Kathryn Holeman v. Carolyn W Colvin, No. 5:2013cv02169 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Ralph Zarefsky. (ib)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Kathryn Holeman v. Carolyn W Colvin Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KATHRYN HOLEMAN OBO JASON BOYLE, 12 Plaintiff, 13 vs. 14 15 16 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO. ED CV 13-02169 RZ MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 17 18 Kathryn Holeman brings this action on behalf of her deceased son, Jason Cameron 19 Boyle (“Plaintiff”), a veteran of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, who sought Social Security 20 disability benefits before he died. The period of potential disability closes with his death. The Court 21 reverses the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, and orders the award of benefits. 22 The Administrative Law Judge found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of 23 “mild degenerative disease of the cervical and lumbar spine; history [of] traumatic brain injury with 24 residual migraine headaches and tinnitus of the left ear; posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); and 25 major depressive disorder.” [AR 25] Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge found that 26 Plaintiff could have performed a species of light work. [AR 27] Relying on the testimony of a 27 vocational expert, the Administrative Law Judge found that there were sufficient jobs that Plaintiff 28 could have performed, and therefore that he was not disabled. [AR34-35] Plaintiff’s main complaints concern his mental impairments. He asserts that the Dockets.Justia.com 1 Administrative Law Judge wrongly discounted the opinion of the consulting psychologist Dr. 2 Townsend, who stated her opinion that Plaintiff might lack the consistency to complete a full day’s 3 work due to his symptoms, including anger and anxiety. [AR 31, referencing AR 670]. The 4 Administrative Law Judge gave this opinion “little weight,” stating three reasons: that it was the 5 product of a one-time examination of Plaintiff; that it appeared to be inconsistent with her findings 6 that were “generally benign,” and that “they [sic] are not supported by the records of the claimant’s 7 extensive activities of daily living.” [AR 32]. 8 If the opinion of an examining physician is uncontroverted, the Administrative Law 9 Judge must provide clear and convincing evidence before rejecting it. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 10 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001); Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. July 23, 2001). Dr. 11 Townsend’s opinion was not controverted, but the reasons the Administrative Law Judge gave for 12 disbelieving it do not meet this standard. The fact that the examination was a one-time affair means 13 little in the context here. The purpose of having a consultation at all was to receive the insight from 14 the consultant, and such consultations almost always are one-time situations. If the consultant’s 15 opinion had differed from that of a physician who had a long-term relationship with Plaintiff, then 16 the fact that the consultant had seen Plaintiff only once would have been a distinguishing factor. See 17 Sprague v. Bowen 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987); Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 18 1994). But here the Administrative Law Judge was not contrasting the consultant’s 19 opinion with that of another physician; she simply was disagreeing with it on its own. 20 In that circumstance, the fact that the examination was a one-time occurrence was not 21 a basis for finding it wanting. 22 The second reason the Administrative Law Judge gave for discounting 23 Dr. Townsend’s opinion also was not clear and convincing. She said that the opinion 24 appeared to be inconsistent with Dr. Townsend’s findings that were “generally 25 benign.” A review of Dr. Townsend’s report, however, does not show any “benign” 26 findings as to Plaintiff’s anger and anxiety, the attributes that Dr. Townsend identified 27 as potentially making it difficult for Plaintiff to have the consistency to hold a full- 28 time job. The findings that were “generally benign” were matters such as the clarity -2- 1 of Plaintiff’s speech and the fact that his intellectual level was average, things that had 2 nothing to do with whether his anger and anxiety, resulting from his PTSD, might 3 make it difficult for him to hold a full-time job. 4 The third reason the Administrative Law Judge gave was that Dr. 5 Townsend’s opinion was not supported by the records of Plaintiff’s “extensive 6 activities of daily living.” She identified a number of activities of daily living 7 elsewhere in her decision [AR 28], but there is no correlation between them and 8 whether Plaintiff’s anger and anxiety resulting from his PTSD would have made 9 holding a full-time job difficult. She identified taking care of his son before and after 10 school, preparing meals occasionally, walking his dog, helping to take care of his 11 grandmother, doing laundry, vacuuming and taking out the trash, and having hobbies 12 including snowboarding and camping. [Id.] It is hard to see how these activities are 13 extensive, and even harder to see how engaging in most of them belies the opinion 14 that Plaintiff would have had trouble managing his anger and anxiety in a work 15 setting. Perhaps caring for his son or his grandmother might have been stressful, and 16 the ability to do so might have shown the capacity to control his anger and anxiety. 