Janis Stephenson v. Carolyn W Colvin, No. 5:2014cv01250 - Document 1211 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Chooljian. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. (hr)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Janis Stephenson v. Carolyn W Colvin Doc. 1211 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JANIS STEPHENSON, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 v. Case No. EDCV 14-1250 JC MEMORANDUM OPINION CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 18 I. On June 26, 2014, plaintiff Janis Stephenson (“plaintiff”) filed a Complaint 19 20 21 22 seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of plaintiff’s application for benefits. The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary 23 24 25 26 27 28 SUMMARY judgment, respectively (“Plaintiff’s Motion”) and (“Defendant’s Motion”). The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15; July 2, 2014 Case Management Order ¶ 5. /// /// 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Based on the record as a whole and the applicable law, the decision of the 2 Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The findings of the Administrative Law Judge are 3 supported by substantial evidence and are free from material error.1 4 II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE 5 DECISION 6 On October 26, 2005, plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental 7 Security Income. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 611). Plaintiff asserted that she 8 became disabled on June 1, 1999 (which she subsequently amended to October 26, 9 2005), due to ankle and back problems, obesity, and anxiety. (AR 136, 401). Plaintiff currently appeals an administrative decision (the third in the case) 10 11 issued after this Court entered judgment reversing and remanding the case, and the 12 Appeals Council, in turn, assigned a new Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to 13 conduct further proceedings. (AR 10-20, 74-81, 401, 452-65). On remand, the 14 ALJ examined the medical record and heard testimony from plaintiff (who was 15 represented by counsel) and a vocational expert on March 1, 2012. (AR 424-51). On May 23, 2012, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled 16 17 through the date of the decision. (AR 401-16). Specifically, the ALJ found: 18 (1) plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis of the 19 ankles and great toes bilaterally, asthma, obesity, depression, general anxiety 20 disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (AR 405); (2) plaintiff’s 21 impairments, considered singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal 22 a listed impairment (AR 407); (3) plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity 23 /// 24 /// 25 26 27 28 1 The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding disability. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115-22 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing contours of application of harmless error standard in social security cases) (citing, inter alia, Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054-56 (9th Cir. 2006)). 2 1 to perform light work (20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b)) with additional limitations2 (AR 2 409); (4) plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work (AR 414); (5) there are 3 jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could 4 perform, specifically small parts assembler, production assembly, and hand 5 packager (AR 415-16); and (6) plaintiff’s allegations regarding her limitations 6 were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the ALJ’s residual 7 functional capacity assessment (AR 412). The Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s application for review of the ALJ’s 8 9 May 23, 2012 decision. (AR 393). 10 III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 11 A. 12 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that the claimant is Sequential Evaluation Process 13 unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 14 determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 15 death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 16 less than 12 months.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) 17 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 18 impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the work the 19 claimant previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial 20 /// 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 The ALJ determined that plaintiff (i) could sit, stand, and/or walk for six hours out of an eight hour workday, provided that she is permitted to alternate positions at 90 minute intervals for one to five minutes at the workstation; (ii) could occasionally kneel, stoop, crawl, crouch, and climb ramps and stairs; (iii) could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (iv) has no restrictions in either fine or gross manipulation; (v) would be restricted from working around hazards such as unprotected heights and moving machinery; (vi) would need to avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants; (vii) could sustain attention, concentration, persistence, and pace in at least two hour blocks of time during an eight-hour workday; and (viii) would be able to respond and interact appropriately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public, but would need to work in an environment that would not cause her to be in direct contact with more than five people at any one time. (AR 409). 3 1 gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 2 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). 