Neilisa Jane Sides v. Carolyn W Colvin, No. 5:2014cv02535 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Jay C. Gandhi. IT IS ORDERED THAT judgment shall be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits. (jtil)
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Neilisa Jane Sides v. Carolyn W Colvin Doc. 21 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 NEILISA JANE SIDES, Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 14 15 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 16 Defendant. 17 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. ED CV 14-2535 JCG MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 18 19 Neilisa Jane Sides (“Plaintiff”) challenges the Social Security Commissioner’s 20 decision denying her application for disability benefits. Two issues are presented for 21 decision here: 22 1. 23 24 Whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) properly rejected Plaintiff’s credibility (see Joint Stip. at 4, 17-20); and 2. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated the medical evidence, in particular, 25 Plaintiff’s treating physician’s medical opinion and evidence of Plaintiff’s migraine 26 headaches (see id. at 4-11). 27 28 The Court addresses Plaintiff’s contentions below, and finds that reversal is not warranted. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 A. 2 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly assessed her credibility. (See Joint 3 4 The ALJ Properly Assessed Plaintiff’s Credibility Stip. at 4, 17-20.) As a rule, an ALJ can reject a claimant’s subjective complaints by “expressing 5 clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 6 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ 7 must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines a 8 claimant’s complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations 9 omitted). 10 11 Here, the ALJ provided at least six valid reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s credibility. 12 First, Plaintiff admitted she sought work after the date she alleged she became 13 unable to work. (Administrative Record (“AR”) at 15, 32); Lenhart v. Astrue, 252 F. 14 App’x 787, 789 (9th Cir. 2007) (ALJ reasonably determined claimant exaggerated 15 symptoms in part because he applied for a job and collected unemployment benefits); 16 Copeland v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1988) (ALJ properly discredited the 17 claimant’s testimony in part because he held himself out as available for work). 18 Second, Plaintiff said she had no complications with her knees after her 19 replacement surgeries, and now requires “[j]ust regular check ups.” (AR at 15, 36, 20 395); Lenhart, 252 F. App’x at 789 (ALJ properly discredited claimant in part because 21 surgery was generally successful in relieving symptoms). 22 Third, Plaintiff admitted that counseling and medication were effective in 23 treating her mental symptoms, and medication also helped her incontinence and other 24 impairments. (AR at 15, 35-36, 38, 40, 43, 50, 502); see Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 25 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ properly rejected claimant’s subjective 26 complaints because she responded favorably to conservative treatment of therapy and 27 medication). 28 2 1 Fourth, Plaintiff’s daily activities – including being able to tend to her own 2 personal needs, drive, shop in stores and online, cook, clean, complete household 3 chores, and handle finances – are inconsistent with her allegation of complete 4 disability. (AR at 14-17, 226, 511); see Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 5 1989) (in discounting claimant credibility, ALJ may properly rely on daily activities 6 inconsistent with claim of disability, including claimant’s ability to care for personal 7 needs, drive, shop, and perform routine household chores). 8 9 Fifth, the ALJ observed that, despite Plaintiff’s allegations of an inability to concentrate, she could process questions without difficulty, respond without delay, and 10 pay attention throughout the hearing. (AR at 16, 28-54); see Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 11 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (ALJ’s “observations of a claimant’s functioning” at the 12 hearing are permissible as part of the overall credibility assessment but “may not form 13 the sole basis for discrediting a person’s testimony”). 14 Sixth, Plaintiff’s allegations of severe physical and mental symptoms 15 contradicted the objective medical evidence. (AR at 16); see Rollins v. Massanari, 261 16 F.3d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2001) (inconsistencies with objective evidence, when 17 combined with other factors, are valid reasons for rejecting a claimant’s testimony). 18 For example: (1) treatment notes indicated Plaintiff’s left knee was doing “fine” and 19 that she had no problems after a stroke; (2) x-rays of both knees showed excellent 20 alignment and fixation of prosthesis; (3) a CT scan of Plaintiff’s head was normal; and 21 (4) treatment notes indicated Plaintiff’s mood improved with medication and therapy 22 sessions, her thoughts were logical and her memory was intact, and she denied 23 hallucinations. (AR at 16-17, 395, 426, 514, 517-18, 522, 544, 551, 572.) 