Juan Cartagena v. Carolyn W Colvin, No. 5:2014cv00884 - Document 16 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Douglas F. McCormick. (twdb)
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Juan Cartagena v. Carolyn W Colvin Doc. 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 EASTERN DIVISION 11 JUAN CARTAGENA, Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 14 15 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 ) Case No. ED CV 14-0884-DFM ) ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ) ORDER ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 18 Plaintiff Juan Jesus Cartagena ( Plaintiff ) appeals from the decision of 19 the Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) denying his applications for Disability 20 Insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits. The Court concludes 21 that the ALJ properly developed the record and then properly determined that 22 Plaintiff was capable of performing other work in the regional and national 23 economies. Therefore, the Commissioner s decision is affirmed and the matter 24 is dismissed with prejudice. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3 Plaintiff filed his applications for benefits on July 6, 2011, alleging 4 disability beginning June 7, 2008. Administrative Record ( AR ) 10. The ALJ 5 determined that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of diabetes mellitus, facet 6 arthropathy of the lumbar spine (back pain), and obesity. AR 12. At the 7 administrative hearing, the ALJ called a vocational expert ( VE ) to testify 8 about what work Plaintiff could perform given his impairments and functional 9 limitations. AR 51-52. The ALJ gave the VE a hypothetical based on what the 10 ALJ determined was Plaintiff s residual functional capacity ( RFC ): 11 Q: Okay, Ms. Porter, assume a hypothetical individual of 12 claimant s age, education, prior work experience. Assume this 13 person is restricted to lifting 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds 14 frequently; walking or standing 4 hours out of an 8-hour day in 15 one-half hour intervals. Sitting 6 hours out of an 8-hour day with 16 normal breaks. No unprotected heights; occasional stairs and 17 ramps; occasional stooping and bending. No ladders. No 18 temperature extremes. No forceful gripping or grasping with the 19 right upper extremity. Could such a hypothetical individual 20 perform either of claimant s past jobs? 21 A: 22 Occupational Titles ( DOT )] or as performed. 23 Q: No, past work is not performable per the [Dictionary of Is there other work such a person could perform? 24 AR 51. In response to the ALJ s question, the VE identified the jobs of 25 production solderer, sewing-machine operator, and garment sorter. AR 51-52. 26 The ALJ relied on the VE s testimony in concluding that Plaintiff was not 27 disabled because he could perform other work available in significant numbers 28 in the national and regional economies. AR 18-19. 2 1 II. 2 ISSUES PRESENTED The parties dispute whether the ALJ erred in (1) relying upon the VE s 3 4 testimony in concluding that Plaintiff was capable of performing other work at 5 step five of the sequential evaluation process; and (2) failing to fully develop 6 the record. See Joint Stipulation ( JS ) at 2-3. 7 III. 8 STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 9 10 Commissioner s decision to deny benefits. The ALJ s findings and decision 11 should be upheld if they are free from legal error and are supported by 12 substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 13 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 14 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as 15 a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 16 Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th 17 Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. 18 Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 19 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). To determine whether substantial evidence supports 20 a finding, the reviewing court must review the administrative record as a 21 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts 22 from the Commissioner s conclusion. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 23 (9th Cir. 1996). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or 24 reversing, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of 25 the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 3 1 IV. 2 DISCUSSION 3 A. The ALJ s Step-Five Determination Was Supported by Substantial 4 Evidence 5 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in determining that he was capable 6 of performing the jobs of production solderer, sewing-machine operator, and 7 garment sorter because those jobs, as described in the DOT, are incompatible 8 with the ALJ s RFC assessment. JS at 3-9. More specifically, Plaintiff contends 9 that the VE only identified jobs that require standing and/or walking for six 10 hours of an eight-hour workday, which conflicts with the ALJ s RFC 11 assessment limiting Plaintiff to standing and/or walking for only four out of 12 eight hours. Id. Plaintiff also argues that the jobs identified by the VE require 13 frequent handling, which conflicts with the ALJ s precluding Plaintiff from 14 forceful gripping or grasping with his right upper extremity. Id. 15 Contrary to Plaintiff s contention, the ALJ s determination at step five of 16 the sequential evaluation was not inconsistent with the requirements of light 17 work. Plaintiff has provided no authority for the proposition that his inability 18 to stand and/or walk for more than four hours per day categorically excludes 19 him from performing all light work. In fact, the Social Security Regulations 20 specifically provide that a job may be categorized as light work even if it does 21 not require a great deal of standing. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b) 22 ( Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category 23 [light work] when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it 24 involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg 25 controls. ) (emphasis added); see also Migliore v. Colvin, No. 12-00251, 2013 26 WL 3935879, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2013) (rejecting Plaintiff s argument 27 that limitation to four hours of walking in and of itself eliminated the ability to 28 perform any light category job). The VE identified specific light jobs that a 4 1 hypothetical person with Plaintiff s limitations could perform. See AR 51-52. 2 Moreover, the Court has reviewed the requirements listed for the DOT for 3 each of those jobs and nothing in those requirements tells the Court that these 4 jobs require standing and/or walking for more than four hours per day.1 5 Similarly, Plaintiff has not shown that the preclusion from forceful 6 gripping or grasping in the RFC assessment prevents him from performing the 7 jobs identified by the VE. Although the Social Security Regulations include 8 seizing, holding, and grasping as types of handling, see SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 9 56857 at *6 (1985), the DOT lists no requirements for forceful gripping, 10 grasping, or twisting of the hands for any of the three jobs cited by the VE.2 11 Thus, although Plaintiff uses the terms handling and forceful gripping or 12 grasping, interchangeably, see JS at 4-7, there is no indication that any of 13 them require forceful gripping or grasping. See, e.g., Bauslaugh v. Astrue, No. 14 09-1853, 2010 WL 1875800, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2010) (concluding that 15 claimant who was precluded from forceful gripping or grasping failed to show 16 any DOT conflict where the jobs identified by the VE did not specifically 17 require these abilities). The act of grasping requires a firm hold or grip. 18 Handling can mean simply touching or using the hands. It is improper to 19 conflate the two terms. Czajka v. Astrue, No. 09-0194, 2010 WL 3293350, at 20 *4, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2010) (emphasis and footnotes omitted); see also 21 Suarez v. Astrue, No. 11-1940, 2012 WL 4848732, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 22 2012) ( [N]either handling nor fingering require forceful gripping or 23 24 25 26 27 1 See DICOT 813.684-022, 1991 WL 681592 (production solderer); DICOT 786.682-026, 1991 WL 681012 (sewing-machine operator); DICOT 222.687-014, 1991 WL 672131 (garment sorter). 