3 In assessing whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is to follow a five-step 4 sequential evaluation process: 5 (1) so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 6 7 Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If (2) Is the claimant’s alleged impairment sufficiently severe to limit 8 the claimant’s ability to work? If not, the claimant is not 9 disabled. If so, proceed to step three. 10 (3) Does the claimant’s impairment, or combination of 11 impairments, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. 12 Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, the claimant is 13 disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 14 (4) Does the claimant possess the residual functional capacity to 15 perform claimant’s past relevant work? If so, the claimant is 16 not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 17 (5) Does the claimant’s residual functional capacity, when 18 considered with the claimant’s age, education, and work 19 experience, allow the claimant to adjust to other work that 20 exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, 21 the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 22 Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th 23 Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 24 1110 (same). 25 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the 26 Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 27 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098); see also Burch 28 /// 4 1 v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (claimant carries initial burden of 2 proving disability). 3 B. 4 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), a court may set aside a denial of Standard of Review 5 benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal 6 error. Robbins v. Social Security Administration, 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 7 2006) (citing Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 8 (9th Cir. 1995)). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 9 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 10 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations and quotations omitted). It is more than a 11 mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing 12 Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990)). 13 To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, a court must 14 “‘consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and 15 evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’” Aukland v. 16 Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 17 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming 18 or reversing the ALJ’s conclusion, a court may not substitute its judgment for that 19 of the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457). 20 IV. DISCUSSION 21 Plaintiff contends that a reversal or remand is warranted because the ALJ 22 failed properly to consider the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physician. 23 (Plaintiff’s Motion at 2-7). The Court disagrees. 24 A. 25 In Social Security cases, courts give varying degrees of deference to Pertinent Law 26 medical opinions depending on the type of physician who provided them, namely 27 “treating physicians,” “examining physicians,” and “nonexamining physicians.” 28 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation 5 1 marks omitted). A treating physician’s opinion is generally given the most weight, 2 and may be “controlling” if it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical 3 and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other 4 substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record[.]” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 5 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). An examining, 6 but non-treating physician’s opinion is entitled to less weight than a treating 7 physician’s, but more weight than a nonexamining physician’s opinion. See id. 8 (citation omitted). 9 A treating physician’s opinion is not necessarily conclusive, however, as to 10 a claimant’s medical condition or disability. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 11 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s 12 uncontroverted opinion by providing “clear and convincing reasons supported by 13 substantial evidence in the record.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th 14 Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Where a treating physician’s opinion conflicts with 15 another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may reject the treating opinion “by providing 16 specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” 17 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (citation and footnote omitted). 18 B. 19 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions expressed Analysis 20 by Dr. Kurt Frauenpreis, plaintiff’s treating physician, in (1) a February 1, 2008 21 letter – which essentially stated that plaintiff was “unable to work” due to her 22 physical impairments; and (2) a July 22, 2011 “Medical Opinion Re: Ability to do 23 Work-Related Activities (Physical)” form, which essentially stated that plaintiff 24 had multiple, significant functional limitations that would prevent her from 25 performing even sedentary work (collectively “Dr. Frauenpreis’ Opinions”). 26 (Plaintiff’s Motion at 2-7) (citing AR 282, 878-80). A remand or reversal is not 27 warranted on this basis. 28 /// 6 1 First, as the ALJ noted, Dr. Frauenpreis provided almost all of his opinions 2 in a check-the-box format. (AR 413, 878-80). Dr. Frauenpreis listed plaintiff’s 3 diagnoses, but did not explain the objective bases (i.e., results of objective medical 4 testing, clinical findings, or a physical examination) for his opinions that plaintiff 5 had the noted significant physical limitations. (AR 413, 878-80). The ALJ 6 properly rejected Dr. Frauenpreis’ Opinions on this basis alone. See Crane v. 7 Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 8 Second, the ALJ also properly rejected Dr. Frauenpreis’ Opinions because 9 they were not supported by the physician’s own treatment notes or the record as a 10 whole. