Craig M. Fratt v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 5:2014cv00779 - Document 15 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Stephen J. Hillman, For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby adjudged that the Decision of theALJ is reversed and remanded pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (sbu)
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Craig M. Fratt v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA-WESTERN DIVISION 11 12 13 14 15 CRAIG M. FRATT, 16 17 v. Plaintiff, 18 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 19 20 Defendant. ) CV 14-0779-SH ) ) MEMORANDUM DECISION ) AND ORDER ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 21 22 This matter is before the Court for review of the Decision by the 23 Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff s applications for Disability 24 Insurance Benefits and social security income. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c), the 25 parties have consented that the case may be handled by the undersigned. The 26 action arises under 42 U.S.C. §405(g), which authorizes the Court to enter 27 Judgment upon the pleadings and transcript of the record before the 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Commissioner. The parties have filed their pleadings and their respective briefs in 2 support of those pleadings. The defendant has also filed the certified 3 Administrative Record. After reviewing the matter, the Court concludes that the 4 Decision of the Commissioner should be reversed and remanded. I. BACKGROUND 5 6 On February 22, 2011, the Plaintiff Craig Michael Fratt filed an application 7 for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. He also 8 protectively filed a Title XVI application for supplemental security income on 9 March 10, 2011. For both applications, plaintiff alleged disability beginning 10 September 1, 2008. (See Administrative Record [ AR ] 23; 220-231). The 11 Commissioner initially denied both applications on July 12, 2011, and again upon 12 reconsideration on August 19, 2011. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a written request 13 for hearing on September 14, 2011. On November 28, 2012, plaintiff appeared 14 and testified at a hearing in Moreno Valley, California. (Id.) 15 The Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) issued an Unfavorable Decision, 16 finding that plaintiff was not disabled and was capable of performing work that 17 involves no more than simple instructions, occasional interaction with coworkers 18 or supervisors and no interaction with the public, no intense concentration for 19 more than one-hour periods without five-minute breaks, no fast-paced work, and . On May , , plaintiff sought review of the Unfavorable Decision to 20 the ability to be absent or off-task for up to ten percent of the time. (See AR 22 the Appeals Council. See AR 21 . The Appeals Council declined to set 23 aside the ALJ s Decision, making it final See AR , . Plaintiff challenges the ALJ s Decision denying disability benefits and 25 supplemental security income. (e alleges that the ALJ erred on the following 24 26 two grounds: granting little or no weight to the mental function 27 assessment of plaintiff s treating physician, and 28 finding that plaintiff s 1 subjective complaints in support of his disability claim are not credible. 2 Based on the totality of the record, the Court concludes that the ALJ clearly 3 erred in affording plaintiff s treating physician limited weight. As such, it is 4 unnecessary to address the remaining issue of plaintiff s credibility. )t is well settled that a treating physician s opinion is entitled to greater II. DISCUSSION 5 7 weight than that of an examining physician. Magallanes v. Bowen, 6 , 9 Cir. 8 Cir. th , citing Sprague v. Bowen, F. d , F. d th . (owever, the treating physician s opinion is not necessarily 10 conclusive as to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability. 11 Magallanes v. Bowen, , n. th Cir. F. d at , citing Rodriguez v. Bowen, F. d . The weight given to a treating physician s 13 opinion depends on whether it is supported by sufficient medical data and is 12 14 consistent with other evidence in the records. C.F.R. § . 15 When a non treating physician s opinion contradicts that of the treating 16 physician but is not based on independent clinical findings, or rests on 17 clinical findings also considered by the treating physician the treating . 18 physician s opinion may be rejected only if the ALJ gives specific, legitimate 19 reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record. 20 Morgan v. Apfel, 99 D.A.R. 1855, 1857 (9th Cir. (Or.) Feb. 25, 1999). 21 In assessing plaintiff s residual mental functional capacity, the ALJ 22 considered medical evaluations conducted by various doctors, including 23 plaintiff s treating physician, Dr. Reddy, as well as examining physician, Dr. 24 Kikani, and non-examining stage agency medical consultants. He gave 25 significant weight to the examining and non-examining physician, and 26 limited weight to plaintiff s treating physician. The ALJ reasoned as follows: 27 28 Dr. Kikani is a licensed psychiatrist who had the opportunity to personally observe the claimant and perform a thorough mental status examination before coming to the conclusion concerning the claimant s functionality. This evaluation is the most thorough evaluation in the record. Dr. Kikani s opinion concerning the claimant s limitations is consistent with the benign objective findings elicited during the mental status examination. It is also consistent with the record as a whole, which documents a conservative course of psychotropic medications and no history of psychiatric hospitalizations. The State agency psychological medical consultants opinion that the claimant would be limited to simple tasks is also consistent with this longitudinal history and Dr. Kikani s opinion. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (See AR 31). 