Samuel Love v. Jose M. Sanchez, et al., No. 5:2015cv01700 - Document 48 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 25 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II . (lc). Modified on 11/14/2016 (lc).
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Samuel Love v. Jose M. Sanchez, et al. Doc. 48 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 United States District Court Central District of California 7 8 9 10 SAMUEL LOVE, Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 13 14 Case No. 5:15-cv-1700-ODW(DTBx) JOSE M. SANCHEZ; MARIA B. SANCHEZ; and DOES 1–10, inclusive, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [25] Defendants. 15 I. 16 INTRODUCTION 17 Before the Court is Plaintiff Samuel Love’s (“Love”) Motion for Summary 18 Judgment on his claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Unruh Act. 19 (ECF No. 25.) Defendants Jose M. Sanchez and Maria B. Sanchez1 argue that their 20 disabled parking space now meets the ADA Accessibility Guidelines and that Love’s 21 ADA claim is therefore moot. (See Opp., ECF No. 31.) In response, Love hired an 22 investigator who concluded that the disabled space does not fully comply with the 23 ADAAG. (See Taylor Decl. ¶¶ 8–12.) At a hearing on the Motion, Defendants filed a 24 report from a Certified Access Specialist (“CASp”) stating that the disabled space 25 meets all ADAAG requirements. (ADA Compliance Inspection Report, ECF No. 42.) 26 1 27 28 Defendants originally appeared in this action pro se; however, they were represented by counsel at the hearing on this Motion, and are now represented by counsel in the action. (ECF No. 41, 46.) Dockets.Justia.com 1 Love disputes Defendants’ report and argues that the disabled space is still not 2 compliant as a matter of law. Based on the analysis below, the Court DENIES 3 Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. II. 4 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 5 Defendants own and operate Mary’s Beauty Salon in Riverside, California. 6 (Love Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 25, Ex. 2.) Love is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for 7 mobility. (Id.) Love attempted to visit the Salon in September 2013 and March 2015. 8 (Id. ¶¶ 5, 10.) He was unable to do so on either date because the Salon had no 9 disabled parking spaces. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 10.) Love had a bad experience in the past where 10 he was trapped in a parking space without an access aisle. (Id. ¶ 7.) Thus, he was 11 deterred from visiting the Salon because of its lack of disabled spaces. Love alleges 12 that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and 13 California’s Unruh Act. (See generally Compl.) 14 Sometime after March 2015, the Salon designated one of its parking spaces as a 15 disabled space. (Sanchez’s Objections and Responses to Interrogatories No. 7, ECF 16 No. 25, Ex. 11.) After Defendants created the disabled space, Love sent Janis Kent, 17 an accessibility expert, to compile a Report evaluating the new disabled space. (Kent 18 Report, ECF No. 25, Ex. 9.) After Kent found that the disabled space did not meet the 19 ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”),2 Love filed the present Motion for 20 Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 25.) 21 In response to Love’s Motion, Defendants used the Kent Report to make further 22 changes to the disabled space. (Jose Sanchez Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 32.) They moved 23 the space to a new location, lengthened and widened the space, installed the required 24 signage, and included adequate striping, all to meet the ADAAG requirements. 25 (Defendants’ List of Exhibits in Opp., ECF No. 27, Ex. A.) However, they made 26 these repairs without consulting an independent CASp because they could not afford 27 28 2 The space did not comply with ADAAG requirements for width, length, proper signage, slopage, or striping. (Kent Report 4, ECF No. 25, Ex. 9.) 2 1 to hire one at the time. (Jose Sanchez Decl. ¶ 5.) After making these changes, each 2 Defendant filed an Opposition to Love’s motion, arguing that his ADA claim is now 3 moot. (ECF Nos. 31, 38.) 4 In response to Defendants’ Oppositions, Love hired Corey Taylor to evaluate 5 the new disabled space. (Taylor Decl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 39, Ex. 1.) Taylor—who has 6 completed evaluations for Love’s attorneys many times but is not a certified CASp— 7 found that Defendants’ disabled space still has excessive cross slopes: 2.8% at one 8 portion of the bottom of the stall and 2.3% at one portion of the head of the stall. (Id. 9 ¶¶ 8–9.) These measurements do not comply with the ADAAG, which mandates that 10 disabled spaces may not have slopes that exceed 2%. (ADAAG § 4.6.3.) 11 However, Defendants filed a new ADA Compliance Inspection Report at the 12 hearing on this Motion. (ECF No. 42.) Ernest Castro, a certified CASp, examined the 13 disabled space and found it to be in full compliance with the ADAAG. (Id. at 2.) 14 Moreover, he included pictures measuring the slope of the space in approximately the 15 same places as Taylor, and found that the slopes were well under the 2% ADAAG 16 maximum. (See id. at 3–6.) At the hearing, Love contested the new Report, claiming 17 that “all [the] defense has accomplished by providing this late evidence is to show that 18 at various locations in this parking space [and] in the adjacent aisle . . . neither the 19 space—the parking nor the aisle are as flat and slope-free as the law requires.” (Trial 20 Tr. 6.) 