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation 11 omitted); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2003). As the ALJ 12 noted, Dr. Frauenpreis’ treatment records for plaintiff mostly documented routine 13 check ups (with few/minor abnormalities on physical examination), blood pressure 14 checks, medication management, sporadic complaints of pain, and unrelated 15 medical issues. (AR 410, 413; see AR 249, 254, 274, 279, 283, 332, 355-56, 708, 16 715, 803, 875 [routine checkups]; AR 250-52, 255, 333, 869 [blood pressure 17 checks]; AR 256, 334, 799, 800, 868, 874, 876 [medication management]; AR 275 18 [5/23/07 progress note – lower back pain]; AR 857 [2/4/11 progress note – “left 19 knee pain x 2 mo”; no medication prescribed, patient to return as needed]; AR 851 20 [10/17/11 progress note – “neck pain x 3 weeks”]; AR 854 [pelvic pain]; AR 253, 21 331 [cough for three months]; AR 707, 855 [allergic reaction on hands/high 22 fever]; AR 256, 257, 334 [“paperwork” and “consult on disability”]; AR 231 [“no 23 show/no call”]). 24 In addition, while some medical records reflected that plaintiff had 25 breathing problems, as the ALJ found, Dr. Frauenpreis generally found that 26 plaintiff’s asthma was mild or “well controlled,” and that some more severe 27 asthma symptoms were due to plaintiff’s non-compliance with prescribed 28 medication. (AR 410; see AR 284-85, 209, 326, 708, 855). Similarly, the ALJ 7 1 noted that in June 2007 plaintiff complained of bilateral ankle and foot pain and 2 x-rays of plaintiff’s feet and ankles revealed some osteoarthritis, but plaintiff 3 apparently did not pursue the treatment recommended, and there are no significant 4 complaints of ankle or foot pain documented in Dr. Frauenpreis’ records after 5 February 2008. (AR 410). As plaintiff correctly notes, on July 14, 2008 Dr. 6 Frauenpreis found “mild swelling” in plaintiff’s knee stemming from a right knee 7 injury the previous day, and an x-ray report prepared on July 25, 2008 noted 8 “moderate osteoarthritis” but “[n]o acute fracture or dislocation” in plaintiff’s right 9 knee. (AR 709-10). Nonetheless, plaintiff points to no functional limitation 10 related to her 2008 knee injury that lasted for more than 12 months or was not 11 already accounted for in the ALJ’s very restrictive residual functional capacity 12 assessment for plaintiff. Ultimately, Dr. Frauenpreis’ treatment records for 13 plaintiff document very few, if any, specific physical limitations much less any 14 objective findings on physical examination that would plausibly support the 15 disabling functional limitations Dr. Frauenpreis found for plaintiff. 16 Plaintiff argues that Dr. Frauenpreis’ Opinions are supported by other 17 medical evidence in the record – specifically, “clinical findings” from Dr. Philip 18 Wirganowicz (the examining orthopaedic surgeon) and Dr. Nizar Salek (the 19 examining internal medicine physician), and “diagnostic imaging study results.” 20 (Plaintiff’s Motion at 4-6). Plaintiff’s argument, however, lacks merit. For 21 example, neither such examining physician opined that plaintiff could not work 22 for any twelve-month period. (AR 232-36, 754-60); see, e.g., Matthews v. 23 Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (in upholding the Commissioner’s 24 decision, the Court emphasized: “None of the doctors who examined [claimant] 25 expressed the opinion that he was totally disabled”). In addition, the opinions of 26 Dr. Salek – which the ALJ adopted (AR 414) – were supported by the physician’s 27 independent examination of plaintiff (AR 756-58), and thus, without more, 28 constituted substantial evidence upon which the ALJ could properly rely to reject 8 1 Dr. Frauenpreis’ Opinions. See, e.g., Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 2 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The Court will not second-guess the ALJ’s 3 reasonable interpretation of the medical evidence based on plaintiff’s currently4 asserted, lay opinion pieced together from raw imaging data and some of the same 5 findings underlying the examining physicians’ opinions. Cf. Ferguson v. 6 Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1985) (ALJ may not substitute his 7 interpretation of laboratory reports for that of a physician); Winters v. Barnhart, 8 2003 WL 22384784, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct.15, 2003) (“The ALJ is not allowed to 9 use his own medical judgment in lieu of that of a medical expert.”); Orn, 495 F.3d 10 at 633 (“When an examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a 11 treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the 12 examining physician are not “substantial evidence.”). 13 Finally, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Frauenpreis’ finding in his 14 February 1, 2008 letter that plaintiff “is unable to work” due to her physical 15 impairments. (AR 413, 282, 383). Such a conclusory finding is not a “medical” 16 opinion, and therefore is not binding on the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. 17 § 416.927(d)(1) (Administration not required to find claimant disabled based on 18 medical source statement that claimant is “unable to work”); Ukolov v. Barnhart, 19 420 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005) (treating physician’s opinion not binding on 20 ALJ with respect to “ultimate determination of disability”) (citation omitted). 21 Accordingly, a remand or reversal is not warranted on the asserted basis. 22 V. CONCLUSION 23 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner of Social 24 Security is affirmed. 25 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 26 DATED: December 18, 2014 27 28 _____________/s/____________________ Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