24 Thus, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s credibility. 25 B. 26 27 28 The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Evidence 1. Treating Physician’s Opinion Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Marcia Hudson. (See Joint Stip. at 4-9.) 3 1 As a general rule, “[i]f the ALJ wishes to disregard the opinion of the treating 2 physician, he or she must make findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for 3 doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.” Murray v. Heckler, 722 4 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983); Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 5 6 7 Here, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Hudson’s opinion that Plaintiff would miss more than four days of work a month, for three reasons. First, Dr. Hudson’s conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s “mental residual functional 8 capacity” (“RFC”) and her “inability to work” are issues reserved for the 9 Commissioner. (AR at 18, 575, 578-79); see Lynch Guzman v. Astrue, 365 F. App’x 10 869, 870 (9th Cir. 2010) (a claimant’s RFC “is an administrative finding reserved to 11 the Commissioner”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1) (statements by a 12 medical source that a claimant is . . . “unable to work” “are not medical opinions, . . . 13 but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner”). 14 Second, Dr. Hudson’s opinion contradicted the objective medical evidence, 15 discussed above. (AR at 18); see Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 16 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t was permissible for the ALJ to give [the treating physician’s 17 opinion] minimal evidentiary weight, in light of the objective medical evidence and the 18 opinions and observations of other doctors.”). 19 Third, Dr. Hudson’s opinion contradicted Plaintiff’s admitted daily activities, 20 discussed above. (AR at 18); see Colter v. Colvin, 554 F. App’x 594, 595 (9th Cir. 21 2014) (ALJ properly disregarded threating physicians’ opinions because assessments 22 were inconsistent with claimant’s own descriptions of her daily activities). 23 24 Thus, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Hudson’s opinion. 2. Migraine Headaches 25 Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ found that she had the severe impairment 26 of migraine headaches, but failed to impose any limitation based on this impairment in 27 the RFC. (See Joint Stip. at 9-11.) 28 4 1 “If an ALJ finds a severe impairment at step two, that impairment must be 2 considered in the remaining steps of the sequential analysis.” Bray v. Comm’r Soc. 3 Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). Specifically, when the ALJ 4 determines a claimant’s RFC between steps three and four, the ALJ shall consider the 5 combined impact of all of a claimant’s medically cognizable impairments on the 6 claimant’s ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523, 416.923; see also Macri v. 7 Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1996). But unlike the analysis at step two, where 8 the ALJ examines the degree of limitation, the RFC is the most a claimant can do, 9 “despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F .R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1) (emphasis 10 11 added). Here, first, in fashioning the RFC the ALJ properly “considered all symptoms” 12 and specifically found Plaintiff was able to (1) understand, remember, and carry out 13 only simple job instructions, (2) maintain attention and concentration to perform only 14 simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, and (3) perform unskilled work. (AR at 15, 20.) 15 Plaintiff does not explain how this fails to account for any limitations from her 16 headaches. See Mitchell v. Astrue, 2010 WL 519703, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2010) 17 (argument – that because ALJ found severe impairment at step two, impairment must 18 have imposed limitations that should have been included in RFC – “fails because it 19 tries to impose a step two finding on the RFC determination”), aff’d, 438 F. App’x 617 20 (9th Cir. 2011). 21 Second, Plaintiff points to no objective evidence of any specific functional 22 limitation due to her headaches that renders her incapable of work. See Hunt v. Colvin, 23 954 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1190 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (treatment notes referencing 24 headaches and migraine medications did not establish any specific functional 25 limitations caused by claimant’s headaches). 26 27 28 5 1 2 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT judgment shall be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits. 3 4 5 6 DATED: September 08, 2015 ________________________________________ Hon. Jay C. Gandhi United States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 *** 11 This Memorandum Opinion and Order is not intended for publication. Nor is it intended to be included or submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis. 12 *** 10 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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