17 But there is no evidence of that, nor is it a necessary conclusion, and most of the other 18 activities identified by the Administrative Law Judge were activities that seem 19 designed to mitigate or relieve anger and stress. The Court cannot say that it is either 20 clear or convincing that Plaintiff’s activities were extensive, or that those activities 21 made Dr. Townsend’s opinion less persuasive. 22 Plaintiff also complains that the Administrative Law Judge wrongly 23 rejected the information from the Veterans Administration as to Plaintiff’s disability. 24 In McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2002), the Court of Appeals held 25 that an ALJ must consider a VA rating of disability when analyzing a veteran’s claim 26 for Social Security disability benefits. The Administrative Law Judge acknowledged 27 this authority, but nevertheless did not accept it. [AR 32]. 28 Administrative Law Judge committed error. -3- In doing so, the 1 In McCartey, the Court held that an Administrative Law Judge “must 2 ordinarily give great weight to a VA determination of disability . . . because of the 3 marked similarity between these two federal disability programs.” 298 F.3d at 1076. 4 The Court identified a number of the similarities, including the fact that “[t]he VA 5 criteria for evaluating disability are very specific and translate easily into SSA’s 6 disability framework.” Id. Still, the two programs are not identical, so “the ALJ may 7 give less weight to a VA disability rating if he gives persuasive, specific, valid reasons 8 for doing so that are supported by the record.” Id., citing Chambliss v. Massanari, 9 269 F.3d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 10 The Administrative Law Judge mis-applied this law. He noted that the 11 VA had determined that Plaintiff had a 70 % disability rating related to his PTSD (but 12 did not note that the VA gave Plaintiff an overall disability rating of 90 % [AR 857]). 13 He did not agree with this rating, however, because it was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 14 activities “which were quite broad and extensive, including caring for his grandmother 15 and teenager son” along with the additional information that Plaintiff was attending 16 community college. [AR 32] The VA, however, took into account the fact that 17 Plaintiff was attending community college [AR 856] so that, in fact, was not a 18 distinguishing characteristic. Nor, as indicated earlier, were Plaintiff’s activities 19 extensive or broad, and there is not any indication how caring for one’s son and 20 helping to care for one’s grandmother is inconsistent with the VA rating. The 21 Administrative law Judge thus did not give persuasive or valid reasons supported by 22 the record for giving less weight to the VA rating. McCartey, supra; cf. Valentine v. 23 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 574 F.3d 685, 695 (9th Cir. 2009) 24 (valid and persuasive reasons where the Administrative Law Judge had evidence that 25 was not before the VA.) 26 Given the errors with respect to the mental impairments, the Court need 27 not discuss the alleged errors with respect to the Administrative Law Judge’s 28 assessment of the treating physician or his credibility analysis of Plaintiff and -4- 1 Plaintiff’s mother. The decision must be reversed. The record is fully developed — 2 indeed, with Plaintiff’s death, nothing more could be accomplished by further 3 administrative proceedings. Accordingly, it is appropriate to remand the matter for 4 an award of benefits. McCartey, supra; Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 5 2014). 6 The Court notes that Plaintiff is survived not only by his mother, but also 7 by his son. The Court leaves it to the Commissioner to make sure that the benefits 8 that are owing are paid to the correct beneficiary. 9 10 11 The decision is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Commissioner for the awarding of benefits. IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 14 15 Dated: December 29, 2014 _________________________________ RALPH ZAREFSKY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -5-
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
