Erik Barcenas v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 5:2014cv01965 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar. The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED, without benefits, for further proceedings pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (See document for further details.) (sbou)
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Erik Barcenas v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA–EASTERN DIVISION 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 ) No. ED CV 14-1965-AS ) ) Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND v. ) ) ORDER OF REMAND CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) Acting Commissioner of the ) Social Security Administration, ) ) Defendant. ) ) ERIK BARCENAS, 18 Pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), IT IS HEREBY 19 20 ORDERED that this matter is remanded 21 for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion. 22 I. 23 PROCEEDINGS 24 On 25 August 16, 2011, Plaintiff Erik Barcenas (“Plaintiff”) 26 applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) based on alleged 27 mental impairments and asserting disability since September 1, 2000. 28 (A.R. at 132–76). The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Paul 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Coulter, examined the records and heard testimony from Plaintiff and 2 a vocational expert (“VE”), Ruth Arnush, on February 20, 2013. 3 at 21–40). 4 written decision. 5 of the ALJ’s decision. (A.R. On April 4, 2013, the ALJ denied Plaintiff benefits in a (A.R. at 9–17). The Appeals Council denied review (A.R. at 1–3). 6 7 On September 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, pursuant to 8 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), alleging that the Social Security 9 Administration erred 10 Entry No. 3). On January 26, 2015, Defendant filed an Answer to the 11 Complaint, (Docket Entry No. 12), and the Certified Administrative 12 Record (“A.R.”), (Docket Entry No. 13). 13 to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge. 14 Nos. 9, 10). 15 (“Joint 16 Plaintiff’s claims. in denying him disability benefits. (Docket The parties have consented (Docket Entry On June 23, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation Stip.”) setting forth their respective positions on (Docket Entry No. 20). 17 II. 18 RELEVANT FACTS 19 20 In applying for SSI benefits, Plaintiff alleged the following 21 disabling impairments: obsessive compulsive disorder (“OCD”), panic 22 attacks, depression, anxiety, agoraphobia, and insomnia. 23 136). 24 were severe, (A.R. at 11), the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could 25 return to his past relevant work, or find other work that existed in 26 significant numbers in the national economy. (A.R. at Although the ALJ found that all of Plaintiff’s impairments (A.R. at 16–17). 27 28 After hearing Plaintiff’s testimony and reviewing the evidence 2 1 in the record, the ALJ decided that Plaintiff possessed the residual 2 functional capacity (“RFC”) “to perform a full range of work at all 3 exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: 4 due 5 repetitive tasks, and no interaction with the general public.” 6 at 14). 7 agency physicians, Dr. Anna Franco and Dr. B. Smith, in determining 8 Plaintiff’s RFC. 9 Franco and Smith, the ALJ correctly noted that both doctors found to his mental impairments, [Plaintiff] is limited to simple (A.R. The ALJ gave “great weight” to the opinions of the state (A.R. at 15). In discussing the opinions of Drs. 10 that Plaintiff was limited to simple 1-2 step tasks. 11 (A.R. at 15, 48, 61). 12 13 In determining whether Plaintiff was capable of performing his 14 past relevant work or other work, the ALJ asked the VE hypothetical 15 questions during the hearing. 16 ALJ asked the VE to consider whether a person of Plaintiff’s age, 17 education, work experience, and possessing Plaintiff’s RFC, could 18 perform any jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 19 economy. 20 to his past relevant work as a picker, (A.R. at 37-38), and could 21 also perform work as a vehicle cleaner, packer, or warehouse worker, 22 (A.R. at 38). (A.R. at 38). (A.R. at 37–39). Specifically, the The VE testified that Plaintiff could return 23 24 Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could 25 perform his past relevant work as a picker or, alternatively, could 26 work as a vehicle cleaner, packer, or warehouse worker. 27 16-17). 28 under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). (A.R. at Consequently, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled 3 III. PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS 1 2 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to properly (1) consider 3 4 the opinions of 5 Plaintiff’s 6 vocational expert. (Joint Stip. at 3). RFC; the and state (3) agency pose a physicians; hypothetical (2) determine question to the 7 IV. 8 DISCUSSION 9 After 10 consideration of the record, the Court finds that 11 Plaintiff’s third claim warrants remand for further consideration. 12 Since remand is appropriate on the issue of whether the ALJ properly 13 posed 14 consider the remaining issues. a hypothetical question to the VE, the Court declines to 15 16 A. The ALJ Failed to Pose a Proper Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert 17 18 An 19 ALJ may ask a vocational expert “hypothetical 20 question[s] . . . reflecting all of the claimant’s limitations, both 21 physical and mental, supported by the record.” 22 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). 23 not 24 testimony has no evidentiary value to support a finding that the 25 claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.’” 26 Shalala, 27 Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 1991)). 28 // reflect 10 all F.3d the 678, However, if a “hypothetical does claimant’s 681 Hill v. Astrue, 698 limitations, (9th Cir. 4 1993) then the (quoting ‘expert’s Matthews v. Delorme v. 1 In this case, the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE was improper 2 because it failed to take into account Plaintiff’s limitation to 3 simple 1-2 step tasks. 4 of the state agency physicians in reaching his RFC determination. 5 Because the ALJ did not state otherwise, it appears that he fully 6 accepted the opinions of Dr. Franco and Dr. B. Smith, including their 7 findings that Plaintiff 8 However, the ALJ 9 hypothetical to 10 hypothetical claimant 11 (A.R. at 38). 