a treating physician requires a statement of “clear and convincing” reasons. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1984). 4 1 substantial evidence in the record.” Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 2 647 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation, quotations and brackets omitted); see 3 Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d at 762 (“The ALJ may disregard the 4 treating physician’s opinion, but only by setting forth specific, 5 legitimate reasons for doing so, and this decision must itself be 6 based on substantial evidence”) (citation and quotations omitted). 7 discussed below, the ALJ erred by relying on illegitimate reasoning to 8 reject the opinions of Dr. Jackson. As 9 10 First, the ALJ stated, “Although [Dr. Jackson’s] treatment notes 11 indicate the claimant’s general disposition was sad, anxious, and 12 depression [sic], with one account of disorganization in May of 2012 13 and one reported hyperactivity in January of 2011, his mental status 14 exam results were otherwise normal” (A.R. 22). 15 mischaracterized the medical record; Plaintiff’s “mental status exam 16 results” were not “otherwise normal” (A.R. 442 (thought processes not 17 “normal” but rather “circumstantial”), 445 (thought content not 18 “normal” but rather included “ideas of reference”3), 447 (mental 19 status exam revealed “olfactory hallucinations”), 525 (affect 20 “restricted,” rather than “appropriate”)). 21 of Dr. Jackson’s treatment notes also failed to take into account 22 notations therein of other abnormalities tending to support Dr. 23 Jackson’s opinions (A.R. 436 (anger), 442 (mood swings), 444 (often 24 angry and feels people are talking about him), 531 (anger, The ALJ thereby The ALJ’s characterization 25 26 3 27 28 The phrase “ideas of reference” denotes “an illogical tendency to relate external events to one’s self.” See Johnson v. United States, 409 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 n.4 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 576 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1978). 5 1 irritability), 532 (“very reactive to stress - concentration very poor 2 . . . angers easily”)).4 3 record can warrant remand. 4 Social Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1999). 5 mischaracterizations in the present case are potentially material. An ALJ’s material mischaracterization of the See, e.g., Regennitter v. Commissioner of The 6 7 Second, to reject Dr. Jackson’s opinions, the ALJ purported to 8 rely on the non-examining state agency physicians’ “mental assessment 9 of the claimant’s alleged mental impairments” (A.R. 23). As 10 previously indicated, the opinion of an examining physician generally 11 should receive more weight than the opinion of a non-examining 12 physician. 13 1995). 14 itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of 15 the opinion of . . . an examining physician.” 16 F.3d at 831; see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d at 632 (“When [a 17 nontreating] physician relies on the same clinical findings as a 18 treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the 19 conclusions of the [nontreating] physician are not ‘substantial 20 evidence.’”); Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 n.4 (9th Cir. 21 1990) (nonexamining physician’s conclusions, with nothing more, not 22 substantial evidence in light of “the conflicting observations, 23 opinions, and conclusions” of examining physician). 24 contradiction of a treating physician’s opinion by another physician’s See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. In fact, “[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by Lester v. Chater, 81 Morever, the 25 26 4 27 28 The Court observes that the record of Dr. Jackson’s progress notes appears to be incomplete. Each of pages 531 through 533 of the Administrative Record contains only a first page of a presumably multi-page progress note. 6 1 opinion triggers rather than satisfies the requirement of stating 2 “specific, legitimate reasons.” 3 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2007); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d at 631-33; 4 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 830-31. See, e.g., Valentine v. Commissioner, 5 6 Third, the ALJ stated that the fact “Dr. Jackson only saw the 7 claimant every three months . . . suggests the claimant’s symptoms 8 were not disabling” (A.R. 23). 9 Dr. Jackson must not have believed in the truth of his own opinions The ALJ appears to have reasoned that 10 because, had he so believed, he would have seen Plaintiff more 11 frequently. 12 order to help their patients collect disability benefits.” Lester v. 13 Chater, 81 F.3d at 832 (citations and quotations omitted). Of course, 14 an ALJ may conclude, based on substantial evidence, that a particular 15 doctor is lying about the severity of a particular patient’s 16 impairments. 17 evidence supporting such a conclusion in the present case, and no such 18 evidence appears from the record. 19 contradiction of Dr. Jackson’s opinions by non-examining physicians 20 cannot constitute substantial evidence. 21 regarding medical matters also cannot constitute substantial evidence. 22 See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d at 1102-03; Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 23 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998); Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// An ALJ “may not assume that doctors routinely lie in However, the ALJ failed to identify any substantial As previously indicated, the 7 The ALJ’s lay opinion 1 1996); Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d at 1156.5 2 3 Fourth, the ALJ stated that, “contrary to Dr. Jackson’s assertion 4 that the claimant has been unable to work since 1995, the claimant’s 5 earnings suggest otherwise” (A.R. 23). 