8 9 In giving limited weight to Dr. Reddy s testimony, the ALJ stated the following: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 )d. . Dr. Reddy noted the claimant s symptoms caused marked limitations that would essentially prevent all work activities Ex. F . Dr. Reddy submitted another letter dated November , , indicating that the claimant was essentially confined to his home and had numerous difficulties with everyday situations. (e noted the claimant had marked limitations with detailed tasks, with understanding, memory, and concentration . . . Dr. Reddy s opinion that the claimant is disabled and the marked limitations that he assessed in the written statements are is [sic] inconsistent with the treatment record as a whole. Dr. Reddy s treatment notes lack detailed objective findings from mental status examinations that would allow an assessment of the claimant s cognitive functioning and progress on medication. Rather, they contain mostly subjective complaints. Yet, overall evidence shows that the claimant has been on a stable course of conservative oral medications. (e showed good cognitive functioning at his evaluation. Dr. Reddy s progress notes show that the claimant was doing better with a medication adjustment . . . Dr. Reddy acknowledged that the claimant s psychotropic medications were effective in controlling the claimant s symptoms, although he felt the symptoms would persist. Based on the above, plaintiff s argument namely, that the ALJ erred by failing to provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting Dr. Reddy s testimony holds water. The ALJ s argument that Dr. Reddy s treatment notes lacked objective findings from mental status examinations is simply false. On March , , Dr. Reddy did conduct a formal mental status examination that showed a constricted affect, 1 depressed and anxious mood, and agitation. See AR 322). Despite the ALJ s 2 conclusion that Dr. Reddy s opinions are inconsistent with the record as a whole, 3 these aforementioned examination results are in fact consistent with the findings 4 from Dr. Kikani s independent examination of plaintiff, which was conducted the For example, Dr. Kikani found evidence of excessive anxiety , slightly 5 following month. 7 pressured speech, a depressed and anxious affect, a preoccupation with 6 8 anxious feelings, traumatic symptoms of chest pain, heart palpitations, 9 dizziness, fear of public places, periodic thoughts of feeling like giving up , 10 obsessive worrying, and more. See AR 324-325). These positive findings from 11 both psychiatrists examinations form more than an adequate basis for Dr. 12 Reddy s mental function assessments, as both doctors found clear evidence to 13 support plaintiff s complaints of fear of leaving his home, self-defeating thoughts, 14 and general anxiety. Thus, defendant s (and the ALJ s) argument that Dr. Reddy s 15 findings concerning plaintiff s disability were incorrectly based on unreliable 16 subjective complaints is also without merit. 17 Though, as the ALJ pointed out, Dr. Kikani found plaintiff oriented in all 18 three spheres with unimpaired memory and good cognitive functioning (See AR 19 325), that finding does not undermine Dr. Kikani s additional findings of 20 excessive anxiety, slightly pressured speech, a depressed and anxious affect, 21 thoughts of suicide, and the like. Moreover, the ALJ s determination that 22 plaintiff s medication improved his condition is not a legitimate basis for giving 23 limited weight to Dr. Reddy s opinion. This is especially true in light of plaintiff s 24 November 2011 visit with Dr. Reddy, at which plaintiff complained that he was 25 still experiencing insomnia despite switching medications, and that his many 26 meds don t work for him. (See AR 377). At his most recent treatment session in 27 November 2012, plaintiff was still confined to his home and fearful of being in a 28 1 car. (See AR 426). Dr. Reddy stated at this session that despite the controlling 2 effects of plaintiff s medication, he expected the symptoms to persist. The ALJ 3 noted as much, yet he mistakenly concluded that Dr. Reddy s opinions are 4 inconsistent with the record as a whole. 5 Lastly, the ALJ claimed that Dr. Reddy did not indicate limitations with 6 regards to plaintiff s ability to perform simple tasks. Though Dr. Reddy found 7 plaintiff mildly limited in his ability to understand, remember, and carry out 8 simple instructions (See AR 390), that does not translate to a finding that plaintiff 9 is capable of performing simple work. Even simple and unskilled work entails 10 much more than the mental capacity to understand, remember, and carry out those 11 simple tasks; it also requires (inter alia) the ability to maintain attention and 12 concentration, to adhere to a schedule, to be punctual, and to maintain socially 13 appropriate behavior. These are all areas in which Dr. Reddy found plaintiff 14 markedly limited. (See AR 390-391). 15 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the ALJ s Decision to 16 determine if: (1) the ALJ s findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) 17 the ALJ used proper legal standards. See DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 18 (9th Cir. 1991). This Court cannot disturb the ALJ s findings if they are supported 19 by substantial evidence, even though other evidence may exist which supports 20 plaintiff s claim. See Torske v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 59, 60 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. 21 denied, Torske v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 933 (1974). Based on the foregoing (i.e., 22 the lack of evidentiary support for the ALJ s Decision), it is clear that the ALJ 23 failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for giving limited weight to Dr. 24 Reddy. Since Dr. Reddy s opinions are clearly supported by sufficient medical 25 data and are consistent with other evidence in the records (including Dr. Kikani s 26 own findings), the ALJ should have given greater weight to Dr. Reddy s findings. 27 All of the reasons proffered by the ALJ were either circular or illegitimate and 28 1 unsupported by the record. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to satisfy 2 the relevant legal standard and committed a reversible error in giving limited 3 weight to Dr. Reddy s opinion. ORDER 4 5 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby adjudged that the Decision of the 6 ALJ is reversed and remanded pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 7 8 Dated: October 7, 2014 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 STEPHEN J. HILLMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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