12 about whether Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work or any 13 other work that exists in significant numbers in the economy 14 Plaintiff was limited to “simple 1-2 step tasks.” 15 VE’s testimony was not entitled to any weight and was improperly 16 relied upon by the ALJ. 17 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Because neither the hypothetical nor the answer 18 properly set forth all of [Plaintiff’s] impairments, the vocational 19 expert’s testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence to support 20 the ALJ’s findings.”). 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 26 27 28 The ALJ gave “great weight” to the opinions was failed the VE to and limited limited to include instead to simple this asked “simple 1-2 step limitation the and VE to repetitive tasks. in his assume a tasks.”1 Consequently, the VE was unable to accurately testify if As a result, the See Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 1 If the ALJ did, in fact, intend to discount findings of the State agency physicians, he was required to explain which findings he discounted and explain the reasons for doing so. See Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (“The Commissioner may reject the opinion of a non-examining physician by reference to specific evidence in the medical record.”) 5 1 B. The ALJ’s Error Was Not Harmless 2 3 “[H]armless error principles apply in the Social Security . . . 4 context.” 5 (citing Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th 6 Cir. 2006)). 7 ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” 8 (citing Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th 9 Cir. 2006)). Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) Generally, “an ALJ’s error is harmless where it is Id. 10 11 The Court finds that the ALJ’s errors were not harmless. 12 discussed above, the VE’s testimony does not constitute substantial 13 evidence to support the ALJ’s findings. 14 alternate jobs that the VE testified Plaintiff could perform are 15 capable of performance by a person limited to simple 1-2 step tasks.2 16 Beyond the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ did not offer any 17 other permissible evidence that Plaintiff is able to return to past 18 relevant 19 While other evidence may exist in the record to support a finding of 20 non-disability, the Court is constrained to the reasons provided by 21 the ALJ in his decision.3 22 According to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), each job listed by the VE at the hearing requires that a worker be capable of more than simple 1-2 step tasks. See Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 919.687-014, 920.587-018, 922.687-058 (January 1, 2008). Additionally, since the ALJ’s hypothetical failed to take into consideration all of Plaintiff’s limitations, the job listings referenced by the VE are also inaccurate. 23 24 25 26 27 28 work or perform any other As Furthermore, none of the work. (See A.R. at 17). See Ceguerra v. Sec. Health and Human 2 Thus, Defendant’s argument that any error was harmless because the state agency physicians suggested acceptable jobs is unavailing. (See Joint Stip. at 16). 3 6 1 Servs., 933 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A reviewing court can 2 evaluate an agency’s decision only on the grounds articulated by the 3 agency.”). 4 the 5 disability determination is incomplete. 6 are not “inconsequential to the ultimate disability determination,” 7 and cannot be deemed harmless. Without other evidence in the ALJ’s decision to support conclusion that Plaintiff may perform any work, the ALJ’s Therefore, the ALJ’s errors See Carmickle, 466 F.3d at 885. 8 9 C. Remand Is Warranted 10 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or order 11 12 an immediate award of benefits is within the district court’s 13 discretion. 14 Where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative 15 proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed, it is 16 appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an immediate award 17 of benefits. 18 further 19 proceedings.”). 20 case suggest that further administrative review could remedy 21 Commissioner’s errors, remand is appropriate. 22 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011); Harman, 211 F.3d at 1179-81. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000). Id. at 1179 (“[T]he decision of whether to remand for proceedings turns upon the likely utility of such However, where, as here, the circumstances of the the McLeod v. Astrue, 640 23 24 Since the for ALJ the failed VE, to remand properly is frame warranted. his 25 questions 26 issues must be resolved before a determination of disability can be 27 made, and “when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to 28 whether the [Plaintiff] is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of 7 Because hypothetical outstanding 1 the Social Security Act,” further administrative proceedings would 2 serve a useful purpose and remedy defects. 3 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 4 not reached any other issue raised by Plaintiff except insofar as to 5 determine that reversal with a directive for the immediate payment of 6 benefits would 7 further proceedings may determine that Plaintiff can perform jobs 8 existing in significant number in the national economy. 9 “evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that Burrell v. Colvin, 775 not be appropriate at this time. The In Court has this case, However, 10 Plaintiff is in fact disabled.” 11 995, 12 Plaintiff’s claims regarding the ALJ’s alleged failures to properly 13 consider the opinions of the state agency physicians and to properly 14 determine Plaintiff’s RFC. 1021 (2014). See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on 15 ORDER 16 17 18 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is 19 REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED, without benefits, for further 20 proceedings pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 21 22 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 23 24 Dated: December 4, 2015. 25 26 27 ______________/s/______________ ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28 8
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