6 Plaintiff previously worked as an in-home caregiver for Plaintiff’s 7 mother (A.R. 424 (“He has been unable to work since 1995 except for 8 period of time when he cared for his elderly mother”); see also A.R. 9 472). Dr. Jackson acknowledged Dr. Jackson evidently believed that this in-home work, which 10 occurred years prior to Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset, did not 11 detract from Dr. Jackson’s opinion that Plaintiff’s alleged inability 12 to function in society would prevent him from performing any outside 13 employment.6 14 explained more fully this alleged discrepancy, or the bases for the 15 limitations Dr. Jackson found to exist, the ALJ should have developed 16 the record further. 17 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly 18 develop the record to assure the claimant’s interests are considered. If the ALJ thought that Dr. Jackson should have See generally Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 5 To the extent Defendant argues that the allegedly “conservative” course of Dr. Jackson’s treatment undermines the opinions regarding disability, the record contains no medical evidence either supporting such an inference or identifying the medical benefits potentially available from more frequent or aggressive treatment of Plaintiff’s severe mental impairments. The Administration cannot properly infer the nonexistence of the reported deficits from a failure to obtain ineffective or nonexistent treatment. See Lapeirre-Gutt v. Astrue, 382 Fed. App’x 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A claimant cannot be discredited for failing to pursue non-conservative treatment options where none exist.”). 6 28 For different reasons, the ALJ found Plaintiff could not perform his past work as an in-home caregiver (A.R. 24). 8 1 This duty exists even when the claimant is represented by counsel.”) 2 (internal citation omitted); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d at 3 1288 (“If the ALJ thought he needed to know the basis of Dr. 4 Hoeflich’s opinions in order to evaluate them, he had a duty to 5 conduct an appropriate inquiry, for example, by subpoenaing the 6 physicians or submitting further questions to them. 7 have continued the hearing to augment the record.”) (citations 8 omitted).7 He could also 9 10 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Valentine v. Commissioner, 574 11 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2009)(“Valentine”), cited by Defendant, is 12 distinguishable. 13 reported [Valentine] was 14 continuing to work full-time,” and the physician’s own treatment 15 progress reports showed Valentine’s improved functioning at work. 16 at 692-93. 17 years ago, long prior to when Dr. Jackson rendered his opinions (and 18 even prior to when Dr. Jackson first examined Plaintiff) (A.R. 427, 19 478). 20 circumstance concerning his sick mother, and the ALJ conceded that 21 Plaintiff had presented “new and material evidence” “related to the In Valentine, the treating physician “repeatedly unemployable while acknowledging he was In the present case, Plaintiff’s prior work occurred many Moreover, Plaintiff’s prior work involved a peculiar 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Id. 7 Plaintiff also faults the ALJ for failing to mention an alleged opinion from Dr. Gill, another of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. It does not appear that the ALJ erred in this regard. In the context of Dr. Gill’s August 15, 2012 “Followup,” when Dr. Gill stated, “He is disabled due to his multiple medical problems,” it appears Dr. Gill was merely reciting Plaintiff’s own allegations. In neither the “Impression” section nor the “Recommendations” section of the “Follow-up” did Dr. Gill purport to address Plaintiff’s ability (or inability) to work (A.R. 314). 9 1 existence of a medically determinable impairment” apparently emerging 2 after his mother’s death (A.R. 14-15). 3 4 II. Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings is Appropriate. 5 6 Remand is appropriate because the circumstances of this case 7 suggest that further administrative review could remedy the ALJ’s 8 errors. 9 INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (upon reversal of an McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2010); see also 10 administrative determination, the proper course is remand for 11 additional agency investigation or explanation, except in rare 12 circumstances); Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) 13 (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative 14 proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a 15 direction to provide benefits”); Treichler v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 16 1090, 1101 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014) (remand for further administrative 17 proceedings is the proper remedy “in all but the rarest cases”); 18 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (court will 19 credit-as-true medical opinion evidence only where, inter alia, “the 20 record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings 21 would serve no useful purpose”); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180- 22 81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1038 (2000) (remand for further 23 proceedings rather than for the immediate payment of benefits is 24 appropriate where there are “sufficient unanswered questions in the 25 record”). 26 present record. 27 /// 28 /// There remain significant unanswered questions in the See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 10 1 2015) (remanding for further proceedings to allow the ALJ to “comment 2 on” the treating physician’s opinion).8 3 4 CONCLUSION 5 6 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s 7 motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded 8 for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion. 9 10 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 11 12 DATED: September 28, 2016. 13 14 /S/ CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 On remand, the ALJ also might reconsider whether to order an examination and evaluation of Plaintiff by a consultative psychiatrist or psychologist. See Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2001) (where available medical evidence is insufficient to determine the severity of the claimant’s impairment, the ALJ should order a consultative examination by a specialist). 11
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
