Lashelle M Martin v. Carolyn W Colvin, No. 5:2013cv02392 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Magistrate Judge Stephen J. Hillman: IT IS THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that the Decision of the Commissioner is reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (rh)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA-WESTERN DIVISION 11 12 13 14 15 LASHELLE M. MARTIN, 16 17 18 19 v. Plaintiff, CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant. 20 21 ) CV 13-02392-SH ) ) MEMORANDUM DECISION ) AND ORDER ) ) ) ) ) ) ) This matter is before the Court for review of the decision by the 22 Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff s application for Social 23 Security Disability Insurance Benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security 24 Act. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c), the parties have consented that the case may 25 be handled by the undersigned. The action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 26 which authorizes the Court to enter judgment upon the pleadings and transcript 27 of the record before the Commissioner. Plaintiff and Defendant have filed their 28 pleadings (Plaintiff s Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Defendant s Brief 1 1 in Opposition [ Defendant s Brief] ; Plaintiff s Reply Memorandum), and the 2 defendant has filed the certified transcript of record. On July 12, 2010, plaintiff Lashelle Marie Martin filed an application for 3 4 a period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits, and Supplemental Security 5 Income, alleging an inability to work since July 1, 2010. (See Administrative 6 Record [ AR ] 135-150, 162). Plaintiff s claim was denied initially on 7 September 27, 2010, and upon reconsideration on February 23, 2011. (See AR 8 66, 78). On April 25, 2011, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an 9 Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ). (See AR 87). On May 31, 2012, following 10 an administrative hearing (see AR 28), the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered 11 from the following severe impairments: status post open reduction and internal 12 fixation of the right tibia and left proximal humerus, and mood disorder, not 13 otherwise specified. (See AR 22). However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was 14 not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (See AR 20-23). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff s request for review on November 8, 15 16 2013 (see AR 1-3), and the plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court. 17 Plaintiff challenges the ALJ s Decision denying benefits, solely alleging 18 that the ALJ erred in rejecting the medical opinion of Dr. Arteaga, the treating 19 physician. After reviewing the matter, the Court concludes that the decision of 20 the Commissioner should be reversed and remanded. 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 23 24 A. The ALJ improperly rejected the treating physician s opinion A treating physician s opinion is generally entitled to more weight than 25 that of a physician with a lesser relationship to the claimant. See Lester v. 26 Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). 27 If the treating physician s opinion is uncontroverted by another doctor, it may be 28 2 1 rejected only for clear and convincing reasons. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 2 830 (9th Cir. 1995); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). 3 Dr. Edna Arteaga-Hernandez was Plaintiff s treating physician. Dr. 4 Arteaga opined that Plaintiff could not reach, handle, push, and pull routinely , 5 and needed to avoid any exposure to extreme heat, cold, wetness, humidity, and 6 hazards in order to avoid complications resulting from her medications or metal 7 hardware . (AR 335). Dr. Arteaga found that Plaintiff was limited to lifting and 8 carrying less than 10 pounds on both an occasional and frequent basis, and was 9 limited to standing and walking for less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, with 10 an allowance for shifting between sitting, standing, and walking. (AR 333-34). 11 The ALJ rejected Dr. Arteaga s opinion, finding that Plaintiff has a 12 residual functional capacity (RFC)1 of sedentary work2, with the following 13 exceptions: limited to simple routine tasks, cannot have public contact, requires 14 a cane for ambulation, and cannot perform overhead reaching with the left upper 15 extremity. (AR 23). The ALJ rejected the treating physician s findings because 16 Dr. Arteaga s physical and mental functional assessments overstate the 17 claimant s limitations when compared to the objective medical findings and the 18 claimant s description of her current activities of daily living. (AR 26). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing 19 20 reasons for rejecting the treating physician s uncontroverted opinion. (See 21 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 831). The defense responds that the ALJ was 22 entitled to dismiss the treating physician s opinion because the opinion was 23 based on Plaintiff s self-reports. (See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 24 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ can reject a treating physician s 25 1 26 27 28 Residual functional capacity is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. (See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); Valentine v. Comm r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2009); Frost v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 359, 366 (9th Cir. 2002)). 2 Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and standing, with walking and standing required occasionally. (20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)). 3 1 opinion when the opinion is based to a large extent on claimant s self-reports 2 which have been discounted as incredible)). However, the ALJ gave no 3 indication that it had rejected the treating physician s opinion because the 4 opinion had been based on Plaintiff s self-reports. Moreover, there is no 5 indication in the record that the treating physician based her opinion on the 6 Plaintiff s self-reports. (See AR 333-38). 7 In addition, Defendant asserts that the objective medical findings are 8 incompatible with the treating physician s opinion, given that Plaintiff s June 9 2010 shoulder and knee surgery had healed well , Plantiff s leg had a stable 10 appearance with no acute abnormality, Plaintiff had full muscle strength in her 11 picofarad and 3/5 strength in her foot, a prior X-ray found that Plaintiff s 12 shoulder fracture had healed, and Plaintiff s prescription for pain medication had 13 not been increased for two years. (See Defendant s Brief at 7). However, the 14 ALJ did not indicate how plaintiff s medical history contradicts her physician s 15 opinion, nor did it indicate which aspects of the objective medical findings were 16 incompatible with the physician s assessment. (See Day v. Weinberger, 522 17 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the ALJ is forbidden from making 18 an independent medical assessment beyond that demonstrated by the record)). 19 Furthermore, although the defense asserts that the plaintiff s ability to 20 shower, cook meals, do the dishes, do laundry, and visit her neighbor was 21 incompatible with the treating physician s opinion, these daily activities are not 22 inconsistent with the treating physician s assessment that Plaintiff is limited to 23 lifting and carrying less than 10 pounds and to standing and walking for less than 24 2 hours per 8-hour workday. (See Defendant s Brief at 5). 25 The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his 26 own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors , are correct. 27 (Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988)). Here, the mere 28 assertion by the ALJ that the treating physician overstated the claimant s 4 1 limitations is insufficient to discredit the physician. Since the ALJ failed to 2 demonstrate that the treating physician s assessment was inconsistent with either 3 the objective medical findings or the plaintiff s description of her current 4 activities of daily living, the ALJ improperly rejected the treating physician s 5 opinion. 6 7 III. CONCLUSION 8 For the foregoing reasons, the Decision of the Commissioner is reversed and 9 remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, pursuant to 10 Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 11 DATED: August 11, 2014 12 13 14 15 ________________________________ STEPHEN J. HILLMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5
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