2 See supra note 1. 28 5 1 grasping. ).3 Moreover, [f]requent handling is not the same as forceful 2 handling. Equihua v. Astrue, No. 10-1022, 2011 WL 321993, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 3 Jan. 28, 2011). 4 Here, the ALJ provided the VE with all of the limitations substantially 5 supported by the medical evidence. Based on these limitations, the VE found 6 that Plaintiff could perform any of three jobs, each of which captures Plaintiff s 7 primary exertional limitations. The VE s testimony provides substantial 8 evidence supporting the ALJ s step-five determination because the VE 9 identif[ied] a specific job or jobs in the national economy having requirements 10 that the claimant s physical and mental abilities and vocational qualifications 11 would satisfy. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162-1163 (9th Cir. 2001); 12 see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that 13 ALJ properly relied on VE s response to hypothetical that included all of 14 claimant s limitations). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding Plaintiff 15 capable of performing other work in the national economy at step five of the 16 sequential evaluation. 17 B. 18 The ALJ Properly Developed the Record Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not fully and fairly develop the record. 19 JS at 11-14. There are various treatment notes in the record from Plaintiff s 20 treating provider, Clinica Medica. See, e.g., AR 268-71, 321-22, 349-51. The 21 ALJ stated that these medical records were not entitled to any weight in part 22 because it is unclear whether these opinions are from a medically acceptable 23 24 25 26 27 3 But see Petersen-Keisler v. Colvin, No. 12-1050, 2013 WL 5424843, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013) ( The ALJ s finding that Plaintiff could work in an occupation requiring frequent to constant handling and fingering conflicts with his finding that Plaintiff could not forcefully grip or grasp with her left hand. ). The Court finds the cases cited in the text more persuasive on this point. 28 6 1 source as the signatures are illegible and they are not followed by the staff 2 member s title. AR 17. Plaintiff contends that, if the ALJ could not determine 3 whether the disability statements were from a medically acceptable source 4 because the signatures were illegible, the ALJ had a duty to contact Clinica 5 Medica to determine who completed the forms. JS at 12. 6 An ALJ has an affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the 7 record at every step of the sequential evaluation process. Bustamante v. 8 Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Webb v. Barnhart, 433 9 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ s duty to develop the record is 10 triggered, however, only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the 11 record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. Mayes v. 12 Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 Here, the ALJ s duty to further develop the record was not triggered 14 because the medical evidence at issue was neither ambiguous nor inadequate. 15 The ALJ rejected the medical records from Clinica Medica not merely because 16 the signature was illegible but primarily because also because those records 17 were brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings. AR 18 17. This was a wholly proper basis on which to reject the opinions contained in 19 the Clinica Medica reports. The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any 20 physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, 21 and inadequately supported by clinical findings. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 22 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); accord Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 23 1149 (9th Cir. 2001).4 24 25 26 27 28 4 It is apparent from the ALJ s decision that the ALJ s concern about these records was heightened by the extreme functional limitations they described. For example, in a Physical Capacities questionnaire, it was opined that Plaintiff could not walk, stand, or sit for more than two hours per day and could never lift any amount of weight. AR 350-51.Without the support of 7 Additionally, the opinions at issue here are contained in mostly check- 1 2 the-box forms without any supporting clinical or laboratory findings. 3 Whoever filled out these forms checked off preprinted choices and provided 4 little if any elaboration or explanation for these opinions. Thus, even if the 5 records from Clinica Medica had legible signatures from an acceptable medical 6 source, the ALJ would nevertheless have been justified in refusing to give 7 controlling weight to these records. See Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th 8 Cir. 1996) (noting that ALJ permissibly rejected check-off reports that did not 9 contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions ); Johnson v. 10 Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that ALJ permissible 11 rejected treating physician s opinion that was conclusory and unsupported by 12 medical evidence). Thus, even if the Court assumes that the ALJ erred in rejecting the 13 14 records from Clinica Medica because of an illegible signature, any error was 15 harmless because the other reasons given by the ALJ were supported by 16 substantial evidence in the record. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 17 (9th Cir. 2012) ( We have long recognized that harmless error principles apply 18 in the Social Security Act context. (citing Stout v. Comm r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 19 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006))). In sum, it is clear that the ALJ did not have a duty to further develop the 20 21 record. The records at issue here were neither ambiguous nor inadequate. 22 Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief on this claim of error. 23 /// 24 clinical findings, it was proper for the ALJ to reject these opinions. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that ALJ properly rejected treating physician s opinion where some of physician s recommendations were so extreme as to be implausible and were not supported by any findings made by any doctor ). 25 26 27 28 8 1 V. 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Social Security 4 Commissioner is affirmed and the matter is dismissed with prejudice. 5 6 Dated: October 6, 2014 7 ______________________________ DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK United States Magistrate Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9
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