21 III. LEGAL STANDARD 22 A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when there is no genuine 23 issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 24 of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 25 (1986). The moving party must show that “under the governing law, there can be but 26 one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.” Id. at 250. The burden is on the moving 27 party to demonstrate that it is entitled to summary judgment. Margolis v. Ryan, 140 28 F.3d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1998); Retail Clerks Union Local 648 v. Hub Pharmacy, Inc., 3 1 707 F.2d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1983). That is, the moving party bears the initial 2 burden of identifying the elements of the claim or defense and evidence that it 3 believes demonstrates the absence of an issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 4 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 5 Where the moving party has the burden at trial, “that party must support its 6 motion with credible evidence . . . that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not 7 controverted at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331. The burden then shifts to the non- 8 moving party “and requires that party . . . to produce evidentiary materials that 9 demonstrate the existence of a ‘genuine issue’ for trial.” Id.; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 10 256; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact will exist “if the evidence 11 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” 12 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 13 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the evidence 14 in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F. 2d 15 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991); T.W. Elec. Serv. Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 16 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987). 17 affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat 18 summary judgment. Thornhill’s Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 19 1979). Moreover, though the court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make 20 credibility determinations, there must be more than a mere scintilla of contradictory 21 evidence to survive summary judgment. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 22 (9th Cir. 2000). 23 24 IV. Conclusory or speculative testimony in ANALYSIS Love argues that he is entitled to injunctive relief under the ADA and statutory 25 damages of $4,000 under the Unruh Act for the Salon’s ADA violations. 26 generally Mot.) To succeed on an ADA Title III claim, “a plaintiff must show that: 27 (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity 28 that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff 4 (See 1 was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of his disability.” 2 Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th 3 Cir. 2010). The third element—the only one at issue here—is met “if there was a 4 violation of applicable accessibility standards.” Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 816 F. 5 Supp. 2d 831, 847 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 6 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011)). 7 accessibility standards for disabled parking spaces. 8 injunctive relief for violations of Title III, not monetary damages. Wander v. Kaus, 9 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002). The ADAAG establishes the applicable Plaintiffs may obtain only After a defendant repairs a violation of 10 accessibility standards, ADA claims may be deemed moot by the court. See, e.g., 11 Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir.2011) (“Because a private 12 plaintiff can sue only for injunctive relief (i.e., for removal of the barrier) under the 13 ADA . . . a defendant’s voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can have 14 the effect of mooting a plaintiff’s ADA claim.”). 15 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides that “a violation of the right of any 16 individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 shall also constitute a 17 violation of this section.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). The Unruh Act allows for plaintiffs 18 to recover at least $4,000 in statutory damages for each occasion where they were 19 denied equal access to a facility. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). However, courts in this 20 district have denied summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental 21 jurisdiction over Unruh Act claims after a plaintiff’s ADA claims have been rendered 22 moot. See Love v. Ayoub, No. EDCV 15-1778-VAP (KKx), 2016 WL 3671089 (E.D. 23 Cal. May 30, 2016) (denying a motion for summary judgment and declining to 24 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s Unruh Act after defendant’s parking 25 space was brought into compliance with the ADAAG). 26 But this case is different from Ayoub due to the continuing dispute regarding the 27 disabled space’s cross-slopes. Both parties request that the Court disregard the 28 measurements presented by the other. A court in the Northern District of California 5 1 dealt with a similar problem in Hernandez v. Polanco Enterprises, Inc., where both 2 the plaintiff and defendant commissioned reports measuring the slope of an entrance 3 landing allegedly in violation of the ADAAG. 19 F. Supp. 3d 918, 935 (N.D. Cal. 4 2013). 5 judgment proceedings,” and ruled that the conflicting measurement reports raised a 6 material dispute about the slope that precluded the court from granting either party’s 7 motion for summary judgment. Id. at 936. That is the case here; the parties simply 8 submit conflicting reports that create a genuine factual dispute as to whether the cross- 9 slopes in the disabled space exceed 2%. Therefore, the Court cannot grant Love’s 10 The court determined that it could “not weigh credibility in summary motion to for summary judgment, nor can it dismiss this action as moot. V. 11 12 13 14 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Love’s Motion for Summary Judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 16 November 14, 2016 17 18 19 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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